Public justification versus public deliberation: the case for divorce

I drive a wedge between public deliberation and public justification, concepts tightly associated in public reason liberalism. Properly understood, the ideal of public justification imposes no restraint on citizen deliberation but requires that those who have a substantial impact on the use of coercive power, political officials, advance proposals each person has sufficient reason to accept. I formulate this idea as the Principle of Convergent Restraint and apply it to legislators to illustrate the general reorientation I propose for the public reason project.     

Omniscience and deliberation

Conclusion To sum up, we have argued that if deliberation is incompatible with (fore)knowing what one is going to do at the time of the deliberation, then God cannot deliberate. However, this thesis cannot be used to show either that God cannot act intentionally or that human persons cannot deliberate. Further, we have suggested that though omniscience is incompatible with deliberation, it is not incompatible with either some speculation or knowing something on the grounds of inference.

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Promises and perils of public deliberation: contrasting two national bioethics commissions on embryonic stem cell research

National bioethics commissions have struggled to develop ethically warranted methods for conducting their deliberations. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission in its report on stem cell research adopted an approach to public deliberation indebted to Rawls in that it sought common ground consistent with shared values and beliefs at the foundation of a well-ordered democracy. In contrast, although the research cloning and stem cell reports of the President's Council on Bioethics reveal that it broached two different methods of public deliberation--balancing goods and following an overarching moral principle--it adopted neither. Thereupon its primer mover, Leon Kass, influenced particularly by the approach of Leo Strauss, sought to develop a method of public deliberation guided by tradition and practical wisdom. When this failed, the Council fell back on a method that took account of shared fundamental values of a free democracy--a method remarkable akin to that employed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Respect for diverse reasonable conceptions of the good in a democratic polity requires national bioethics commissions to seek and incorporate that which is valuable in opposing positions.     

Act utilitarianism and dynamic deliberation

Coordination problems, problems in which each agent's expected utility depends upon what other agents do, pose a problem for act utilitarianism. When the agents are act utilitarians and know of each other that they are so, they seem unable to achieve optimal outcomes in certain coordination problems. I examine various ways the act utilitarian might attempt to solve this problem, where act utilitarianism is interpreted within the framework of subjective expected utility theory. In particular, a new method for computing expected utility,dynamic deliberation, deserves examination as a possible act utilitarian solution to coordination problems. I argue that even dynamic deliberation fails to give the act utilitarian what he needs in coordination problems, and that the failure of act utilitarianism for such problems suggests the need for an alternative theory of moral choice along rule utilitarian lines.     

Combatting Jihadist Terrorism: A Quality-of-Life Perspective

Many scholars and commentators have written on ways to counteract acts of terrorism initiated by Islamist militants associated with Jihadist groups operating predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa Region (hereafter the MENA region). Most of what has been published in the academic literature with respect to slowing, eventually stopping, the rate of Islamist-inspired terrorism has focused on short-term public safety solutions to the problem. In this paper, we build a quality-of-life model to address the drivers of Jihadist terrorism and deduce the underlying factors that contribute to counterterrorism programs directly from our understanding of these drivers. Specifically, we provide suggestive evidence to show increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism is mostly motivated by increased negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims toward their more affluent Western neighbors. This negative sentiment is influenced by a host of quality-of-life factors: economic ill-being factors (e.g., income disparities, poverty, and unemployment; and disparities in technological innovation), political ill-being factors (e.g., authoritarian tribal and exclusionary regimes), religious ill-being factors (e.g., increased Islamic religiosity, and lack of secularism), globalization and media ill-being factors (e.g., the global media), and cultural ill-being factors (e.g., perceived decadence of Western culture, and Western prejudice and discrimination). More effective counterterrorism strategies are deduced directly from understanding how these quality-of-life factors influence increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism.     

The procedural epistemic value of deliberation

Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted deliberation. I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in ethics.     

Knowledge,reasoning, and deliberation

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge.     

Interactions between deliberation and delay-discounting in rats

When faced with decisions, rats sometimes pause and look back and forth between possible alternatives, a phenomenon termed vicarious trial and error (VTE). When it was first observed in the 1930s, VTE was theorized to be a mechanism for exploration. Later theories suggested that VTE aided the resolution of sensory or neuroeconomic conflict. In contrast, recent neurophysiological data suggest that VTE reflects a dynamic search and evaluation process. These theories make unique predictions about the timing of VTE on behavioral tasks. We tested these theories of VTE on a T-maze with return rails, where rats were given a choice between a smaller reward available after one delay or a larger reward available after an adjustable delay. Rats showed three clear phases of behavior on this task: investigation, characterized by discovery of task parameters; titration, characterized by iterative adjustment of the delay to a preferred interval; and exploitation, characterized by alternation to hold the delay at the preferred interval. We found that VTE events occurred during adjustment laps more often than during alternation laps. Results were incompatible with theories of VTE as an exploratory behavior, as reflecting sensory conflict, or as a simple neuroeconomic valuation process. Instead, our results were most consistent with VTE as reflecting a search process during deliberative decision making. This pattern of VTE that we observed is reminiscent of current navigational theories proposing a transition from a deliberative to a habitual decision-making mechanism.     

Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction

Synthese - Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will do A? ‘No’, say some authors, for ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’...     

Agent deliberation in an executable temporal framework

Autonomous agents are not so difficult to construct. Constructing autonomous agents that will work as required is much harder. A clear way in which we can design and analyse autonomous systems so that we can be more confident that their behaviour is as required is to use formal methods. These can, in principle, allow us to exactly specify the behaviour of the agent, and verify that any implementation has the properties required. In addition to using a more formal approach, it is clear that problems of conceptualisation and analysis can be aided by the use of an appropriate abstraction.In this article we tackle one particular aspect of formal methods for agent-based systems, namely the formal representation and implementation of deliberation within agents. The key aspect here is simplicity. Agents are specified using a relatively simple temporal logic and are executed by directly interpreting such temporal formulae. Deliberation is captured by modifying the way in which execution handles its temporal goals. Thus, in this article we provide motivations, theoretical underpinnings, implementation details, correctness arguments, and comparisons with related work.     

Local interactions and the dynamics of rational deliberation

Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria may fail to agree with any of the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, (b) deliberative dynamics which converged to the same deliberative outcome in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation may lead to different deliberative outcomes here, and (c) Bayesian deliberation seems to be more likely to avoid nonstandard deliberative outcomes, contrary to the result reported in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, which argued in favour of the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics.     

Commitment to change from locomotion motivation during deliberation

The factors that motivate commitment to behavioral change (e.g., quitting smoking) are important in understanding self-regulation processes. The current research examines how an individual??s motivational orientation during deliberation affects the likelihood that they will commit to change. Building on the insights of regulatory mode theory (Higgins et al. in Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, New York, vol 35, pp 293?C344, 2003), we propose that increased commitment to change can result from increased locomotion motivation in the deliberation phase. Three studies provide evidence that increased commitment to change is related to locomotion motivation arising either from a chronic orientation or from a movement-focused deliberation tactic that intensifies that orientation. Although locomotion motivation is typically associated with goal pursuit, the current work highlights the impact that locomotion motivation can have on commitment to change in the initial deliberation phase.     

Internal reasons and practical limits on rational deliberation

I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.