“动手不动口”：手部动作与语言进化的关系

语言进化是进化心理学研究领域的重要问题。镜像系统假说、工具制造假说与传授假说从不同角度对手部动作与语言进化间的关系进行了解释, 三种假说都认为人类语言起源于手部动作经验。相关实证研究发现：手语与口语具有一致性特征、语言与手部动作具有共同的神经基础、手势发展可以预测语言发展水平以及手势可以提高工具制造知识的传播效率, 这些研究为三种假说的具体观点提供了实证支持。未来该领域的研究需要关注手势语与口语在进化中的发展关系, 以及人类语言进化与其他认知特征的进化关系。     

试论康德心理学思想及其对当代的影响

康德著作中蕴含着丰富的心理学思想,其在继承沃尔夫理性心理学与经验心理学二分的基础上,通过批评理性心理学,消解了我思的主体地位,为解决二元论问题做出了重要努力;通过批评经验心理学,指明了心理学在成长为一门科学过程中必须面对的诸多问题。新康德主义在继承并改造康德思想的过程中,发展出一系列影响深远的心理学理论;认知心理学的重要代表人物皮亚杰基于对康德思想独具特色的把握,提出了发生认识论;而当代认知科学的图式理论,则完全是建基于对康德经验图式理论框架的全面继承上。     

German philosophy, Freud, and the riddle of the woman

After Kant's critique of empiricism, subjectivist epistemologies cropped up in 19th-century German philosophy. Schopenhauer argued that the true essence of every object was an irrational and sexual will. This underlying will distorted a subject's knowledge of the world. Schopenhauer's notion of this true essence was analogous to his portrayal of women; they too were natural, irrational, and instinctual. Nietzsche postulated a will-to-power that structured and hence distorted a chaotic world. That structureless "real" world Nietzsche symbolized as the essential "truth of a woman," a truth which for Nietzsche was unknowable to the desirous male philosopher. Freud, while maintaining belief in empirical truth, developed a psychology of mis-knowledge which had much in common with Schopenhauer's epistemology. His theory of transference grew from a need to explain how female patients libidinally distorted the reality of their male analysts. Conversely, Freud's later writings on women are hampered by the author's realization of his own precarious and subjective position as man trying to know woman. These counter-transferential concerns ultimately made the woman's psychological essence an unknowable riddle for Freud.     

From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ.     

IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic

This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.     

The science of language and the evolution of mind: Max Müller's quarrel with Darwinism

For Darwinism to succeed as a general theory of the development of life, it had to account for at least the rudiments of all human characteristics. Thus Darwin and his colleague G. J. Romanes had to make "mental evolution" the basis for scientific psychology. F. Max Müller, Oxford's professor of comparative philology, drew on Kant's work, Romantic Naturphilosophie, and his views on the history of language and the relation of language to thought to maintain that language showed a difference not in degree but in kind between man and the lower primates. In his debate with Romanes, he argued that the study of language, not Darwinist natural history, should be the basis for a science of human psychology. However, the two authors had such different definitions of the key terms in their discussion that their differences were not only unresolved but irresolvable.     

Thought experiments and conceptual revision

The idea that claims about the physical world might be arrived through a priori reasoning has a long history in physics. But it is clear that empiricist notions of the nature of science, and in particular the empirical nature of physics, have held sway in this century. Yet, in the idea of thought experiments in science, we might find the survival of earlier a priori reasoning to the truth of claims about the physical world. This paper challenges the notion that science can be understood as a purely empirical endeavor and points out what reforms would be necessary for teaching the image of science to our young.     

Logical Operations and Invariance

I present a notion of invariance under arbitrary surjective mappings for operators on a relational finite type hierarchy generalizing the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion for logicality and I characterize the invariant operators as definable in a fragment of the first-order language. These results are compared with those obtained by Feferman and it is argued that further clarification of the notion of invariance is needed if one wants to use it to characterize logicality.     

