A critical examination of Michael Polanyi's conception of skills

In this paper I will consider some of the main issues in Michael Polanyi's discussion of ‘Skills’ from Chapter 4 of his book Personal Knowledge published in 1958.The concept of ‘skill’ features prominently in psychological theories of human performance in activities such as games, gymnastics, swimming and dance; such theories are often applied to other spheres of human activity in which issues about skill acquisition arise. It is not surprising to discover that skill theory is considered to be essential to the study of human movement and physical education. Physical education teachers in schools have consistently maintained that ‘skill acquisition’ is a major objective for the P.E. curriculum — see Kane 1974. Yet concepts such as ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and ‘know-how’ are constituent features of practical knowledge therefore the notion of ‘skill acquisition’ on its own will not do as a curriculum objective since all instances of skill and practical knowledge are specific to their contexts, namely, to different practical activities. If particular activities are valued in schools in the pursuit of children's learning and education it seems necessary to clarify the epistemological features of such activities in order to understand what it means to teach them and what it means for children to learn and know-how to perform them successfully. It is in these respects that the concept of ‘skill’ in different human activities should attract the interest of physical education students. In order to draw attention to major features of Polanyi's thesis on the nature of ‘skill’ I shall consider the relevance of his ideas about skill and knowledge in relation to human action theory. I suggest that misconceptions may arise in teaching and learning theories relating to ‘playing soccer’ if the basic underlying ideas about ‘skill’ in human activities are inconsistent with ideas about human action or, say, practical reasoning. It is this issue that is not, in my view, attended to by Polanyi in his discussion of ‘skill’. Thus, if my criticisms of Polanyi's ideas are shown to be valid it will be necessary, by implication that is, to exercise caution before any attempt is made to use his thesis as a basis from which to formulate ideas about teaching skills and skill acquisition. The extensive use I make of quotations from Polanyi's writings is necessary because it is towards Polanyi's use of language in his explanation of ‘skills’ that much of my criticism is directed. It is hoped that what follows may provide students of human movement and physical education with an insight into Polanyi's view of ‘skills’ in particular and to issues related to skill theory and human action in general.     

Modern Maladies of the Self: Borrowed Selves and Collective Faith

Cultures give rise to and support different kinds of self-constructions and types of faith. In this article I argue that particular Western beliefs and values can give rise to modern maladies of self and faith—borrowed selves and collective faith. Borrowed selves reveal a fundamental insecurity or anxiety that comes from a felt lack of possessing or owning the attributions of one's identity, which in turn shapes the very relationships and faith upon which identity is linked. More specifically, I identify two distinct, though related, manifestations of borrowed selves—normotic selves and nomadic selves—and their concomitant types of collective faith—merged faith and eclectic-autonomous faith. Both self-constructions and types of faith manifest persons' specific stance with regard to community and its traditions, and both are fueled by an unconscious anxiety and a belief in what I call relativistic individualism.     

Theoretical explanation and errors of measurement

Conclusion By using the concept of a uniformity, the Structuralists have given us a most useful means of representing approximations. In the second section of this paper, I have made use of this technique to show how we can deal with errors of measurement — imprecise explananda — in the context of theoretical explanation. As well as (I hope) providing further demonstration of the power of the Structuralist approach, this also serves to support the ontic conception of explanation by showing that it can help us resolve substantial problems in the theory of explanation.I would like to thank Professor C. U. Moulines for his kindness in reading an earlier draft of this paper, and in particular for suggesting to me to mention the points made in footnotes 12 and 13. I am also most grateful to this journal's referee for many helpful comments whereby the paper has been much improved.     

