TORTURE AND JUST WAR

I offer an argument for why torture, as an act of state‐sponsored force to gain information crucial to the well‐being of the common good, should be considered as a tactic of war, and therefore scrutinized in terms of just war theory. I argue that, for those committed to the justifiability of the use of force, most of the popular arguments against all acts of torture are unpersuasive because the logic behind them would forbid equally any act of mutilating or killing in battle. I will also argue that looking at torture through the perspective of the just war tradition forces us to place strictures on the practice that make it hard to justify, helps us to see why torture should never be legalized, helps us to clarify when circumstances might justify torture, and suggests what sort of character is required to recognize when those circumstances have occurred.     

FEMINIST APPROACHES TO RELIGION AND TORTURE

Feminists look critically at any infliction of pain on others, usually requiring that it be consensual, and often both consensual and for the benefit of the person afflicted. Most torture of women is not recognized under official definitions of torture because it is not performed by or with the consent of (government) officials. Women are, however, also victims of torture under official definitions as military or civilian prisoners or as members of defeated populations in war, and are more often subjected to sexual torture, which until recently has not been understood either as torture or even a war crime. Rape, especially serial gang rape, it is argued, should be understood as torture, as the essence of torture is the use of severe pain to obscure or obliterate the victim's sense of agency.     

EXPERIENTIAL NARRATIVES OF RAPE AND TORTURE

Many Guatemalan women suffered extreme sexual violence during the latter half of the twentieth century. Learning of this violence can evoke hatred in persons who love and respect women—hatred for the men who perpetrated the violence and also for other men around the world who victimize women in this way. Hatred is a common response to a perceived evil, and it might in some cases be a fitting response, but it is important to subject one's emotions to critical moral reflection. A key task of ethics is to encourage persons to cultivate good habits of being moved. This essay analyzes the way in which two different texts manage, through the skillful presentation of experiential narratives, to help readers acknowledge the hatred they might feel, but also to think twice about the hatred to which they consent.     

PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE

Abstract. Violence is in its broadest sense the deliberate creation of "bads" or negative goods as opposed to production, which is the deliberate creation of good. Its two major sources are malevolence and threat. Malevolence is the situation where A's perception that B is worse off increases A's welfare or utility. Threat systems are probably the largest source of violence. Four responses to threat are: compliance or submission: defiance: flight; and counter-threat, which is stable in the short run, but must eventually break down and is the major source of violence in the modern world.     

THE MEDIA AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The meanings of violence, political violence, and terrorism are briefly discussed. I then consider the responsibilities of the media, especially television, with respect to political violence, including such questions as how violence should be described, and whether the media should cover terrorism. I argue that the media should contribute to decreasing political violence through better coverage of arguments for and against political dissidents' views, and especially through more and better treatment of nonviolent means of influencing political processes. Since commercial pressures routinely conflict with media responsibility, I argue that society should liberate substantial amounts of culture from such pressures.     

VIOLENCE: A THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

A few years ago J. L. Segundo, discussing signs of the alienation of theology in Latin America, could point with some reason to the fact that the theme of violence was entirely absent from theological work. Since then, a significant number of contributions have been made to the discussion, but a systematic survey has still to be made. What we ofer here are some disconnected points for reflection, which are intended to put the issue in theological perspective.     

THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD EXPOSURE TO MARITAL VIOLENCE ON ADOLESCENT GENDER-ROLE BELIEFS AND DATING VIOLENCE

Children exposed to marital violence in childhood are at risk for engaging in dating violence as adolescents or young adults. Using a longitudinal prospective design, mother–child pairs from violent and nonviolent homes ( N = 208) were interviewed about exposure to marital violence twice over a 7–9 year time span. Responses to questions about adolescent gender-typed beliefs, the acceptance of dating violence, and experiences with dating violence were collected during follow-up interviews. Results indicated that adolescents exposed to marital violence during childhood were more likely to justify the use of violence in dating relationships. Possessing traditional attitudes of male–female relationships and justifying relationship violence were associated with higher levels of dating violence perpetration regardless of marital violence exposure. How adolescents thought about dating relationships was more important than whether they witnessed marital violence in childhood. Results have implications for social-cognitive and norm-based interventions.     

A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Rejecting Kant's absolute opposition to revolution, I propose a modified Kantian perspective for reflecting on political violence, drawing from Kant's basic ideas but abandoning some dubious assumptions. Developing suggestions in earlier papers, the essay sketches a model for moral legislation that combines the core ideas of each of Kant's formulas of the Categorical Imperative. Though only a framework for deliberation, not a complete decision procedure, this excludes extremist positions, prohibitive and permissive, about political violence. Despite Kant's hopes, the values implicit in his fundamental principle fail to support easy, inflexible solutions; but they place strong presumptions against lawless coercion and killing, undermining social order, treating persons as dispensable, underestimating options, arrogant faith in one's own judgment, and reckless simplicity in political thinking.