African Philosophy and Postmodern Rationality

Abstract

In this essay I explore some of the ramifications that postmodernism, in its re-vision of Western rationality, holds for African philosophy. Insofar as African philosophy has associated itself with the traditional form of Western rationality, I argue that much can be gleaned by African philosophy from postmodernism's re-vision of Western rationality. The merits of such a postmodern re-vision of Western rationality for African philosophy include, an acknowledgement of alternative forms of reasoning and their accompanying cultural expressions; an insistence that knowledge production is not independent of moral and political value; a grounding of rationality in social relations; and a recognition of commitment, caring and feeling in rationality.     

Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism

Abstract

The question of what an African ecofeminist environmental ethical view ought to look like remains unanswered in much of philosophical writing on African environmental ethics. I consider what an African ecofeminist environmental ethics ought to look like if values salient in African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu are seriously considered. After considering how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu foster communitarian living, relational living, harmonious living, interrelatedness and interdependence between human beings and various aspects of nature, I reveal how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu could be interpreted from an ecofeminist environmental perspective. I suggest that this underexplored ecofeminist environmental ethical view in African philosophical thinking might be reasonably taken as an alternative to anthropocentric environmentalism. I urge other ethical theorists on African environmentalism not to neglect this non-anthropocentric African environmentalism that is salient in African ecofeminist environmentalism.     

On critical African philosophy: Mapping the boundaries of a good philosophical tradition

This essay deploys the existence of epistemic vices in the trajectory of Western philosophy to map the erasures and complicities that accompanied the emergence of contemporary African philosophy (CAP₁). It argues that the complicity of CAP₁ in the hyperspecialization and academic self-absorption that marked the professionalization of Western philosophy, makes it difficult to attend to the conditions for its own possibility. CAP₁ arguably needs to make a critical turn into critical African philosophy (CAP₂), understood as a metatheoretical and metaphilosophical framework for an internal transformation that is emancipatory. CAP₂ is envisioned, first, as a critique of postcoloniality that rehumanizes the autonomous African subject; and, second, as an ethicopolitical project that explores the cracks between philosophy as theoretical practice and philosophy as praxis in opening up the spaces for postcolonial emancipation. The essay identifies three conditions that instigate the emancipatory possibility of philosophizing on the continent: the spatial/platial, demosophic, and political.     

On historicity,context and the existence of African philosophy

Abstract

The author reviews the second edition of Philosophy from Africa by comparing it with the first edition and with other anthologies in African philosophy. Questions regarding the existence and identity of African philosophy receive special attention. It is argued that a negation of the existence of African philosophy results from monolithic, ahistorical and decontextualized thinking about Africa and about philosophy. The roots and development of African philosophy are inseparably bound up with the continent’s historical, political, cultural and economic complexities. The challenge facing African philosophers is twofold: deconstructing the notion of philosophy as constructed and conceived by the West; and reconstructing the history of African philosophy.     

The Postcolonial Heart of African Philosophy

abstract

This piece is one of among a handful that seek in the first instance to reveal the origin of African philosophy as an academic discipline, the source of its unity and distinctiveness. The discipline of African philosophy originates in Ragedy, out of pain, confusion and rage stemming from colonial destruction; destruction that is responsible for what Fanon calls the ‘negro neurosis’ caused by what Biko would describe as the unbearable fusion of colonised and coloniser. I argue that the birth of African philosophy as an academic discipline is largely responsible for its character and, crucially, for its distinctive creative possibilities.     

Ifá divination as an exercise in deconstructionism

Abstract

Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy has largely been met with hostility from African philosophers. Whilst Tempels intended to show that the Bantu were not only capable of thinking, but also that they had a distinct and coherent philosophy of their own, his project seems to have achieved exactly the opposite. Temples’ project sought to expose the racism of thinkers such as Lucien Levy-Bruhl, thereby raising the African to the same status as the Westerner. However, his efforts have been rejected for a number of reasons ranging from the view that it is a theory of magic, freely generalized to the Bantu, to the accusation that his project fails to speak on behalf of the oppressed Bantu and furthermore, that he is overly obsessed with finding the African difference at the cost of reason. In this paper, I seek to argue that a neglected critique of Tempels is one that has to do with the basis of his philosophical racialism. I seek to show that at the root of Bantu Philosophy is racialism grounded in the same assumptions as those made by Levy-Bruhl. I seek to argue that the categories that Tempels creates for Bantu thought do not simply seek to articulate a genuine difference from Western categories. The Bantu categories are coined as inferior, incoherent, inarticulate, illogical, and mystified. I argue that it is for reasons of philosophical racialism that Tempels urges his Western audience to overthrow their logical and articulable systems if they ever want to understand the Bantu system of thought.     