Formalising the informal?: Dynamic social order, bottom-up social control, and spontaneous normative relations

The right framework for studying normative issues in infosociety and MAS is that of deliberate or spontaneous social order, and intended or unintended, centralised or decentralised forms of social control. For effectively supporting human cooperation it is necessary to “incorporate” social and normative knowledge in intelligent technology; computers should deal with—and thus partially “understand”—permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust, etc. Here only one facet of this problem is considered: the spontaneous and decentralised norm creation, and normative monitoring and intervention. Cognitive aspects of spontaneous conventions, implicit commitments, tacit agreements, and the bottom-up issuing and spreading of norms are discussed. The transition from “face to face” normative relationships to some stronger constraints on agents' action, and to institutions and authority, and the possibility of a consequent increase of trust, are explored. In particular, I focus on the transition from two party trust, right, permission, and commitment, to three party relationships, where some witness or some enforcing authority is introduced. In this perspective of ‘formalising the informal’, i.e., the interpersonal unofficial normative matter, I discuss (also in order to stress dangers of computer-based formalisation and enforcement of rules) the important phenomenon of functional (collaborative) systematic violation of rules in organisation and cooperation, and the possible emergence of a “convention to violate”.     

Separating cue relevance from cue importance within models of judgment and decision making

Many investigations concerned with human decision making have centered their attention on the issues of cue integration and cue importance. Unfortunately, an equally important issue—that of cue relevance—has been either neglected or equated with the importance issue. Two experiments tested the ability of information integration theory (N. H. Anderson, 1981, Foundations of information integration theory, New York: Academic Press) to disentangle cue relevance and cue importance formally as well as empirically. The decision environment was divided into two components: aspects of the information present during a decision (information context) and aspects of the situation surrounding a decision (situation context). It was hypothesized that variations in information context would affect cue importance while changes in situation context would affect cue relevance. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the weight parameter (w) of information integration theory would reflect the information context manipulations but not situation context manipulations. Results supported previous findings showing the influence of information context on w. As predicted situation context did not affect w; however, it did affect the variability of the responses to a cue's values. The relationship between perceived variability and situation context suggests that the scale dispersion parameter σ of information integration theory may be used as a measure of relevance (K. L. Norman, 1980, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 289–310).     

Focused attention, open monitoring and automatic self-transcending: Categories to organize meditations from Vedic, Buddhist and Chinese traditions

This paper proposes a third meditation-category—automatic self-transcending— to extend the dichotomy of focused attention and open monitoring proposed by Lutz. Automatic self-transcending includes techniques designed to transcend their own activity. This contrasts with focused attention, which keeps attention focused on an object; and open monitoring, which keeps attention involved in the monitoring process. Each category was assigned EEG bands, based on reported brain patterns during mental tasks, and meditations were categorized based on their reported EEG. Focused attention, characterized by beta/gamma activity, included meditations from Tibetan Buddhist, Buddhist, and Chinese traditions. Open monitoring, characterized by theta activity, included meditations from Buddhist, Chinese, and Vedic traditions. Automatic self-transcending, characterized by alpha1 activity, included meditations from Vedic and Chinese traditions. Between categories, the included meditations differed in focus, subject/object relation, and procedures. These findings shed light on the common mistake of averaging meditations together to determine mechanisms or clinical effects.     

Western and Russian Traditions of Big History: A Philosophical Insight

Summary  Big History – an integral conception of the past since the Big Bang until today – is a novel subject of cross-disciplinary interest. The concept was construed in the 1980–1990s simultaneously in different countries, after relevant premises had matured in the sciences and humanities.Various versions and traditions of Big History are considered in the article. Particularly, most of the Western authors emphasize the idea of equilibrium, and thus reduce cosmic, biological, and social evolution to the mass-energy processes; the informational parameter involving all mental and spiritual aspects are seen as epiphenomena of material structures” complication that do not play their own role in evolution. In Russian tradition ascending to A. Bogdanov, E. Bauer, I. Prigogine, and E. Jantsch, sustainable non-equilibrium patterns are used. This implies attention to the pan-material sources and evolution of mental capacities and spiritual culture (as basic anti-entropy instruments) and humans” growing intervention in the material processes on Earth and outside it.The non-equilibrium approach in the context of modern control and self-organization theories, alters the portrayal of the past, and still more dramatically, estimation of the civilization’s potential perspectives.     

The dynamics of world concordance

All human beings are similarly actuated by three fundamental (Ur) conations: Ur I, for physical vitality and longevity; UR II, for interpersonal securities; and Ur III, for existential faiths. All languages express a need for social communications, rendering possible meaningful transcultural messages for friendly collaboration toward mutual Ur-attainments. All mankind as a single species (homo-habilis — the user and misuser of tools) is slowly evolving toward the status of homo sapiens — man the wise.Condensed from an address to the Eghth World Congress of Psychiatry, Athens, Greece, October, 1989.     

Ethos,pathos and logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A re-examination

In Aristotle's Rhetoric, logos must be conceived as enthymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn't relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker or (reasons for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation — with a good procedure and rational judges — logos dominates and in the real situation of Aristotle's time — with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges — ethos and pathos prevail.I should like to thank R. Berkenbosch and J. Wisse for their comments.     

How to deal with your most difficult client—You

Conclusion Therapists are human-and, believe it or not, fallible humans. Ideally, they are supremely well infored, highly confident, minimally disturbed, extremely ethical and rarely under- or overinvolved with their clients/Actually, they are hardly ideal. If you, as a therapist, find yourself seriously blocked in your work, look for the same kind of irrational beliefs, inappropriate feelings, and dysfunctional behaviors that you would investigate in your underachieving clints. When you ferret out the absolutistic philosophies and perfectionist demads that seem to underlie your difficulties, ask yoursell—yes,strongly ask yourself—these trenchant questions: (a) Why do Ihave to be an indubitably great and unconditionally lowed therapist?; (b) Where is it written that my clientsmust follow my teachings and absolutelyshould do what I advise?; (c) Where is the evidence that therapymust be easy and that Ihave to enjoy every minute of it?If you persist in asking important questions like these and insist on thinking them through to what are scientific and logical answers, you may still never become the most accomplished and sanest therapist in the world. But I wager that you will tend to be happier and more effective than many other therapists I could—but charitably will not—name. Try it and see!This article is adapted from an invited address presented at the 91 st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association at Anaheim, Calif., August 1983.     

The systems approach — A. Bogdanov and L. von Bertalanffy

We undertake the comparison between Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory and Alexandr Bodganov's Tektology as two theories proposing a holistic interpretation of reality and claiming to solve problems which are unsolvable via conventional philosophic and scientific theories and methodologies. Basic misunderstandings by some Soviet authors regarding the nature of these theories — especially in the case of Tektology — are pointed out. The comparison is made in what concerns the general origins and purposes of the theories, their approaches to the problem of organization, their treatment of mathematics and their understanding of the cybernetic concept of regulation.We contend that Tektologycontains — some 15 years earlier — all the basic concepts which will be later developed by the General Theory of Systems. As we shall see, Tektology is the ultimate expansion of any theory of systems. This fact is widely ignored in contemporary specialized literature.We finally contend that both Tektology and the General Systems Theory are a sign of the times. A holistic secular monism is a respectable alternative to the failure of contemporary science and philosophy in guiding the life of men, in providing araison d'être for human existence. However, we do not explore the soundness of this alternative.     

Must new worlds also be Good?

The activities analysed by Spinosa et al., viz entrepreneurship, citizen action, and cultural leadership, are all central to the American experience. They have a common phenomenological structure and a common purpose, which is to ‘disclose new worlds’, i.e. so to reconfigure the collective perceptions as to bring about ‘large‐scale cultural and historical changes’. Each, more or less unselfconsciously, is an exercise of skill, an expression of freedom, and a building of solidarity through the recovery or discovery of human meanings. I argue that unless we know the ends to which skill and freedom tend, and in which meaning is found, all three (which the authors treat rather as ends in themselves) are underdescribed, and impossible to see as possessing or conferring value simply per se. The same goes for the original three activities. Cultural leadership, citizen action, and entrepreneurship can work as easily towards bad ends as good. To see them as virtual ends in themselves, then, is premature, and a kind of formalism.     

