Does it all go together when it goes? The nineteenth Bartlett memorial lecture

As groups of people age, the differences in the cognitive abilities of the most and least able become more extreme. This increase in between-individual variance is accompanied by an increase in within-individual variance: the difference between individuals' levels of performance on their best and least well retained skills. The implications of increasing between-individual variance are discussed in terms of the range of different factors that may affect cognitive ageing. Increases in within-individual variance are discussed in terms of differences betweeen “fluid” and “crystallized” abilities. The usefulness of this distinction and its functional implications are questioned. The hypothesis that age-related declines in “fluid” abilities are best modelled in terms of declines in a single factor is evaluated. Evidence is presented of disparate rates of decline, even of “fluid” cognitive abilities, such as performance on IQ tests, ability on information-processing tasks, and efficiency on memory tasks. Data from large-scale cross-sectional studies suggests that cognitive skills do not “all go together when they go”, but that there may, rather, be characteristic patterns, or syndromes, of cognitive ageing.     

The imaginaiy questionnaire

The experiment was designed to throw some light on the statistical problems in the analysis of questionnaire data. Previous work (unpublished) suggested that a simple choice response was partially determined by previous responses; and also that the nature of the determination was changed with changing length of series. A “null” experiment was devised in the form of a questionnaire without any questions, and the distribution of responses was studied with respect to the problems formulated.

The observations are discussed in three sections.

In the statistical discussion an alternative meaning to overall association or dissociation is advanced. This: relates association or dissociation to human behaviour in the serial response situation, rather than to qualities of the questionnaire. It is further suggested that association between specific, questions should be tested against the association in the whole questionnaire, and an appropriate treatment is indicated.

The observations depart from statistical randomness in certain ways. Answers made up almost entirely of one form of response are given less often than would be expected. Long sequences of the same type of response are relatively infrequent, and sequences of alternation of response are also rare. As the material is “null” it implies that the human concept of randomness differs from the statistical concept.

An attempt is made to define the human concept of randomness. It appears that a series of responses which has a pattern, or for which the subject can postulate a simple “cause” will not be accepted as random by the human subject. This raises problems of a perceptual and cognitive nature. It also has a bearing on the design of questionnaires. or experiments involving serial responses.     

The nature of phonological processing in oral reading: Evidence from surface dyslexia

Investigation of a neurological patient (PT) who presents with a relatively pure disorder of reading was carried out. His performance on a number of oral reading tasks was very similar to that of the surface dyslexic patient (HTR) reported by Shallice, Warrington and McCarthy (1983). Both patients showed an effect of “degree” of regularity in terms of accuracy of reading response. PT did not, however, show an effect of “typicality of divergence”, which was considered by Shallice and his colleagues to be responsible for the former effect. The size of orthographic-phonological unit operational in PT's oral reading was experimentally determined. PT appeared to rely on grapheme-phoneme correspondences that were assigned in a probabilistic rather than an “all-or-none” manner. No evidence for the existence of the sub-syllable as an independent unit was found. In contrast, this unit apparently mediated the performance of skilled adult readers. Implications of these results for models of the phonological route are discussed.     

伙伴选择对合作行为的影响作用与机制

伙伴选择是指个体根据其他个体能否给自己带来获益而选择或拒绝与他们建立伙伴关系的行为。伙伴选择对合作行为具有非常重要的影响, 表现为：个体只要有离开或自主选择伙伴的机会即可促进合作; 若能了解到伙伴的行为或特质层面的信息, 则可以进一步促进合作。基于目前研究, 伙伴选择主要可能通过4种具体机制促进合作行为, 即离开或拒斥的惩罚机制, 寻求合作者的奖赏机制, 分类匹配机制以及生物市场中的竞争机制。未来还需要从厘清伙伴选择的概念, 提升研究的生态效度, 深入探索其促进合作的内在机制, 尝试用伙伴选择解决伙伴控制条件下的合作问题, 以及探索中国文化背景下的伙伴选择与合作等方面开展进一步研究。     

Conceptual models and task representation in using a command language

In most cases, there is no direct correspondence between the objectives that users of an interactive device may be led to formulate and the commands that enable them to attain those objectives. In order to set up what Young (1981) calls a “mapping” between the “task and action arenas”, users must (1) reorganize their objectives in order to adapt them to the capabilities of the device and (2) if necessary, combine several commands to reach a given objective. In doing so, they are assumed to rely on a “conceptual model” of the device, a notion whose cognitive status remains to be clarified. In this article, the editing keys of the MS/DOS operating system are taken as an example and described according to two different conceptual models. The links between the task and action arenas, in these two conceptual models and in a third one called the “mixed model”, are analysed in detail. Finally, the performance of three groups of subjects, while editing a line of text, are compared. All three of the dependent variables analysed are shown to vary according to how the objective is assumed to be formulated in the three conceptual models. Some hypotheses are presented concerning the cognitive mechanisms involved in such a situation.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Repetition Priming Follows Spontaneous but not Prompted Recognition of Familiar Faces

Reaction times to make a familiarity decision to the faces of famous people were measured after recognition of the faces in a pre-training phase had occurred spontaneously or following prompting with a name or other cue. At test, reaction times to familiar faces that had been recognized spontaneously in the pre-training phase were significantly facilitated relative to an unprimed comparison condition. Reaction times to familiar faces recognized only after prompting in the pre-training phase were not significantly facilitated. This was demonstrated both when a name prompt was used (Experiments 1 and 3) and when subjects were cued with brief semantic information (Experiment 2).

Repetition priming was not found to depend on prior spontaneous recognition per se. In Experiment 3, spontaneously recognizing a familiar face did not prime subsequent familiarity judgements when the same face had only been identified following prompting on a prior encounter. In Experiment 4, recognition memory for faces recognized after cueing was found to be over 90% accurate. This indicates that prompted recognition does not yield repetition priming, even though subjects can remember the faces. A fusion of “face recognition unit” and “episodic record” accounts of the repetition priming effect may be more useful than either theory alone in explaining these results.     

Repetition priming of face recognition

Three experiments investigating the priming of the recognition of familiar faces are reported. In Experiment 1, recognizing the face of a celebrity in an “Is this face familiar?” task was primed by exposure several minutes earlier to a different photograph of the same person, but not by exposure to the person's written name (a partial replication of Bruce and Valentine, 1985). In Experiment 2, recognizing the face of a personal acquaintance was again primed by recognizing a different photograph of their face, but not by recognizing the acquaintance from that person's body shape, clothes etc. Experiment 3 showed that maximum repetition priming is obtained from prior exposure to an identical photograph of a famous face, less from a similar photograph, and least (but still significant) from a dissimilar photograph.

We argue that repetition priming is a function of the degree of physical similarity between two stimuli and that lack of priming between different stimulus types (e.g., written names and faces, or bodies and faces) may be attributable to lack of physical similarity between prime and test stimuli. Repetition priming effects may be best explained by some form of “instance-based” model such as that proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1985).     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Cue location does not account for all selective associations in food aversion learning

Studies of food aversion learning have been widely interpreted as yielding evidence for selectivity in the associability of cues and consequences. On the one hand, taste cues were easily conditioned to interoceptive consequences (e.g. “illness”), but only with difficulty to exteroceptive consequences (e.g. shock). On the other hand, audiovisual stimuli were easily conditioned to shock, but only with difficulty to illness (Revusky and Garcia, 1970). Sullivan (1984) has emphasized that cue location and temporality have been important uncontrolled variables in many food-aversion studies and has argued that when these factors are taken into account, the supposed selectivity related to sensory modality is lost. Thus, Sullivan (1984) argues that shocks, like “illness”, are readily associated with tastes provided that the tastes are intrinsic attributes of the substances ingested.

