The Diremption of Love: Gillian Rose on Agency,Mortality, and Hegelian Feminism

Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place and the meaning of feminism and gender identity in Rose's work by addressing both her philosophical writings and her personal memoir, written in the months preceding her untimely death. It argues that although Rose's overall work was not developed in a feminist context, her philosophy, and in particular her ethical‐political notion of diremption, is valuable for developing a critical feminist philosophy that overcomes the binaries of law and morality, inclusion and exclusion, power and powerlessness—and focuses on the meaning of love as negotiating, rather than mediating, these oppositions.     

James Baldwin,Christian Ethics,and the Recovery of Tradition

This essay uses James Baldwin’s thought about racism and homophobia as a critical lens for thinking about some influential strands of Christian ethics. The first part shows how Baldwin understood racism and homophobia and related them to one another by framing them as instances of spirit/flesh dualism and as effects of Christian supremacy. The second part relies on Baldwin’s categories to analyze and juxtapose the thought of select neo-Anabaptist and neo-Augustinian social ethicists. Like Baldwin, the ethicists I engage respond to the distorting power of Christian supremacy and of spirit/flesh dualism. Unlike Baldwin, these ethicists frame their response to Christian supremacy and dualism as a recovery of a more authentic or faithful Christian tradition. Baldwin, who often relied rhetorically and morally on Christian claims and frequently called on Christians to reflect the example of Jesus and the precepts of love, related to the tradition from the perspective of someone who had become an outsider to the church. He tended to focus instead on what the problems he described reflected about Christianity. The contrast with Baldwin helps identify two distinct retrieval strategies, which characterize the neo-Anabaptist and neo-Augustinian ethicists I discuss. One strategy seeks to preserve the integrity of Christian faith, and the other seeks to protect its essential decency. In what follows, I highlight some of the weaknesses of these approaches to tradition retrieval.     

Reflective thinking and medical students: some thoughtful distillations regarding John Dewey and Hannah Arendt

Reflective thought (critical thinking) is essential to the medical student who hopes to become an effective physician. John Dewey, one of America's foremost educators in the early twentieth century, revolutionized critical thinking and its role in education. In the mid twentieth century Hannah Arendt provided profound insights into the problem of diminishing human agency and political freedom. Taken together, Dewey's insight regarding reflective thought, and Arendt's view of action, speech, and power in the public realm, provide mentors and teachers of medical students guidance in the training of thought and the need for its effective projection at the patient's bedside and in the community.     

On Being Found: How Habitual Patterns of Thought Influence Creative Interest,Behavior, and Ability

This study on 138 undergraduate students used path analysis to investigate the relationship between creativity (interest, measured by a creative activities survey; and ability: fluency, originality, and elaboration) and different aspects of thought patterns presumed to influence the preparation and illumination phase of the creative process: habitual patterns of thought (ruminative brooding, ruminative self-reflection), thought suppression, thought intrusion, mind wandering, and associative ability. Such relationship was hinted at in Wallas’s classical model of the creative sequence, but is rarely investigated. We found that creative behavior/interest was driven by self-reflection, thought intrusion, and the lack of a need for thought suppression; creative ability was fueled mainly by associative ability. The only variable that influenced both aspects of creativity was the lack of resistance to thought suppression; this distinguished the creativity variables from dysphoria, which was associated with a desire for thought suppression. The results suggest that what drives the need to create is not creative ability per se, but rather self-focused attention, as well as the feeling or experience of being found by thought, rather than finding it. That is, the need to create is associated with having thoughts that interrupt one’s ordinary stream of consciousness and that are seen as welcome rather than interfering.     

Cross-Field Differences in Creative Problem-Solving Skills: A Comparison of Health, Biological, and Social Sciences

In the present study, 258 doctoral students working in the health, biological, and social sciences were asked to solve a series of field-relevant problems calling for creative thought. Proposed solutions to these problems were scored with respect to critical creative thinking skills such as problem definition, conceptual combination, and idea generation. Results indicated that health, biological, and social scientists differed with respect to their skill in executing various operations, or processes, involved in creative thought. Interestingly, no differences were observed as a function of the students' level of experience. The implications of these findings for understanding cross-field, and cross-experience level, differences in creative thought are discussed.     

Cross-Field Differences in Creative Problem-Solving Skills: A Comparison of Health,Biological, and Social Sciences

In this study, 258 doctoral students working in the health, biological, and social sciences were asked to solve a series of field-relevant problems calling for creative thought. Proposed solutions to these problems were scored with respect to critical creative thinking skills such as problem definition, conceptual combination, and idea generation. Results indicated that health, biological, and social scientists differed with respect to their skill in executing various operations, or processes, involved in creative thought. Interestingly, no differences were observed as a function of the students' level of experience. The implications of these findings for understanding cross-field, and cross-experience level, differences in creative thought are discussed.     

