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1.
Simon Prosser 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2018,61(3):328-350
This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book. 相似文献
2.
Valtteri Arstila 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(2):287-302
Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, I argue that the different aspects of temporal experiences arise from different mechanisms operating separately. If the theory is true, then temporal experiences do not tell us anything special about the nature of consciousness and its temporal properties per se. 相似文献
3.
Roberto Loss 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(9-10):1136-1156
The ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory. 相似文献
4.
Geoffrey Lee 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2018,61(3):315-327
I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: (1) it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover (2) this gives us evidence in favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book. 相似文献
5.
主观时间与客观时间有着巨大区别。病人当下的即刻体验是在主观时间持续流动的意义上而言的,而医生则根据对客观时间的测量来将病人的不适体验归结为某种疾病类型。病人的不适体验是具体的,医生的诊疗方案是抽象的;前者的基础是主观时间,后者则是客观时间。医生和病人对于时间的不同理解在为前者探讨疾病的时间哲学提供不同视角的同时,也在一定程度上为医生与病人之间的有效交流制造着障碍。基于此,疾病的时间现象学分析有助于以病人为中心的诊疗观的完善。
相似文献6.
Frank Jackson 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):188-192
I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage. 相似文献
7.
《Psychologie Fran?aise》2016,61(3):163-175
In a visual search task, visual attention progresses from the most to the least salient item until a target is found. The time course of such salience-based progression remains unclear although the temporal deployment seems as crucial as the spatial deployment. The present study investigated how the general hierarchical pattern takes place. Healthy volunteers were presented with a primed visual search paradigm in which the primes consisted of three items differing in salience for either 33, 50 or 100 ms. Subsequently one of them became the target and participants had to make a judgment about it. In order to progress on the basis of salience, attention seemed first to be captured by the most salient item. Secondly, the first two most salient items seemed both encompassed within the attentional spotlight. At that time, the least salient item seemed inhibited, completing the stepwise progression of attention. In summary, our data suggest that the hierarchical pattern is built up over time through orienting and expansion of the spotlight, and inhibition of the least salient signals. Furthermore, complementary analyses revealed a proximity effect influencing the selection of the next location to visit. As predicted by different computational models, items located closely to the first visited location were more prone to attract attention than distant items but interestingly enough, this effect only applied to the least salient item suggesting a balance between salience and proximity criteria. Critically also, salience and proximity effects seem to have different time courses. Results are only partially explained by current visual attention models and require further investigation. 相似文献
8.
Research on the mental representation of time (‘subjective time’) has provided broad insights into the nature of time perception and temporal processing. As the field comprises different scientific disciplines, such as psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience, studies differ with regard to the basic terms and concepts used. For this reason, research on subjective time lacks a coherent conceptual system. We argue that research in the field of subjective time should aim at establishing such a system, i.e., a more standardized terminology, in order to strengthen its theoretical basis and to support an efficient communication of results. Based on key empirical findings and concepts that are commonly (but inconsistently) used in the literature, we argue for a conceptual framework for the study of subjective time that differentiates between three types of mental representations of time: basic temporal processing, time perception in terms of passage, and time perception in terms of duration. 相似文献
9.
Marius Backmann 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(9-10):979-1007
In this paper, I will investigate the compatibility of different metaphysics of time with the powers view. At first sight, it seems natural to combine some sort of powers ontology with a dynamical view of time, since the dynamic character of powers appears to account for the progression of time. Accordingly, it has been argued that a powers ontology, which is supposed to be inherently dynamic and productive, is incompatible with eternalism, which does not allow for any sort of real productivity. After having reviewed these arguments, I will argue that the powers view is not only incompatible with eternalism but also with the moving spotlight view and growing block theory. I will go on to argue that the specific notion of activity that the powers ontology provides is not straightforwardly compatible with presentism either. 相似文献
10.
Marta Jorba 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):730-753
AbstractThis paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excluded from the phenomenal domain. This paper sheds light on the nature of different kinds of thoughts and questions a fundamental asymmetry between the perceptual and the cognitive domain when it comes to their ontology and temporal character. 相似文献
11.
Nihel H. Jhou 《Ratio》2023,36(2):99-110
This paper brings together the Sarvāstivāda (a major school of Abhidharma Buddhism) and Miller's (2019) moving spotlight theory to see how presentness is explained in terms of causation. The paper argues that a causal theory of presentness like Miller's encounters a dilemma: causation is either synchronic or diachronic, but neither is safe in the presence of the challenges. On the one hand, if causation is synchronic, how does a causal chain extend over time so that the wave of causation (and hence the spotlight) can move at all? On the other, if causation is diachronic, then a present moment has a temporal extension enough to accommodate a cause and its proximate effect. The paper proposes a synchronic notion of causation that counters the first challenge. This can be done by bringing together the Sarvāstivādin grasp-production model of causation, some Stoic ideas about causation, and some Armstrong's metaphysics. 相似文献
12.
In this article, we articulate a version of non‐standard A‐theory – which we call Flow Fragmentalism – in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past‐ and future‐tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to accept both past and future‐tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in the philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B‐theory, moving spotlight, and Fine's and Lipman's versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past‐ and future‐tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time. 相似文献
13.
Mikel Burley 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):411-416
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I
examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition
as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams
therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought
to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly
should be rejected.
相似文献
Mikel BurleyEmail: |
14.
《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2017,(1):72-89
This paper engages in a comparative analytic study of the notions of time and change in the Yijing.It analyzes the Yijing's philosophy of time as a version of the B-theory of time,which regards time as having multiple timelines,without any "privileged present." In the Yijing's hexagrams,events and situations are characterized by earlier than,simultaneous with,and later than relationships.Time in the Yijing does not have a unique "present";rather,time is marked by relationships among events and situations.Furthermore,in the Yijing's philosophy of time,change is essential to the existence of time;change is what makes time possible. 相似文献
15.
The Spotlight Effect and the Illusion of Transparency: Egocentric Assessments of How We Are Seen by Others 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency tooverestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others. 相似文献
16.
We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others. 相似文献
17.
Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits. 相似文献
18.
Accurately timing acoustic events in dynamic scenes is fundamental to scene analysis. To detect events in busy scenes, listeners must often identify a change in the pattern of ongoing fluctuation, resulting in many ubiquitous events being detected later than when they occurred. This raises the question of how delayed detection time affects the manner in which such events are perceived relative to other events in the environment.To model these situations, we use sequences of tone-pips with a time–frequency pattern that changes from regular to random (‘REG–RAND’) or vice versa (‘RAND–REG’). REG–RAND transitions are detected rapidly, but the emergence of regularity cannot be established immediately, and thus RAND–REG transitions take significantly longer to detect. Using a temporal order judgment task, and a light-flash as a temporal marker, we demonstrate that listeners do not perceive the onset of RAND–REG transitions at the point of detection (∼530 ms post transition), but automatically re-adjust their estimate ∼300 ms closer to the nominal transition.These results demonstrate that the auditory system possesses mechanisms that survey the proximal history of an ongoing stimulus and automatically adjust perception to compensate for prolonged detection time, allowing listeners to build meaningful representations of the environment. 相似文献
19.
Rick Grush 《Synthese》2006,153(3):417-450
A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts. 相似文献
20.
Bradley Richards 《Thought: A Journal of Philosophy》2013,2(1):9-19
Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity‐crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object‐seeing without object‐attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity‐crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non‐perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity‐crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity‐crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about phenomenal experience of an object in the absence of object‐attention. Finally, even unconscious object perception in identity‐crowding likely involves an attention‐like selective process. 相似文献