共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Ross Paul Cameron 《Synthese》2008,164(2):261-280
This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p>
or <Necessarily, p>. In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 2 I criticise
Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes
essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 4 I discuss,
and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving
the problem. 相似文献
2.
Samuel Kimpton-Nye 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2021,102(2):342-358
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard about the nature of the hardcore actualist’s modal reality and how radically this departs from possible worlds orthodoxy. Once we achieve this departure, the prospects of a hardcore actualist validation of S5 look considerably brighter. This paper thus strengthens hardcore actualism by arguing that it can indeed validate S5–arguably the most popular logic of metaphysical modality–and, in the process, it elucidates the very nature of modality according to this revisionary, but very attractive, modal metaphysics. 相似文献
3.
Eric Stencil 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2016,97(1):2-26
In the 1680s, Gottfried Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld engaged in a philosophically rich correspondence. One issue they discuss is modal metaphysics – questions concerning necessity, possibility, and essence. While Arnauld's contributions to the correspondence are considered generally astute, his contributions on this issue have not always received a warm treatment. I argue that Arnauld's criticisms of Leibniz are sophisticated and that Arnauld offers his own Cartesian account in its place. In particular, I argue that Arnauld offers an account of possibility that is actualist (only actual things exist), modal actualist (modality is irreducible) and essence‐based (essences ground de re counterfactuals). 相似文献
4.
It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects – cannot deal adequately with statementsinvolving iterated modality, because such claims require reference, either explicit or surreptitious, to non-actualobjects. If so, actualists would have to reject the standard semantics for quantified modal logic (QML). In this paper I develop an account of modality which allows the actualist tomake sense of iterated modal claims that are ostensibly aboutnon-actual objects. Every occurrence of a modal operatorinvolves the stipulation of a possible world, and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.I provide an actualistically acceptable (AA) semantics for QMLwherein the nesting relation is irreflexive and intransitive and forms a tree. Despite these restrictions, AA models can beshown to be sound and complete for a wide variety of modal logics. 相似文献
5.
Christopher Menzel 《Synthese》1990,85(3):355-389
Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight into the modal structure of reality. For possible world semantics, it is supposed, commits one to possibilism. In this paper I take issue with this view. To the contrary, I argue that one can take possible world semantics seriously and yet remain in full compliance with actualist scruples. 相似文献
6.
E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2011,181(3):471-488
This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz.,
the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic
propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having
justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments
against both claims. 相似文献
7.
Jonathan D. Jacobs 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(2):227-248
Possible worlds, concrete or abstract as you like, are irrelevant to the truthmakers for modality—or so I shall argue in this
paper. First, I present the neo-Humean picture of modality, and explain why those who accept it deny a common sense view of
modality. Second, I present what I take to be the most pressing objection to the neo-Humean account, one that, I argue, applies
equally well to any theory that grounds modality in possible worlds. Third, I present an alternative, properties-based theory of modality and
explore several specific ways to flesh the general proposal out, including my favored version, the powers theory. And, fourth,
I offer a powers semantics for counterfactuals that each version of the properties-based theory of modality can accept, mutatis mutandis. Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals
generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. 相似文献
8.
Jean-Paul Vessel 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):183-195
There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle:
The principle states that for any acts (or any bearers of normative status) a and b, if it is obligatory for a specific agent to do the conjunctive (or compound) act a & b, then that agent is obligated to do a and is also obligated to do b—the deontic operator of obligation distributes over conjunction. Possibilists—those who believe that we should always pursue
a “best” possible course of action available to us—accept the principle as true. Actualists—those who believe that certain future facts about
the actual world can generate obligations incompatible with the best possible course of action available to us—reject the principle
as false. And recent commentators on the dispute—some who endorse DC, others who reject it—have attempted to dig out and
defend intermediary positions, suggesting that extreme versions of each view are unsatisfactory.
I’m out to defend DC from the actualist attack. Here I briefly present the central actualist argument against DC. I then
show that possibilism has all of the resources to explain the phenomena with which actualists are so concerned. Next, I try
to diagnose the actualists’ malcontent: The relevance of certain subjunctive conditionals to consequentialist reasoning has
been vastly overemphasized. Finally, I attempt to shed some light on the nature of consequentialist conditionals by incorporating
possibilist insights into a semantics for subjunctive conditionals appropriate for consequentialist theorizing.
相似文献
Jean-Paul VesselEmail: |
9.
Christopher Evan Franklin 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):199-230
In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the
luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary
for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features
of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing
why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four
formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand
why the Mind argument also fails. 相似文献
10.
