Reconciling Just Causes for Armed Humanitarian Intervention

Michael Walzer argues that the just cause for humanitarian intervention is not met if there are only “ordinary” levels of human rights abuses within a state because he believes that respecting the right to collective self-determination is more morally important than protecting other individual rights. Several prominent critics of Walzer advocate for a more permissive account of a just cause. They argue that protecting individuals’ human rights is more morally important than respecting a right to collective self-determination. I argue that these two accounts are far more similar than either Walzer or his critics realize because collective self-determination requires the protection of some human rights in order to allow each person the opportunity to participate in collective choices. Consequently, the just cause for intervention is met whenever at least some important human rights of one person are violated and others are being credibly threatened. The counter intuitive conclusion of my argument is that justified interventions can actually promote rather than undermine collective self-determination because just interventions allow innocents, who otherwise would have excluded from this process, the opportunity to contribute to collective choices. Of course, a just cause is insufficient in itself for intervention to be permissible because other just war precepts must also be met.     

Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the Limits of Casuistry

This essay argues that the ethics of humanitarian intervention cannot be readily subsumed by the ethics of just war without due attention to matters of political and moral motivation. In the modern era, a just war draws directly from self-benefitting motives in wars of self-defense, or indirectly in wars that enforce international law or promote the global common good. Humanitarian interventions, in contrast, are intuitively admirable insofar as they are other-regarding. That difference poses a challenge to the casuistry of humanitarian intervention because it makes it difficult to reason by analogy from the case of war to the case of humanitarian intervention. The author develops this point in dialogue with Michael Walzer, the U.S. Catholic bishops, and President Clinton. He concludes by showing how a casuistry of intervention is possible, developing a motivational rationale that draws on the Golden Rule.     

Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention

My essay “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard” (JRE 40.2) called for more questioning engagement with R2P than the broadly uncritical welcome given by the churches to the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008. In response to Luke Glanville's reply, this essay identifies further reasons for caution before accepting R2P and so‐called humanitarian wars alongside defensive wars as paradigmatically justified. It is structured with reference to the tests in A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the Report by the Secretary‐General's High‐level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as recommended to the General Assembly when considering whether to authorize or apply military force: seriousness of risk, intention, last resort, proportional means, balance of consequences.     

理想主义或现实主义?——中国革命中政治参与的政治心理分析

本文试图梳理40年代到70年代中国人积极参与政治运动的心理逻辑.纯粹的理想主义视角无法解释为什么参与者对信息采取趋利避害的过滤,纯粹的现实主义视角则忽略了人有为其理性选择赋予意义的天性.本文试图通过援引社会心理学中的"认知冲突"理论,来填补理想主义视角和现实主义之间的鸿沟,消除其二元对立.本文认为,缓解认知冲突的心理需求,往往会推动参与者通过自我说服将现实主义动机内化为理想主义信念.     

Humanitarian Intervention: Closing the Gap Between Theory and Practice

abstract   Apparently, there are some important tensions that must be confronted in grappling with the issue of the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. Notably, there is the tension between respecting sovereignty and responding to the plight of the needy, that is, there is tension between respecting governments' authority and desire for non-interference, and respecting the individuals who suffer under their leadership. I argue that these and other tensions should be resolved in favour of protecting the individuals who suffer in humanitarian crises, though the way to do this defensibly requires that we put in place many safeguards against abuse. My main theoretical argument emerges from a model of global justice that I develop.
I then examine recent reports on intervention and state sovereignty compiled by an inter-national commission in order to show that consensus is building about the permissibility of military intervention to protect fundamental human rights for vulnerable populations in certain cases. Some important public policy proposals are evolving in the direction of protecting individuals over states, but there are still some important gaps that remain between what is theoretically desirable and proposals about international law. I show where some of those gaps are and how we can close them.     

Horstmann, Siep, and German Idealism

Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus. By Rolf-Peter Horstmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Anton Hain, 1991, 321 pp. ISBN 3–445-08568-4
Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. By Ludwig Siep. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992, 348 pp. ISBN 3–518-28635-8 pb     

Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success in a Norwegian Armed Forces Border Patrol Selection Course

The present study investigates the effects of psychological hardiness and successful completion of a rigorous 250‐km ski march over 9 days in Arctic winter conditions. This ski march is the final portion of a selection program for border rangers in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Study participants were N = 178 soldiers with a mean age of 19.9 years (range 18–23). Hierarchical regression results showed that successful completion of the ski march was predicted by total hardiness scores, after controlling for nutrition factors, physical fitness and sensation seeking. A second hierarchical regression found that the commitment facet of hardiness was the most significant predictor of ski march success, again controlling for nutrition, physical fitness and sensation seeking. Analyses of daily participant surveys showed that the high commitment group reported the highest levels of positive daily coping, and also evaluated their performance more positively. This group also showed increasingly positive self‐evaluations as the exercise went on. Together, these results indicate that hardiness commitment is a key factor influencing performance in a rigorous and stressful endurance task requiring sustained effort, perhaps by enhancing active coping skills and self‐efficacy beliefs.     

On Altruistic War and National Responsibility: Justifying Humanitarian Intervention to Soldiers and Taxpayers

The principle of absolute sovereignty may have been consigned to history, but a strong presumption against foreign intervention seems to have been left in its stead. On the dominant view, only massacre and ethnic cleansing justify armed intervention, these harms must be already occurring or imminent, and the prudential constraints on war must be satisfied. Each of these conditions has recently come under pressure. Those looking to defend the dominant view have typically done so by invoking international peace and stability, or the value of communal self-determination. But the internal aspect of legitimacy has been overlooked in all of this. If a government insists on defending the human rights of foreigners, it must also be sure not to violate the rights of its own citizens in the process. I argue that the current presumption against humanitarian intervention cannot be substantially relaxed for internal reasons, or given the obligations that states owe to their own constituents.     

Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.     

Idealism and illusions

According to the idealist, facts about phenomenal experience determine facts about the physical world. Any such view must account for illusions: cases where there is a discrepancy between the physical world and our experiences of it. In this article, I critique some recent idealist treatments of illusions before presenting my own preferred account. I then argue that, initial impressions notwithstanding, it is actually the realist who has difficulties properly accounting for illusions.     

McDowell and Idealism

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common‐sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject.