FORGETTING AND THE TASK OF SEEING: Ordinary Oblivion,Plato, and Ethics

The gaps, fissures, and lapses of attention in a life—what I call “ordinary oblivions”—are fertile fragilities that present a compelling source for ethics. Plato, not Aristotle, is the ancient philosopher specially poised to speak to this feature of human life. Drawing upon poet C. K. Williams's idea that forgetting is a “looking away” that makes possible “beginning again,” I present a Platonic approach to ethics as an alternative to Aristotelian or virtue ethics. Plato's Phaedrus is a key source text for this alternate picture; from it I suggest how we might construe Iris Murdoch's “task of seeing” in terms of the engagement with written form. Poetry is a central locale for such engagement, and thus suggests a kind of ethical praxis that arises from the theoretical emphases of my examination of forgetting, the unmoored self, remade other‐regard, and sacred sources.     

Explorations in the Meanings of Excellence and Its Importance for Counselors: The Culture of Excellence in the United States

Contemporary narratives of excellence embody the competitive striving and achievement themes underlying the idea of American exceptionalism. The author examines excellence through Aristotle's (trans. 2002) Nicomachean Ethics. An overemphasis on winning or excelling can undermine general human excellence and harm well‐being. Counselors are encouraged to embrace general human excellence and to challenge narratives of excellence.     

Fichte's striving subject

In this paper I argue that Fichte's attempt to reconcile the dualism of concept and intuition requires the overcoming of any idea of a thing‐in‐itself. At the same time he preserves the idea of an external constraint on the I's self‐positing. This central role for the realist constraint of the check conflicts with recent interpretations of Fichte that see his project as advocating the exclusivity of the space of reasons. The striving subject confronts and unifies the opposition between the realistic and idealistic elements in the Wissenschaftslehre. It is argued that as striving, reason's drive for self‐determination is a process of self‐transformation, as consciousness confronts the limitations of its inadequate explanations of the objects of experience.     

Implicit Theories About Willpower Predict Subjective Well‐Being

Lay theories about willpower—the belief that willpower is a limited versus nonlimited resource—affect self‐control and goal striving in everyday life (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010). Three studies examined whether willpower theories also relate to people's subjective well‐being by shaping the progress they make toward their personal goals. A cross‐sectional (Study 1) and two longitudinal studies (Studies 2 and 3) measured individuals’ willpower theories and different indicators of subjective well‐being. Additionally, Study 3 measured goal striving and personal goal progress. A limited theory about willpower was associated with lower subjective well‐being in a sample of working adults (Study 1, N = 258). Further, a limited theory predicted lower levels of well‐being at a time when students faced high self‐regulatory demands (Study 2, N = 196). Study 3 (N = 157) replicated the finding that students with a limited theory experienced lower well‐being in phases of high self‐regulatory demands and found that personal goal progress mediated this relationship. Results suggest that the belief that willpower is based on a limited resource has negative implications not only for self‐control but also for personal goal striving and subjective well‐being.     

The Activities of The Scandinavian Societies

Freud's concept of the death instinct has given rise to many different interpretations which have often been contradictory. It is in fact already possible to discern two diametrically opposite meanings of this concept in Freud's work from 1920—Beyond the Pleasure Principle—in which he first introduced the concept of the death instinct. In this paper, it is argued that both these meanings are relevant in describing psychical life, although only one of these meanings actually qualifies for the concept “death instinct”. Beyond the Pleasure Principle was written in order to try to understand some everyday, as well as clinical phenomena which could not be explained by the so-called pleasure principle. Freud postulated something beyond the pleasure principle, which initially seemed to have to do with binding energy. I will preserve this idea and attempt to develop it within the context of a phenomenological analysis of time. The temporalization of the subject involves a very basic affirmation of existence, in that the subject experiences something constant, something that can be said to possess the quality of a gestalt. I propose that that which is beyond the pleasure principle—this binding of energy—should be understood as the opposite of the idea of a primordial death instinct striving towards death. In this case, that which is beyond the pleasure principle reflects an original affirmation of existence, which could be said to correspond to Freud's first meaning of the death instinct. The second meaning—for which the name “death instinct” seems to be applicable—concerns the discharge of energy, which from a temporal point of view shows itself as a tendency to dissolution. The concept of the death instinct in its various meanings is discussed in connection with phenomenological reflections on time, which is a different approach from Freud's attempt to ground the death instinct in biology.     

RUPTURES IN THE ANALYTIC SETTING AND DISTURBANCES IN THE TRANSFORMATIONAL FIELD OF DREAMS

This paper explores some implications of Bleger's (1967, 2013) concept of the analytic situation, which he views as comprising the analytic setting and the analytic process. The author discusses Bleger's idea of the analytic setting as the depositary for projected painful aspects in either the analyst or patient or both—affects that are then rendered as nonprocess. In contrast, the contents of the analytic process are subject to an incessant process of transformation (Green 2005). The author goes on to enumerate various components of the analytic setting: the nonhuman, object relational, and the analyst's “person” (including mental functioning). An extended clinical vignette is offered as an illustration.     