Humanization,democracy, and political education

Given the current concern in the Soviet Union and East Europe to emancipate public education from its Stalinist past, it is understandable that educators have called for the humanizing of education. Yet humanization is a none too clear idea and must be approached, I propose, through its opposite: dehumanization. Dehumanization, itself, can be understood as the denial of the dignity of the individual — a cardinal principle of the philosophies that comprise classical and contemporary liberal theory. This principle of the dignity of the individual in turn implies duties for the liberal democratic state to treat all citizens (and for all citizens to treat each other) with equal respect as ends in themselves and equally as choosers of ends, as being, at least in principle, capable of choosing and acting on the ultimate ends in their own lives and as potential sayers of great words and doers of great deeds in the common public enterprise.Now in claiming that the principle of the dignity of the individual is central to an understanding of a just and humane society, we do not thereby commit ourselves to those doctrines long associated with liberalism, viz., ontological and moral individualism. The form of political, or united-reformed, liberalism argued for in this paper is clearly compatible with strong forms of community, even authoritarian types of community insofar as they do not transgress the principle of the dignity of the individual as regards informed choice. As decidedly non-perfectionist and agnostic about ultimate goods (tempered by the ban on all public forms of dehumanizing behavior and treatment), this form of political liberalism is neither individualistic nor communitarian, neither capitalist nor socialist (though the state is not indifferent to their fortunes).This rendering of the liberal democratic state sets the requirements for a deep and thorough political education that goes well beyond any familiar example today. In seeking to develop, to humanize individuals for a world of thought and action in the common public enterprise, political education — the premier form of education — in a liberal democratic state seeks to develop individuals who are theoretically informed and practically wise — thus the emphasis on the development of rationality in all of its forms. Moreover, despite the formal agnosticism of the state concerning ultimate human ends, a political education requires deep student exposure to and critical assessment of religion, possible ways of life, and those views of the human good that humans throughout history have found worthy of pursuit. And this even if it means that students will come to reject the principle of the dignity of the individual.Together, Fred Ellett and I have thought through many of these ideas. In no way, however, is he responsible for the, undoubted, weaknesses herein.     

Rationality and epistemic paradox

This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[A_p] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.Belief in the latter claim, so the problem runs, must render the agent unable to come to a stable, rationally defensible decision about whether to accept p itself, since each decision can in the event clearly be seen to be unwise. The solution defended in the present paper suggests that in its most serious form the problem beguilingly — but erroneously — assumes that rational agents are always allowed to assume their own rationality when deciding how they should choose.The first draft of this paper was written while I was a visiting fellow at the Department of Philosophy (Research School of the Social Sciences) of the Australian National University. I am grateful to the department and the school, and especially to Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, for their support during my tenure of the fellowship, and to various commentators at Universities in Australia and New Zealand for their useful criticisms. In this connection I owe special thanks to Barbara Davidson, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, and Richard Sylvan. I have also benefitted from correspondence with Earl Conee and Dick Epstein, and am greatly indebted to a number of anonymous referees forSynthese for helping me to clarify some utterly crucial aspects of my argument.     

Contextual Trends in Intellectual Development

I argue that the historical rupture between paradigms and theories rooted in the acontextual processing accounts of classical physics (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885/ 1913) and those rooted in contextualist accounts like Bartlett′s (1932) is being bridged by an emerging trend to incorporate elements from both traditions into a unified account of cognitive development. Two such accounts are the Bio-ecological Theory of intellectual development and the Triarchic Theory of intelligence. I draw on these two theories for illustrative examples of what I perceive to be a more general trend among cognitive developmentalists. Both theories are multipronged frameworks for conceptualizing individual differences in intellectual development. In this paper, however, I focus on only one of these prongs, namely, the contextually dependent nature of processing resources. Regardless of the ultimate success of these two theories, I believe that their successors will continue the trend of incorporating context into processing accounts of cognitive growth, thus bridging the paradigms of Ebbinghaus and Bartlett.     

Simulation, projection and empathy

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term “empathy” when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler’s classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding—in particular the understanding of emotional expressions—that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.     

A Hierarchical Taxonomy of Human Goals

This paper presents a hierarchical taxonomy of human goals, based on similarity judgments of 135 goals gleaned from the literature. Women and men in 3 age groups—17–30, 25–62, and 65 and older—sorted the goals into conceptually similar groups. These were cluster analyzed and a taxonomy of 30 goal clusters was developed for each age group separately and for the total sample. The clusters were conceptually meaningful and consistent across the 3 samples. The broadest distinction in each sample was between interpersonal or social goals and intrapersonal or individual goals, with interpersonal goals divided into family-related and more general social goals. Further, the 30 clusters were organized into meaningful higher order clusters. The role of such a taxonomy in promoting theory development and research is discussed, as is its relationship to other organizations of human goals and to the Big Five structure of personality.