Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: reply to Saiki (2000)

J. Saiki (2000) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (1998) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: reply to Hill, Gelso, and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000)

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes. She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating.     

Nature, culture, and explanations for erotic plasticity: reply to Andersen, Cyranowski, and Aarestad (2000) and Hyde and Durik (2000)

R. F. Baumeister's (2000) article on erotic plasticity was criticized by B. L. Andersen, J. M. Cyranowski, and S. Aarestad (2000) for not being biological enough and by J. S. Hyde and A. M. Durik (2000) for being too biological. Both critiques were based on drawing a polarized caricature of R. F. Baumeister's actual view, although the two caricatures are opposites. Actually, neither commentary questioned the gender difference R. F. Baumeister documented; rather, the dispute is about how to explain it, which is indeed a challenge remaining for further work. Although both commentaries provided valuable suggestions about how to approach an explanation, neither approach can provide a coherent account until various theoretical problems are resolved and seemingly contrary empirical findings are addressed.     

Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: a reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000)

The following points are made in reply to critical comments on the author's meta-analysis of partner physical aggression (J. Archer, 2000): (a) The theoretical dichotomy used in the review is one clearly identifiable in published articles, and the distinction between acts (aggression) and consequences (violence) is clearer than alternative definitions involving victims' perceptions; (b) despite the database containing many samples of U.S. students, there were sufficient other samples to draw meaningful conclusions; (c) the Conflict Tactics Scale may be limited, but in contrast to suggested alternatives, it involves clearly defined categories; (d) sexual aggression, although forming an important part of partner violence, cannot legitimately be aggregated with nonsexual physical aggression; and (e) there is a marked contrast between sex differences in physical aggression toward partners and toward same-sex opponents.     

Serial processing in reading aloud: reply to Zorzi (2000)

K. Rastle and M. Coltheart (1999; see also M. Coltheart & K. Rastle, 1994) reported data demonstrating that the cost of irregularity in reading aloud low-frequency exception words is modulated by the position of the irregularity in the word. They argued that these data implicated a serial process and falsified all models of reading aloud that operate solely in parallel, a conclusion that M. Zorzi (2000) challenged by successfully simulating the position of irregularity effect with such a model. Zorzi (2000) further claimed that a reanalysis of K. Rastle and M. Coltheart's (1999) data demonstrates sensitivity to grapheme-phoneme consistency (which he claimed was confounded across the position of irregularity manipulation) rather than the use of a serial process. Here, the authors argue that M. Zorzi's (2000) reanalyses were inappropriate and reassert that K. Rastle and M. Coltheart's (1999) findings are evidence for serial processing.     

Client perspectives and open-ended questions: a reply to Dean, et al. (2000)

Utilizing an open-ended question may allow subjects to respond in their own words but does not necessarily avoid the problem of narrowing the focus to a specific predetermined topic.     

Stimulus congruity,irrelevant spatial SR correspondence,and display-control arrangement correspondence: A reply to O'Leary,Barber, and Simon (1994)

Summary We recall how Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991) defined stimulus (S) congruity, the SS-correspondence factor they demonstrated to account for both the Simon effect and the Hedge and Marsh effect, and how they explained the mechanisms that bring S congruity into play in the verbal and nonverbal versions of the Simon task and in the Hedge and Marsh task. We show that, contrary to O'Leary, Barber, and Simon's claim, Hasbroucq and Guiard used a consistent definition of S congruity across the various tasks of interest. Finally, we recognize that Hasbroucq and Guiard's experiments produced no direct falsification of the display control arrangement correspondence (DCC) hypothesis — the special-purpose hypothesis put forward by Simon and his group as an attempt to reconcile the Hedge and Marsh effect with their interpretation of the Simon effect in terms of irrelevant spatial SR correspondence —, but we argue that the DCC account is unnecessary and implausible.     

The rank hypothesis and lexical decision: a reply to Adelman and Brown (2008)

J. S. Adelman and G. D. A. Brown (2008) provided an extensive analysis of the form of word frequency and contextual diversity effects on lexical decision time. In this reply, the current authors suggest that their analysis provides a valuable tool for the evaluation of models of lexical access and that the results they report are broadly supportive of the rank hypothesis suggested by W. S. Murray and K. I. Forster (2004)--more supportive, in fact, than the originally reported data. However, Adelman and Brown's conclusion that the results of these analyses can be taken as evidence against rank (and thereby serial models of lexical access) and for instance models is rejected. It is shown that at least one instance model makes the wrong predictions and that Adelman and Brown's conclusions rest on the assumption that lexical decision time presents a pure measure of the time involved in lexical access. Results from eye tracking are reported, which also support a rank account, as do results from analyses that show that a log frequency account is clearly inadequate. Finally, it is demonstrated that, unlike other models, the rank account continues to make accurate predictions regarding the form of both reaction time and error rate effects.     

