The stigma of the self

Abstract

After recounting some personal life experiences that sensitized him to the kind of stigma that Erving Goffman systematically explored in his 1963 classic, Stigma, the author, who Is a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, introduces hit concept of the stigma of the self. Paradoxically, the stigma of the self may occur when a person is treated as merely normal, and as only a social self and when, a? a consequence, there does not seem to be any recognition of what D. W. Winnicott has termed the true self. Drawing on his studies of the self [in his recently published The Singles Scene: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Breakdown of Intimacy(Alper, 1995)] the author explores the dynamics of what he calls intimacy hunger, an unappreciated but powerful need that, especially after a sufficient period of deprivation has elapsed, cannot be satuifed by a purely social substitute.     

Sartre and Ricoeur on Productive Imagination

Commenting on Jean‐Paul Sartre's theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre's examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination, I examine Sartre's philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation, well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative‐identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative‐theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

Derrida argued at great length early on in his career that texts live on in the absence of their author. The question remains, however, of precisely how this survival takes place. In this paper I argue that the life of Derrida’s own ?uvre is sustained through his particular practice of self‐inheritance. I justify this claim by focusing on one moment in the text Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, in which Derrida inherits from himself through self‐citation. In citing himself while at the same time modifying his citation, Derrida sets into motion a deconstruction of his own text that he does not seem to anticipate. It is this movement of deconstruction that enables Derrida’s text to live on.     

Darwin, Design and Dawkins’ Dilemma

Richard Dawkins has a dilemma when it comes to design arguments. On the one hand, he maintains that it was Darwin who killed off design and so implies that his rejection of design depends upon the findings of modern science. On the other hand, he follows Hume when he claims that appealing to a designer does not explain anything and so implies that rejection of design need not be based on the findings of modern science. These contrasting approaches lead to the following dilemma: if he claims that Darwinism is necessary for rejecting design, he has no satisfactory response to design arguments based on the order in the laws of physics or the fine-tuning of the physical constants; alternatively, if Humean arguments are doing most of the work, this would undermine one of his main contentions, that atheism is justified by science and especially by evolution. In any case, his Humean arguments do not provide a more secure basis for his atheism because they are seriously flawed. A particular problem is that his argument for the improbability of theism rests on a highly questionable application of probability theory since, even if it were sound, it would only establish that the prior probability of God’s existence is low, a conclusion which is compatible with the posterior probability of God’s existence being high.     

An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Surprise Execution

This paper further develops the system of illocutionary logic presented in ‘Propositional logic of supposition and assertion’ (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1997, 38, 325-349) to accommodate an ‘I believe that’ operator and resolve Moore's Paradox. This resolution is accomplished by providing both a truth-conditional and a commitment-based semantics. An important feature of the logical system is that the correctness of some arguments depends on who it is that makes the argument. The paper then shows that the logical system can be expanded to resolve the surprise execution paradox puzzle. The prisoner's argument showing that he can't be executed by surprise is correct but his beliefs are incoherent. The judge's beliefs (and our beliefs) about this situation are not incoherent.     

Bullinger's Defence of Infant Baptism in Debate with the Anabaptists

Abstract

Bullinger presents his understanding of infant baptism not only in systematic or summary form in the Decades and confessional works but also in dialogue or discussion form in other works. From 1525 what is fundamental in expounding his view and in challenging his opponents’ views is the argument from the covenant, which is one and eternal. In 1525 he begins with this and then examines Anabaptist objections. However in 1531 and 1560 he begins with his opponents’ case, though with different elements in it. The substance of his defence of infant baptism is unchanged between 1525 and 1560, though some new arguments emerge over the years. There is continuity between Zwingli and Bullinger, both in the argument from the covenant and in a range of biblical arguments. However, unlike Zwingli, Bullinger makes no use of election in support of his case and later expounds Acts 19 differently from Zwingli.     

Jerome on Sinlessness: a Via Media between Augustine and Pelagius

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms.     

Better No Longer to Be

Abstract

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life,² one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism³. This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism⁴ deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be.     

Ricoeur’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">askēsis</Emphasis>: textual and gymnastic exercises for self-transformation

This essay examines what the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur can contribute to current debates on the role of spiritual exercise, or askēsis, in philosophical life. The influential work of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault has sparked a widespread interest in the ancient model of philosophy, variously described as a way of life, art of living, or care of the self. Ricoeur’s potential contribution to this conversation has been overlooked, largely because he does not discuss these themes explicitly or often. However, Ricoeur’s early phenomenology of embodiment in The Voluntary and the Involuntary offers valuable insights regarding the exercises of self-transformation. After a brief survey of Ricoeur’s concept of askēsis, this essay draws on Ricoeur to demonstrate the merits of physical exercise, or gymnastic, in ethical and spiritual formation. Gymnastic, Ricoeur shows, can be a form of spiritual exercise. The final section of the paper then makes a similarly counterintuitive claim: namely, that reading is an embodied practice that can facilitate the ethical formation of the lived body.     

