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1.
Simon Prosser 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(3):319-349
In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker’s version of two-dimensional
modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to
what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of
consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the
mind than standard representationalist theories. 相似文献
2.
This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism – the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according to the view itself, do not exist to be drawn. The paper begins with a non-technical exposition of the main ideas and technical results, which can be read on its own. This exposition is followed by a formal investigation of higher-order contingentism, in which the tools of variable-domain intensional model theory are used to articulate various versions of the view, understood as theories formulated in a higher-order modal language. Our overall assessment is mixed: higher-order contingentism can be fleshed out into an elegant systematic theory, but perhaps only at the cost of abandoning some of its original motivations. 相似文献
3.
Karen Bennett 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):263-294
Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view
and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view
– and that it definitely isn’t actualist.
* I would like to thank Rae Langton, Jim Pryor, Robert Stalnaker, Ed Zalta, and, especially, an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for very helpful comments. Thanks also to Andrew Cortens, Michael Jubien, and an audience at the ANU for helpful discussion
of an early version of this paper. 相似文献
4.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):443-453
Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been
instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't
have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which
there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true
in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were
propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider
such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds
in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis,
P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds
are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence
to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying
that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no
principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation
for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
5.
Peter Fritz 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2018,47(3):407-418
The models of contingency in what propositions, properties and relations there are developed in Part 1 are related to models of contingency in what propositions there are due to Robert Stalnaker. It is shown that some but not all of the classes of models of Part 1 agree with Stalnaker’s models concerning the patterns of contingency in what propositions there are they admit. Further structural connections between the two kinds of models are explored. 相似文献
6.
Jason Stanley 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):87-113
Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained
conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also
accepts the “direct reference” theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker’s view
of content is thus threatened by Frege’s Puzzle. Stalnaker’s classic paper “Assertion” is intended to provide a response to
this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker’s claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to
a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in “Assertion” is not
sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege’s Puzzle. 相似文献
7.
Paul Redding 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2019,27(3):379-398
ABSTRACTHere, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from the epistemological role it also played for him. It is argued that Kant’s approach to modality in the Critique of Pure Reason can best be understood as a transcendental variation on Leibniz’s earlier ‘possibilist’ approach that treated the actual world as just one of a variety of possible alternative worlds. In this context, empirical intuitions seem to work like the mythical Givens subject to Sellars’ critique. This Kantian possibilism is then contrasted with an ‘actualist’ alternative approach to modality found in the contemporary work of Robert Stalnaker, but also recognizable in Hegel. In particular, the role of immediate perceptual judgments in Hegel is likened to that played by ‘witness statements’ in Robert Stalnaker’s attempt to distinguish the logic of judgments about the actual world from those about its alternate possibilities. 相似文献
8.
Gregory Bochner 《Philosophical Studies》2013,163(3):611-626
Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions have there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic interpretation, while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available, the metasyntactic interpretation, which grants that names have their bearers essentially and yields some account of a priori knowledge. 相似文献
9.
S A Guttman 《Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association》1986,34(4):835-862
This presentation reveals a little-known area of Robert Waelder's work. As his literary executor, I have been privileged with access to his unpublished material, notes, and correspondence. And, of course, I am familiar with his mode of thinking. I wish to pass on some of this knowledge. What cannot be passed on, however, in some abstract intellectual way, are psychoanalytic principles themselves. Therefore, while this paper sheds light on a very particular aspect of Robert Waelder's work, it is also in some ways a cautionary tale, a plea that the reader understand what is behind the psychoanalytic point of view and its basic concepts--namely, clinical experience. 相似文献
10.
David Denby 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):191-207
Our knowledge of the most basic alternative possibilities can be thought of as generated recursively from what we know about the actual world. But what are the generating principles? According to one view, they are recombinational: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by “patching together” parts of distinct worlds or “blotting out” parts of worlds to yield new worlds. I argue that this view is inadequate. It is difficult to state in a way that is true and non-trivial, and anyway fails to account for our knowledge that there might have been other things, properties, relations, and combinations of these than there actually are. I sketch and defend an alternative view based on the distinction between determinable and determinate properties: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by “intra-determinable” variation, variation from one determinate to another of the same determinable. 相似文献
11.