Sense of agency over thought: external misattribution of thought in a memory task and proneness to auditory hallucination

Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased and that scores of AHES-17 predicted the rate of false memory of critical lures. Furthermore, we revealed that the relationship between AHES-17 scores and the rates of false alarms to critical lures was strictly linear. Therefore, it might be said that individual differences in auditory hallucination-like experiences are highly related to the external misattribution of thought. We discussed these results from the perspective of the sense of agency over thought.     

Critical Reflection,Self-Knowledge,and the Emotions

Abstract

Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation impairs the capacity for autonomy.     

Adorno,Hegel, and Dialectic

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, I show that Adorno can do so consistently because of how he reshapes Hegelian dialectic.     

Disentangling the Impact of Resistance and Ambivalence on Therapy Outcomes in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Resistance and ambivalence about change are increasingly recognized as important determinants of treatment outcomes. Moreover, resistance and ambivalence are thought to be theoretically related in that clients who are more ambivalent about change are more likely to demonstrate resistance to the process and tasks of treatment. In the context of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for generalized anxiety disorder, the present study simultaneously examined early resistance and ambivalence using two observer-based coding systems in order to determine their inter-relationship and, importantly, to investigate their relative contributions to outcome. Resistance was also coded during mid-treatment in order to investigate possible mediation pathways. Early ambivalence (clients’ arguments against change or counter-change talk) was found to be no longer related to outcomes when early resistance was taken into account, suggesting that disharmony in the therapeutic relationship is more important to outcomes than ambivalence per se. Moreover, mid-treatment resistance partially mediated the relationship between early resistance and post-treatment worry severity. That is, higher early opposition to therapist direction is related to poorer outcomes, in part because it is associated with greater resistance during the working phase of CBT. The findings underscore the critical need for therapists to be sensitive to identifying resistance early and throughout treatment.     

Forms of resistance: Foucault on tactical reversal and self-formation

This paper argues that two distinct models of resistance are to be found in Foucault's work. The first, tactical reversal, is predicated on the idea that conflict is inherent to power relations, the strategical model of power, and thus that a specific configuration of power and knowledge can be thwarted by reversing the mechanisms whereby this relation is sustained. The second, the aesthetics of existence, is based in the governmental model of power and holds that it is possible to forge autonomous forms of life in and through such techniques of governance. I argue that Foucault came to favor the latter of these two alternatives because the model of power underlying resistance as tactical reversal proved insufficient both historically and conceptually. It was thus on this basis that he was able to work out the governmental conception of power relations and thereby accord a fundamental role to the concept of resistance as autonomy or self-formation. The key to understanding how this project is not only practical, but is also our obligation lies in the genealogy of the critical attitude that Foucault was developing in his final years.     

The psychological unconscious. Found, lost, and regained.

In response to Greenwald's article on contemporary research on unconscious mental processes, the authors address three issues: (a) the independence of much recent research and theory from psychodynamic formulations; (b) the broad sweep of the psychological unconscious, including implicit perception, memory, thought, learning, and emotion; and (c) the possibility that the analytic power of unconscious processing may depend both on the manner in which mental contents are rendered unconscious and the manner in which they are to be processed.     

Emotion,the bodily,and the cognitive

In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking at evidence from neuroscience and social psychology, as well as thought experiments and theoretical arguments, I conclude that it is necessary to acknowledge both that emotions have intentional content and that they involve somatic agitation. I also point out some of the more promising directions for future research in this area.     

Relationships between thought-action fusion, thought suppression and obsessive-compulsive symptoms: a structural equation modeling approach

Research has shown that there are strong similarities in content between the obsessions and compulsions that characterize obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical obsessions and compulsions. However, clinical and nonclinical obsessions and compulsions do differ with respect to characteristics like frequency, intensity, discomfort and elicited resistance. Two separate concepts have been invoked to explain how normal obsessions and compulsions may develop into clinical phenomena. First, it is suggested that thought-action fusion (TAF) contributes to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Second, thought suppression may intensify obsessive-compulsive symptoms due to its paradoxical effect on intrusive thoughts. Although both phenomena have been found to contribute to obsessive-compulsive symptoms, possible interactions between these two have never been investigated. The current study explored how TAF and thought suppression interact in the development of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Undergraduate psychology students (N = 173) completed questionnaires pertaining to TAF, thought suppression and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Covariances between the scores on these questionnaires were analyzed by means of structural equation modeling. Results suggest that TAF triggers thought suppression, while thought suppression, in turn, promotes obsessive-compulsive symptoms.     

