Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present

Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, I argue that the different aspects of temporal experiences arise from different mechanisms operating separately. If the theory is true, then temporal experiences do not tell us anything special about the nature of consciousness and its temporal properties per se.     

Explaining away temporal flow – thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’

I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: (1) it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover (2) this gives us evidence in favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book.     

体验与诊疗：疾病的时间现象学分析

主观时间与客观时间有着巨大区别。病人当下的即刻体验是在主观时间持续流动的意义上而言的,而医生则根据对客观时间的测量来将病人的不适体验归结为某种疾病类型。病人的不适体验是具体的,医生的诊疗方案是抽象的;前者的基础是主观时间,后者则是客观时间。医生和病人对于时间的不同理解在为前者探讨疾病的时间哲学提供不同视角的同时,也在一定程度上为医生与病人之间的有效交流制造着障碍。基于此,疾病的时间现象学分析有助于以病人为中心的诊疗观的完善。

     

Salience-based progression of visual attention: Time course

In a visual search task, visual attention progresses from the most to the least salient item until a target is found. The time course of such salience-based progression remains unclear although the temporal deployment seems as crucial as the spatial deployment. The present study investigated how the general hierarchical pattern takes place. Healthy volunteers were presented with a primed visual search paradigm in which the primes consisted of three items differing in salience for either 33, 50 or 100 ms. Subsequently one of them became the target and participants had to make a judgment about it. In order to progress on the basis of salience, attention seemed first to be captured by the most salient item. Secondly, the first two most salient items seemed both encompassed within the attentional spotlight. At that time, the least salient item seemed inhibited, completing the stepwise progression of attention. In summary, our data suggest that the hierarchical pattern is built up over time through orienting and expansion of the spotlight, and inhibition of the least salient signals. Furthermore, complementary analyses revealed a proximity effect influencing the selection of the next location to visit. As predicted by different computational models, items located closely to the first visited location were more prone to attract attention than distant items but interestingly enough, this effect only applied to the least salient item suggesting a balance between salience and proximity criteria. Critically also, salience and proximity effects seem to have different time courses. Results are only partially explained by current visual attention models and require further investigation.     

Beyond “Beyond A- and B-time”

This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected.

The B-Theory of Time and the Notion of Change in the Yijing

This paper engages in a comparative analytic study of the notions of time and change in the Yijing.It analyzes the Yijing's philosophy of time as a version of the B-theory of time,which regards time as having multiple timelines,without any "privileged present." In the Yijing's hexagrams,events and situations are characterized by earlier than,simultaneous with,and later than relationships.Time in the Yijing does not have a unique "present";rather,time is marked by relationships among events and situations.Furthermore,in the Yijing's philosophy of time,change is essential to the existence of time;change is what makes time possible.     

The Spotlight Effect and the Illusion of Transparency: Egocentric Assessments of How We Are Seen by Others

We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency tooverestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others.     

Time to Death and Cognitive Performance

We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others.     

Phenomenology and psychophysics

Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits.     

Retroactive adjustment of perceived time

Accurately timing acoustic events in dynamic scenes is fundamental to scene analysis. To detect events in busy scenes, listeners must often identify a change in the pattern of ongoing fluctuation, resulting in many ubiquitous events being detected later than when they occurred. This raises the question of how delayed detection time affects the manner in which such events are perceived relative to other events in the environment.To model these situations, we use sequences of tone-pips with a time–frequency pattern that changes from regular to random (‘REG–RAND’) or vice versa (‘RAND–REG’). REG–RAND transitions are detected rapidly, but the emergence of regularity cannot be established immediately, and thus RAND–REG transitions take significantly longer to detect. Using a temporal order judgment task, and a light-flash as a temporal marker, we demonstrate that listeners do not perceive the onset of RAND–REG transitions at the point of detection (∼530 ms post transition), but automatically re-adjust their estimate ∼300 ms closer to the nominal transition.These results demonstrate that the auditory system possesses mechanisms that survey the proximal history of an ongoing stimulus and automatically adjust perception to compensate for prolonged detection time, allowing listeners to build meaningful representations of the environment.     

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.