Singapore's Cultural Experimentation: Gay Rights,Stem Cells,Casinos and the Evangelical Response

Abstract

Since the early 1990s the Singapore government has been taking a more liberal stance on controversial issues such as gay rights, embryonic stem cell research and the gaming industry. My paper analyses the Singapore state's utilitarian justification and its authoritarian enactment of these liberal policies. The first part looks at the underlying motivation for the cultural makeover. I frame my analysis around the reaction of the Singapore Christian community to these developments. I focus on the criticisms of the state's ‘liberal’ agenda made by Evangelicals, and describe how the People's Action Party (PAP) regime has defended these policies on utilitarian grounds. The first part ends with a comparative analysis of how the ‘cultural war’ debate was played out in Singapore and the USA. In the second part I examine the procedural aspects of this cultural experimentation. I start with a review of Singapore's political reform. I show that civil society in Singapore has attained a new openness. Yet there remain constraints, leading critics to label the PAP-led government as a ‘soft-authoritarian’ democracy. Singapore's cultural policies, I explain, are essentially an ‘elitist’ state-engineered top-down development. This is in contrast to the experience in the USA, where grassroots activists exercise tangible bottom-up influence on how cultural contests are resolved. My main thesis is to argue that Singapore's recent cultural liberalisation is guided by social–economic expediency notwithstanding the alleged moral risks, and that these are state-commanded liberal experimentations, imposed by the ruling elite upon a constituency that is still largely conservative in moral outlook.     

The True Confessions of a White Rawlsian Liberal: An Argument for a Capacities Approach to Democratic Legitimacy

Abstract

This paper takes as its point of departure the constitutional talks in South Africa in the early 1990’s. I suggest that liberal rather than democratic values held a particular attraction to South African political philosophers like me. Taking the example of Rawlsian liberalism, I show how liberalism locates the normative anchors of legitimacy outside the democratic process and is content with a weak interpretation of political equality. As an alternative I sketch a capacities approach to democratic legitimacy drawing on the work of Sen and Nussbaum. In particular I argue that the capacity to participate in democratic practices is what grounds and legitimizes principles of democratic justice agreed to by citizens. I conclude by suggesting that South Africa’s democracy would have been stronger if the state had attended to the capacities of citizens to participate in the democratic process.     

Christian–Muslim Relations in South Africa (circa 1986–2004): Charting Out a Pluralist Path

South Africa, like many other nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa, has been a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious state for more than a century. This mosaic character of South African society stimulated Archbishop Desmond Tutu to aptly describe it as ‘the rainbow nation’. The population of South Africa's rainbow nation numbers in the region of 44.8 million, and is predominantly Christian. Other members of this nation belong to numerous other religious traditions, including Muslims, who make up roughly 1.5% (less than one million) of the total population. Despite their small numbers, Muslims have played a prominent role in South African society before and throughout the twentieth century, and their relationship with the majority Christian society, particularly within the African, Coloured and Indian communities, may generally be described as cordial.     

A political economy of the Poor People’s Campaign: From MLK and Polanyi to Trump

ABSTRACT

A stalemate has emerged in mainstream liberal/left responses to Trump. Many commentators prefer to see our predicament in terms of either class-based or identity politics. Vis-à-vis the influence of the Chicago school of economics and its structural adjustment schemes, we crosshatch MLK’s Poor People’s Campaign and Polanyi’s Great Transformation to envision overcoming this stalemate. King’s effort to radicalize the welfare state from below by linking struggles against poverty, racism, and imperialism shares Polanyi’s focus on the economy’s embeddedness in society. We underscore the importance of King’s and Polanyi’s visions for building a leftist coalition that does not divorce social from economic justice.     

Contextual Citizenship in Modern Islamic Thought

This paper examines the concept of citizenship in Egyptian Islamic thought. It focuses on a group of intellectuals referred to as the ‘New Islamists’, who have articulated a kind of Islamic citizenship which would include non-Muslim minorities. In contrast to many Islamists, these thinkers do not advocate reviving the dhimma as a model for the treatment of non-Muslims within an Islamic state. The paper looks at the methods and arguments used for justifying citizenship within the Islamic ideological framework. It compares this conception of citizenship with Western assumptions and shows that there are a number of divergences. However, it also questions the efficacy of simply judging citizenship in Islamic thought through this lens. It asks whether a more constructive question is whether Egyptian Islamists have been able to articulate a conception of citizenship that has evolved ‘contextually’, taking into account Egyptian social, moral, and political culture.     

