Patočka’s Care of the Soul Reconsidered: Performing the Soul Through Movement

Care of the soul is arguably the core concept in Pato?ka’s phenomenology. However, what is the soul? In this paper I seek to determine its ontological meaning, connecting the concept of caring for the soul with that of the movement of existence. Starting from Pato?ka’s affirmative presentation of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, I interrogate the “orthodox” Platonic concept of caring for the soul and develop an alternative notion, putting emphasis on action in the world. I demonstrate the impossibility of identifying the third movement with true existence, or with the care for the soul, whether conceived as the performance of philosophy or as political action. Finally, I outline a reinterpreted concept of care for the soul in which the (active) self-moving of the soul is not ontologically prior to (passive) responding. The soul is inherent in action; and it is free only as responding to the world and responsible only in being free.     

The Freedom of Thought: Patočka on Descartes and Husserl

Pato?ka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to Descartes, Husserl and Pato?ka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Pato?ka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Pato?ka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Pato?ka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object.     

Reduction and the Question of Beginnings in Husserl,Fink and Patočka

The article is an attempt to define reduction as the beginning of philosophy. The author considers such questions as: What motivates a phenomenologist to do reduction? Can one speak of philosophy before reduction? What is the essence of reduction? To answer these questions the author refers to Husserl, Fink and, Pato?ka, and tries to show that reduction is to be understood as an unmotivated expression of philosopher’s will to overcome evidence inherent to natural attitude. The author argues that reduction enables one a problematization of the world as such. Finally, reduction is defined as an attempt to take doing philosophy seriously.     

Martin Ritter: Into the world: the movement of Patočka’s phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review - The studies of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka (1907–1977) has been flourishing recently. Martin Ritter’s book Into the...     

Day and Night Overlap: Jan Patočka’s Phenomenological Interpretation of the Front-Line Experience

With insight from the methodology of phenomenology, Jan Patočka draws multiple meanings from the special front-line experience, including new understanding of the fringe of death, absolute freedom, universal responsibility, and solidarity with enemies. The front-line experience is in sharp contrast with daily life experience, and is regarded by Patočka as a continuous consciousness of problematization toward history. This consciousness, which the front-line experience gives rise to, can be maintained through true care for reality and history. Patočka names this “care for the soul” and regards it as the core of the European spirit. The potential philosophical and historical value of the front-line experience urges Patočka to maintain an eternal fight, and he eventually concludes that it is this eternal fight that brings forth eternal peace.     

Jan Patočka’s sacrifice: philosophy as dissent

This article attempts to bring together the life, situation, and philosophical work of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Pato?ka in order to present his conception of philosophy and sacrifice and to understand his action of dissent and his own sacrifice as spokesman for Charter 77 in light of these concepts. Pato?ka philosophized despite being barred from teaching under the German occupation and under the communist regime, even after he was forced to retire and banned from publication. He also refused the official philosophical categories of communism and, what is more, criticized the very manner in which its ideology allowed it to function. Against the destruction of moral and political life by communist and liberal regimes alike, he outlined the necessity of a “life in the idea” that would be responsive to the notion of sacrifice. Such a position of distance from the things of the world which remains anchored among them is meant to respond to dissatisfaction with the world as it is found and is the very movement of human freedom. Taken together, these three aspects of his philosophical practice made him a dissident, a role he took on more completely when, as part of the Charter 77 movement, he publicly opposed the state, in a course of action that led to his death.     

The shattering of meaning. Jan Patočka and his triple concept of history

Continental Philosophy Review - My paper aims at laying out the main tenets of Pato?ka’s unusual and highly provocative position with regard to the question of history, drawing...     

The Art of Sculpture: Jan Patočka’s Concept of Incarnate Being

Jan Pato?ka is known as a philosophical analyst of the phenomenological concept of the live-word (Lebenswelt), which contradicts the preoccupations expressed in Sir Herbert Read’s Art of Sculpture. This essay interprets Pato?ka’s “philosophy of sculpture” in the intellectual context of communist Czechoslovakia, arguing that he regarded sculpture as an incarnate being. His phenomenological interpretation defies all attempts to narrow such a being to the realm of mere haptic or visual sensibilities.     

