Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent

Honoring a living will typically involves treating an incompetent patient in accord with preferences she once had, but whose objects she can no longer understand. How do we respect her “precedent autonomy” by giving her what she used to want? There is a similar problem with “subsequent consent”: How can we justify interfering with someone's autonomy on the grounds that she will later consent to the interference, if she refuses now? Both problems arise on the assumption that, to respect someone's autonomy, any preferences we respect must be among that person's current preferences. I argue that this is not always true. Just as we can celebrate an event long after it happens, so can we respect someone's wishes long before or after she has that wish. In the contexts of precedent autonomy and subsequent consent, the wishes are often preferences about which of two other, conflicting preferences to satisfy. When someone has two conflicting preferences, and a third preference on how to resolve that conflict, to respect his autonomy we must respect that third preference. People with declining competence may have a resolution preference earlier, favoring the earlier conflicting preference (precedent autonomy), whereas those with rising competence may have it later, favoring the later conflicting preference (subsequent consent). To respect autonomy in such cases we must respect not a current, but a former or later preference.     

Extreme malleability of preferences: Absolute preference sign changes under uncertainty

Malleability of preferences is a central tenet of behavioral decision theory. How malleable preferences really are, however, is a topic of debate. Do preference reversals imply preference construction? We argue that to claim preferences are construed, a demonstration of more extreme preference malleability than simple preference reversals is required: absolute preference sign changes within participants. If respondents value a prospect positively in 1 condition but negatively in a different condition, preferences cannot be considered stable. Such absolute preference sign changes are possible under uncertainty. In 2 incentive‐compatible experiments, we found participants were willing to pay to take part in a gamble and also demanded to be compensated to take part in a subsequent gamble with identical outcomes and probabilities. Such absolute preference sign changes within participants led to simultaneous risk aversion and risk seeking for the same risky prospect, suggesting that, at least in the domain of risky decisions, consumers' preferences are indeed malleable and construed.     

On the self-undermining functionality critique of morality

Nietzsche's injunction to examine “the value of values” can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster's new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche's critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality critique” and raise three problems for it: (i) Is there room within an etiological conception of function for the notion of self-undermining functionality? (ii) If Nietzsche's critique is internal and based solely on the function it ascribes to morality, where does that critique derive its normative significance from? (iii) Does Reginster's account not make out ascetic morality to be more universally dysfunctional than it is, given that some priestly types have done remarkably well out of morality?     

Accounting for Time Preference in Management Decisions: An Application to Invasive Species

Managers of invasive species seek to prevent and mitigate their impact, which vary in the time horizon over which they are realized. Likewise, stakeholders vary in the time horizons they consider relevant. Agricultural impacts might reasonably be considered over two or three decades, although ecologists typically consider environmental impacts over much longer time frames. Although time preference plays a critical role in decision making, it has largely been ignored in multicriteria analyses. In this study, we examine how time has been treated in previous decision analyses of invasive species management, focusing on the differences between multicriteria and economic cost–benefit analyses. We then outline a method for incorporating time preference information into multicriteria decision analyses to ensure that criteria weights remain a faithful representation of the decision maker's preferences. To illustrate how time preference can be elicited for invasive species problems involving both monetary and nonmonetary consequences, we describe a small empirical study we conducted with a small group of experts and managers. By outlining a way to consider time preference information in multicriteria analyses of invasive species management, we hope to facilitate better decision making that is reflective of the decision maker's true preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political socialization: A multivariate analysis of Swedish political attitude and preference data

Studied the socio-political attitudes and political party preferences of 532 Swedish high school students as a function of seven background variables: (I) the mother's political party preference, (2) the father's political party preference, (3) the mother's education, (4) the father's education, (5) the mother's income, (6) the father's income and (7) social class identification. Multiple classification analysis and multivariate nominal analysis were used to uncover the most important possible determinants of political socialization of the youth in both bivariate and multivariate aspects. The results showed that, of the seven predictor or background variables studied, only three had any substantial relationship with socio-political attitudes and political party preferences of the youth: (a) the mother's political party preference, (b) class identification and (c) the father's political party preference in that general order of importance. Furthermore, the superiority of the mother's political party preference over the father's political party preference was especially marked for girls. Among other things, the results also disclosed that ‘left-wing’ youth tended to be more loyal to parental political beliefs than ‘moderate’ and ‘right-wing’ youth. Several alternative explanations were proposed for these findings.     