Epistemological notes on recent studies of social perception

Among three possible avenues toward a good society — revolutionary Marxism, liberal‐democratic reform, and radical citizenship education — this paper examines and advocates the third. Societies are held to be ‘good’ so long as the Most Basic Rights are in fact enjoyed by all (i.e. the right (1) to stay alive, (2) to remain unmolested, and (3) to be free to develop one's potentialities). Some key propositions in ‘contract theory’ as represented by such diverse theorists as Socrates, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tussman and Meiklejohn are discussed, and an alternative tradition, ‘freedom theory’, is sketched, with contributions from Socrates, Godwin, Thoreau, and Camus. An argument is then developed to the effect that the contract theorists have all contributed to the basis on which the contemporary ‘liberal make‐believe’ rests. This term refers to the myth that our society is democratic, i.e. that working (only) within the system of our constitutional procedures will or can lead toward a just society. Finally, it is argued that the highest priority in citizenship education is to destroy this liberal make‐believe, and that freedom theory provides a better foundation than contract theory in the struggle for human rights, and for mankind's survival.     

The Behavioural Economist and the Social Planner: To Whom Should Behavioural Welfare Economics Be Addressed?

ABSTRACT

This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ‘Who is the addressee of welfare economics?’ These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics and have different implications for how welfare economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a ‘social planner’, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that welfare economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form ‘It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x’. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention that uses a highly simplified model of politics. I defend the contractarian approach and show that it is less supportive of ‘soft paternalism’ than is the welfarist approach.     

Africa and the World Economy

Abstract

Africa's partnership in world economy is depicted and possible response of Africa and world community to the African predicament is highlighted.     

Gadamer,Heidegger, play,art and the appropriation of tradition

Abstract

The present paper is an investigation into the links between Gadamer’s conception of the mode of being of art in terms of ‘play’, and related models in the thought of some of his philosophical precursors, notably Kant and Heidegger. Due attention is given to the shift, in Gadamer’s work, to a less subject-oriented approach to art, compared to those of Kant and Schiller, and the extent to which his own views were shaped by Heidegger’s move away from subjectivism is emphasized. The place of the concept of ‘tradition’ in Gadamer’s work is also examined with a view to casting light on his own appropriation of the (art-)philosophical tradition. Lastly, an interpretation of a specific instance of innovative art practice (the multi-installation, Body II - Sublimation, which was exhibited at this year’s KKNK at Oudtshoom, South Africa) is attempted in light of what the investigation into ‘art as play’ and the role of tradition has yielded.     

Shame and Silence

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s proposal on how to live in ‘this strange place’ of contemporary South Africa, includes an appeal to the concepts of shame and silence. In this paper, I use Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben to move the discussion of shame from a moral to an existential question. The issue is not about how one should feel, but about the kind of self that whiteness in South Africa makes possible today. Shame desubjectifies. Vice’s recommendation of silence is then taken as witnessing/listening, which I argue grounds the possibility of a recovery of the self.     

Assembling Oscar,assembling South Africa,assembling affects

The cover feature of Time, “Oscar Pistorius and South Africa's Culture of Violence” (Perry 2013), assembles the shooting body of Oscar Pistorius and the dead body of Reeva Steenkamp in and as the body of post-apartheid South Africa. In analyzing this cover feature, mobilizing Deleuzian concepts, we consider how the bodily presence or absence of Oscars' prostheses at the time of the shooting – critical to the juridical establishment of his vulnerability and fear, and hence his innocence or guilt – is figured in relation to the history of race relations through which the author, Alex Perry, builds the moral compass that points toward South Africa's future. We also speculate about the relations through which the extra-textual material body of the reader is co-implicated in the event that is being assembled in this text. This is not to give a stable or final account of the text, the shooting, or the reader, but rather to contemplate the ways in which textual assemblages might become assembled for, by, in and as the collective body of a nation state or a reader.     