Die deduktiv-nomologische Erkl?rung als hauptmotiv empirisch-wissenschaftlicher t?tigkeit

In this paper an attempt is made at developing the notion of a real and complete empirical explanation as excluding all forms of potential or incomplete explanations. This explanation is, however, no longer conceived as the proper aim of empirical science, for it can certainly be gleaned from recent epistemological publications that no comprehensive notion of a real and complete scientific explanation is likely to be constructed from within empirical science. Contrary to common understanding the empirical explanation, deductive-nomological as well as statistical explanation, is considered here only as motive of scientific activities, i.e., as common aim of a transcending cooperation of scientific and non-scientific social practice. Following from this the proper aim of empirical science now consists in the development of practically relevant explanatory theories.This redetermination of the aim of scientific activities of empirical science also means criticism of the unification of deductive-nomological and statistical explanations, as it has been proposed by Wolfgang Stegmüller in his pragmatisch-epistemische Wende. For both forms of empirical explanation must be referred to fundamentally different kinds of practical relevance, the former playing a more important role in the advancement of social practice. Stegmüller's development of a comprehensive probabilistic notion of empirical explanation, as tied up to pragmatic knowledge-situations, in a way already transcends a scientifically immanent determination of it, but he seems to have stopped halfway on the road to practically relevant empirical explanations. Several insufficiencies with his probabilistic notion of empirical explanation are shown up in this paper as a consequence of his abiding by pragmatic, and not penetrating to practical, knowledge-situations. The final result of it, however, consists in a clarification and a modification of the concept of deductive-nomological explanation, originally developed by Hempel and Oppenheim.     

Reasonability,normativity, and the cosmopolitan imagination: Arendt,Korsgaard, and Rawls

In this essay I consider the normative implications of the notion of reasonability for the construction of an idea of public reason that is cosmopolitan in scope. First, I consider the argument for the distinction between reason and reasonability in the work of Sibley and Rawls. Second, I evaluate the normative implications of reasonability through a consideration of Korsgaard's recent work. Third, I argue for a notion of reasonability that moves us beyond a Kantian concept of autonomy through a consideration of the relationship between reasonability and judgment vis-à-vis Arendt's work on Kant's Third Critique. Finally, I argue for a cosmopolitan appropriation of the notion of reasonability based on Kant's notion of the aesthetic idea. The latter argument relaxes the bonds of public reason, moving us beyond the domain of ethnocentricism.     

On A Semantic Interpretation Of Kant's Concept Of Number

What is central to the progression of a sequence is the idea of succession, which is fundamentally a temporal notion. In Kant's ontology numbers are not objects but rules (schemata) for representing the magnitude of a quantum. The magnitude of a discrete quantum 11...11 is determined by a counting procedure, an operation which can be understood as a mapping from the ordinals to the cardinals. All empirical models for numbers isomorphic to 11...11 must conform to the transcendental determination of time-order. Kant's transcendental model for number entails a procedural semantics in which the semantic value of the number-concept is defined in terms of temporal procedures. A number is constructible if and only if it can be schematized in a procedural form. This representability condition explains how an arbitrarily large number is representable and why Kant thinks that arithmetical statements are synthetic and not analytic.     

Kant,teleology, and evolution

This essay examines Kant's idea of organic teleology. The first two sections are devoted to Kant's analysis and justification of teleological conceptions in biology. Both the idea of teleology and Kant's anti-reductionism are derived from basic elements of his critical treatment of the human intellect. The third section discusses the limitations Kant places on accounts of origins in the life world. It is argued that the limitations Kant places on accounts of the origins of species do not follow from his idea of teleology. The final section briefly outlines the fate of the Kantian formulation of teleology in the nineteenth century.     

