马克思对"本体思维方式"的历史性变革

传统本论在黑格尔哲学中达到了它的最高形态,同时暴露出严重问题。对此,马克思没有采取与他同时代的其他哲学家（如叔本华、尼采等）仅仅改变“本体论哲学”的某种理论形态的做法,而是从根本上否定了传统本体论借以立立论的那种“绝对化”的基本思想原则和思维方式,使哲学找回了具有双重生命本性的现实的人和由人参与开拓的现实生活世界。即使如此,也不宜把马克思的哲学归结为“实践本体论”。     

马克思哲学与“生存论转向”

马克思哲学在哲学史上所造成的革命变革是从本体论层面上发动并展开的。这一变革的实质就在于 ,它使哲学发生了“生存论转向” ,即使哲学关注的焦点从超验世界转向“感性世界” ,从宇宙本体转向人的生存状态 ,从“寻求最高原因”转向探究人的生存实践活动。对于马克思哲学来说 ,“全部问题都在于使现存世界革命化” ,消除人的生存的异化状态 ,从而“把人的世界和人的关系还给人自己” (马克思语 )。这样 ,马克思哲学便终结了“形而上学” ,使西方哲学从知识论形态转向生存论形态 ,从而展示了一个新的思想地平线。我在这里所说的“形而上学”…     

“感性世界”实践论诠释的认识论意义

《哲学研究》 2004年第 3期刊登了笔者《“感性世界”的实践论诠释与哲学范式的变革》一文。该文的基本观点是, 马克思的那句名言: “哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界, 而问题在于改变世界”是具有本体论意义的哲学命题, 这个命题的本体论含义是在马克思关于“感性世界”的实践论诠释中得以显现的, 亦即马克思通过对“直观的唯物主义”的批判, 明确强调: “感性世界”并非是独立于人的、与人的活动无关的自在世界, 而是以人的“感性活动”为深刻基础的属人的现实世界或“生活世界”。马克思的这一理论暗示着哲学范式的重大变革, 即从“解…     

马克思对人的存在的探解及其现实方法论意义──对马克思哲学思想的一种解读

对马克思哲学本体论历来存在不同的理解。本文认为,马克思超越旧哲学本体论的主要之点就在于它不是停留于传统的自然本体论,而是以“人的存在”为本体,并由此展开了新哲学的一系列的基本观点。“人的存在”是马克思哲学的一个最基本的范畴（这里的“人”是概括了人的个体、共同体和整个人类的总体性概念）。对“人的存在”的探解构成了马克思哲学的最基本的内容。那么,马克思“人的存在”的基本内涵是什么？马克思如何揭示人的存在的基本内涵？马克思对人的存在的探解的方法论意义,特别是现实意义何在？本文主要以体现马克思哲学思想形…     

马克思辩证法能否规避“本体论承诺”的风险

关于辩证法的“本体论承诺”问题，以往的研究主要囿于谓词逻辑而不是现实存在去探求其“是什么”,从而将日常生活世界与抽象理念世界割裂开来。这不可避免地滋生出形式化或诡辩论风险，削弱了辩证法对于生活世界的具体意义的解释力。马克思辩证法始终关注现实存在的本质及其演变，因而也将遭遇外在的“本体论承诺”的难题。然而，能否规避“本体论承诺”的风险，根本上取决于辩证法是否直指存在本身并展示本体论的构建性维度。马克思辩证法立足于现实世界和人类实践，内蕴了本体论的构建性意义，在人类实践的发生学视野中将辩证法的本体论探索转换到追问其“是否真实存在”这一深层问题，促使外在形式化的“本体论承诺”转向内在构建性的本体论意义，有效转化并规避了“本体论承诺”的风险。     

略论物质本体论与实践本体论的统一

1 在马克思的“实践的唯物主义”中,有无本体论,如果有本体论的话,又是什么本体论,目前尚有争议。我们认为,任何哲学体系作为世界观和方法论的统一,都有其本体论的前提和本质。马克思主义哲学也不例外。在马克思看来,即使“人的感觉、激情等等不仅是在[狭隘]意义上的人类学的规定,而且是真正本体论的本质(自然)肯定”(《马克思恩格斯全集》第42卷第150页)。更不用说他的哲学世界观和社会历史观有其本体论的前提和本质了。马克思以前的哲学本体论,或者把整个世界的本质和本体视为某种超自然的、非物质的和能动的“精神实体“(唯心主义),或者视为一种与主体活     

