When is an alternative possibility robust?

According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision.     

Does ease to block a ball affect perceived ball speed? Examination of alternative hypotheses

According to an action-specific account of perception, the perceived speed of a ball can be a function of the ease to block the ball. Balls that are easier to stop look like they are moving slower than balls that are more difficult to stop. This was recently demonstrated with a modified version of the classic computer game Pong (Witt & Sugovic, 2010). However, alternative explanations can also explain these results without resorting to nonoptical effects on perception. To examine whether blocking ease influences perception, we conducted several experiments. We examined whether the apparent effects were due to the type of perceptual judgment, the timing of the judgment, and the effectiveness of the paddle. The results are consistent with a perceptual explanation, and help build a case that blocking ease can influence perceived speed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Is gratitude an alternative to materialism?

Materialistic strivings have been implicated as a cause of unhappiness. Gratitude, on the other hand – both in its manifestations as a chronic affective trait and as a more temporary emotional experience – may be a cause of happiness. In the present paper we review the empirical research on the relationships among materialism, gratitude, and well-being. We present new correlational data on the gratitude–materialism relationship and propose that gratitude may have the potential to reduce materialistic strivings and consequently diminish the negative effects of materialistic strivings on psychological well-being. We conclude with some recommendations for future research on the relationships among gratitude, materialism, and well-being.     

What happens to an individual visual working memory representation when it is interrupted?

This study tested the hypothesis that even the simplest cognitive tasks require the storage of information in working memory (WM), distorting any information that was previously stored in WM. Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis by requiring observers to perform a simple letter discrimination task while they were holding a single orientation in WM. We predicted that performing the task on the interposed letter stimulus would cause the orientation memory to become less precise and more categorical compared to when the letter was absent or when it was present but could be ignored. This prediction was confirmed. Experiment 2 tested the modality specificity of this effect by replacing the visual letter discrimination task with an auditory pitch discrimination task. Unlike the interposed visual stimulus, the interposed auditory stimulus produced little or no disruption of WM, consistent with the use of modality‐specific representations. Thus, performing a simple visual discrimination task, but not a simple auditory discrimination task, distorts information about a single feature being maintained in visual WM. We suggest that the interposed task eliminates information stored within the focus of attention, leaving behind a WM representation outside the focus of attention that is relatively imprecise and categorical.     

What is an expert?

Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what theyknow (epistemic expertise), or what theydo (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct.     

Does perceived size depend on perceived distance? An argument from extended haptic perception

Two experiments were directed at the comparison between two perspectives on the perception of size achieved by probing the gap between two occluded distal surfaces by means of a hand-held rod. One perspective was the classical size—distance invariance hypothesis developed for the problem of visual size perception with a central role for perceived distance; the other was the hypothesis that the extended haptic perception of gap size is specific to a physical invariant λ of the dynamics of probing. Experiment 1 examined the relation between haptically perceived gap size and haptically perceived gap distance. No causal connection between the two was found, and all the variance in perceived size was accounted for by?. Experiment 2 manipulated the rotational inertia of the probe. Its effect was different for the two perceptions of size and distance, underscoring their independence. The indifference of perceived size to perceived distance was discussed in reference to identifying invariants for both the haptic and the visual perception of size at a distance.     

Interpersonal consequences of forgiveness: Does forgiveness deter or encourage repeat offenses?

Benefits of forgiveness have been well documented, but past research has not directly addressed the crucial question of whether forgiveness deters or invites repeat transgressions. Our research indicates that expressing forgiveness typically discourages future offenses. In Study 1, participants playing a form of the prisoner’s dilemma game were more likely to repeat their transgressions against unforgiving victims than forgiving victims, especially when victims had no chance to retaliate. In response to a hypothetical scenario presented in Study 2, participants reported that they would be less likely to risk offending someone for a second time if that person had forgiven their first offense. In Study 3, participants’ autobiographical recollections of their prior transgressions revealed that receiving forgiveness predicted higher repentance motivation.     

Does Belief Have an Aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.     

To reverse or not to reverse: when is an ambiguous figure not ambiguous?

The role of bottom-up processes in our perception of reversible figures was examined. In Experiment 1 the overlapping squares figure and nonsense reversible figures were used. The effects of adapting subjects for differing durations to an unambiguous version of the figure before presentation of the traditional reversible figure were determined under conditions of varying precision of fixation. In Experiment 2 the research was expanded to other examples of reversible figures. In both experiments, results with two dependent measures (the subject's first percept and the number of reversals reported) were generally consistent with the interpretation of bottom-up processes underlying the adaptation effects. However, the crucial role of stimulus and procedural variables and the differential sensitivity of the two dependent measures was demonstrated.     

Casuistry: an alternative or complement to principles?