Modality,Quantification, and Many Vlach-Operators

Consider two standard quantified modal languages \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) and \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) whose vocabularies comprise the identity predicate and the existence predicate, each endowed with a standard S5 Kripke semantics where the models have a distinguished actual world, which differ only in that the quantifiers of \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) are actualist while those of \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) are possibilist. Is it possible to enrich these languages in the same manner, in a non-trivial way, so that the two resulting languages are equally expressive—i.e., so that for each sentence of one language there is a sentence of the other language such that given any model, the former sentence is true at the actual world of the model iff the latter is? Forbes (1989) shows that this can be done by adding to both languages a pair of sentential operators called Vlach-operators, and imposing a syntactic restriction on their occurrences in formulas. As Forbes himself recognizes, this restriction is somewhat artificial. The first result I establish in this paper is that one gets sameness of expressivity by introducing infinitely many distinct pairs of indexed Vlach-operators. I then study the effect of adding to our enriched modal languages a rigid actuality operator. Finally, I discuss another means of enriching both languages which makes them expressively equivalent, one that exploits devices introduced in Peacocke (1978). Forbes himself mentions that option but does not prove that the resulting languages are equally expressive. I do, and I also compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian methods. In due course, I introduce an alternative notion of expressivity and I compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian languages in terms of that other notion.     

Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of "containment," a second time in terms of "identity," a third time in terms of the explicative-ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of "cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction." The paper asks which, if any, of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—has the best claim to be Kant's fundamental conception of analyticity in the first Critique. It argues that it is the second. The paper argues, further, that Kant's distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject-predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction's meaning and tenability.     

Kant,Boole and Peirce's Early Metaphysics

Charles Peirce is often credited for being among the first, perhaps even the first, to develop a scientific metaphysics of indeterminism. After rejecting the received view that Peirce developed his views from Darwin and Maxwell, I argue that Peirce's view results from his synthesis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and George Boole's contributions to formal logic. Specifically, I claim that Kant's conception of the laws of logic as the basis for his architectonic, when combined with Boole's view of probability, yields Peirce's metaphysics of probabilistic laws. Indeterminism provides, therefore, an excellent illustration of how Peirce attempted to use logic to clarify metaphysical problems.Since everyone must have conceptions of things in general, it is most important that they should be carefully constructed. I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical research, but shall merely say that in the opinions of several great thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics. (W1: 490, 1866)²     

Exploring a taxonomy for aggression against women: can it aid conceptual clarity?

The assessment of aggression against women is demanding primarily because assessment strategies do not share a common language to describe reliably the wide range of forms of aggression women experience. The lack of a common language impairs efforts to describe these experiences, understand causes and consequences of aggression against women, and develop effective intervention and prevention efforts. This review accomplishes two goals. First, it applies a theoretically and empirically based taxonomy to behaviors assessed by existing measurement instruments. Second, it evaluates whether the taxonomy provides a common language for the field. Strengths of the taxonomy include its ability to describe and categorize all forms of aggression found in existing quantitative measures. The taxonomy also classifies numerous examples of aggression discussed in the literature but notably absent from quantitative measures. Although we use existing quantitative measures as a starting place to evaluate the taxonomy, its use is not limited to quantitative methods. Implications for theory, research, and practice are discussed. Aggr. Behav. 35:462–476, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task

Proponents of 'the poetic hypothesis>> in Kant interpretation assume that the third Critique provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding the nature of all theological discourse. This article opens with the assumption – taken from one of Kant's last works – that philosophy and theology must always remain in conflict. Then, by way of an abductive comparison of Gordon Kaufman and Adina Davidovich, I demonstrate that the poetic hypothesis leads to religious compromises that contradict this assumption. To conclude, I argue for an understanding of the motif of holism that is better able to uphold Kant's notion of conflict.     

The uniqueness problem in Kant's transcendental doctrine of method

Conclusion The verificationist defense of Kant's refutation of idealism is a specimen of the reconstructive work that needs to be done in evaluating Kant's transcendental philosophy. It is necessary to proceed piecemeal in the critical examination of each of Kant's arguments, fitting it to the proposed indirect proof model, and rethinking its soundness or unsoundness. There may be few conclusions that can stand just as they are. The justification of Kant's transcendental proof that there are unknowable things in themselves establishes an important first step in this continuing inquiry.     

Melia and Saatsi on structural realism

Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties may be indispensable to SR.