The value of dignity in and for bioethics: rethinking the terms of the debate

The discussion of the nature and value of dignity in and for bioethics concerns not only the importance of the concept but also the aims of bioethics itself. Here, I challenge the claim that the concept of dignity is useless by challenging the implicit conception of usefulness involved. I argue that the conception of usefulness that both opponents and proponents of dignity in bioethics adopt is rooted in a narrow understanding of the role of normative theory in practical ethical thinking. I then offer an alternate understanding of the nature and value of dignity. I begin by recognizing that claims that one’s dignity has been violated point to an important difference between “respect for autonomy” and “respect for persons.” I then suggest three different conceptions of how dignity can be normatively guiding for bioethics, and conclude that, ultimately, understanding dignity as the cornerstone of a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection and deliberation is valuable for doing bioethics well.     

Spirituality in Christian Transhumanism: Commentary on Cole-Turner,Green, and Cannon

Christian transhumanism is the growing movement in which Christians appropriate the transhumanist vision of human technological evolution in the twenty-first century for millennialist ends. In the April 2015 issue of Theology and Science, three Christian transhumanist theologians present their visions and arguments for why Christians should accept transhumanism. I draw upon the wisdom of age from the World War II generation. Their concerns about an erosion of trust that decreases quality of life guide my commentary on the theological papers. Identifying issues with vision, theology, values, character, messaging, and leadership, I present spirituality as potentially supporting future wisdom.     

Nanotechnologies, bioethics and human dignity

Nanoscale science, research, and technology present a complex set of circumstances. First of all, this field involves many different subjects, including biology, chemistry, physics, and environment sciences. Secondly, although scientists are working increasingly at a molecular level, nanotechnology is about much more than a reduction of scale. Indeed, nanoscience and Nanotechnologies offer an unprecedented ability to control and manipulate nature, offering hope for progress. Ethical perspectives vary considerably in this field, but commentators and researchers share a concern about a specific worrisome issue: the lack of appropriate ethical and legal principles and processes (associated with issues including health risks, human body manipulation, and private life violation), to guide nanotechnological R&D, commercialization, and final use. Some authors partially reject this concern by suggesting that Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies do not constitute an autonomous category, and that they are instead just the operative result of combining other traditional areas of study. However the nanotechnological debate brings up the semantic and content issues of bioethics and foments a contentious discussion emphasizing human dignity. Issues include enhancement versus therapeutic intervention, traceability versus privacy, and societal benefits versus risks. From these preliminary considerations, we will move on to discuss (I) the traditional, although still controversial, relationship between bioethics and human dignity, and (II) return to the subject of nanotechnology. We will discuss how today in Europe, although still indefinite, the principle of respect for human dignity is a welcomed contributor to "ethical vigilance" about the uncertain development of new nano-scale technologies. We will also note how U.S. strategy in this regard is simply lacking and appears only as a purely discursive "key issue in long term ".     

What is Mormon Transhumanism?

Abstract

Mormon transhumanism is the idea that humanity should learn how to be compassionate creators. This idea is essential to Mormonism, which provides a religious framework consistent with naturalism and supportive of human transformation. Mormon transhumanists are not limited to traditional or popular accounts of religion, and embrace opportunities and risks of technological evolution. Although usually considered secular, transhumanism has some religious origins and sometimes functions as religion. Accelerating change contextualizes a Mormon transhumanist narrative of common expectations, aspirations, and parallels between Mormonism and transhumanism. Mormon transhumanism has produced secular arguments for faith in God and religious arguments for transhumanism.     

Death with dignity from the Confucian perspective

Death with dignity is a significant issue in modern bioethics. In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technologies at the end of life has caused heated debate on how to protect human dignity. The key point of contention lies in the different understandings of human dignity and the dignity of death. Human dignity has never been a clear concept in Western ethical explorations, and the dignity of death has given rise to more confusions. Although there is no such term as “dignity” in Confucian ethics, there are discussions of a number of ideas related to human dignity and the dignity of death. Therefore, Confucian bioethics can offer a new perspective for understanding the theoretical difficulties associated with the dignity of death and new methods for solving them. In this article, we attempt to reconstruct Confucian views on human dignity and the dignity of death and, based on those views, to analyze the following issues: the relationship between the dignity of death and biological life, the relationship between the dignity of death and suffering, the relationship between the dignity of death and the autonomy of human beings, and the relationship between the dignity of death and social justice. This article will also compare the Confucian views on these issues with the views of Western philosophers. Confucian ethics can offer distinct answers to the above issues and help resolve some confusions concerning concepts and theories in Western research on the dignity of death.     

