Oh the humanity! Humanity-esteem and its social importance

Past research has examined the consequences of a favorable personal identity (i.e., personal self-esteem) and social identity (i.e., collective self-esteem), but has neglected the consequences of a favorable human identity (i.e., humanity-esteem). Two studies examined individual differences in humanity-esteem using a new measure of this construct, the Humanity-Esteem Scale. Results indicated that the measure is reliable, taps affective and cognitive reactions to humanity, and possesses strong convergent and discriminant validity. Furthermore, a third study utilized a manipulation of humanity-esteem to examine its effect on group differentiation. The results supported the notion that low humanity-esteem increases group differentiation. Thus, humanity-esteem is an important novel construct for understanding how humans regard and relate to one another.     

Screen memory: its importance to object relations and transference

A screen memory of an obsessive and narcissistic man, reported early in psychoanalysis, both represented and disguised the patient's oedipal conflict, incestuous wishes, and sibling rivalry. It symbolized for him his relationship with his mother and was treated by him, in a repetitive and fetishistic manner throughout treatment, as the reason for his bitterness toward life, his sense of entitlement, his narcissism, and his distrust of women. In the transference, the memory-far from being inert- constantly played an active role in his wishes and disappointments regarding the analyst, and in his fantasied oedipal triumph over him. As the analysis progressed, and after years of treatment, the encapsulated nature of this memory began to give way to the patient's growing awareness of his oedipal wishes, the full range of his feelings toward his mother, and his sense of abandonment by her. The nature of screen memory is explored, including how it relates to a patient's personality and use of the past in general, how it may figure in the development of a person's object relations, and the decisive role it may play throughout a treatment.     

Effects of gender roles and self perceptions on affective reactions to horror films

Responses to graphic horror films have been shown to be modified by a number of personality variables, and in particular, by gender-specific rules for social conduct. In earlier horror research it has been assumed that gender-specific responses are largely determined by biological gender. More recent research has focused on psychological patterns of gender identity that often transcend biological gender lines. This investigation sought clarification by examining the impact of individuals' self-perceived gender role and other personality characteristics on affective responses to horror. Subjects' perceptions of how same- and opposite-gender peers would respond to such materials were also assessed. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the findings revealed strong effects on the estimation of opposite-gender target's reactions as a function of both the rater's gender role characteristics and biological gender. Other personality factors were found to influence responses to horror only marginally, however. The results are discussed in terms of the gender role socialization model of affect.     

Awe or horror: differentiating two emotional responses to schema incongruence

ABSTRACT

Experiences that contradict one's core concepts (e.g. of the world, people, the self) elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that are too vast to understand with existing cognitive schemata cause one to feel that schemata should be updated [i.e. a “need for cognitive accommodation” (NFA); Keltner & Haidt, 2003. Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 17(3), 297–314]. However, other emotional responses to schema incongruence, such as horror, have not been investigated. The current studies compared awe and horror to investigate if they are distinct emotional responses to schema incongruence. Study 1 observed significant differences between awe and horror in cognitive appraisals (e.g. certainty, legitimacy), indicating several areas of dissimilarity. Study 2 found evidence that awe and horror are both responses to schema incongruence, as schema incongruence and NFA were salient in awe and horror, but not a contrast emotion. However, awe and horror were elicited by different types of schema incongruence: awe by spiritual vastness, horror by extremity. Awe-eliciting experiences also appeared to be easier to assimilate than horrifying experiences, as NFA and uncertainty were significantly lower in awe than in horror. Differences in the functions of horror and awe are also discussed.     

The importance of traits and group memberships

Anglo‐Americans and Mexican‐Americans were asked to list five of their traits and five of their group memberships. They were also asked to rank (relative to each other) and rate (on an absolute scale) the importance of these traits and groups. Consistent with the distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures, Mexican‐Americans ranked and rated their groups as being more important than did Anglo‐Americans. In addition, although participants from both cultural groups gave greatly decreased ratings for less important groups, this decrease was more pronounced for Anglo‐Americans than for Mexican‐Americans. Finally, the data indicated that the perceived importance of group memberships is only weakly related to their cognitive accessibility. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Violent times,the horror of the unspeakable and the temporality of religious experience

Continental Philosophy Review - Violence is essential to religion, while religion holds the promise of transcending violence. The designation religious refers not to a type of violence, but to a...     

Dyadic measurement invariance and its importance for replicability in romantic relationship science

Comparisons of group means, variances, correlations, and/or regression slopes involving psychological variables rely on an assumption of measurement invariance—that the latent variables under investigation have equivalent meaning and measurement across group. When measures are noninvariant, replicability suffers, as comparisons are either conceptually meaningless, or hindered by inflated Type I error rates. We propose that the failure to account for interdependence among dyad members when testing measurement invariance may be a potential source of unreplicable findings in relationship research. We developed fully dyadic versions of invariance models, created an R package (dySEM) to make specifying dyadic invariance models easier and reporting more reproducible, and executed a Registered Report for gauging the extent of dyadic (non)invariance in romantic relationship research across measures of relationship well‐being, personality, and sexuality in a sample of 282 heterosexual couples. We found that although a number of popular measures display good evidence of dyadic invariance, a few display concerning levels and interesting patterns of noninvariance, while others appeared either noninvariant or poorly fitting for both men and women. We discuss our findings in terms of their meaning for the replicability dyadic close relationship research. We close by arguing that increased theorizing and research on dyadic invariance, and inclusive methods for analyzing invariance with indistinguishable dyads, are needed to capitalize on the opportunity to advance our field's understanding of dyadic constructions of relational concepts.     

Confronting the horror of natural evil: An exchange between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis

In this exchange, Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis discuss the problem of natural evil in the light of the recent Asian tsunami disaster. The exchange begins with an extract from a newspaper article written by Coghlan on the tsunami, followed by three rounds of replies and counter-replies, and ending with some final comments from Trakakis. While critical of any attempt to show that human life is good overall despite its natural evils, Coghlan argues that instances of natural evil, even horrific ones, can be justified as the unavoidable by-product of a natural system on which human life and culture depends. Trakakis, however, rejects this view, counselling instead a degree of skepticism about our ability to construct a plausible theodicy for horrific evil.