Heretical Hindsight: Patočka’s Phenomenology as Questioning Philosophy

I argue that Jan Pato?ka’s phenomenology can be understood as a kind of questioning philosophy that preserves the work and thought of Edmund Husserl by holding it in hindsight. Following Martin Heidegger’s lead to take up Husserl’s phenomenological questions more than Husserl’s answers, Pato?ka further develops Heidegger’s strategy with the addition of heresy: the philosophical process of distinguishing traditional questions from their answers in such a way as to preserve both, the original wonder sourced in questioning as well as the specific answers that compose tradition. As excellent answers can tend to eclipse the powerful dynamism of original questions, heretical philosophy is revealed to be Pato?ka’s way to take up, modify, and enact Husserl’s motto “to the [questions] themselves!” In this way, Pato?ka’s further develops phenomenology while at the same time throwing a thinker back onto phenomenology’s central questions.     

Remorse and Self-love: Kostelnička’s Change of Heart

Does remorse imply self-hatred? In this paper, I argue that self-hatred is a false response to one’s wrongdoing because it is corrupted by the vice of pride, which affects the perception of its object. To identify the detrimental operation of pride, I propose to study the process of change of heart and its impediments. I use the example of Kostelni?ka, from Janá?ek’s opera Jen?fa, to show that the impediment to remorse is active already as a source of wrongdoing and self-deception. I identify three different aspects of Kostelni?ka’s pride: social ambition, defensive anger, and moral ambition. I show that it is pride as moral ambition that prevents the wrongdoer’s acknowledgment of her blameworthiness by causing her obsession with her blameless self-image and corrupting her self-love. In the last part of the paper, I reject Kostelni?ka’s initial self-hatred before her change of heart, because it is not based on an accurate judgement of her agency. Kostelni?ka’s true remorse is thereupon connected with her inner transformation towards humility and with a reorientation of her attention towards the victim of her wrongdoing, as testified in her plea for forgiveness. The implied moral improvement and reconstitution of her relationship to herself and others opens the way for her coming to terms with her guilt.

     

Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought

This paper focuses on Plotinus?? account of the soul??s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads. Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus?? direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus?? account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2?C3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus?? view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus?? understanding of Plato??s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus?? account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition.     

A Review of: “Let's Talk About Taking Care of You:”

The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore how military wives’ coping mechanisms are related to their emotional connection with their deployed husbands. Conceptualizing the marital relationship as an attachment system, we explored how military wives adopted various coping mechanisms during their husbands’ deployment and identified two types of efforts toward independence: self-sufficient independence through emotional avoidance, and autonomous interdependence through emotional connection. These are consistent with those coping behaviors informed by secure and avoidant attachment styles. Clinical implications are offered based on the discussion of the results.     

Foucault,Velázquez and the place of sacramentality

In Lars von Trier's Breaking the Waves, the protagonist Bess McNeill is often viewed as a Christ-figure, in particular, as an image of Christ's love. In this essay, I address the feminist critique that taking Bess in this way represents a serious distortion of Christ's love, arguing that Bess need not be seen as endorsing a self-destructive and victimizing form of love that feminist critics rightly reject. Instead, I suggest that we can view her love as an indictment of the institutions structuring its expression. Finally, I argue that Bess’ love for Jan combines aspects of love that have typically been segregated into eros and agape in a way that enriches our understanding of agape and prompts us in turn to re-evaluate our understanding of Christ's love and death.     

Care of the Self and Patient Participation in Genetic Discourse: A Foucauldian Reading of the Surgeon General's “My Family Health Portrait” Program

Critics of genetic discourse are concerned that deterministic and discriminatory views of genetics are increasingly becoming adopted. These views argue that current genetic discourse becomes a source of power whereby powerful institutions harm people with so-called “bad” genes. This essay argues that current analyses of the power of genetics discourse are grounded in an improper reading that disempowers patients. Deploying Michel Foucault's concept “care of the self,” this essay claims that genetics discourse is better understood as a way that patients take on power through rhetoric rather than a force that has power over patients. Through a close reading of the “My Family Health Portrait” program, this paper argues that patients experience a process of “subjection” wherein they become agents of and objects of genetics discourse both. This alternative mode of analyzing the power of genetics discourse has implications for our collective understanding of the operations of the care of the self and the uses of genetic information that we propose.