The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context

This paper aims to show that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) can lead to trouble in certain dialectical contexts. Suppose a person knows that p but does not know that they know that p. They assert p in compliance with the KNA. Their interlocutor responds: ‘but do you know that p?’ It will be shown that the KNA blocks the original asserter from providing any good response to this perfectly natural follow-up question, effectively forcing them to retract p from the conversational scoreboard. This finding is not simply of theoretical interest: I will argue that the KNA would allow the retort ‘but do you know that p?’ to be weaponized in strategic communication, serving as a tool for silencing speakers without having to challenge their testimonial contributions on their own merits. Our analysis can thereby provide a new dimension to the study of epistemic injustice, as well as underscoring the importance of considering the norms governing speech acts also from the point of view of non-ideal social contexts.     

Assertion,Complexity, and Sincerity

The target of this paper is the ‘simple’ knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is constituted by a single epistemic rule of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p’ (where p is a proposition). My aim is to argue that those who are attracted to a knowledge account of assertion should prefer what I call the ‘complex’ knowledge account, according to which assertion is constituted by a system of rules all of which are, taken together, constitutive of assertion. One of those rules—which, following John Searle, I call the ‘preparatory condition’—is of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p.’ All else being equal, simple accounts are preferable to complex accounts. I argue in this paper that all else isn't equal. While the simple knowledge account provides an elegant explanation of certain data, it is hard to see how to integrate the simple knowledge account into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. Because the complex knowledge account avoids this objection while explaining the same data as the simple knowledge account does, I conclude that the complex knowledge account is superior to the simple knowledge account.     

Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains

Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 1) and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within the clinical domain, we contrast epistemic injustice with epistemic privilege and authority. We then argue that testimonial and hermeneutic injustices also affect individuals with mental disorders not only when communicating with their caregivers but also in the social context as they attempt to reintegrate into the general society and assume responsibilities as productive citizens. Following the trend of the movement of mental health care to the community, the testimonies of people with mental disorders should not be restricted to issues involving their own personal mental states.     

Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion

Abstract

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we’re held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.     

Medicalization and linguistic agency

Medicalization is the process by which conditions, for example, intellectual disability, hyperactivity in children, and posttraumatic stress disorder, become understood as medical disorders. During this process, the medical community often collectively assigns a label to a condition and consequently to those who would be said to have the disorder. We argue that there are at least two previously overlooked ways in which this linguistic practice may be wrongful, and sometimes, unjust: first, when the initial introduction of a medical label is done without the participation of those individuals who are being labelled, and second, when attempts by those individuals to renegotiate the labels are thwarted or otherwise rendered ineffective. In both cases, we argue, individuals are unfairly excluded from a linguistic practice that would be valuable for them to participate in. Furthermore, we argue that their exclusion depends in part on the authority of the medical institution to ignore their demands for participation. In making this case, we will propose the more general claim that participating in the linguistic processes of determining and renegotiating the words that will be used to describe oneself is an exercise of linguistic agency, a capacity that has both instrumental and intrinsic value.     

A non‐normative account of assertion

Many contemporary philosophers argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm. In particular, many defend the knowledge account of assertion, which says that one should assert only what one knows. Here, I defend a non‐normative alternative to the knowledge account that I call the repK account of assertion. According to the repK account, assertion represents knowledge, but it is not governed by a constitutive epistemic rule. I show that the repK account offers a more straightforward interpretation of the conversational patterns and intuitions that motivate the knowledge account. It does so in terms of ordinary normative principles that philosophers already accept, none of which are constitutive to assertion. I then contend that the repK account is preferable to the knowledge account because it is simpler, its implications are less contentious, and it avoids a problem for normative accounts of assertion recently raised by Peter Pagin. I also argue that the repK account offers a satisfying explanation of selfless assertion, a counterexample to the knowledge account posed by Jennifer Lackey.     

Nietzsche's place in nineteenth century German philosophy

I describe two ways of thinking about what constitutes a knowledgeable assertion – the ‘orthodox view’ and the ‘isomorphic view’. I argue that we should discard the orthodox view and replace it with the isomorphic view. The latter is more natural and has greater theoretical utility than the former.     

Indirect directives in monological argumentation

The paper deals with sentence adverbials and clauses with the propositional content no doubt can be cast on ... and their occurrence in monological argumentative discourse. Such adverbials and clauses are regarded as illocutionary indicators of indirect directives aiming at the verbal behaviour of the reader, or, more precisely, at the omission of verbal activity on reader's part. Such attempts to influence the reader's behaviour can be both fair ones, to anticipate reader's objections, but also manipulative ones, so as to suppress them. That is why some general guidelines are given how to distinguish between the discourse-organizing and the manipulative function of indirect directives in concern.     