Sullivan's important article may have demonstrated significant weaknesses in the evidence for specific associations of exteroceptive cues with shock rather than with “illness”, and this point will not be considered further. However, there are two aspects of Sullivan's case that cannot be substantiated. Firstly, the attempt to demonstrate that taste cues are as readily associated with shock as they are with “illness” is unconvincing. Secondly, unjustified assumptions are made about the nature of the unconditioned stimulus in conditioning with interoceptive consequences, which is presumed to be “illness” despite extensive evidence to the contrary.     

Perceptions of speakers with minimal eye contact: Implications for stutterers

One hundred and thirty-three college students responded to percentage definitions of “good,” “minimal,” and “no” eye contact. They also judged their perceptions of a speaker with “little or no eye contact” on a semantic differential scale containing 60 polarized adjective pairs regarding personality traits. The majority of the student respondents defined an individual with “good” eye contact as looking at his/her audience/listener 90–100% of the time. This is a more stringent definition than other literature has indicated. Furthermore, speakers with little or no eye contact were judged less favorably on 70% of the items, which indicates that low eye contact adversely affects perceptions of a speaker's personality. Therefore, stutterers need to be made aware of the importance of and determinants of effective eye contact in communication. Also, the development of effective eye contact needs to be incorporated as a major goal in stuttering therapy.     

Contextual assimilation and its effect on the division of attention between nonverbal signals

Subjects performed a recognition task in which a low or a high frequency signal was presented simultaneously with a dim or a bright intensity one. The independent variable was the degree of association between the signals on the two dimensions. Unknown to the subjects four levels were tested in separate conditions, 1.0, 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2. Increasing the positive association improved overall sensitivity as measured by d' on both dimensions, but left contingent sensitivity unchanged. Changing the association did not affect overall bias, as measured by Beta. However, holding context constant by analysis produced significant differences between individual measures of contingent bias in the direction of assimilation, for example “low” responses tended to accompany dim signals and “dim” responses. The differences were unaffected by the changes in association. The results are interpreted as favouring models of contextual assimilation which assume that biasing at some level of processing depends upon the mutually contingent interaction of discrete events rather than on memory and expectation of the relative frequency of conjoint events. Further support for this conclusion comes from previous studies which indicate that assimilation occurs with separate responses but not with unitary ones. The implications of the findings for research on the division of attention are discussed, particularly the need to control variability in measured bias to establish a true change in the allocation of attention. Two generalized models of contextual assimilation are proposed, one based on “object” and the other on “lexical” assimilation. The possible application of these models to synaesthesia is considered.     

Selective effects of an anaesthetic drug on cognitive behaviour

The prediction has been tested that under the influence of an anaesthetic drug, nitrous oxide, cognitive performances undergo differential impairment, the extent of which is positively correlated with the “complexity” of the task, Ten kinds of performance were investigated, ranging from speed of finger tapping to reasoning by analogy. The relative complexity of each task was determined, in accordance with conventional criteria, from its respective qualitative category or “level”—relational, associative, and motor—and within each category from qualitative analysis of the component processes involved in its execution. A simple group difference design was used, involving two groups of 50 subjects each, matched for age and sex.

Significant deterioration as a consequence of drug administration occurred in the performance of all tasks. On the whole, the more complex a task the more did it tend to be impaired. Motor performances were, however, impaired to a greater extent than had been predicted. The possible significance of these findings is discussed.     

Enhanced old–new recognition and source memory for faces of cooperators and defectors in a social-dilemma game

A popular assumption in evolutionary psychology is that the human mind comprises specialized cognitive modules for social exchange, including a module that serves to enhance memory for faces of cheaters. In the present study, participants played a trust game with computerized opponents, who either defected or cooperated. In a control condition, no interaction took place. In a surprise memory test, old–new recognition for faces and source memory for the associated cooperative or non-cooperative behavior were assessed. A multinomial model was used to measure old–new discrimination, source memory, and guessing biases separately. Inconsistent with the assumption of a memory mechanism that focuses exclusively on cheating, the present study showed enhanced old–new discrimination and source memory for both cooperators and defectors. Rarity of the behavior strategies within the experiment modulated source memory, but only when the differences in base rates were extreme. The findings can be attributed to a mechanism that focuses on exchange-relevant information and flexibly adapts to take into account the relative significance of this information in the encoding context, which may be more beneficial than focusing exclusively on cheaters.     