Casuistry is a traditional method of interpreting and resolving moral problems. It focuses on the circumstances of particular cases rather than on the application of ethical theories and principles. After a brief history of casuistry, the method is explained and its relation to theory and principles is discussed.     

Is ecology an ‘alternative’ natural science?

This article discusses whether ecology represents an alternative type of natural science, that is normatively committed. Central questions are:-how man and human action are integrated into the subject matter of ecology;-whether evaluative concepts like health are incorporated into the conceptual structure of ecology; and-whether ecology transcends the image of natural knowledge as control of nature.It is concluded that all hypotheses of ecology being inherently judgmental in character must be rejected.Like all the healing arts, ecology is through and through judgmental in character. It cannot be value-neutral.... What violates the natural harmony must be condemned; what enhances it be endorsed.... Ecology is the closest our science has yet come to an integrative wisdom. It, not physics, deserves to become the basic science of the future.     

Is there an interaction between perceived direction and perceived aspect ratio in stereoscopic vision?

In monocular vision, the horizontal/vertical aspect ratio (shape) of a frontoparallel rectangle can be based on the comparison of the perceived directions of the rectangle's edges. In binocular vision of a typical three-dimensional scene (when occlusions are present), this is not the case: Frontoparallel rectangles would be perceived in a distorted fashion if an observer were to base perceived aspect ratio on the perceived directions of the rectangle's edges. We psychophysically investigated stereoscopically perceived aspect ratios of frontoparallel occluding and occluded rectangles for various distances and fixation depths. We found that observers did not perceive the distortions that would be predicted on the basis of the above-mentioned comparison of the perceived visual directions of the edges of the rectangle. Our results strongly suggest that the mechanism that determines perceived aspect ratio is dissociated from the mechanism that determines perceived direction. The consequences of the findings for the Kanizsa, Poggendorff, and horizontal/vertical illusions are discussed.     

Inhibiting responses when switching: Does it matter?

In the present study, cued task-switching was combined with the stop-signal paradigm in order to investigate the interaction between response inhibition and task-switching. In line with earlier findings from Schuch and Koch (2003), the results show that switch and repetition trials following inhibited responses were processed equally fast. This confirms the hypothesis of Schuch and Koch (2003) that after signal-inhibit trials there is less interference, resulting in a disappearance of the switch cost. Furthermore, stopping performance was not affected by task-switching. The estimated stop-signal latencies were similar for switch and repetition trials, while the stop-signal delays were longer for switch compared to repetition trials. This result suggests that response inhibition and the inhibition processes in cued task-switching are not relying upon a common mechanism.     

Is there any Proffitt in stair climbing? A headcount of studies testing for demographic differences in choice of stairs

The apparent slope of a hill, termed geographical slant perception, is overestimated in explicit awareness. Proffitt (2006) argued that overestimation allows individuals to manage their locomotor resources. Increasing age, fatigue, and wearing a heavy back pack will reduce the available resources and result in steeper reports for a particular hill. In contrast, Durgin and colleagues have proposed an alternative explanation for these effects based on experimental design—particularly, the potential effects of experimental demand. Proffitt’s resource-based model would predict that pedestrians with reduced resources should avoid climbing a hill that would further deplete their resources if the opportunity arose. Within the built environment, stairs are the man-made equivalent of relatively steep hills (20°–30°). In many public access settings, pedestrians can avoid climbing the stairs by opting for an adjacent escalator. Observations of pedestrian behavior in shopping malls reveal that 94.5 % do so. This article summarizes the effects of demographic grouping on avoidance of stairs in public health research. Observations in shopping malls (n = 355,069) and travel contexts (n = 711,867) provide data consistent with Proffitt’s resource model. Women, the old, and those carrying excess body weight or large bags avoid the stairs more than do their comparison groups. Discussion focuses on differences in physiology that may underlie avoidance of stair climbing in order to highlight the pedestrian behavior that psychology needs to explain.     

Does retinal size have a unique correlate in perceived size?

Subjects estimated the size and distance of a single electroluminescent disc in the absence of distance cues and without the use of visual comparators. For different groups of Ss the disc subtended a visual angle of 1, 2, 4, or 8 deg. The size estimates varied directly with visual angle and the distance estimates varied inversely with visual angle. These results were considered in relation to the question of whether or not retinal size hasa direct correlate in perceived size.     

Does head-movement feedback calibrate the perceived direction of optical motions?

Vertical motions of the head were made to cause diagonal optical motions by using an electronic rearrangement technique. Constancy of visual position during the head movement showed a rapid adaptive change; however, no change was found in perceived movement direction when the head was then held stationary and a vertical object movement presented. These results confirm that a memory exists for the correlation between head motion and optical motion, but indicate that this memory does not control the perception of externally generated optical motions. Together with earlier evidence, the results suggest that the memory lies in the eye-movement control system and in a part of that system which is operative during head movement. but not during passively viewed object movement.