具身框架下的社会认知研究述评

具身理论是继计算隐喻、联结主义之后诠释人类是如何获取知识表征世界这样一个本质性问题的新视角, 指出概念系统的建构对真实身体及其身体活动的体验的依赖, 即具身性。随着认知科学的快速发展, 具身理论已从原始阶段的哲学思辨成为认知心理学、社会认知等领域解释各种现象的一种新的研究范式。文章简要回顾了具身理论的起源及发展, 选取了社会认知心理学中主要的研究对象, 即态度、社会知觉、情绪等, 总结具身理论在这些领域的研究范式及最新研究成果。最后, 文章从实证的角度指出在社会认知领域中以具身理论为框架开展实证研究时值得注意的要点, 并提出此类研究结合其他研究视角(例如, 神经科学, 跨文化心理学)的可能性。     

Manipulations in argumentation

In public and political practice, argumentation involves verbal manipulations, which have not been sufficiently studied in modern argumentation theory. This paper proposes to analyse such manipulations as speech acts, by means of the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation.     

Suppositions in argumentation

The atheist who begins to argue his case by saying, Suppose there is an omniscient Being of the sort in which Christians believe ... is employing a very familiar move in argumentation. However, most books on argumentation theory ignore suppositions completely. Searle omits suppositions entirely from his taxonomy of speech acts and this appears to lead to a similar omission in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by van Eemeren and Grootendorst.This paper argues that suppositional argument is elegant, powerful and extremely common, that the correct way to understand it is based on Gottlob Frege's distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions and hence that suppositions are neither assertions nor (and this is more important) assertives. The paper discusses the connections between suppositions and conditionals; it argues that argumentation theory which ignores suppositions is systematically misleading; and it concludes by indicating some possible developments in argumentation theory.Revised version of a paper delivered at the University of Amsterdam, April 3, 1987.     

Social norms in adolescent risk engagement and recommendation

Social influence is an important determinant of adolescent risk-taking, but little is known about how social norms contribute to adolescents’ tendency to recommend and engage in risky behaviours. Using the Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire, we assessed subjects’ (n = 198, age = 10–26) propensity to engage in and recommend risk-taking as well as their perception of risk norms. Adolescents recommended risk-taking more often compared to children and young adults. Perceived social norms were the most important factor predicting engagement in risky behaviours, and adolescents perceived risk-taking to be more normative than children or adults. Our findings highlight two mechanisms that contribute to adolescent risk-taking, active recommendation and perceived social norms. On this basis, we discuss potential means to attenuate excessive adolescent risk-taking.     

Explorations in the Social Construction of Anger

On the basis of the social-constructionist theory of anger, 2 studies were conducted to explore the social rules relating to anger appraisals and anger-related responses. In Study 1, 400 adults were asked about appropriate causes of anger and appropriate anger-related actions. Attribution of blame, impact or severity of harm, and perceived usefulness of becoming angry emerged as the major determinants of appropriate anger. Talking things over with the offender was judged as the most appropriate behavior when angry at someone. In Study 2, 112 adults were presented with vignettes depicting anger-provoking incidents that varied in regard to the nature of the provocation and the nature of the relationship between offender and target. Both factors significantly influenced the perceived appropriateness of anger-intensity and anger-related behavior. Taken together, the results provide evidence for high social consensus regarding the appropriate causes of anger and anger-related actions. However, there were also noteworthy interindividual differences and cross-situational variations in everyday constructions of anger. The implications of the findings for the social-constructionist view of anger are discussed.     

Young children's moral judgments of commission and omission related to the understanding of Knowledge or Ignorance

This study examined developmental change in young children's moral judgments of commission and omission related to mental states, especially knowledge or ignorance. 4–5 and 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds (n=67) made moral judgments about the tasks related to the understanding of knowledge or ignorance. The tasks were also composed of two types of acts: commission or omission. The results showed that the both age groups understood knowledge and ignorance, but that the older group made moral judgments based on this understanding more similar to adults compared to the younger group. There was not an age difference concerning whether the acts were of commission or omission. These findings indicate that there is no difference for young children in the difficulty in moral judgments of acts of commission and omission related to mental states, whereas there is a developmental difference in using the understanding of knowledge or ignorance for making moral judgments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective

In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed.     

社会认知中归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性现象

在社会知觉中,人们会较多的根据个体的行为表现推论其所具有的人格特质（归纳推论）,较少根据人格特质来推论个体的行为表现（演绎推论）,Maass将这一现象命名为归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性,并在西方文化下验证了这一现象。刻板印象在这一不对称性现象中起着调节作用,行为信息与刻板印象是否一致影响了归纳推论,对与刻板印象一致的信息更易做出归纳推论,而对演绎推论没有影响。在不同的文化背景下,归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性表现存在差异,东方文化下的个体对两种推论过程没有表现出明显的倾向性。本文介绍了这一现象的表现,并总结了产生这一社会现象的内在原因及相关的研究进展。     

社会认知内容的“大二”模型

社会认知的内容存在两个基本维度,一个与热情或社会性特质有关,另一个与能力或智力性特质有关,称之为社会认知内容的"大二"模型。关于"大二"模型的理论有进化心理学、本体论和功能性三种解释。目前,"大二"模型的理论焦点集中在模型的文化普适性检验、两维度之间的关系以及两个维度的权重和偏好问题上。今后可结合本土实际情况围绕着三大焦点问题和两维度的具身研究等问题进行深入探讨。