Teaching African Philosophy in African institutions of higher learning: The implications for African renaissance

In the not-so-distant past, colonial European scholarship denied the existence of African philosophy. In reaction, indigenous African scholars assiduously strove to prove its existence. While Africans succeeded in demonstrating the existence of African philosophy, another denial—deliberate or otherwise—manifested and continues to manifest itself in the non-existence or peripheral existence of African philosophy in institutions of higher learning. It is argued in this article that African philosophy should be at the core and centre of teaching in African institutions of higher learning. It is anticipated that such a move could help Africans in their quest for self-rediscovery and reconstruction, otherwise known as ‘African renaissance’. Simultaneously this move could help to reverse the psychological damage that many Africans continue to experience as a result of two unresolved issues: 1) some outside the African cultural community, continue to distort—insultingly—African culture, and 2) some inside the African cultural community—particularly the powerful ruling African elite—make self-serving statements in the name of African culture in pursuit of their selfish interests.     

Gleaning the social contract theory from African communitarian philosophy

The social contract is one of the most influential political theories in Western philosophy. Although the social contract theory is mainly associated with a number of thinkers in the broad history of social and political philosophy, I am particularly focused on the social contract theory proffered by two British philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. While the social contract theory has mainly been influenced by these British philosophers, little has been done in terms of appraising its key normative ideas from non-Western philosophical traditions. In this article, I examine how the social contract theory might be understood differently from a non-Western perspective, if values salient in African communitarian philosophy are properly understood. As I attempt to establish how the African social contract theory can be gleaned from African communitarian philosophy, I make comparisons and contrasts between the social contract theory in the African tradition and the traditional social contract theory in Western philosophy. I intend to make a novel interpretation of the ideals of the former that are implicit in the African communitarian structure. I seek to provide reasons why the African communitarian structure could be taken as the normative basis for a plausible social contract theory in the African social and political context.     

Teaching ancient African philosophy

In this article, I critically examine the pedagogical problems in the teaching of ancient history of African philosophy in continental and diaspora Africa. I argue that the teaching of ancient history of African philosophy poses ab initio some peculiar problems arising from a number of factors: scepticism about the existence of such a classical philosophy; the problem of language and the controversy in the historiography of African philosophy. An examination of these issues as well as a discussion of their possible resolutions constitutes serious challenges both at the pedagogical and philosophical levels. I establish the particularistic, mythological, comparative, historical, and philosophical dimensions of ancient African philosophy which are instructive in the teaching of the course in tertiary institutions in continental and diaspora Africa. I provide advice on some common issues that are sensible to acquaint learners with in the teaching of the course in the homeland and diasporas, regardless of the variations in topics, emphasis, contents and texts. Consequently, I suggest a course scheme in ancient history of African philosophy that may be minimally adopted at the tertiary level.     

Meaning as perceived and experienced by an African student group

This qualitative study explored what a Batswana group of African students (N?=?73) find most meaningful in their life and why those sources of meaning are important to them. Findings showed that, in line with previous Western studies, the most important source of meaning is relationships, and in particular family which provides support, but is also intrinsically valuable. Relatedness in this African group is also different from Western conceptualisations and previous empirical findings in the sense that horizontal (interpersonal) and vertical (spiritual) relationships are deeply intertwined. Education as a domain of life is also an important source of meaning to this cohort of students. The reported perceived meanings and experienced reasons bring forth a picture that resonates with values and expectations from the specific cultural and life phase contexts in which these African students are embedded. The meaning of these meanings for the enhancement of well-being in students merits exploration.     

