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1.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
2.
Robert F. GarnettJr. 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(5):437-447
In this paper, I employ the pioneering works of Nussbaum, Sen, Saito, and Walker, in conjunction with the U.S. tradition of
academic freedom, to outline a capability-centered vision of undergraduate education. Pace Nussbaum and Walker, I propose
a short list of learning capabilities to which every undergraduate student should be entitled. This working definition of
undergraduate education offers a starting point for discussion and experimentation. I employ it here to engage the current
controversy in U.S. colleges and universities over the nature, value, and legitimacy of undergraduate students’ academic freedoms.
In contrast to the anti-indoctrination emphasis of David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights, I argue that students’ academic freedoms can be more effectively secured through the articulation of “essential freedoms
for liberal learning” whose principal focus is not the behavior or political affiliations of teachers but the intellectual
needs and circumstances of students. 相似文献
3.
Nathan Carlin 《Pastoral Psychology》2011,60(5):755-764
In this essay, I review a recent book that deals with the history of pastoral counseling. I offer an overview of the book,
some criticism of the book, and a discussion of how this book relates to my own work. I argue that what Susan Myers-Shirk
has identified as a “liberal moral sensibility” among pastoral counselors seems to have certain affinities with Peter Homans’s
“mourning religion” thesis. I suggest that this thesis can shed light on the divide between liberal and conservative pastoral
counselors, a divide that Myers-Shirk identifies, and that this thesis can build on Myers-Shirk’s historical work by providing
a rubric for understanding the relationship between private experience and public theory among liberal pastoral counselors.
I also suggest that Myers-Shirk should write a sequel to this book. 相似文献
4.
Mitchell Avila 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(1):87-124
In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive
doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive
doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that
decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine,
not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints
carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original
position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately
obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient
warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority
of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency
and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness
of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice.
This paper explores theoretical ideas I introduced in embryonic form in a paper presented at the International Conference
on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, 17–18 May, 2003, Mofid University (Qom, Iran). That paper, “Political
Liberalism and Religious Freedom: Asymmetrical Tolerance for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines” (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the conference), addressed specific issues related to religious toleration, but left unexplored theoretical questions
regarding the status of decent peoples. I wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on my interpretation
of Rawls' international political theory, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar
Dahbour, Yasien Ali Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. In addition, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to the Executive
Committee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh. 相似文献
5.
Sharon Todd 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):213-228
As a flashpoint for specific instances of conflict, Muslim sartorial practices have at times been seen as being antagonistic
to “western” ideas of gender equality, secularity, and communicative practices. In light of this, I seek to highlight the
ways in which such moments of antagonism actually might be understood on “cosmopolitical” terms, that is, through a framework
informed by a critical and political approach to cosmopolitanism itself. Thus, through an “agonistic cosmopolitics” I here
argue for a more robust political understanding of what a cosmopolitan orientation to cultural difference can offer education.
The paper moves from a focus on harmony to agonism and from cosmopolitanism to the cosmopolitical, and within each I discuss
the questions of democracy and universality, respectively. Drawing on, the work of Chantal Mouffe, Judith Butler and Bonnie
Honig, I discuss the basis upon which our agonistic interactions can inform education in promoting better ways of living together.
This requires, in my view, nothing less than a clear understanding of the very difficulties of pluralism and a questioning
of some of the ways we often reflect on the political dimension of these difficulties. I offer some reflections on what an
agonistic cosmopolitics has to offer the debates surrounding the wearing of various forms of Muslim dress in schools in the
conclusion. My overall claim is that cosmopolitanism as a set of ideas that seek more peaceful forms of living together on
a global scale is in need of a theoretical framework that faces directly the difficulties of living in a dissonant world. 相似文献
6.
Susan Mendus 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):233-241
In his essay, ‘The Question of Machiavelli’, Isaiah Berlin notes the depth of Machiavelli's pluralism. Taking my cue from Berlin, I argue that much modern liberal political philosophy neglects this deep pluralism and, as a result, misunderstands modern political problems such as the phenomenon of religiously-motivated terrorism.The present paper was read at the Isaiah Berlin Lecture 2005, held at the University of Haifa, Center for Democratic Studies on 23 November 2005. 相似文献
7.
D. Gene Witmer 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(1):185-225
8.
