Philosophy in the ‘house of stone’: a critical review

Post-colonial African philosophy has emerged as a viable discipline in a number of African countries. In particular, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and to some extent, Malawi and South Africa, have contributed to the fledging discipline. Although it does not receive prominent coverage, Zimbabwe has witnessed a growing expansion in the teaching of philosophy, as well as in published philosophical reflection. This article provides an overview of the developments of philosophy in Zimbabwe, paying particular attention to the post-colonial period. It surveys the context in which philosophical reflection has taken place in Zimbabwe, alongside highlighting the key themes that have preoccupied practitioners in the field. The article explores some problematic aspects of philosophy in Zimbabwe, and interrogates the possibility (or lack thereof) of locating Zimbabwean philosophy within the broader philosophical traditions such as the analytic and continental traditions.     

How to do philosophy of religion: towards a possible speaking about the impossible

Abstract

It is postulated from different philosophical traditions, and explicitly in recent literature, that there is no further need for doing philosophy of religion – it has become an impossible task. I argue, however, that there remains a philosophical space for this practice and that this space determines greatly how philosophy of religion can be done. The starting point of my argument is the current discussion in the SAJP between De Wet and Giddy and the significance of my article is that it puts this debate within the broader international philosophical context by engaging the work of Trakakis and Desmond to resolve some of the apparently intractable issues raised. Trakakis discusses the divide between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions in which De Wet and Giddy’s work is further contextualized and clarified. Desmond’s work is seminal in its search for a metaxology wherein he advocates a new ‘in between’ position for doing philosophy of religion. I take this view of Desmond further by applying it to the current debate in South Africa and also using it to indicate some possibilities of speaking about the impossible.     

Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism

Abstract

The question of what an African ecofeminist environmental ethical view ought to look like remains unanswered in much of philosophical writing on African environmental ethics. I consider what an African ecofeminist environmental ethics ought to look like if values salient in African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu are seriously considered. After considering how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu foster communitarian living, relational living, harmonious living, interrelatedness and interdependence between human beings and various aspects of nature, I reveal how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu could be interpreted from an ecofeminist environmental perspective. I suggest that this underexplored ecofeminist environmental ethical view in African philosophical thinking might be reasonably taken as an alternative to anthropocentric environmentalism. I urge other ethical theorists on African environmentalism not to neglect this non-anthropocentric African environmentalism that is salient in African ecofeminist environmentalism.     

Teaching and Doing Philosophy of Education: The Question of Style

This paper explores the practice of teaching philosophy, and particularly philosophy of education, in a higher education context. Starting from a critical discussion of some of the literature on teaching and learning in higher education, I introduce the notions of philosophical style and temperament and suggest that exploring these notions, the problems they raise, and their implications for issues to do with our own identity as philosophers and as teachers, can enrich our understanding of the practice of teaching philosophy in higher education and our ability to reflect on and possibly improve our own teaching practice.     

The question of happiness in African philosophy

This article articulates some of the problems inherent in the attempt to determine the meaning of happiness in African philosophy and proposes a solution. I begin by outlining the conceptual arguments in contemporary African philosophy. Thereafter, I discuss the difficulties with defining happiness, especially in its psycho-moral implications. Finally, I provide an African philosophical response to the difficulties identified in the first two sections by relating the notion of happiness to an African theory of meaningful life as it is inscribed in a particular form of action. I argue that, while happiness and meaningful life are not equivalent, there is an African conception of happiness that is grounded in an African psycho-social and cultural worldview, which in turn involves a particular conception of the meaning of human existence. This work is exploratory in nature: many of the claims, especially as they relate to African philosophy, are based on analytical deduction from the available literature on African philosophy and intuitive deductions from the African worldview.     