Remarks about the Nietzschean dancing God

Nietzsche and (or beyond) Christianity: a worn-out and almost banal problem? In this article I argue that this topic goes far beyond a mere opposition between Christians and Nietzscheans. I want to show that the actual issue concerns Nietzsche's attempt to overcome the moral hegemony within Christianity. In this context, Nietzsche's project is not to eradicate religion but to define a new religious space. I have organised this discussion by conceiving the present article around a sentence extracted from Thus spoke Zarathustra. I first analyse the text in its syntactic and rhetorical composition. Nietzsche's very strategy (or trick?) resides in undermining the Christian discourse from the inside: he argues that Christian morality is not inspired by a cheerful affirmation of life but by its vindictive negation. I further show that Nietzsche puts at stake the Christian striving for a justification of life and consequently its incapacity of accepting the question-mark of existence. Within his radical critique, Nietzsche points to an authentic attitude towards life, an attitude which I have designated with the metaphor of the dancing God.     

Hegel's real habits

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a “second nature.” This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life, if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call “real habits.” First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive—Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale—concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.     

Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique

In this article the author suggests that progress in philosophy can be conceived through contemporary French theories that propose a new, polysemantic way of thinking. Postmodern philosophy has tried to renew the meaning of the subject, of the subject's identity, and of language and communication. The author believes that the postmodern, feminist approach to those concepts represents significant progress in philosophy. It is, in fact, exactly in the context of feminism—conceived of not just as a women's sociopolitical or scientific activity but as a broad theoretical approach to many areas—that Western philosophy has acquired its most explicit and adequate meaning. A crucial example here is the new historicophilosophical analysis of the concept of gender. The author appeals to Lipovetsky, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and other thinkers to show how postmodern feminism helps to overcome the binary vision of the contemporary world and the dichotomic composition of earlier philosophical thought.     

Reply to Nadler: Spinoza and the metaphysics of suicide

Steven Nadler has argued that Spinoza can, should, and does allow for the possibility of suicide committed as a free and rational action. Given that the conatus is a striving for perfection, Nadler argues, there are cases in which reason guides a person to end her life based on the principle of preferring the lesser evil. If so, Spinoza’s disparaging statements about suicide are intended to apply only to some cases, whereas in others (such as the case of Seneca) he would grant that suicide is dictated by reason. Here, I object to Nadler’s interpretation by showing that it conflicts with Spinoza’s metaphysical psychology. Even given Nadler’s interpretation of the conatus doctrine, the possibility that reason could guide a person to commit suicide is incompatible with the conatus of the mind. Spinoza holds that the mind cannot contain an adequate idea ‘that excludes the existence of our body’ (E3p10). Yet, as I argue, in order for reason to guide a person voluntarily to end her life, she would need to have an adequate idea representing her death – an idea that excludes the existence of her body. For this reason, Spinoza's system rules out the possibility of rational suicide.     

Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel

This article is a comprehensive critical analysis of the objections of Michael Sandel to the possibilities of human enhancement as foreseen by recent developments in new (particularly genetic) biotechnologies. It is shown that enhancement has always been a feature of human development. The nature and possibilities of these new technologies are briefly discussed, followed by an explanation of Sandel's views. In critical response to Sandel, the author raises three arguments that are discussed in detail, followed by a conclusion that contains wrap-up arguments. The three main arguments relate, first, to Sandel's rejection of enhancement tout court, second to the (in)consistency of his argument about the ‘gifted’ nature of reality, and third to the problems raised by his idea that the striving for mastery is the main problem with enhancement. On the basis of an extensive analysis, the author finds Sandel's position untenable. It is shown that Sandel espouses the ‘simple conservative argument’ (Buchanan). The author concludes that science and technology are not value free, and that the critical evaluation of enhancements cannot lead to an overall judgment, but has to progress in a piecemeal manner. The author also concludes that the notion of ‘human nature’ cannot be regarded as a moral desideratum.     

PARRHESIA,PHAEDRA, AND THE POLIS: ANTICIPATING PSYCHOANALYTIC FREE ASSOCIATION AS DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE

This essay explores the mostly unexamined analogy of psychoanalytic free association to democratic free speech. The author turns back to a time when free speech was a matter of considerable discussion: the classical period of the Athenian constitution and its experiment with parrhesia. Ordinarily translated into English as “free speech,” parrhesia is startlingly relevant to psychoanalysis. The Athenian stage—in particular, Hippolytus (Euripides, 5th century BCE)—illustrates this point. Euripides's tragic tale anticipates Freud's inquiries, exploring the fundamental link between free speech and female embodiment. The author suggests that psychoanalysis should claim its own conception of a polis as a mediated and ethical space between private and public spheres, between body and mind, and between speaking and listening communities.     