Erik A. Anderson 《Philosophia》2013,41(2):411-427
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Christopher J. Eberle have defended the view that the ethics of liberal citizenship allows citizens to publicly support the passage of coercive laws based solely on their religious convictions. They also develop positive conceptions of virtuous citizenship that place moral limits on how citizens may appeal to their religion. The question I address in this essay is whether the limits they impose on citizens’ appeals to their religion are adequate. Since Eberle’s “ideal of conscientious engagement” provides us with the most extensive statement of these limits, it is the primary focus of my attention here. My conclusion is that in its current form, Eberle’s ideal is not constraining enough. In the first section, I argue that Eberle’s ideal does not require citizens to be self-critical enough about their religious and political commitments. In the second section, I highlight a conflict between Eberle’s ideal and the need for citizens to respect the religious freedom of their fellow citizens. I argue that the way to resolve this conflict is to adopt a more fine-grained conception of religious reasons and to hold that citizens should not rely on religious reasons of certain kinds. In the final section, I argue that laws punishing or discouraging homosexual conduct (which Eberle’s ideal would apparently allow) violate what Wolterstorff calls “the Idea of liberal democracy” and so are not the kind of proposal that virtuous citizens can defend. 相似文献
9.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2012,31(1):29-46
Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to a flourishing democracy
because it helps foster universal and reciprocal amity between citizens. Citizens who participate in this reciprocal relationship
ought to be encouraged to recognize that “much that people do does in fact help to make communal civic life less brutish,
pleasanter and more flourishing.” This is the case even when the majority of citizens do not intentionally seek to make civic
life better for others. Were citizens to recognize the appropriateness of gratitude in these situations, the bonds of our
democratic communities would be strengthened. In this paper, I examine White’s argument more carefully, arguing that it fails
to address adequately the difficulties that arise when we attempt to encourage the virtue of gratitude in our students. To
address these difficulties, I turn to an unlikely source for democratic inspiration: Friedrich Nietzsche. In spite of his
well-known anti-democratic sentiments, Nietzsche offers democratic citizens insights into the social value of gratitude. I
argue that Nietzsche’s ideas resolve the educational difficulties in White’s argument and viably establish gratitude as an
important democratic virtue that ought to be cultivated. 相似文献
10.
Stephen Nathanson 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(4):401-422
This paper examines whether patriotism and other forms of group partiality can be justified and what are the moral limits
on actions performed to benefit countries and other groups. In particular, I ask whether partiality toward one’s country (or
other groups) can justify attacking enemy civilians to achieve victory or other political goals. Using a rule utilitarian
approach, I then (a) defend the legitimacy of “moderate” patriotic partiality but (b) argue that noncombatant immunity imposes
an absolute constraint on what may be done to promote the interests of a country or other group involved in warfare or other
forms of violent conflict. 相似文献
11.
Sharon Todd 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):101-111
In this paper I draw some distinctions between the terms “cultural diversity” and “plurality” and argue that a radical conception
of plurality is needed in order both to re-imagine the boundaries of democratic education and to address more fully the political
aspects of conflict that plurality gives rise to. This paper begins with a brief exploration of the usages of the term diversity
in European documents that promote intercultural education as a democratic vehicle for overcoming social conflict between
different cultural groups. In contradistinction to these usages, this paper calls for a more robust conception of plurality,
one that does not simply denote membership in different cultural groupings but is rooted in the human condition and based
on a conception of uniqueness. Following the work of Hannah Arendt and feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero, I explore how
the appearance of unique beings in specific contexts can be understood as an eminently political act and I contend that such
a view leads to a better educational understanding of conflict and contestation. The paper sketches the contours of democratic
plurality along this line of thought and discusses how these new boundaries have implications for education’s relation to
democracy. 相似文献
12.
Klas Roth 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(4):299-312
Institutions worldwide respond to the need to recognise the value of educating children and young people to handle or solve conflicts in communication. But how do they or we know that an event is correctly interpreted as a conflict? How can people analyse the quality of deliberation when handling or solving conflicts in communication in education? I discuss these questions and argue that the notion of conflict cannot be defined only in terms of incompatibility, clash, opposition and/or disagreement; it also has to encompass negativity in the approach to the other. I also argue that the quality of deliberation can be analysed through a deliberative pedagogical approach, which takes into account structural features of deliberation and required dispositions of the participants, and that our knowledge of conflicts emerges holistically and is interpersonal and objective. I begin by giving an account of some institutional responses to conflicts. Then I discuss the notion of conflict and define it, inter alia, in terms of incompatibility, disagreement and negativity. Finally, I discuss ideas for analysing the quality of deliberation in communication when handling or solving conflicts in education. 相似文献
13.
Christina Elizabeth Easton 《Journal of applied philosophy》2023,40(3):550-568
What should be the aim of LGBT-inclusive, state-mandated curricula in liberal, pluralist societies? In this article, I identify two distinct aims that such curricula might have. The first, LGBT Respect, aims to teach that LGBT individuals have equal political status and rights. The second, LGBT Approval, aims to teach a positive attitude towards LGBT relationships, including that there is nothing wrongful about these forms of relationship. I examine what arguments in favour of these different aims are available to the liberal concerned with accommodating pluralism. To capture this concern, I adopt political liberalism's strict standard for legitimate political interventions that these must have justifications that all reasonable citizens can accept. This initially seems to recommend curricula that aim at LGBT Respect but stop short of LGBT Approval. Can the political liberal go any further? I propose and critically discuss the most promising arguments in favour of LGBT Approval, including the need to prevent harm to children, ensure political equality, and secure the social conditions needed for the development of the primary good of self-respect. I tentatively conclude that there exists a cumulative case for state-mandated curricula aiming at LGBT Approval, at least in the contingent, nonideal circumstances that currently obtain. 相似文献
14.
