Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.     

论自由意志并非道德责任的必要条件

传统哲学观认为,自由意志是道德责任的必要条件,没有自由意志就没有道德责任。但对二者的概念分析却表明,在某些情境下,自由意志并非道德责任的必要条件,实验哲学研究为这一观点的合理性提供了佐证,而道德演化论则阐释了自由意志不足以成为道德责任之必要条件的缘由。     

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss

Philosophia - Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR...     

The Sufficient and Necessary Condition for the Identifiability and Estimability of the DINA Model

Psychometrika - Cognitive diagnosis models (CDMs) are useful statistical tools in cognitive diagnosis assessment. However, as many other latent variable models, the CDMs often suffer from the...     

The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Recent work suggests a strong connection between intuitions regarding our own free will and our moral behavior. We investigate the origins of this link by asking whether preschool-aged children construe their own moral actions as freely chosen. We gave children the option to make three moral/social choices (avoiding harm to another, following a rule, and following peer behavior) and then asked them to retrospect as to whether they were free to have done otherwise. When given the choice to act (either morally or immorally), children avoided harm and abided by rules, but they endorsed their freedom to have done otherwise. When choice was restricted by adult instruction, children did not endorse their free choice and indicated feeling constrained by moral obligation in their explanatory responses. These results suggest that children believe that their moral actions afford free will, but this belief is dependent on their experience of choice.     

Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to van Inwagen

In The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases.     

道德异乡人何以共处——恩格尔·哈特的允许原则述评

北美是生命伦理学的发源地 ,而恩格尔·哈特是北美知名生命伦理学家之一。他在其代表作《生命伦理学的基础》中提出 ,应以允许原则作为后现代生命伦理学的基础 ,从而解决道德异乡人 (ｍｏｒａｌｓｔｒａｎｇｅｒ)的共处问题。1　允许原则的含义恩氏所提出的允许原则是一个程序性原则 ,其核心是 :在一个世俗的多元化的社会中 ,任何不涉及别人的行动 ,别人都无权干涉 ,而涉及别人的行动则必须得到别人的允许。在他的生命伦理学体系中 ,允许原则是首要原则 ,而行善原则位居其次。套用黄金律的表达式“己所不欲 ,勿施与人”就是“人所不欲 ,勿施…     

Haste makes waste,but not for all: The speed-accuracy trade-off does not apply to neurotics

ObjectivesTo examine if neurotics are the exception to the speed-accuracy rule and in fact are more accurate when making faster decisions.DesignThe study employed a laboratory-based, cross-sectional design.MethodOne hundred and ninety-six elite young cricketers completed measures of neuroticism before performing a cricket-specific computer-based decision-making task.ResultsNeuroticism significantly moderated the relationship between decision-making time and decision-making accuracy such that decreases in response time were associated with improvements in decision-making accuracy for individuals with high levels of neuroticism. Conversely, decreases in response time were associated with decrements in accuracy for individuals with low levels of neuroticism.ConclusionsThe study presents the first data that confirm that speed accuracy trade-offs do not occur across all individuals; individuals with high levels of neuroticism benefit from making faster decisions.     

A Likely Explanation: IBE as a Guide to Better (but not more probable) Hypotheses

Abstract

Several friends of inference to best explanation have claimed in recent work that explanatory virtues, such as consilience, simplicity and increased precision, play an important heuristic role in assigning probabilities to available hypotheses and that it is this role that justifies continued efforts to investigate the scope, nature and epistemic value of the inference rule. In this paper I argue that understanding explanatory virtues as a guide to probability assignments creates a critical dilemma for advocates of IBE that has not previously been made sufficiently explicit and which has significant implications for the prospects of the rule. I conclude that the viability of IBE requires that explanatory virtues be related to a non-probabilistic conception of success.     

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson,and the Difference it Should Make

P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.Thanks to an audience at Carleton University for helpful discussion.     

道德理论的新进展--道德判断的社会直觉模式

道德判断的研究一直遵循皮亚杰和柯尔伯格的理性主义模式．但随着人们对认知双重过程论的逐渐认可,传统的道德判断理论受到了挑战。本文介绍了道德判断的一种新的理论模式——道德判断的社会直觉模式。该理论认为,道德判断是由迅速、自动的评价(直觉)所导致。     

License to Ill: The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and CEO Moral Identity on Corporate Social Irresponsibility

Although managers and researchers have invested considerable effort into understanding corporate social responsibility (CSR), less is known about corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Drawing on strategic leadership and moral licensing research, we address this gap by considering the relationship between CSR and CSiR. We predict that prior CSR is positively associated with subsequent CSiR because the moral credits achieved through CSR enable leaders to engage in less ethical stakeholder treatment. Further, we hypothesize that leaders’ moral identity symbolization, or the degree to which being moral is expressed outwardly to the public through actions and behavior, will moderate the CSR–CSiR relationship, such that the relationship will be stronger when CEOs are high on moral identity symbolization rather than low on moral identity symbolization. Through an archival study of 49 Fortune 500 firms, we find support for our hypotheses.