Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments.     

Scientific Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Revisiting a Controversial Relation

The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.     

What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science

A survey of some recent literature on the concept of emergence provides a case study of an important issue in the general metaphysics and epistemology of science. Emergentism has often been motivated by the desire to avoid excessive reductionism in the philosophy of mind and culture and in the respective fields of the philosophy of science—philosophy of psychology and of the human and social sciences. Philosophers employing the concept of emergence usually argue that there are several ‘levels’ of reality and that the entities and properties of the ‘higher’ levels (e.g., mentality) emerge from those of the ‘lower’ ones (e.g., the physical universe). The standard division between ontological and epistemological approaches to this concept is shown to be inadequate through a critical discussion of emergence from the perspective of a pragmatist philosophy of science. It is argued that emergence should be conceived of both ontologically and epistemologically, because there is no humanly possible point of view for ontologizing about the way the world is structured in itself, entirely independently of our epistemic standpoints. Emergence thus turns out to be an example of the way in which the ‘pre-critical’ dispute between dogmatic metaphysics and skeptical reactions to it (which Kant famously wanted to overcome) still dominates philosophy of science. Hence, the problems of emergence and realism are observed to be intimately connected.     

社会建构主义心理学：“反实在论”还是“实在论”？

“反实在论”与“实在论”之争是当前有关社会建构主义心理学争论的核心。批判者指责社会建构主义心理学是“反实在论”,社会建构主义者则竭力澄清自己的“实在论”立场。该文认为：社会建构主义是一个芜杂的思想体系,任何一种简单的结论都难免失之武断,妨碍对它进一步的认识和理解;把握社会建构主义关键在于对“现实”的理解,社会建构主义的“现实”是统一了主客体的生活的现实,它对主客关系的超越对现代心理学具有重要的方法论意义;对于实在论者,了解实在论特有的问题和局限性,有助于更加理性地认识和参与这场争论。     

Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists

In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles.     

Critical Realism—A Sustainable Bridge Between Science and Religion?

Since Barbour's introduction of the term in 1966, “critical realism” bridges the gulf between science and religion. Yet, like the Golden Gate Bridge, this bridge must be supported by pillars to carry its weight. These pillars are the social and the human sciences, which are still designed too small within critical realism to make a really sustainable construct. Critical realism should be modified to “constructive-critical realism” to allow for more weight of these disciplines in the dialog, which actually should become a trialog.     

What do our critical practices say about the nature of morality?

A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices of science and morality is loosely interpreted, the argument does not support moral realism—for paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion display the relevant critical practices just as well. So if the argument is to have force, the realist must say more about why the critical practices of morality are sufficiently like those of science to warrant realism. But this cannot be done—moral inquiry differs from scientific inquiry in too many important ways. So the analogy with the critical practices of science fails to vindicate moral realism. But there are further lessons: in looking closely at the critical practices of our moral discourse—and in comparing them to the critical practices of science and fashion—we gain insight into what is distinctive about morality objectivity and moral metaphysics.     

Rehabilitating neutrality

This article responds to Janet Kourany’s proposal, in Philosophy of Science after Feminism, that scientific practices be held to the ideal of ‘socially responsible science’, to produce results that are not only cognitively sound, but also significant in the light of values ‘that can be morally justified’. Kourany also urges the development of ‘contextualized philosophy of science’—of which feminist philosophy of science is exemplary—that is ‘politically engaged’ and ‘activist’, ‘informed by analyses of the actual ways in which science interacts with the wider society in which it occurs, the ways in which science is shaped by and in turn shapes society’, and that can contribute to understanding both the cognitive and social dimensions of science. Although I share Kourany’s commitment to contextualized philosophy of science, I question her proposed ideal of ‘socially responsible science’ and the grounds she provides for adopting it. My argument leads me to defend rehabilitating the traditional ideal of the ‘neutrality’ of science, which I reinterpret as the ideal of ‘inclusiveness and evenhandedness’.     

Absolute Other: Lacan's ‘Big Other’ as Adjunct to Critical Social Psychological Analysis?

Lacanian theory offers a series of promising conceptualization – amongst then the notion of the ‘big Other’– which, despite their obvious analytical value, have been curiously neglected by critical social psychology. This paper concerns itself with an overview of this concept of the ‘big Other’ particularly in reference to how it may benefit critical social psychological analyses. The explanatory value of this notion is introduced via a series of Lacanian paradoxes (the Other as vanishing‐point of inter‐subjectivity that cannot itself be subjectivized; the Other as simultaneously ‘inside’ and ‘outside’; the Other as both embodiment of the social substance and yet also the site of the unconscious). I then move on to show how this notion opens conceptual opportunities for social psychological conceptualizations of the formation of the social. I close by demonstrating what the ‘big Other’ offers critical social psychological analyses of power.     