Muslim Women and the Politics of Religious Identity in a (Post) Secular Society

Women’s bodies, states Benhabib (Dignity in adversity: human rights in troubled times, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011: 168), have become the site of symbolic confrontations between a re-essentialized understanding of religious and cultural differences and the forces of state power, whether in their civic-republican, liberal-democratic or multicultural form. One of the main reasons for the emergence of these confrontations or public debates, says Benhabib (2011: 169), is because of the actual location of ‘political theology’. She asserts that within the context of globalization, the concept of ‘political theology’ is complicated by its unstable location between religion and the public square; between the private and official; and between individual rights to freedom of religion versus state security and public well-being. Ultimately, therefore, the nature of the tension between religion as a political theology and the forces of state power can at best be described as a clash between identities of a collective nature (as envisaged by the nation-state) and identities of an individual nature (as manifested in different religions and cultures). Ongoing attempts to counter the ascendancy of religion, and as will be discussed in this article, specifically the ascendancy and visibility of Islamic identity as practiced by Muslim women, has brought into serious debate the notion of a (post) secular society and its implications for religious rights. What emerges from the state’s insistence that individuals not be allowed to enter the public discourse as religious beings, are, on the one hand, the constraints imposed on Muslim women by liberal democracies, and on the other hand, that Islam, as represented by Muslim women, is not constitutive of democratic citizenship. Will the inclusion and recognition of Muslim women, therefore, necessarily augment a democratic citizenship agenda, and will it lead to an alleviation of the conflict? Then, in exploring a re-articulation of an inclusive citizenship—one which is held accountable by its minimization of social inequality—what ought to be the parameters of inclusion and how should it unfold differently to what is already happening in liberal democracies?     

Liberalism,Communitarianism and the Project of Self

Abstract

In this article the authors seek to conceptualize a dynamic and inclusive understanding of personal identity within multicultural democracies such as South Africa, which will draw on both the liberal and communitarian traditions’ respect for the project of self. A preliminary layout for such a project emerges from a literature survey of recent, primarily South African publications on identity and culture, and it suggests that selfhood depends on: a) virtues, cultivated within cooperative communities which allow for effective freedom; b) a venture into existential uncertainty, which alleviates that fear of loss of identity that is supposedly central to many multicultural conflicts; c) the hermeneutic construction of identity through narratives that allow for a plurality of voices; and d) the creative transcending and re-interpretation of values and traditions. The authors contend that such an understanding of identity goes some way towards addressing the question of the way that diverse personal and group identities are to be accommodated in South Africa’s multicultural democracy, and to rethinking the unity which underlies diversity without resorting to liberalism’s reduction of personal identity to rational autonomy.     

Social citizenship and social psychology

This paper outlines the concept of social citizenship, which was first theorized in the late 1940s alongside the creation of the UK welfare state and concerns citizens' rights to a basic income and standard of living. It suggests that social citizenship—particularly welfare provision—is a useful and important topic for social psychological research, albeit one that has been largely overlooked. We provide an overview of key developments in social citizenship and consider the impact of 30‐plus years of neoliberal governance in Western democracies, which has resulted in ongoing changes to how welfare rights and responsibilities are configured, such as policies that make social citizenship rights contingent on conduct. We outline social scientific work that examines these shifting ideas of citizenship, personhood, welfare, and conditionality and make the case for a critical discursive psychological approach, which we illustrate with a brief empirical example. We suggest that critical discursive social psychology is particularly well‐placed to examine how psychological assumptions are built into both policy and lay discourse and how these can legitimate interventions designed to work on the conduct of the unemployed, such as therapeutic and behavior change initiatives. Finally, we argue that psychology is faced with a choice; while there are opportunities for the discipline to contribute to the design and implementation of such initiatives, to do so requires accepting the basic values of the underpinning neoliberal agenda. Instead, it is vital to place these assumptions under the critical microscope and explore how they work to obscure structural disadvantage.     