“实践本体论”刍议

“实践本体论”是“实践唯物主义”讨论中争论的一个焦点。现就以下几个问题提出自己的粗浅看法:1、实践本体论提出的理论背景是什么?2、实践本体论和传统本体论的区别和联系。3、实践本体论的含义及其在马克思著作中根据。在马克思的原著中,并没有直接讲过“实践本体论”这样的话,它是针对现行体系中的“物质本体论”或“自然本体论”而提出来的。在我们现行的教科书中,实际上并没有把实践性原则作为马克思全部哲学的首要的和基本的观点,而是把“物质”和社会历史观中的“社会存在”作为最核心的概念和最高的原则。因此,自然主义、客体至上、见物不见人成     

全国报刊部分哲学论文目录索引

关于马克思主义哲学史的几个问题/黄(木丹)森/中国社会科学.1991,6马克思哲学本体论思路历程/俞吾金/学术月刊.1991,11马克思社会历史进程理论考评/万斌/苏州大学学报.1991,4马克思早期对人本质问题的研究不能逻辑地导向唯物史观/于文军/理论探讨.1991,6关于马克思“世界历史”范畴的理解/江丹林,孙麾/哲学动态.1991,11马克思恩格斯美学思想的体系/庄锡华/苏州大学     

辩证法与本体论的双重转换——马克思辩证法理论的本体论变革意蕴

马克思哲学的本体论的变革与其辩证法的变革是同一问题不可分割的两个方面。在哲学史上,黑格尔曾试图通过辩证法与本体论的内在统一改造和重构形而上学本体论。与黑格尔的"辩证本体论"不同,马克思哲学的实践观点把人对自然的"依赖性"和"超越性"、人类活动的"感性对象性"和"理性能动性"等两极对立的矛盾关系在实践活动中否定性地统一起来,使对人而言的"现实世界"具有了真正辩证的本性。以禀赋辩证本性的现实世界为基础,马克思对黑格尔"辩证本体论"的理论前提进行了深入的批判性反思,在为辩证法确立了真实的本体论根基的同时,也实现了哲学本体论真正的辩证变革,从而实现了辩证法与本体论的双重转换。这是马克思哲学重要的理论贡献。     

论世界历史性的个人──哲学中革命性变革的实质

本文考察了从康德的“世界公民”、黑格尔的“世界历史个人”到马克思的“世界历史性的个人”思想的历史演变,进而认为,康德哲学的意义决不仅仅在于它是近代哲学主题由本体论向认识论转变的完成者,更主要的是它开启了近代哲学主题由认识论向历史观的转变这一“新的哲学变革”;黑格尔哲学以其“宏大的历史感”和否定性辩证法使历史观的探讨达到前所未有的高度;而马克思的唯物史观则使历史观真正奠立在科学的基础上,从而完成了近代哲学主题由认识论向历史观的转变。在深化改革、扩大开放的现汽化建设过程中,有必要重新认识和把握马克思的哲学革命的实质与现实意义。     

Heidegger?s Thought and Nazism

This article rejects the idea that Heidegger's Nazism derives from his philosophical thought. No connection has convincingly been shown to hold between the ontological apparatus of Being and Timeand any political orientation. The elaboration of the concept of being in the later work needs to be understood as Heidegger's own reaction to the activism of his earlier thought which in the absence of any principle of respect for other human beings could provide no moral basis for resistance to Nazi ideology. The tensions between the circumstances of Heidegger's early life - rural, conservative, and Catholic - and the Nietzschean modernism of his philosophical thought are explored. It is suggested that there were analogous tensions between tradition and the modern world in Nazism and that it was Heidegger's hatred of that world that led him to respond favorably to some (but not all) of the themes of Nazi thought.     

Deleuze and Naturalism

Abstract

Against the tendency to regard Deleuze as a materialist and a naturalistic thinker, I argue that his core philosophical writings involve commitments that are incompatible with contemporary scientific naturalism. He defends different versions of a distinction between philosophy and natural science that is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and with the scientific image of the world as a single causally interconnected system. He defends the existence of a virtual realm of entities that is irreconcilable with ontological naturalism. The difficulty of reconciling Deleuze’s philosophy with ontological naturalism is especially apparent in his recurrent conception of pure events that are irreducible to their incarnation in bodies and states of affairs. In the last section of this essay, I canvass some of the ways in which Deleuze’s thought might be reconciled with a more liberal, pluralist and ethical naturalism that he identified in an early essay on Lucretius.     