人的尊严与生命伦理

“尊严”是频繁出现在生命伦理学中的一个概念,但关国学者麦克琳却在最近认为,尊严在生命伦理学中是个无用的概念,可以毫无损失地用其它概念,比如尊重人的自主性概念所代替。反驳了麦克琳的观点,定义了尊严的含义,认为生命伦理学的使命就是在当代生命科技高度发达的情况下如何尊重和保护人的尊严。     

Autonomy,life as an intrinsic value,and the right to die in dignity

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. The author’s research interests include bioethics, free speech, tolerance and ethics in the media.     

DISPOSABLE BODIES,DISABLED MINDS,AND CHRISTIAN HOPE: RESURRECTION IN LIGHT OF TRANSHUMANISM AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

This piece brings into critical conversation Christian resurrection hope, virtual versions of transhumanism, and intellectual disability and demonstrates that Christian resurrection provides a more cogent hope for people with severe intellectual disabilities than transhumanism. I argue that transhumanist virtual futures are theologically problematic, as bodily resurrection is neither required nor desirable. It is particularly problematic for people with severe intellectual disabilities given the way they would be excluded from these futures. Disability theology also raises issues with the traditional notions of “healing” in the resurrection and the implications for the value and identity of persons with intellectual disabilities. Starting with these problems, I explore the nature of Christian hope, noting the inadequacies of a virtual transhumanist future with respect to both resurrection faith and intellectual disability, and address how resurrection hope can account for issues raised in disability theology, and so properly include people with intellectual disabilities.     

The Dark Side of Desire: Nietzsche,Transhumanism, and Personal Immortality

Nietzsche has become embroiled in two interesting twenty‐first century debates about advancing technology and its impact on human life, especially its meaning/value. The first focuses on Nietzsche himself and is concerned with the extent to which his views align with those of transhumanism. The second involves the not so blatantly Nietzsche‐centric question of whether or not immortality, or radical life‐extension, is desirable. Given that the desire for immortality, or at least some more feasible (but not so permanent) approximation of it, is strongly associated with transhumanism, it seems that these two debates have some fairly significant overlap. Establishing what Nietzsche ultimately believes about such a core transhumanist issue will go a long way toward determining how sympathetic he would be to the transhumanist cause in general. I argue that while his views do not commit him to an all‐encompassing disdain for immortality, his intolerance for immortality‐seekers means that he might only be open to some of the more fringe understandings of transhumanism.     

Birth with dignity from the Confucian perspective

The development of biotechnologies has broadly interfered with a number of life processes, including human birth. An important moral question arises from the application of such medical technologies to birth: do biotechnological advancements violate human dignity? Many valid arguments have been raised. Yet bioethicists are still far from reaching a consensus on how best to protect the dignity of human birth. Confucianism is an influential ethical theory in China and presents a distinctive understanding of human dignity. In this paper, we reconstruct the two Confucian concepts of dignity—namely, universal dignity and personal dignity. We then apply these concepts to human birth in the context of biotechnologies involving embryos and genetic enhancement. We conclude that the dual Confucian understanding of dignity contributes a valuable perspective to the question of whether biotechnologies related to human birth violate human dignity.     

Some psychoanalytic reflections on the concept of dignity

After reviewing the pertinent philosophical and psychoanalytic writings on the concept of dignity, this paper proposes three categories of dignity. Conceptualized as phenomenological clusters, heuristic viewpoints, and levels of abstraction, these include (i) metaphysical dignity which extends the concept of dignity beyond the human species to all that exists in this world, (ii) existential dignity which applies to human beings alone and rests upon their inherent capacity for moral transcendence, and (iii) characterological dignity which applies more to some human beings than others since they possess a certain set of personality traits that are developmentally derived. The paper discusses the pros and cons of each category and acknowledges the limitations of such classification. It also discusses the multiple ways in which these concepts impact upon clinical work and concludes with some remarks on the relationship of dignity to choice, narcissism, and suicide.     

Universalism, particularism and the ethics of dignity.

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense--thus meeting the demands of universalism--but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations--thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.     

The Social and Ethical Acceptability of NBICs for Purposes of Human Enhancement: Why Does the Debate Remain Mired in Impasse?