Divine Infinity in Thomas Aquinas: I. Philosophico-Theological Background

A reassessment of Aquinas's doctrine of divine infinity, particularly in the light of the previous history of the concept within Western philosophy and theology. From the critical perspective provided by this history the central place which has been claimed for it in Aquinas's thinking is questioned, as are also its originality and coherence. The notion that the doctrine of divine infinity was introduced to Western thought by Judaeo-Christianity is rejected; from Anaximander onwards it had been a central concept in Greek philosophy. Aristotle however had rejected it so effectively that, for several centuries afterwards, it seems to have led an 'underground' existence until it finally surfaces again in 'Gnostic' and related currents of thought. It is from these circles that it finally, and after some resistance, patchily entered orthodox Christian thinking. Likewise Plotinus was not the source of the doctrine, as some have claimed; historical precedence must be given to the Gnostics. Neoplatonism never, despite the prestige of Plotinus, fully accepted the doctrine; in Proclus it is a subordinate emanation from the One, which is beyond Infinity and Infinitude. Nor, because of the influence of Aristotle, does Islamic Neoplatonized Aristotelianism endorse the doctrine. Aquinas's commitment to it seems to stem from the impact of John of Damascus's stress upon the doctrine, the translation of whose work greatly influenced Western theology from the late twelfth century onward, together with his need to distance himself from the restrictions of the divine power and freedom found in the Arabic Aristotelian philosophers, whom, in general, he regarded as philosophical authorities. But his position on the doctrine is flawed by equivocation and self-contradiction, flowing from his attempt to reconcile Christian personalist theism with Neoplatonized Aristotleain necessitarian monism.     

Theology, History, and Religious Identification: Hegelian Methods in the Study of Religion

This essay deals with the impact of Hegel's philosophy of religion by examining his positions on religious identity and on the relationship between theology and history. I argue that his criterion for religious identity was socio-historical, and that his philosophical theology was historical rather than normative. These positions help explain some historical peculiarities regarding the effect of his philosophy of religion. Of particular concern is that although Hegel’s own aims were apologetic, his major influence on religious thought was in the development of various historical and critical approaches to religion.     

Pierre Hadot on Habit,Reason, and Spiritual Exercises

This essay is a reappraisal of Pierre Hadot's concept of spiritual exercises in response to recent criticisms of his work. The author argues that contrary to the claims of his critics, Hadot articulates a compelling argument that spiritual exercises that employ imaginative, rhetorical, and cognitive techniques are both necessary for and successful at producing a subject in which reason is integrated into human character. Such exercises are critical for overcoming the effects of habit, as a result of which everyday conduct resists rational control, and Hadot provides a nuanced account of how particular practices affect different aspects of emotion, behavior, and thought. The concept of spiritual exercises remains a viable component of theoretical frameworks for the study of religious ethics, though the author concludes that Hadot's position on habit and its role in ethical practice requires further investigation.     

The Thousand Goals and the One Goal: Morality and Will to Power in Nietzsche's Zarathustra

Nietzsche's critical stance toward morality appears to support some version of moral relativism. Yet he praises some actions and attributes while condemning others. Are these evaluations expressions of his moral prejudices, or is there a basis for them in his thought? Through a close reading of key passages from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I attempt to demonstrate that morality for Nietzsche is the historically situated working‐out of will to power and therefore subject to critique on that basis.     

Sugar and Spice,and Everything Nice: What Rough Heroines Tell Us about Imaginative Resistance

This article examines the asymmetry between our engagement with male characters in fictional narratives who transgress moral norms and female characters who do the same. I claim that rough heroines present a new puzzling instance of resistance phenomena that cannot be accounted for by even the most recent accounts of imaginative resistance that incorporate considerations of narrative context, such as genre and narrative artistry. I sketch a solution that points to the violation of gender norms and the challenge to power dynamics as the source of resistance. I argue that rough heroines reveal an important element of narrative engagement that has been largely overlooked in the literature: appreciators’ interpretive horizons.     

Toward an operant model of power in organizations

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that behavior analysis can help to explain social power. In this approach, an individual's potential for influence is thought to be partially a function of his or her access to stimuli that can be used as consequences. This access can occur either through direct authority or indirectly through social networks and exchanges. Social power is also thought to be a function of an individual's skill in delivering the stimuli in ways that will have the most impact on behavior. A number of predictions about power based on an operant approach are offered.