A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account
that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension
has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and
Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate
for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose,
rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose
of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and
purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the
case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance
that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist.
This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which
states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said
to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all
in a liberal society.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
15.
Barry L. Bull 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(6):449-460
Liberal political theory is widely believed to be an inadequate source of civic commitment and thus of civic education primarily
because of its commitment to what is perceived as a pervasive individualism. In this paper, I explore the possibility that
John Rawls’s later political philosophy may provide a response to this belief. I first articulate a conception of liberal
politics derived from Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium that generates an overlapping consensus about political principles
among those who hold a wide variety of cultural and personal conceptions of the good. Next I develop the aims for civic education
in a society that employs such a politics. Then I suggest the elements of the public school curriculum appropriate for such
a civic education, including a robust multicultural education, intellectual reflection on the society’s history, and philosophical
training that enables children to understand the events and policies of their nation as following from general political principles.
I also consider the kinds of classroom practice that seem necessary to provide the motivation to engage in the process of
the emergence of an overlapping consensus, including opportunities to develop and to reflect on the principles that may be
included in the current consensus and to understand the way in which those principles relate to children’s developing conceptions
of the good. Finally, I compare this conception of civic education to those of other liberal theorists.
相似文献
Barry L. BullEmail: |
16.
Sarah J. DesRoches 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2016,35(6):537-549
In this paper I explore how citizenship education might position students as always/everywhere political to diminish the pervasive belief that one either is or is not a “political person.” By focusing on how liberal and radical democracy are both necessary frameworks for engaging with issues of power, I address how we might reframe citizenship education to highlight the ubiquity of politics, offering a deepened sense of democracy. This reframing of citizenship education entails highlighting how liberalism and radical democracy are mutually reinforcing when it comes to illustrating political life as entangled in power relations. My argument centers on Sigal Ben-Porath’s (Edu Theory, 62(4):381–395, 2012) concept of shared fate as a frame for citizenship education. In this model, students are habituated into thinking of democracy as an “enduring pluralism” in which their fates are connected to that of their fellow citizens. In this paper I recast shared fate education in the singular to an education of shared fates in the plural. By doing so I theorize how citizenship education might construct citizenship as relational, emotional, embedded in power, and uncomfortable. 相似文献
17.
Matteo Bonotti 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):107-123
Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious
political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains
the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction
imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political
liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’
political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily
understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives
on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative
implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to
allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness
and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which
may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to
religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of
reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious
partisanship. 相似文献
18.
Dan Hooley 《Res Publica》2018,24(4):509-530
In this essay I challenge the idea that political agency must be central to the concept of citizenship. I consider this question in relation to whether or not domesticated animals can be understood as our fellow citizens. In recent debates on this topic, both proponents and opponents of animal citizenship have taken political agency to be central to this question. I advance two main arguments against this position. First, I argue against the orthodox view that claims political agency is a requirement of citizenship. This position ignores both how citizenship is understood in practice by modern, liberal democracies, as well as the separate functions of citizenship. Further, there are no plausible ways we can consistently extend citizenship to humans regardless of intellectual ability, while denying it to domesticated animals. Nevertheless, I argue that it is important to distinguish two ways in which citizenship is enacted: Citizenship as Membership and Citizenship as Responsible, Political Agent. Domesticated animals should be understood as citizens, despite the fact that they are not responsible, political agents. Second, I challenge the view, put forward by Donaldson and Kymlicka, that animals are capable of certain forms of political agency. I argue that political agency is not crucial to whether, and how, the preferences of these animals matter for political decision-making. The upshot of my argument is that political agency matters much less to debates about the citizenship of non-human animals than both sides of this debate have been inclined to think. 相似文献
19.
William Glod 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2010,48(2):177-196
This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of reasonableness. In section 4, I handle concerns that showing NP fails the test of Rawlsian public justification is a nonstarter since NP does not threaten any of our basic liberties. I sketch an argument that, if this is so, the burden is on political liberalism to defend its particular account of basic liberties, since MCEM is reasonable on Rawlsian grounds. More precisely, MCEM is a conception that challenges the way Rawls characterizes basic liberties; that is, his list of basic liberties should be more inclusive by political liberalism's own structural commitments, including Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy.” On this revised account, political liberalism can mount a strong opposition to hard legal paternalism. 相似文献
20.
This paper explores the value of the eros motif for critical pedagogy and citizenship education. The conceptual affinities between eros and democracy are identified and integrated into a theory of democratic political education. Long recognized as vital to the process of self knowledge, the ancient Greek concept of eros has nevertheless been largely erased from contemporary educational debate. By retrieving eros from the fringe of academic discourse and integrating it with critical pedagogy, the aims of radical democracy can be more fully achieved. The essay emphasizes the civil society or cultural dimensions of democracy as against its legal or procedural aspects. Renewed emphasis on the associational qualities of democracy underscore the importance of eros as an educational principle. The ancient pedagogical motif of educating the desires is posited as an alternative to the liberal/modernist paradigm of education which de-values affective domains of knowledge. 相似文献