The emergence and development of convergent technologies for the purpose of improving human performance, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information sciences, and cognitive science (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and moral arguments that must be engaged by philosophers who hope to take seriously the question of the ethical and social acceptability of these technologies. This article advances an analysis of the factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the topic, in order to help in understanding why arguments that form a part of the debate between transhumanism and humanism result in a philosophical and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that emerges from the fact that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and the negative evaluation of NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these arguments with foundations that will enable others to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic society. The present effort at communication about the difficulties of the argumentation process is intended as a necessary first step towards developing an interdisciplinary response to those difficulties.     

作为一项权利的人的尊严

The concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the “theory of attribution-dignity”, the “theory of autonomy-dignity” or the “theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity”, and the “theory of end-in-itself-dignity”); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (6): 85–92     

Shaping Individuality: Human Inheritable Germ Line Gene Modification

In this paper I deal with ethical factors surrounding germline gene therapy. Such implications include intergenerational responsibility, human dignity, moral status of embryos and so on. I will explore the relevance of the above mentioned issues to discuss the ethical implication of human germline gene therapy (HGLT). We will see that most of arguments claimed by bioethicists do not provide valid reason to oppose HGLT. I will propose an alternative view, based on personal identity issues, to discuss the ethics of human inheritable gene modification. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Human dignity and vulnerable agency: An ethical framework for forensic practice

In this paper, we present an integrated ethical framework that covers the different levels of ethical tasks inherent in forensic and correctional work. First, we briefly give an overview of the ethical framework and its component notion of human dignity. Second we analyze in depth the concept of dignity and its relationship to normative theories and ethical concepts that are particularly relevant for forensic practitioners. Third, we explore the capacity of the conceptions of human dignity and vulnerable agency to integrate principles typically contained in ethical codes and practice, such as beneficence, autonomy, and justice. Fourth, we discuss how conflict between ethical codes or duties of station adhered to by practitioners can be effectively addressed in light of the model of dignity and agency outlined earlier. Fifth, we explain how individuals' specific ethical judgments and actions should proceed in light of our framework model.     

生命伦理学:权力与不公正--在第六届国际生命伦理学大会的致辞

在现代生命伦理学的讨论中,主要关注的是改造医患关系中的权力关系。通过强调人权和对个人尊严的尊重,对脆弱人群授予权利已经达到。然而,在卫生保健中,权力的不平衡依然普遍存在。这在相当程度上与对社会不公正的关注不够有关。那种权力的不平衡加之新的权力形式的发展,例如,通过新的遗传生物技术,产生了对日益增长的社会不公的恐惧与忧虑。由此,扩展与公共卫生有关的伦理学讨论将受到关注。政治哲学研究也需要变为改造国际权力关系和改善人口健康。     

Endurantism vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered

One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most (if not all) of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists (/perdurantists) allegedly have some trouble addressing, and to which perdurantism (/endurantism) apparently has a straightforward response. I argue, however, that in each case, there are versions of endurantism (/perdurantism) that can offer precisely the same (or at least a highly analogous) response to the challenge, and thus the ability to provide this particular solution does not directly tell in favour of one the two views. In §1, I elaborate two views which will be particularly prominent in the discussion: liberal endurantism and restrictive perdurantism. In §2–6 I discuss in turn the central pro‐perdurantism arguments: the argument from anthropocentricism, the argument from vagueness, the argument from recombination, the argument from temporary intrinsics, and the argument from coincidence. In §7–8, I discuss the main pro‐endurantism arguments: the arguments from motion, and the argument from permanent coincidence. Finally, in §9, I discuss what conclusion can be drawn from this discussion.     

Examining the suitability of the principle of subsidiarity for bioethics

The political and social principle of subsidiarity can be useful as a general principle of bioethics. The principle states that only those decisions and tasks that cannot be effectively decided upon or performed by a supported or subsidized lower level authority ought to be relegated to a more central or higher authority. The concept of subsidiarity has been embedded tacitly in Western political thought for two millennia, but it has been articulated expressly only in the twentieth century. The principle has unique strengths: it is the only principle that addresses the issue of locus of decision making; it is strongly linked to human dignity, democracy, and solidarity; and it can assist in reaching agreements on the common good. There are also potential drawbacks that need to be taken into account when developing rules and guidelines for the principle's application in bioethics. The principle is particularly helpful in public health ethics, but it is also of use in the ethics of personal care and human research ethics.     

The Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament

The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.