If merely more words,what is the point? A critical response

A critical response is given to the five articles constituting the special issue theme ‘Critical psychotherapy and counselling: if not now, when?’ The related arguments concerning political justice, professional struggles, new public management, therapeutic language use and ecotherapy are considered concisely and challenges made. Into this discussion is injected a degree of ‘brutalist objection’, along with a recommendation for radical honesty, a confession of depressive realism and hints of nihilism. Psychotherapy, whether traditional or critical, is taken to task for its romantic enmeshment in a hubristic fantasy of infinite relevance and improvement.     

Social Psychology,War and Peace: Towards a Critical Discursive Peace Psychology

In this paper, I make two related arguments: that peace psychology and social psychological peace research should give greater attention to discourse, and that critical discursive approaches in social psychology should explore matters of international military conflict, an area which has hitherto been somewhat neglected in this tradition of work. These arguments are developed in relation to debates concerning the nature and status of psychological ‘science’, and the neglect of language in social and peace psychology. To illustrate the possibilities of a critical discursive approach, research on the discursive function of ‘peace’ is discussed. In conclusion, it is suggested that a critical discursive perspective enables analysts to interrogate a range of assumptions underpinning militaristic ideologies.     

Our world is more than physics: a constructive – critical comment on the current science and theology debate

“Critical realism” is one of the most important positions in the current science and theology debate. An analysis of its origin and meaning leads to the question if this position mostly propagated by physicist-theologians could miss an intrinsic feature of the personal dimension of reality. A deeper meaning of the personal dimension sets human science apart. Taking into account social science's insight that persons responsible for their conclusions and actions drive the process of science, the moral dimension of science has to be emphasized. To integrate these aspects into a coherent position, a more differentiated epistemological model is needed. The solution proposed in this paper is to modify critical realism to constructive-critical realism. Theologically interpreted, constructive-critical realism remembers humankind's purpose to shape nature in cooperation with God and with the means of culture toward increasing realization of freedom in relationship. The argument is widely influenced by an analysis of the works of John Polkinghorne.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

Conventionalism,scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge*

In this paper the basic aim of the so‐called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ‘strong programme’ is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti‐realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ‘context of justification’ of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law‐discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ‘logic of scientific discovery’ are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti‐realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ‘strong programme’ appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science.     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

Culture,context and society – The underexplored potential of critical realism as a philosophical framework for theory and practice

This article explains how the meta‐theoretical framework of critical realism addresses methodological issues of concern to social psychologists and social scientists. The article outlines key tenets of critical realism – its notion of the stratified nature of reality and generative mechanisms as powers in natural and social objects that cause things; its notion of knowledge of reality as stratified rather than only empirical; its acceptance of epistemological but not judgmental relativism; and its monist ontology. The article then introduces realist social theory to provide a framework for understanding the society–person connection. It explains how issues relating to culture, context, and society raised in the indigenous psychology English literature might be addressed from a critical realist perspective. Some implications arising from adopting a critical realist perspective in research practice are outlined and social psychologists and social scientists are encouraged to explore the potential of critical realism as a meta‐theoretical framework and new paradigm.     

Liberation social psychology: learning from Latin America

Liberation Social Psychology (la psicología social de la liberación, LSP) has developed amongst a body of psychologists in Latin America over the last decade. There has been no survey of the field in English, although some of the ideas are of relevance for those working with oppressed groups elsewhere in the world. This article explores the context in which LSP grew from the work of Ignacio Martín‐Baró and was developed by Maritza Montero, amongst others. Within LSP, key concepts emerge, including ‘conscientization’, ‘realismo‐crítico’, ‘de‐ideologization’, a social orientation, ‘the preferential option for the oppressed majorities’ and methodological eclecticism. The application of LSP is explored with reference to three domains. First, it is suggested that community social psychology as practised in some parts of Latin America reflects LSP in its emphasis on social transformation and participatory methods. Second, psycho‐social work with victims of state oppression, which adopts a highly social and societal orientation embodies LSP. Third, social analyses which explicitly adopt socio‐psychological‐political analyses of the social realities confronting countries in Latin America embrace, in different ways, principles and concepts of LSP. Some of the challenges facing LSP are discussed and open dialogue is encouraged between LSP and critical, community and applied social psychologists. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A REFUTATION OF PURE CONJECTURE

The present paper explores three interrelated topics in Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aim of science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning. Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture. Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackle it by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferential considerations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses and educated guesses in an attempt to show that there is more to scientific conjecture than conjecture. The suggestion is made that some inductive considerations enter into the process of educated guessing or scientific conjecture in such a way that the ‘context of discovery’ cannot be sharply separated from the ‘context of justification’. This discussion leads to a tension between Popper's negative method of conjecture and his realism. Given Popper's (implicit) theory of meaning it seems Popper's epistemology (the conjecture and refutation method) is incompatible with his metaphysical realism.     

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.