Revisiting backward recall and benchmark memory effects: a reply to Bireta et al. (2010)

When participants are asked to recall lists of items in the reverse order, known as backward recall, several benchmark memory phenomena, such as the word length effect, are abolished (Bireta et al. Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010). Bireta et al. (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) suggested that in backward recall, reliance on order retention is increased at the expense of item retention, leading to the abolition of item-based phenomena. In a subsequent study, however, Guérard and Saint-Aubin (in press) showed that four lexical factors known to modulate item retention were unaffected by recall direction. In a series of five experiments, we examined the source of the discrepancy between the two studies. We revisited the effects of phonological similarity, word length, articulatory suppression, and irrelevant speech, using open and closed pools of words in backward and forward recall. The results are unequivocal in showing that none of these effects are influenced by recall direction, suggesting that Bireta et al.’s (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) results are the consequence of their particular stimuli.     

Gay marriage affiliation and location in return of lost letters: reply to Waugh, Plake, and Rienzi (2000)

Reinspection of Waugh, Plake, and Rienzi's 2000 data allowed for several additional analyses. Statistical confirmation was found for no more negative attitudes toward gay marriage as measured by returned responses among churchgoers than among the general public. Confirmation was also found for their previous conclusion that the putative gay marriage controversy among Christian church attendees would be greater than among the general public, but for reasons different from those they proposed. Finally, it is argued that the limitations for the lost letter technique in "prohibiting fine distinctions" is not always correct because their analysis of one research question seemed not too subtle a distinction for the technique.     

The importance of frameworks for directing empirical questions: reply to Goodie and Fantino (2000)

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) make two main criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (1999) RCCL model. (RCCL is pronounced "ReCyCLe"; it stands for Represent the task, Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular, RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their original data--a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous accounts.     

The evidence rejects the expertise hypothesis: reply to Gauthier & Bukach

In Robbins, R. & McKone, E. (2006). No face-like processing for object-of-expertise in three behavioural tasks. Cognition this issue, we showed face-like holistic/configural processing does not occur for objects-of-expertise on standard paradigms including inversion, part-whole, part-in-configurally-transformed-whole, and the standard composite task. In this reply to the discussion by Gauthier, I., & Bukach, C. (2006). Should we reject the expertise hypothesis? Cognition, this issue, we focus on several issues: the fact that they do not dispute our review of previous data; the strength of null effects obtained from multiple studies and paradigms; the evidence for domain-specificity of the neural substrate supporting face processing; the difference between the expertise hypothesis (as a theory about the origin of face processing) and studies of how experience affects object processing in general; and the problems with G&B's proposed alteration to the standard composite paradigm. We argue that overwhelming evidence suggests the expertise hypothesis should be put to rest so that researchers can focus on what the origin of "special" processing for faces actually is, and investigate the many interesting changes to object recognition that do occur with experience.     

The role of computational models in neuropsychological investigations of language: reply to Ruml and Caramazza (2000)

W. Ruml and A. Caramazza's (2000) analysis of the model of normal and aphasic lexical access proposed by G. S. Dell, M. F. Schwartz, N. Martin, E. M. Saffran, and D. A. Gagnon (1997) is completely at odds with current practice concerning the use of models in psychology. An evaluation of Dell et al.'s original claims using Ruml and Caramazza's model parameters sustains these claims in all respects.     

The relationship between value and temporal context is an empirical question: a reply to Fantino (2000)

E. Fantino (2000) argued that R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's (2000) experiments fail to elucidate the relationship between stimulus value and temporal context. His reasoning is that predictions for R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's probe tests based on delay-reduction theory (DRT) and the contextual choice model (CCM) are indistinguishable. However, his method of applying DRT to the probes ensures that temporal context will have no effect on which stimulus is preferred, contrary to the core principle of that theory. The only basis for differential responding in the probes is baseline training, and R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's data clearly show that the terminal-link schedules, independent of temporal context, control choice in the probes, as predicted by CCM.     

The controlled application of a strategy can still produce automatic effects: reply to Redington (2000)

The deliberate application of a strategy can have unintended discriminative effects. It is argued that these effects or influences on discriminative responding are the source of automatic influences and can be dissociated from controlled influences under appropriate circumstances. Such automatic influences are often latent in the interaction between the memory structures and the strategies that participants bring to bear in many implicit learning tasks.