The Ideal of African Scholarship and its Implications for Introductory Philosophy: the Example of Placide Tempels

Abstract

Thinking of an academic discipline in terms of a ‘social practice’ (MacIntyre) helps in formulating what the ideal captured in the slogan ‘African scholarship’ can contribute to the discipline. For every practice is threatened by the attractiveness of goods external to the practice–in particular, competitiveness for its own sake–and to counter this virtues of character are needed. African traditional culture prioritizes a normative picture of the human person which could very well contribute here to upholding the values internal to scholarship. I argue, contrary to Matolino, that for these purposes Tempels’ notion of the transactional process of becoming more of what you are by virtue of the human insertion in nature, is a useful starting point. But the dominant way philosophy is framed today, the human person outside of ‘nature’, omitting the key notion of presence-to-self, disallows this dialogue between the dominant tradition and African thought culture. I show, by interrogating what I take to be an impoverished understanding of objectivity in the dominant philosophical approach, how the idea of personal, subjective, growth is crucial to introductory philosophy if the project of African scholarship is to find purchase. As an example I look at rival ways of understanding the value of justice, procedurally or, alternatively, substantively and hence foregrounding participation.¹     

Integrating African heritage studies as a new terrain of African philosophy

One of the innovative features of post-apartheid scholarship in Africa is the emergence of African heritage studies, an inter-disciplinary field concerned with the study of the collection, conservation and interpretation of historical, archaeological and anthropological artefacts of African cultural heritage. However, despite the preoccupation with questions about the value of African heritage in African philosophy, the imperative and benefits of integrating African heritage studies and contemporary African philosophy have largely been ignored by both fields. In this article, I argue for the integration of African heritage studies and African philosophy by showing their inherent symbiosis and the potential mutual benefits of their integration. By highlighting the mistaken assumption that critics of ethnophilosophy reject the centrality of the study of African heritage in African philosophy, I show how criticisms of ethnophilosophy, in fact, provide not only the rationale for African heritage studies, but also the most promising theoretical direction for how African philosophy could draw on African heritage studies, for its object of analysis and how African heritage studies can, in turn, benefit conceptually and methodologically from integrating itself with African philosophy.     

The relevance of connecting sustainable agricultural development with African philosophy

Our global food system is complex and philosophers can – or should – pose critical questions about it. One question that deserves particular attention is Western interference in agricultural development in Africa. To today, the Western scientific paradigm forms the basis for mainstream agricultural research and development – with a firm belief in technological solutions and economic progress. It is concerning that African philosophy is a largely unknown field among agricultural scientists and practitioners. The aim of this philosophical essay is therefore to explore the relevance of connecting sustainable agricultural development with African philosophy. The article explores Eurocentric thinking in agricultural research and development and why such thinking can be problematic. In a search for ways to respond to Eurocentrism, I follow Kimmerle, who engaged in intercultural dialogues between African and Western philosophies. Mutually respectful and transformative dialogues can lead to mutual understanding and a more equal relation between Africa and the West, in the sense that this relation becomes more open to African philosophies and less Eurocentric.     

The Monogamous Conception of Romantic Love and Western Critiques of Polygamy in African Traditions

Abstract

I critically examine how, from a Western cultural perspective of romantic love and Judeo-Christian tradition, certain liberal cultural values and prejudices are used presumptuously to criticize polygamy in African traditions. These criticisms assume, circularly, the superiority of Western cultural monogamous values over African cultural traditional practice of polygamy. I argue that these arguments are specious and particularly unreasonable from an intercultural philosophical perspective. A plausible liberal justification for Western legal imposition of monogamy is to prevent harm. I argue that if polygamy is so harmful as to warrant legal restriction based on the liberal principle of harm, such harm also exists in monogamy. The harm that is falsely associated with polygamy is not the result of polygamy per se but other factors relating to the social-cultural context of the marriage or the character of the individuals in the marriage.     

African Philosophy of Education: The Price of Unchallengeability

In South Africa, the notion of an African Philosophy of Education emerged with the advent of post-apartheid education and the call for an educational philosophy that would reflect this renewal, a focus on Africa and its cultures, identities and values, and the new imperatives for education in a postcolonial and post-apartheid era. The idea of an African Philosophy of Education has been much debated in South Africa. Not only its content and purpose but also its very possibility have been, and continue to be, the subject of understandably passionate exchanges. In this paper, after discussing some of the constitutive features of African Philosophy of Education, we indicate aspects with which we are sympathetic. Our central question is whether African Philosophy of Education is the revisioned, ‘typically African’ philosophy of education that it is claimed to be. We argue that it has revealed certain tendencies that are remarkably similar to characteristics of Fundamental Pedagogics, the repressive doctrine complicit in apartheid education that it claims to replace. More substantially still (and this is a feature that has wider ramifications for philosophy of education internationally), African Philosophy of Education, by labeling itself uniquely and distinctly ‘African’, runs the risk of insulating itself not only from interaction with the wider (i.e. non-African) world but also from any critical interrogation.