《周易》和中国古代阴阳矛盾学说

本文从易学史角度考察中国古代哲学中阴阳矛盾学说的演进历程．认为《易传》构建了阴阳矛盾学说的基本框架,是阴阳矛盾学说之源。从玄学易到理学易．阴阳矛盾学说得以进一步展开,而王夫之易学,则对中国古代阴阳矛盾学说作了全面总结。     

Philosophizing with a historiographical figure: Descartes in Degérando’s Histoire comparée des systèmes de philosophie (1804 and 1847)

Abstract

The writings by the ‘state philosophers’ of nineteenth-century France are often seen, either as entirely driven by political or ideological concerns, or reduced to mere history of philosophy. Hence, ironically, those who established the philosophical canon that still now informs philosophy teaching in France were themselves excluded from that canon. Using the heuristic concept of a philosophical figure, this article intends to show how, for these philosophers, historiography represented a seemingly inoffensive, but in reality, extremely efficient means of searching out philosophical alternatives to the institutionally dominant philosophy of Victor Cousin (1792–1867). Focusing on the almost forgotten case of Joseph-Marie Degérando (1772–1842), I show how he used the philosophical figure of Descartes and how he used it to counter Cousin.     

THE HEADING OF A PROBLEM

Efforts to understand the division between analytic and continental philosophy in strictly philosophical terms seem slated to disappointment. Nevertheless, the worldwide dominance of these two models and their numerous subvarieties is the most salient feature of the passage of philosophy through the twentieth century. This paper explores this dominance and offers an assessment of developments that point toward a change from the model of two models. Specific attention is paid to Jacques Derrida's work on philosophical nationalism, which suggests that this change reflects the growing extension of the English language across the world and, hence, belongs to a profoundly ambiguous development. According to Derrida, on the one hand, this development holds out the chance for something radically nonparochial: “the universal penetration of the philosophical and of philosophical communication,” while on the other hand, it raises the threat that certain forms of “dogmatism and authority” that are linked to particularities of nation and history will impose “an axiomatic of philosophical discourse without any possible discussion.” 1 The future of continental philosophy is assessed in light of this ambiguous development.     

From a Continental Point of View: The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms.     

Teaching African Philosophy in African institutions of higher learning: The implications for African renaissance

In the not-so-distant past, colonial European scholarship denied the existence of African philosophy. In reaction, indigenous African scholars assiduously strove to prove its existence. While Africans succeeded in demonstrating the existence of African philosophy, another denial—deliberate or otherwise—manifested and continues to manifest itself in the non-existence or peripheral existence of African philosophy in institutions of higher learning. It is argued in this article that African philosophy should be at the core and centre of teaching in African institutions of higher learning. It is anticipated that such a move could help Africans in their quest for self-rediscovery and reconstruction, otherwise known as ‘African renaissance’. Simultaneously this move could help to reverse the psychological damage that many Africans continue to experience as a result of two unresolved issues: 1) some outside the African cultural community, continue to distort—insultingly—African culture, and 2) some inside the African cultural community—particularly the powerful ruling African elite—make self-serving statements in the name of African culture in pursuit of their selfish interests.     

Pariah Status,Identity, and Creativity in Babylon: Utopian Visions of "Home" in the African Diaspora

In this article I explore the complex relationships among diasporic identity, home, and marginality in the context of Rastafari philosophy and practice. Groups within the African diaspora believe that globalization and the "We are all one" slogan exist to create one huge market for the benefit of the multinational and international corporate elites. Not only has the Black underclass in the diaspora continued to expand rather than shrink, but, in many ways, Blacks are further behind Whites than they have been in the past. In an effort to survive with some modicum of dignity and self-respect, they have attempted to counter the trend toward global neoapartheid. Rastafari have intentionally chosen to identify themselves not only as Blacks (the children of Africa), but as "marginals" outside of the domain of Babylon. They take pride in the fact that they have rejected the values of the new world order.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

On historicity,context and the existence of African philosophy

Abstract

The author reviews the second edition of Philosophy from Africa by comparing it with the first edition and with other anthologies in African philosophy. Questions regarding the existence and identity of African philosophy receive special attention. It is argued that a negation of the existence of African philosophy results from monolithic, ahistorical and decontextualized thinking about Africa and about philosophy. The roots and development of African philosophy are inseparably bound up with the continent’s historical, political, cultural and economic complexities. The challenge facing African philosophers is twofold: deconstructing the notion of philosophy as constructed and conceived by the West; and reconstructing the history of African philosophy.     

Comments on Guyer

Paul Guyer's paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy” raises a set of issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism” that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant's moral philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant's moral philosophy prior to the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the Groundwork's attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said about them.     