What are Adaptive Preferences? Exclusion and Disability in the Capability Approach

It is a longstanding problem for theorists of justice that many victims of injustice seem to prefer mistreatment, and perpetuate their own oppression. One possible response is to simply ignore such preferences as unreliable ‘adaptive preferences’. Capability theorists have taken this approach, arguing that individuals should be entitled to certain capabilities regardless of their satisfaction without them. Although this initially seems plausible, worries have been raised that undermining the reliability of individuals' strongly‐held preferences impugns their rationality, and further excludes already marginalised groups. I argue that such criticisms trade on an ambiguity between two uses of the term ‘adaptive preference’. An adaptive preference is often assumed to be irrational, and an unreliable guide to its possessor's best interests. However, I suggest a preference may also be adaptive in the sense that it is an unreliable guide to our distributive entitlements, and that this does not require an assessment of individuals' rationality. I consider this distinction in relation to disability, arguing that this clarification allows us to justifiably ignore some disabled individuals' preferences, in the context of theorising about distributive justice, without disrespecting or undermining their rationality or culture.     

Preference Consistency and Preference Strength: Processing and Judgmental issues1

Recent research in motivated reasoning has examined processing of information that is consistent or inconsistent with one's preferences. This paper extends the work by examining the micro‐processes of the processing of such information. In addition, it examines the moderating impact of preference strength and argument quality on processing of and judgments associated with preference‐consistent and preference‐inconsistent information. Across 2 studies, evidence was obtained suggesting that preference‐inconsistent information is processed in greater depth as well as in a more biased manner. Findings are also reported indicating that when preferences are weak, people are less resistant to changing their preferences, particularly when exposed to strong arguments accompanying preference‐inconsistent information. Implications for comparative advertising in a consumer marketing context are discussed.     

Sensitivity to the Sampling Process Emerges From the Principle of Efficiency

Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon choices reveal stronger preferences. Together, these two lines of research suggest that we have two distinct capacities for inferring preferences. Here we propose that this is not the case, and that spatial‐based and statistical‐based preference inferences can be explained by the assumption that agents are efficient alone. We show that people's sensitivity to spatial and statistical information when they infer preferences is best predicted by a computational model of the principle of efficiency, and that this model outperforms dual‐system models, even when the latter are fit to participant judgments. Our results suggest that, as adults, a unified understanding of agency under the principle of efficiency underlies our ability to infer preferences.     

Indeterminate Preferences

It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz’s recent criticism.     

Aims and Exclusivity

If belief has an aim by being a (quasi) intentional activity, then it ought to be the case that the aim of belief can be weighed against other aims one might have. However, this is not so with the putative truth aim of belief: from the first‐person perspective, one can only be motivated by truth considerations in deliberation over what to believe (exclusivity). From this perspective then, the aim cannot be weighed. This problem is captured by David Owens's Exclusivity Objection to belief having an aim (2003). Conor McHugh (2012; 2013) has responded to this problem by denying the phenomenon of exclusivity and replacing it with something weaker: demandingness. If deliberation over what to believe is characterised by demandingness and not exclusivity, this allows for the requisite weighing of the truth aim. I argue against such a move by suggesting that where non‐evidential considerations play a role in affecting what we believe, these considerations merely change the standards required for believing in a particular context, they do not provide non‐evidential reasons for forming or withholding belief, which are considered as such from the deliberative perspective. Exclusivity thus remains, and so too does Owens's objection.     

‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson

A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.     

The Influence of Other's Morality and Own Social Value Orientation on Cooperation in The Netherlands and the U.S.A.