What is Ubuntu,? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent

Abstract

In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question ‘What is ubuntu,?’ that I have been able to identify among South Africans of African descent (SAADs). I show that it is possible to distinguish between two clusters of answers. The answers of the first cluster all define ubuntu, as a moral quality of a person, while the answers of the second cluster all define ubuntu, as a phenomenon (for instance a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or, a worldview) according to which persons are interconnected. The concept of a person is of central importance to all the answers of both clusters, which means that to understand these answers, it is decisive to raise the question of who counts, as a person according to SAADs. I show that some SAADs define all Homo sapiens, as persons, whereas others hold the view that only some Homo sapiens, count as persons: only those who are black, only those who have been incorporated into personhood, or only those who behave in a morally acceptable manner.     

African and Islamic philosophy: Expanding the horizons of philosophical counselling

Philosophical counselling has traditionally utilized a limited number of philosophical traditions: Existentialism, Stoicism, and the employment of Socratic dialogues being the most common ones. Focusing on a limited number of philosophical views does not exploit the potential therapeutic value of many other philosophical traditions, and may enhance dogmatism. In this paper we illustrate the need for a wider philosophical toolkit by showing the potential value of two rarely-employed philosophical traditions: African and Islamic philosophy. From the plethora of issues in these philosophical traditions, we highlight the relevance of African philosophy to conflicts between social duties and individual desires, and the relevance of Islamic philosophy to conflicts between faith and reason. We then emphasize the relevance of these philosophies in the current social and political situation in the Western world in general, and in Europe in particular.     

Inaugural lecture: Philosophy enough

Abstract

This inaugural lecture was delivered at the Howard College Campus of UKZN on 2 April 2008. In it I do three things. First I sketch some arguments in favour of a naturalist conception of philosophy. The conclusions that I’m after are that philosophy is not an autonomous enterprise, so that it had better be continuous with scientific enquiry if it is to get anywhere. A supplementary claim I defend briefly is that the natural and social sciences should be viewed as more integrated than they usually are. Second, I offer some reasons for rejecting all identifiable forms of social constructivism about knowledge. Finally, I say something about what ‘African Scholarship’ might mean, given the preceding considerations. There I briefly defend the claim that there is no epistemically interesting sense in which there is such a thing as African knowledge.     

A mixed-model for psychoanalytic education*

Abstract

If psychoanalysis is to avoid total marginalization, something has to be changed in the way future generations are prepared for working with patients and doing research. Reformation of psychoanalytic education may easily be the crucial issue when it comes to the survival of psychoanalysis. Its current organizational scheme has been criticized for various reasons, and various models of its structure have been proposed. I advocate a model that would combine the best features of the university education (training in clinical skills together with philosophy of science and research methodology) with personal analysis as part of psychoanalytic institutes. Although universities can remedy some of the problems of psychoanalytic institutions, they cannot contain the subjective experience of being analyzed.     

Doing African political philosophy from a universalist perspective

There has been a strong impetus to set the definitional parameters of study in African political philosophy and theory. Many scholars advance the idea of a discipline intended to provide lessons that stem from “original” African moral, ideological, and political traditions. Often, these traditions and their ideas are presented as holding categorical moral substance in so far as they are seen to be specific to a culturally essentialist understanding of “Africa.” In turn, an influential part of the literature estimates the normative value of the intellectual ideas and arguments afforded by a varied historical, socio-cultural and economic African geography by the degree to which, in being tethered to a seemingly homogenous, “culturally African” influence, these ideas can be opposed to a “Western” equivalent. In this article, I argue that the effects on the discipline of attending to, and being defined by, this cultural essentialism are at best unclear, at worst detrimental. I aim to contribute to the side of those who advocate a universalist perspective to the study of African political philosophy and thought, and who argue for jettisoning an unhelpful dichotomy between “West” and “African,” in favour of a methodological, conceptual and historical specificity that allows the discipline to be truly useful to itself and to others.