Two French Variations on Truth: Ricoeur's Attestation and Foucault's “Parrhesiastic” Attitude

Both Ricoeur and Foucault, apparently independently of each other, dedicated much effort to provide an account of truth that goes far beyond the truth of sentences, propositions, or judgments. While well aware of the speech act theory and pragmatics, they want to go beyond a formalism of rules of speech or arguments and integrate the attitude of the one who speaks in the very notion of truth. They see truth not merely as a property of statements, but as an existential process in such a way that the truth of statements is linked to the historically situated speaker. Truth as a property of statements is related to truth as an event. However, both reject any form of historicism or relativism.

I examine Ricoeur's notion of attestation and Foucault's notion of parrhesia, showing how both notions represent a kind of “poetics of truth”, which combines the existential position of the speaker and the historical circumstances of utterance. I show the extent to which both poetics of truth are political and ethical and how successful each poetics is: Ricoeur believes that he can maintain a claim to universality whereas Foucault abandons such a claim and instead subscribes to a radical singularity of the event of speech in a mode of truth that is, as he says, “polemic”.     

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.     

From One Testament to the Other

Translation of Paul Ricoeur, “D'un testament à l'autre” Translator's Preface: This essay, part of the section “Essais d'herméneutique biblique” in Ricoeur's Lectures 3: aux frontières de la philosophie, is one example of the later Ricoeur's increasing willingness to let theology and philosophy speak to each other. I would like to draw readers’ attention to two moves made here by Ricoeur: (1) the way in which his philosophical hermeneutics opens the way for a biblical ontology rooted in Exodus 3:14, and (2) the way his theory of metaphor reveals the same implied ontology behind 1 John 4:8.     

A Child Mourns the Family He Cannot Come From1

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the clinical material from the analysis of a young adolescent who was conceived using artificial reproduction techniques (ART). After reviewing the scant literature regarding how a child is conceived through the use of ART, the use of the term birth other is employed to understand this child’s longstanding sadness and sense of isolation. The material from his analysis demonstrates that the meaning of birth other as Eherensaft suggested (2005, 2007) is not the only meaning that an individual can assign to his experience. This child created a fantasy of a family from which he felt excluded because his parents had birth other families within which they were conceived. The material indicated that his attempt at mourning his lack of a genetically based family in a way that not even adopted children often mourn, occurred only in an unconscious manner, inhibiting him from focusing on more age-appropriate concerns. The psychological issues that he brought to his analysis clearly reflected the complexity of the circumstances of his birth and that he felt he existed outside of a family that he could identify with.     

Surviving without a Brain: A response to McMahan on Personal Identity

Abstract

In his Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, Jeff McMahan defends what he calls the embodied mind view of identity, and then puts forward several arguments in support of the view that physical continuity of the brain is crucial to our survival. He ultimately denies that psychological continuity is of any importance. His strategy is to recommend, by means of thought experiments, intuitions that support the importance of physical continuity of the brain and then argue against the plausibility of the notion of psychological continuity to which psychological theorists appeal. This paper is specifically concerned with the alleged importance of physical continuity to our survival. It responds to the positive and negative aspects of McMahan’s case by arguing that thought experiments that recommend the psychological view are far more compelling than he allows them to be and that psychological theorists can make do with a notion of psychological continuity that is immune to his criticisms.     

Marx's commodity fetishism

Marx's work in the first chapters of Capital is sometimes taken to be ‘metaphysical’, since his remarks do not lend themselves to ‘scientific’ testing against quantitative data. I argue that Marx aimed to re‐present the economic theory of his day in order to reveal the characteristic presuppositions of capitalist society, and ‐ in the first instance ‐ to rid the theory of logical confusions. Though his distinctions are ingenious and his arguments consistent, the enterprise fails in certain respects, because he relies on Ricardian propositions about value and labour, and because his use of certain methods and distinctions of nineteenth‐century logic is no longer convincing. Hence he reaches conclusions about the meaning of value, and the nature of commodities and labour, that are wrong in principle. These conclusions were the logical basis for his most sweeping predictions about capitalist society.     

UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED

Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know‐how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action.