马克思的自由观及其当代意义

马克思的哲学中,艺术活动始终是人类自由生存的典范状态。在其早期思想中,由于视生产劳动本质上是一种类似于艺术的活动,马克思认为消除了异化的生产实践便是人的自由的实现?而在其晚年思想中,由于认识到物质生产领域始终是一个必然性王国,自由王国便被置于这一必然王国的彼岸,自由的实现也便只能存在于艺术活动之中,但这一自由王国的繁荣又依赖于必然王国借助生产率的提高所提供的自由时间的增长。马克思的这一自由观对于当代人类的自我理解仍有重要的意义。     

现代新儒家的易学思想论纲

现代新儒家代表人物特重<易传>,他们借助于诠释<易传>来阐发自己的哲学思想.熊十力的易学是以"乾元"为中心的本体-宇宙论;马一浮的易学是以"性理"为中心的本体-工夫论;方东美的易学是以"生生"为中心的形上学;牟宗三的易学是以"穷神知化"为中心的道德形上学;唐君毅的易学是以"神明之知"为中心的天人内外相生相涵的圆教.他们以现代哲学的观念与问题意识重点阐发了<周易>哲学的宇宙论、本体论、生命论、人性论、境界论、价值论及其间的联系,肯定了中国哲学之不同于西方哲学的特性是生机的自然观,整体和谐观,自然宇宙和事实世界涵有价值的观念,至美至善的追求,生命的学问和内在性的体验.他们重建了本体论和宇宙论,证成了超越性与内在性的贯通及天与人合德的意义.     

董仲舒易学哲学思想探析

董仲舒的易学哲学思想是他的整个哲学体系的核心内容.其内涵丰富而深刻,主要表现在董仲舒赋予<易传>中的"元"以逻辑在先和价值根源之意义,表明"元"是一个价值本体范畴;他把<易传>的"继善成性"论改造为"天止人继"说,反映了人类在宇宙万物中之地位与意义的一种自觉精神;又把<易传>"人文化成"的思想观念发展为一种"人文宇宙观",从宇宙观高度审视人类文化,又从人类文化角度看待宇宙,观与文化观合二为一,表明了宇宙是人类文化创造的本源和基础,而人类文化是宇宙的发展和完善.这就从宇宙观的高度肯定、突出了人文价值的崇高意义.     

Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics

In this paper I investigate differences and similarities in the definitions of human being and human essence as proposed by two of the most influential thinkers of 20th-century world philosophy, namely Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger. I first examine a number of interpretations put forth by scholars that assess the philosophical compatibility of the thought of the two philosophers. Each of these assessments tend to agree that they are incompatible with each other based on what they perceive as an absolute distance between Mou’s and Heidegger’s ways of thinking. Although these studies are pioneering and show an in-depth understanding of Mou’s thought, none demonstrate a correct understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy. Therefore, I will attempt to demonstrate that, despite their differences, the ontological and ethical theses of Mou and Heidegger have several striking points of contact. I will also put forth the claim that Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy is more compatible with Mou’s philosophy than Kant’s system.     

Personale Seinsweisen bei S.L. Frank: Schnittstellen zwischen Anthropologie und Ontologie

This article strives to combine conceptions of the person by Semën Frank. From his early critical Marxist works to his metaphysical personalism and late Christian anthropology, he covered normative-ethical, transcendent-epistemological, and ‘total unity’—ontological questions in equal measure. This diversity will be synthesized in comparisons of his personalist and ontological thought. The text will highlight Frank’s different schemes of personal modes of being, i.e. correlations between the ‘I–thou’ relationship and the absolute being, and move on to contrast his concepts of ontological personality.     

Thoughts,Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness

Abstract

This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excluded from the phenomenal domain. This paper sheds light on the nature of different kinds of thoughts and questions a fundamental asymmetry between the perceptual and the cognitive domain when it comes to their ontology and temporal character.     

The fall of fantasies: a Lacanian reading of lack

The purpose of this article is to explain to a non-Lacanian audience the broad philosophical foundations of Lacanian theory, particularly the relationship that Lacan draws between the human subject's ontological lack and his or her creative capacities. In an effort to explain Lacan's distaste for psychoanalytic approaches aimed at strengthening the ego, the article outlines the manner in which Lacan connects ego-driven fantasies to the constriction of the subject's psychic world. Lacan suggests that narcissistic fantasies are misleadingly seductive because they-in occluding the internal rifts and antagonisms of the subject's being-alleviate his or her anxieties about the contingent basis of existence. However, the illusory sense of plenitude and self-presence that such fantasies provide prevents the subject from effectively discerning the "truth" of his or her desire, thereby holding him or her captive in socially conventional psychic paradigms. In consequence, it is only the fall of the subject's most cherished fantasies that empowers him or her to pursue a degree of subjective singularity. The article also considers the clinical implications of Lacan's theory of lack, including the ways in which the analyst's lack enhances the patient's capacity to claim an increasingly autonomous and multidimensional mode of encountering the world.