The present study examines a two-person social dilemma characterised by the conflict between the pursuit of own benefits and collective benefits. The main purpose is twofold: (1) to examine the effect of perceptions of one person's morality (e.g. honesty) on expected cooperation from another and own cooperation, and (2) to examine whether pre-existing differences between individuals in their social value orientation, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to self and others (McClintock, 1978), would modify these effects of other's morality. As predicted on the basis of the Might over Morality hypothesis (Liebrand, Jansen et al., 1986), it was found that considerably more cooperation was expected from one perceived as highly moral than from another perceived as low on morality. Contrary to a second Might over Morality prediction, however, this effect was not moderated by individual differences in social value orientation. In addition, it was found that subjects with pro-social value orientations, as well as those with individualistic and competitive orientations cooperated considerably more with a person perceived as highly moral than with another perceived as low on morality. This latter finding extends previous work on social value orientation in that it suggests that individuals who are predisposed to choose noncooperatively in social dilemmas are willing to cooperate if they are quite confident that the other has truly cooperative and good intentions. Finally, the aforementioned findings were observed in two experiments, one conducted in The Netherlands, the other in the United States. This supports the cross-cultural generalisability of the present findings.     

When Choices Are Not Personal: The Effect of Statistical and Social Cues on Children's Inferences About the Scope of Preferences

Individual choices are commonly taken to manifest personal preferences. The present study investigated whether social and statistical cues influence young children's inferences about the generalizability of preferences. Preschoolers were exposed to either 1 or 2 demonstrators’ selections of objects. The selected objects constituted 18%, 50%, or 100% of all available objects. We found that children took a single demonstrator's choices as indicative only of his or her personal preference. However, when 2 demonstrators made the same selection, then children inferred that it generalized to other agents of the same kind as the original demonstrator's, but not to agents of a different kind. Lastly, only when both demonstrators blatantly violated random selection (i.e., in the 18% condition) did children generalize the preference even to an agent of a different kind. Thus, from a young age, social and statistical cues inform children's naïve sociology.     

Accuracy and differentiation in social prediction: A developmental perspective1

Two studies examined the accuracy and differentiation of 4–5-yearolds‘, 8–9-year-olds’, and undergraduates' predictions of the preferences of peers and nonpeers. In Study 1 each subject was presented with separate arrays of snacks, meals, and activities depicted on cards and were asked to select their own preferences and the preferences of peers and nonpeers (“grown-ups” for the children, and “4- to 5-year-olds” for the undergraduates). In Study 2 each subject selected his or her own preference, the preference of peers, and the preferences of both older nonpeers (“grown-ups”) and younger nonpeers (“2-year-olds”). For all age groups, including 4–5-year-olds: (1) the preference predictions differentiated peers from nonpeers, as well as older nonpeers from younger nonpeers; (2) it was very rare for a subject to select his or her own preferences for the preference predictions of both peers and nonpeers. There were no consistent developmental differences either in the tendency to select one's own preferences when predicting the preferences of others or in the tendency to differentiate predictions for peers and nonpeers. In contrast, there was a clear developmental increase in predictive accuracy, with 4–5-year-olds being relatively inaccurate in predicting the preferences of nonpeers. The inadequacy of constructs such as “assumed similarity” and “egocentrism” as explanations for the general accuracy in predicting peers' preferences and the 4–5-year-olds' inaccuracy in predicting nonpeers' preferences is discussed. Possible alternative variables underlying developmental increases in judgmental accuracy, such as “social reference,”“self reference,” and “social category knowledge,” are then proposed.     

Preference for rich,random tactile stimulation in woodlice (Porcellio scaber)

All living beings exhibit preferences for a variety of biologically significant stimuli. Interestingly, stimuli without biological significance, such as saccharine, are also able to induce preferences in vertebrates. Can invertebrates show preferences for biologically neutral cues as well – i.e. independently of any conditioning process? Experiment 1 aimed to determine the preference of woodlice (Porcellio scaber Latreille 1804) exposed to floor textures that differed in tactile cues, how they expressed their tactile preference, and whether they were able to inhibit that preference when a shelter of variable quality was available on the non-preferred floor texture. Experiment 2 provided additional information relative to the strength of woodlice's tactile preference as well as the way of measuring it. Experiment 3 complemented the previous one in attempting to determine woodlice's preference for regular versus random tactile cues. Taken together, the results suggest that (i) woodlice are able to process sensory information relative to biologically non-significant stimuli and (ii) that, because the motivation induced can interact with sheltering as a survival-related behavior, the processing of both types of motivation might depend on the same brain systems.     