On some philosophical foundations of the disappointing performances of the African soccer teams in world competitions

For decades, African senior club and national soccer teams, involved in world competitions (FIFA World Cup and FIFA Club World Cup), have failed to perform beyond mere honorable appearances. In this paper, we explore two of the fundamental causes underlying these disappointing performances. First, we examine the dilemma which forces almost all the African federations to overlook the Africa-based players in favor of those based outside the continent. Second, we show that the roots of the poor performances of the African teams go far beyond this crippling dilemma. Indeed, we argue, the persistent underperformances of African teams appear to be rather consistent with the fate of postcolonial Africa itself, a continent marred in an acute identity crisis. In fact, this crisis essentially stems from the relentless brain drain inflicted on the African soccer world which has so far dispersed its best talents all across Europe and beyond through the naturalization of its soccer diaspora. In addition, Africa has shown no ability to offer any type of attractive alternatives to the talented sons and daughters of its diaspora as well as to any other world class players. This ineptitude, coupled with Africa’s inability to leave behind its nostalgic Senghorian soccer essentialism, condemns the continent to perpetual poor performances. Therefore, we suggest that the African national federations and their respective governments move away from their deeply held soccer essentialism in order to begin to move toward some kind of soccer existentialism alongside such European countries as France, Germany, Switzerland, and The Netherlands which appear to acknowledge, perhaps reluctantly, the invaluable contributions made by the African (and other world) diaspora to the success of not only their local and national leagues but also their national teams.     

Philosophy of Science: Interfaces between Logic and Knowledge Representation

Abstract

In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science.

I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today.     

Caricatures,Myths, and White Lies

Pedagogical situations require white lies: in teaching philosophy we make decisions about what to omit, what to emphasise, and what to distort. This article considers when it is permissible to distort the historical record, arguing for a tempered respect for the historical facts. It focuses on the rationalist/empiricist distinction, which still frames most undergraduate early modern courses despite failing to capture the intellectual history of that period. It draws an analogy with Michael Strevens's view on idealisation in causal explanation to distinguish between myths and caricatures. Myths are distortions of the historical record that undermine students' understanding of the past, despite having other pedagogical benefits (being illuminative of some other period, or helping uptake of philosophical skills and methods). Caricatures are distortions that either increase or are indifferent to understanding of the past. Mythmaking, the article argues, is unjustified.     

Comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy? Some difficulties and suggestions’

In this comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy?’ (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct as far as it goes. I then suggest, but do not attempt to establish, a bolder thesis. Finally, I raise some doubts about the adequacy of Yolton's reading of Descartes and Berkeley set out in two of his ‘Puzzlements.’ The ‘Puzzlements’ themselves are supposed to illustrate typical misreading of major figures in the history of philosophy.     

“To learn healing knowledge”: Philosophy,psychedelic studies and transformation

“Philosophical learning” may be summarised in Sobiecki’s fitting catchphrase “to learn healing knowledge”. This catchphrase is taken from an article on the use of psychoactive plants among southern African diviners. In the spirit of this link, I aim to challenge contemporary negative attitudes to the topic of psychedelics, and argue that there are good reasons for philosophers to pay attention to the role that the psychedelic experience can play in promoting philosophical perception. I argue first that the results of some contemporary studies affirm the benefits of psychedelic use in an “orchestrated guided experience”. Secondly, I argue that the aims of such “orchestrated guided experiences” are consonant with the nature of philosophical learning. Philosophy, understood as a learning practice, has a strong historical precedent and ties to contemporary indigenous cultural practices. Here I cite research into the use of psychedelics and the Eleusinian Mysteries at the origin of Western philosophy. Numerous cultures, ancient and contemporary, venerate psychoactive substances as agents of learning, healing, and transformation. Thus, contemporary mainstream philosophy may have opportunities to learn, or relearn, from southern African indigenous cultural practices. Considering the positive light in which the topic of psychedelics will be painted, I will conclude by suggesting that psychedelics have the potential to play an important role in fostering the deeply transformative “philosophical learning” that is the condition for positive social change. This makes the topic of psychedelics worthy of philosophical reflection.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”