Thomas W. Polger 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(1):109-130
Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker
hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s
critique of Block and Stalnaker crucially hinges on a reductio argument, and that the reductio can be defused. I conclude
that the counterexamples given by Block and Stalnaker are cogent. If I am right, then we have no reason to accept Chalmers’
and Jackson’s contentions that physicalism requires a priori, transparent, reductive explanations of all facts in terms of
microphysical facts. This conclusion has consequences for C&J’s argument that conceptual analysis is essential to philosophical
methodology. 相似文献
12.
Philosophical Studies - In this paper, I argue that, contrary to Robert Stalnaker’s highly influential account of linguistic communication, successful communication does not depend on a... 相似文献
13.
Nomy Arpaly 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):303-307
I argue that in his response to me Robert Pippin misrepresents my view of akrasia (partially because of what looks like his strong disbelief in the existence of akrasia) as well as expresses a false view of the way a generalizing moral theory is supposed to apply to specific cases. The last issue is related to particularism, which I turn to discuss, arguing that one familiar way in which it seems attractive is a misleading one. 相似文献
14.
Stephan Torre 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):97-114
I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker
takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I
argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible
world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I
argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified
with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have
centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared
possibilities. 相似文献
15.
16.
Gerhard Nuffer 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2009,47(2):187-204
Robert Stalnaker has argued that mathematical information is information about the sentences and expressions of mathematics. I argue that this metalinguistic account is open to a variant of Alonzo Church's translation objection and that Stalnaker's attempt to get around this objection is not successful. If correct, this tells not only against Stalnaker's account of mathematical truths, but against any metalinguistic account of truths that are both necessary and informative. 相似文献
17.
Simon Prosser 《Synthese》2006,149(1):77-96
John Perry has argued that language, thought and experience often contain unarticulated constituents. I argue that this idea
holds the key to explaining away the intuitive appeal of the A-theory of time and the endurance theory of persistence. The
A-theory has seemed intuitively appealing because the nature of temporal experience makes it natural for us to use one-place
predicates like past to deal with what are really two-place relations, one of whose constituents is unarticulated. The endurance view can be treated
in a similar way; the temporal boundaries of temporal parts of objects are unarticulated in experience and this makes it seem
that the very same entity exists at different times. 相似文献
18.
Karen S. Lewis 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2018,52(3):481-507
The classic Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals captures that Sobel sequences are consistent sequences, for example:
- a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro dance.
- b. But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance.
19.
Sinan Dogramaci 《Philosophical Studies》2014,168(2):355-369
Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our senses are reliably veridical, where that warrant is one we enjoy by default, that is, without relying on any evidence or engaging in any positive argument. The problem with this form of Rationalism is that, even if you have default knowledge that your senses are reliable, this is not adequate to rule out every kind of skeptical scenario. The problem is created by one-off skeptical scenarios, scenarios that involve a highly reliable perceiver who, by a pure fluke, has a one-off, non-veridical experience. I claim you cannot infer that your present perceptual experience is veridical just on the basis of knowledge of your general reliability. More generally, if you infer that the present F is G, just on the basis of your knowledge that most Fs are Gs, this is what I call statistical inference, and, as I argue, statistical inference by itself does not generate knowledge. I defend this view of statistical inference against objections, including the objection that radical skepticism about our ordinary inductive knowledge will follow unless statistical inference generates knowledge. 相似文献
20.
Gavin G. Enck 《Philosophia》2014,42(2):335-347
Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this expert is unable to rule them out. Consistent with the LSA is the outcome that people not exposed to these live hypotheses can know what these experts cannot. However, in this paper, I defeat the LSA by developing and defending a counterexample that focuses on the phenomenon of genius testimony. Everyone, including the LSA’s proponent, can and should allow that expertise comes in degrees. While in many cases a person’s intelligence, understanding, and knowledge are parallel to others in the field, there are some who are extraordinary in their intelligence, understanding, and knowledge (geniuses). If an expert meets with a genius, it is possible that the genius provides this individual with beliefs that can rule out a skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, an expert can have knowledge, even if the skeptical hypothesis is live and endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. After providing this counterexample, I present three potential objections, and show how people can know global warming exists and that smoking does not give someone cancer. I conclude by defending this counterexample from a likely reply by proponents of the LSA involving luck and knowledge. 相似文献