Imaginal action: towards a Jungian conception of enactment,and an extraverted counterpart to active imagination

This theoretical paper considers the fashion in which Jung's psychology radically challenges modern assumptions concerning the nature of subjectivity. With an eye for the clinical implications of Jung's late work, the author introduces the idea of imaginal action. In order to explain what is meant by this, the paper begins by exploring how Jung's thinking demonstrates an underlying bias towards introversion. It is argued that while Jung's interest in synchronicity ultimately resulted in his developing a worldview that might address the introverted biases of his psychology, the clinical implications of this shift have not been sufficiently clarified. With reference to some short examples from experience, the author outlines a conception of relational synchronicity wherein the intrapsychic emerges non‐projectively within the interpersonal field itself. Comparing and contrasting these occurrences to the more introverted practice of active imagination, it is claimed that such a notion is implicit in Jung's work and is needed as a corrective to his emphasis on interiority. The author suggests that imaginal action might be conceived as a distinctly Jungian approach to the psychoanalytic notion of enactment. It is also shown how the idea outlined might find further support from recent developments in the field of transpersonal psychology.     

Reason,Religion, and Sexual Difference: Resources for a Feminist Philosophy of Religion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

Reading Hegel's 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion alongside his Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that his vision for becoming a self‐conscious subject—or seeing (oneself as) “spirit”—requires taking responsibility for the insight that every act of reason expresses an experience of sexual difference. It entails working to bring into being communities whose conceptions of gender and the absolute realize this idea.     

ANALYTIC MIND USE AND INTERPSYCHIC COMMUNICATION: DRIVING FORCE IN ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE,PATHWAY TO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL LIFE

Developed from established psychoanalytic knowledge among different psychoanalytic cultures concerning unconscious interpsychic communication, analysts' use of their receptive mental experience—their analytic mind use, including the somatic, unconscious, and less accessible derivatives—represents a significant investigative road to patients' unconscious mental life, particularly with poorly symbolized mental states. The author expands upon this tradition, exploring what happens when patients unconsciously experience and identify with the analyst's psychic functioning. The technical implications of the analyst's “instrument” are described, including the analyst's ego regression, creation of inner space, taking mind as object, bearing uncertainty and intense affect, and self‐analysis. Brief case vignettes illustrate the structure and obstacles to this work.     

The Sexual Division of Labor and the Split Paycheck

This essay takes up an apparently minor idea of Susan Moller Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family—that employers should split the paycheck of wage‐earning husbands between employees and their stay‐at‐home spouses—and suggests that it actually threatens to undermine Okin's entire argument by perpetuating the most central cause of women's inequality by Okin's own account: the sexual division of labor. Recognizing the vital contributions that Okin's seminal work made and the impact that it had on the field of feminist philosophy and political theory, the essay explores the ethical, political, and philosophical problems with this solution to the dire problems of gender inequality and injustice that Okin correctly identifies. The essay suggests that her commitment to liberalism may have resulted in a commitment to an inadequate vision of how to solve the problems of gender inequality, and offers other possibilities that Okin could have pursued instead that sustain her strong commitment to liberalism.     

Unlawful Entry: Male Fears of Psychic Penetration

In this paper, it is argued that males as well as females have an early experience in relation to the nursing mother of being receptive to bodily and psychic penetration. Males tend to lose access to this experience and may come to fear penetration as a threat such that a masculine sense of self is felt to be dependent on an impermeable psychic boundary that is not to be penetrated. Instead, phallicism as a fortress of emotional self-sufficiency—which the author labels the citadel complex—becomes the matrix of a subjective sense of masculinity. The multiple and combined forces of bodily development, the establishment of gender identity, and the process of separation-individuation are examined for their role in this process.

A critique of the Lacanian concept of paternal law suggests that the “law of the father” can be interpreted as a law regulating penetration. Paternal law can be viewed as a code for the establishment of an impenetrable masculinity whereby entry into an adult male psyche becomes unthinkable, “unlawful.” An impermeable bodily and psychic boundary—the ability to penetrate without the ability to be penetrated—collapses a necessary dialectical tension that may affect men's experience of sex and of love and that may shape and limit their desire.     

The Dwelling Places of Self-Experience

Instead of dichotomizing psychic life as either intrapsychic or interpersonal, I suggest we think in terms of a continuum of self-experience from the most private or interior to the most public or exterior. I articulate four “domains”—phenomenologic, intrapersonal, interpsychic, and interpersonal—that constitute this spectrum of self-experience. Each domain lends a specific quality to one's internal life, and together (but in varying proportions) they constitute the psychic dwelling place unique to a given individual. This article illustrates how the variability among our patients in their habitual dwelling places may explain their diverse responses to differing analytic stances, interpretive approaches, and indeed, different analysts. A clinician's awareness of his or her own personal proclivity toward a more interior or more exterior orientation helps promote optimal contact with the patient's psychic life.     

The Epic of Evolution as a Framework for Human Orientation in Life

This article sketches what is required of a world picture (religious or nonreligious) that is intended to provide orientation in the world for ongoing human life today. How do we move from conceptions and theories prominent in the modern sciences—such as cosmic and biological evolution—to an overall picture or cosmology which can orient us for the effective address of today's deepest human problems? A biohistoricalconception of the human is proposed in answer to this question.