Anthony Wrigley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):175-190
Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result,
there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered
harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical
assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In
this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity arguments rely upon a specific adoption of a theory
of modality and identity and how adopting an alternative account of modality can be used to reject many conclusions formed
through Non-Identity type arguments. By using Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic account to understand ways we might have been,
I outline the basis of a modal account of harm that incorporates a person-affecting aspect. This, in turn, has significant
implications for ethical decision-making in areas such as reproductive choice and the welfare of future generations. 相似文献
11.
Adrian Bardon 《Philosophia》2005,33(1-4):69-95
‘Performative’ transcendental arguments exploit the status of a subcategory of self-falsifying propositions in showing that
some form of skepticism is unsustainable. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between performatively inconsistent
propositions and transcendental arguments, and then to compare performative transcendental arguments to modest transcendental
arguments that seek only to establish the indispensability of some belief or conceptual framework. Reconceptualizing transcendental
arguments as performative helps focus the intended dilemma for the skeptic: performative transcendental arguments directly
confront the skeptic with the choice of abandoning either skepticism or some other deep theoretical commitment.
Many philosophers, from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to Jaakko Hintikka, C.I. Lewis, and Bernard Lonergan, have claimed
that some skeptical propositions regarding knowledge, reason, and/or morality can be shown to be self-defeating; that is to
say, they have claimed that the very upholding of some skeptical position is in some way incompatible with the position being
upheld, or with the implied, broader dialectical position of the skeptic in question. Statements or propositions alleged to
have this characteristic also sometimes are called ‘self-falsifying,’ ‘self-refuting,’ ‘self-stultifying,’ ‘self-destructive,’
or ‘pointless.’ However, proponents of the strategy of showing skepticism to be self-defeating have not in general adequately
distinguished between two types of self-defeating proposition: self-falsifying and self-stultifying. In the first part of
this paper I distinguish between self-falsifying and self-stultifying propositions, and introduce the notion of performative
self-falsification. In the second part I discuss classical transcendental arguments, ‘modest’ transcendental arguments, and
objections to each. In the third part I introduce two types of transcendental argument—each labeled “performative”—corresponding
to two types of performatively self-falsifying proposition, and I compare them to modest transcendental arguments. 相似文献
12.
Ross Paul Cameron 《Synthese》2008,161(1):27-45
In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates
the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance
of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts
to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial
of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show
how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents.
I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum. 相似文献
13.
Patrick Toner 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):421-434
It is fairly common, among those who think propositions exist, to think they exist necessarily. Here, I consider three arguments
in support of that conclusion. What I hope to show is not that that claim is false, but, rather, that the arguments used in
its defense tend to presuppose a certain kind of approach to modality: a roughly Plantingian view. What the arguments show,
then, is that one cannot accept that approach to modality and accept contingently existing propositions. But there are other
approaches to modality – I discuss three such approaches – into which contingently existing propositions fit perfectly well.
This suggests that disputes over, for example, singular propositions, must be conducted within a broader agreement over modal
matters if they are to be at all productive. 相似文献
14.
Peter Schulte 《Synthese》2011,181(3):413-431
Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can
provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project
is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project,
I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated,
which, when combined with a specific theory of reduction (the ‘conceptual entailment approach’), yields a new analysis of
truthmaking. This analysis is intuitively appealing and avoids the problem of necessary truths, which poses a serious obstacle
for standard accounts. 相似文献
15.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献
16.
Jack Ritchie 《Synthese》2008,162(1):85-100
Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.
In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall.
I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how
to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meaning—semantic
holism. I explain how a version of structural realism can be developed using Davidson’s theory of meaning and some advantages
this has over the Ramsey-sentence version of structuralism. 相似文献
17.
Boris Kukso 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):21-37
In this paper, I make a contribution to a naturalistically-minded theory of truthmakers by proposing a solution to the nasty problem of truthmakers for negative truths. After formulating the difficulty, I consider and reject a number of solutions to the problem, including Armstrong's states of affairs of totality, incompatibility accounts, and JC Beall's polarity view. I then defend the position that absences of truthmakers are real and are responsible for making negative truths true (and positive falsehoods false). According to the positive account of absences I offer, absences of contingent states of affairs are causally relevant mind-independent features of the physical world, located within space and time, and capable of being discovered by scientific inquiry. Recognition of the reality of absences strengthens truthmaker theory as a naturalistic metaphysics, as truth and falsity of each and every contingent proposition finds an ontological grounding in some region of the physical universe. 相似文献
18.
Agustín Vicente 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):293-312
In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science,
2007) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious
in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection
processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such
properties can do, i.e., to their causal powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion
problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy
with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument
that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may
imply for the issue of mental causation. 相似文献
19.
According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational
content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.”
According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing
an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency
thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First,
I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory
qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can
vary despite constancy in representational content. 相似文献
20.
Jeff A. Snapper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):45-56
In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction”
section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not
succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s
argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist
theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully
rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both
kinds of arguments for its inconsistency. 相似文献