Novelty,familiarity, and infant reasoning

Where stimuli are possibly discriminable but do not elicit spontaneous differential looking it is customary to use one or other variation of the habituation–dishabituation method in order to investigate their discriminability, and the literature abounds with such studies. However, there are many variations on habituation–dishabituation procedures, varying both within and between the sensory modalities investigated. Additionally, infant attention is a dynamic process which is likely to change over time, and given the great variations in procedures it can often be difficult to know whether infants are giving a familiarity or a novelty preference at test, which can make interpretation of results a difficult, and often controversial problem. Houston‐Price and Nakai give some clear examples of the changing nature of infant preferences, and relate them particularly to the amount of familiarisation prior to testing. The model they favour (and which receives a good deal of support) is that put forward by (among others) Hunter and Ames (1988) in which preferences change over the course of familiarisation time, from preference for neither familiarity or novelty, to familiarity, to no preference, to a novelty preference. They suggest that ‘If an attentional shift from what is familiar to what is novel is always found as the encoding of a familiar stimulus… is completed… then the pattern of change in preference over time should provide crucial information regarding the identity of the obtained effect’. I will argue that this attentional shift is not always found, and that in many instances we need converging evidence in order to clarify experimental findings. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Variation of Preference Inconsistency When Applying Ratio and Interval Scale Pairwise Comparisons

Several studies on numerical rating in discrete choice problems address the tendency of inconsistencies in decision makers' measured preferences. This is partly due to true inconsistencies in preferences or the decision makers' uncertainty on what he or she really wants. This uncertainty may be reflected in the elicited preferences in different ways depending on the questions asked and methods used in deriving the preferences for alternatives. Some part of the inconsistency is due to only having a discrete set of possible judgments. This study examined the variation of preference inconsistency when applying different pairwise preference elicitation techniques in a five‐item discrete choice problem. The study data comprised preferences of five career alternatives elicited applying interval scale and numerically and verbally anchored ratio scale pairwise comparisons. Statistical regression technique was used to analyse the differences of inconsistencies between the tested methods. The resulting relative residual variances showed that the interval ratio scale comparison technique provided the greatest variation of inconsistencies between respondents, thus being the most sensitive to inconsistency in preferences. The numeric ratio scale comparison gave the most uniform preferences between the respondents. The verbal ratio scale comparison performed between the latter two when relative residual variances were considered. However, the verbal ratio scale comparison had weaker ability to differentiate the alternatives. The results indicated that the decision recommendation may not be sensitive to the selection between these preference elicitation methods in this kind of five‐item discrete choice problem. The numeric ratio scale comparison technique seemed to be the most suitable method to reveal the decision makers' true preferences. However, to confirm this result, more studying will be needed, with an attention paid to users' comprehension and learning in the course of the experiment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Infant's visual preferences for facial traits associated with adult attractiveness judgements: Data from eye-tracking

Human preferences for facial attractiveness appear to emerge at an early stage during infant development. A number of studies have demonstrated that infants display a robust preference for facial attractiveness, preferring to look at physically attractive faces versus less attractive faces as judged by adults. However, to-date, relatively little is known about which traits of the face infants use to base these preferences upon. In contrast, a large number of studies conducted with human adults have identified that preference for attractive faces can be attributed to a number of specific facial traits. The purpose of the experiments here was to measure and assess infant's visual preference via eye-tracker technology for faces manipulated for one of three traits known to effect attractiveness judgments in adult preference tests: symmetry, averageness, and sexually dimorphic traits. Sixty-four infants (28 female and 36 male) aged between 12 and 24 months old each completed a visual paired comparison (VPC) task for one of the three facial dimensions investigated. Data indicated that infants displayed a significant visual preference for facial symmetry analogous to those preferences displayed by adults. Infants also displayed a significant visual preference for feminine versions of faces, in line with some studies of adult preferences. Visual preferences for facial non-averageness, or distinctiveness were also seen, a pattern opposite to that seen in adults. These findings demonstrate that infant's appreciation for facial attractiveness in adult images between the ages of 12 and 24 months of age is based on some, but not all, traits that adults find attractive.