THE ILLIBERALITY OF ‘LIBERAL EUGENICS’

This essay evaluates the moral logic of ‘liberal eugenics’: the ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention. I argue that liberal eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires it. I introduce an alternative to Rawls's social primary goods that might be called natural primary goods: hereditable mental and physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range of projects and pursuits. I suggest that reproductive genetic biotechnologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and genetic engineering, which aim to enhance ‘general purpose’ traits in offspring are less like childrearing practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory. I argue that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all‐purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. I conclude that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio against liberal theory.     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

This White ‘I’: The Reciprocal Shame of Oppressor and Oppressed

Abstract

Vice’s answer to the question of this white ‘I’ who must try to live well in South Africa, configures shame, political silence and humble self-reconfiguration. I accept her insightful analysis of ‘whiteness’ in terms of the oppressor’s shame, but find that her specification of identity does not accommodate the multiplicity of privilege/oppression relations in which individuals participate. Since this implies that many South Africans, albeit unevenly, share the oppressor’s shame, her advice concerning ‘whites only’ political withdrawal seems inappropriate and curiously self-subversive. Focussing instead on her reflections concerning moral emotions in ethically-compromised selves, which should motivate self-reconfiguration, and drawing from Kristeva on ‘forgiveness’, I argue that compromised selves in privilege/oppression relations cannot reconfigure themselves independently, and should rather negotiate on-going forgiveness relationships. Further, since privileged and oppressed shoulder different but reciprocal ethical responsibilities, besides considering the privileged self who should appeal for forgiveness,¹ one must address a gap in Vice’s argument concerning the reciprocal shame of the oppressed.     

Between Retribution and Restoration: Justice and the TRC

Abstract

Having been struck by the Levinasian aspects of J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron, this article tries to ‘reveal’ Coetzee’s novel as a Levinasian narration of how the other ruptures a specific subject’s self-regarding egoism, leading the subject to take up its responsibility for the other. Throughout, the concreteness and realism of the novel is considered supplementary to the abstraction of Levinas’s philosophical thought. It is demonstrated how the main character in Age of Iron, Elizabeth Curren, is confronted by the other as a face, has her right to be put into question by the other, experiences guilt for her usurpation of the place of the other, which becomes positive in her assuming responsibility for the other. In awakening to the other, Curren moves from a Heideggerean concern with her own death (she is dying of cancer) towards a Levinasian prioritising of the other’s life over her own. Her coming into contact with the political violence and oppression of late 1980s South Africa adds to and focuses her expiation for the other.     

Vice’s Vicious Virtues: The Supererogatory as Obligatory

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s essay, ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’, is a sensitive and subtle exploration of the difficult moral terrain of the issues of white responsibility and white moral self-reform in a South Africa that is formally post-apartheid, but still profoundly shaped by the legacy of white domination, both in its enduring socio-economic structures and in its citizens’ typical moral psychologies. Vice’s conclusion is that shame is the moral emotion most appropriate for whites unable to free themselves from white privilege and live up to what she sees as the required standards of moral excellence. In response, I argue that she is in effect making the supererogatory obligatory, and constructing an unrealistic schedule of virtues. Drawing on various recent writings on non-ideal theory, I suggest that standard moral distinctions need to be relocated to take systemic social oppression into account, thereby yielding a more forgiving moral taxonomy than Vice’s own over-demanding mapping.     

Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find support in the idealism of Hegel. I begin by first explaining what philosophical naturalism amounts to. I then move on to show, using Finn Spicer’s and Alison Stone’s understandings of philosophical naturalism, how there is a stronger form of philosophical naturalism but also how there is a weaker form as well. Having established the distinction between stronger and weaker variants of philosophical naturalism, I discuss Sebastian Gardner’s recent objections to treating absolute idealism as a genuinely naturalist position. I argue that Gardner is incorrect to claim that absolute idealism is not a genuinely naturalist position on both historical and interpretive grounds, where to do so I bring in features of Hegel’s idealism to show that Hegel was committed to liberal naturalism. In the next section of the paper, I address Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for liberal naturalism. To counter this claim, I offer an Hegelian diagnosis of Neta’s charge and argue that Neta’s concern about the possibility of liberal naturalism is illegitimately motivated.