Recognition and attention

Sternberg has suggested that a possible way of achieving identification of degraded stimuli would be to execute “preprocessing” operations prior to recognition. Such operations would have some parallels with the “filtering” operations, suggested by Broadbent and others, for perceptual selection and attention. But when trying, in this paper, to consider how such operations could be implemented, some rather non-trivial problems emerge. Experimentally, these doubts find support in visual selection tasks of quite general character, in that filtering does not appear to take place. It seems, however, that these problems may be successfully overcome by some simple, though implicative, conceptual changes. The main implication is that effective focal attention is rather likely to be achieved through a process that is best described as “context-sensitive” selection.     

Constraints in the performance of bimanual tasks and their expression in unskilled and skilled subjects

Unskilled and skilled subjects were asked to perform a variety of bimanual tapping tasks. Three major effects were seen. First, right-handers performed dual tasks better when the preferred hand took the “figure” and when the nonpreferred hand took the “ground” of the dual movement. This effect was not seen in left-handers. Second, subjects performed a simple slow/fast dual task better when they commenced the task with the fast rather than with the slow hand. This effect was seen in right- and lefthanders. Third, both unskilled and skilled subjects showed marked interdependence of movements such that performance of one hand was a function of movements in the other hand. The results are in agreement with a model that postulates the presence of a superordinate control mechanism that initiates action in subordinate control mechanisms, which in turn set the movement trajectories in the two hands. The results also show that attention is an important factor in the interaction between these two levels of control.     

Driye-leyel and flexibility in paired-associate nonsense-syllable learning

“High-anxiety” and “low-anxiety” subjects, selected for extreme scores on the Taylor Anxiety Scale, learned a list of paired-associate nonsense syllables in the belief that they were undergoing an intelligence test. Both groups were then given a second list of paired associates to learn, the stimulus-items being the same as those of the first list but the responses being changed. Before the presentation of the second list, half the subjects in each group were given anxiety-increasing instructions and the remaining half were given reassuring instructions.

The results verified two predictions made from Hull's behaviour theory, using the concept of fear or anxiety as a secondary drive:—“high anxiety” subjects took more trials to master the second learning task than “low-anxiety” subjects; and there was a significant interaction between initial anxiety-level and type of instructions, such that “high-anxiety” subjects who received drive-increasing instructions had a worse performance in the second part than all other sub-groups. There was no indication that “low-anxiety” subjects were significantly affected by the type of instructions received. The “high-anxiety” group had greater difficulty than the “low-anxiety” group in learning the first list, but the difference was non-significant.     

Discriminability and central intermittency in same-different judgements

Four sets of paired visual stimuli (OO, XX, XO, or OX) were judged by 48 subjects to be either “same” or “different.” Decision latencies of the same and different judgement were studied as a function of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). In Experiments I and II, in which stimulus durations were 70 millisec., decision latencies showed marked increases when the ISI was reduced to 100 millisec., but in Experiments III and IV, in which the stimulus durations were only 40 millisec., comparable increases did not occur until the ISI was reduced to 50 millisec. These increases were more marked for “same” than for “different” judgements, although overall decision latencies were generally shorter for “same” judgements. The effects of varying ISIs and stimulus durations are interpreted in terms of masking; they fail to support an hypothesis of central intermittency.     

What is folk psychology?

Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called “folk psychology”. That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist. We argue that the expression “folk psychology” is ambiguous in an important way. On the one hand, “folk psychology” is used by many philosophers and cognitive scientists to refer to an internally represented theory of human psychology exploited in the prediction of behavior. On the other hand, “folk psychology” is used to refer to the theory of mind implicit in our everyday talk about mental states. We then argue that sorting out the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding “folk psychology” has major consequences for the eliminativism debate. In particular, if certain models of cognition turn out to be true, then on some readings of “folk psychology” the arguments for eliminativism collapse.