《德意志意识形态》的文献学研究及其当代价值国际学术研讨会综述

为纪念<德意志意识形态>创作160周年和广松涉逝世10周年,由教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地南京大学马克思主义社会理论研究中心、南京大学中日文化研究中心、南京大学哲学系联合主办的"<德意志意识形态>的文献学研究及其当代价值暨第二届广松涉与马克思主义哲学国际学术研讨会"于2005年4月23～24日在古城南京举行.中日学者70余人与会,大家围绕<德意志意识形态>与唯物史观的当代价值、恩格斯在唯物史观创立过程中的作用、广松版<德意志意识形态>及其当代争论等问题进行了深入研讨.     

陶伯特与《德意志意识形态》的编辑和研究

在《德意志意识形态》的百年文献学研究历程中，德国MEGA²编辑专家英·陶伯特的编辑与研究工作可谓至关重要。正是陶伯特首创了MEGA²试编卷中“费尔巴哈”章的编排架构，构想了《德意志意识形态》的完整版框架，并最终正式提出了时间顺序版“费尔巴哈”章。值得一提的是，陶伯特所构想的《德意志意识形态》完整版是理解MEGA²版《德意志意识形态》的重要中介，它为我们在比较视域下编排中文二版《德意志意识形态》提供了有益借鉴。     

新MEGA视野中的《德意志意识形态》“卢格问题”探讨

从《马克思恩格斯全集》新历史考证版的有关资料看,卢格在马克思思想发展历史上具有重要的意义。青年黑格尔派成员中,卢格与其他成员思想上的不同主要在三个问题上体现出来:宗教批判与政治批判的关系、对黑格尔纯粹理论立场的批判、民主主义的政治立场。因此卢格不能简单地被等同于马克思意识形态批判中的那些德意志意识形态家。     

意识形态的魔力与主体的祛魅——哲学视域中的《法兰西阶级斗争》和《雾月十八日》

《1848年至1850年的法兰西阶级斗争》和《路易.波拿巴的雾月十八日》在马克思哲学思想的发展过程中起到极为重要的推动作用。在这两个文本中,马克思打破了市民社会决定国家的单向模式,详细分析了政治国家对市民社会的反作用,进一步完善了历史唯物主义的基本原理。在此基础上,马克思看到,无产阶级并不像他在《德意志意识形态》中预言的那样,彻底摆脱了资产阶级国家意识形态的束缚,成为共产主义革命的真正代言人,相反,他们却陷入到资产阶级意识形态和金钱拜物教的漩涡之中。但马克思认为,这种束缚是暂时的,随着资本主义经济危机的爆发,工人必然会冲破意识形态和拜物教的牢笼,上升为自为的革命阶级。与《德意志意识形态》相比,这两个文本无疑在主体向度上深化了马克思的历史唯物主义。     

最新哲学论文索引

马恩列斯毛邓等哲学思想“现实的个人”:唯物史观的入口处——《德意志意识形态》的个人概念及其意义/汪信砚,李志//哲学动态,2007.9历史与实践——解读《德意志意识形态》/金崇碧//湖北社会科学,2007.9文本的命运(下)——《德意志意识形态》手稿保存、刊布与版本源流考/聂锦芳//河北学刊,2007.5关于马克思《1844年经济学哲学手稿》思想性质的定位问题/王金福//福建论坛(人文社会科学版),2007.9走进《1844年经济学哲学手稿》——论马克思对劳动的存在论阐明/刘兴章//西南大学学报(社会科学版),2007.5翻译与差异性:马克思文本研究中的一个问…     

《德意志意识形态》的文献学问题讨论

主要由马克思和恩格斯撰写的《德意志意识形态》手稿的主要部分形成于1845年至1846年之间,1846年其主要部分曾送交出版社,但因故没有出版。全文第一篇在马克思和恩格斯生前没有完成,加上手稿的部分佚失和损坏,马克思和恩格斯去世以后,各种版本各持己见对此进行了不同的编辑。我们在此发表两篇《德意志意识形态》文献学讨论的文章,以纪念其主要手稿形成160周年。     

“《德意志意识形态》的文献学研究及其当代价值暨第二届广松涉与马克思主义哲学国际学术研讨会”综述

为了纪念《德意志意识形态》(以下简称《形态》)创作160周年和当代日本著名马克思主义哲学家广松涉逝世十周年,教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地南京大学马克思主义社会理论研究中心、南京大学中日文化研究中心、南京大学哲学系于2005年4月23日至24日在南京联合召开了“《德意志意识形态》的文献学研究及其当代价值暨第二届广松涉与马克思主义哲学国际学术研讨会”,来自中央编译局、中国社会科学院、北京大学、南京大学、复旦大学、南开大学、清华大学等高校与科研机构的国内学者60余人,与来自名古屋大学、大东文化大学、早稻田大学、情况出…     

关于《德意志意识形态》"费尔巴哈"章的排序问题

主要由马克思和恩格斯撰写的《德意志意识形态》手稿的主要部分形成于1845年至1846年之间,1846年其主要部分曾送交出版社,但因故没有出版。全文第一篇在马克思和恩格斯生前没有完成,加上手稿的部分佚失和损坏,马克思和恩格斯去世以后,各种版本各持己见对此进行了不同的编辑。我们在此发表两篇《德意志意识形态》文献学讨论的文章,以纪念其主要手稿形成160周年。     

《德意志意识形态》中的“关系”概念再探

恩格斯和马克思分别在《德意志意识形态》誊清稿上,插入了一句对动物是否对他者具有"关系"的断言。马克思和恩格斯语境中的"关系",不是泛指对个体事物的单纯超出和在概念中对诸个体的共同把握,而是注重事物对事物所施加的行为和影响。"关系"的这种行为施加的含义,具有施-受的方向性。关于这种狭义的"关系",马克思还将意识纳入其中,将意识视作一种特殊的行为,当作特定的"关系"。恩格斯则更加严格地界定"关系",并不纳入意识。马克思和恩格斯在《德意志意识形态》中的表述分歧,是在对事情具有基本共识的前提下,带有个人色彩的言说方式的差异,并且与《德意志意识形态》的草创性质有关。     

论马克思主义意识形态批判的本质——也谈柯尔施问题

意识形态往往以观念的形式出现,因此长期以来,意识形态批判主要是一种意识形态的观念批判或观念的意识形态批判。对马克思来说,这种意识形态批判不过是意识形态批判的形式或形式的意识形态批判,而问题的关键却在于,意识形态在本质上恰恰不是观念的,而是实存的、现实的和实践的。这构成马克思《德意志意识形态》这本著作的核心思想。这一思想部分地被柯尔施在《马克思主义与哲学》一书所捕捉,在柯尔施看来,马克思从来都是"把意识形态(包括哲学)当作具体的现实而不是空洞的幻想来对待"。因此,意识形态批判就主要不是观念的批判而是现实的批判,这才是意识形态批判的本质,其他统统只是形式。但是除此之外,还有另外一个重大的问题也同时被特别地忽视了,那就是,这正好为后来第二国际的一些马克思主义者轻视理论特别是哲学提供了借口,然而正是在这里,隐含着意识形态批判的另一深层本质:意识形态本身内在实践结构。因此,为了实现意识形态的实践的和本质的批判,坚持和创新意识形态就不能不具有特别重大的理论意义和现实意义。     

马克思的“个体”和“共同体”概念

个体与共同体的概念在马克思哲学和历史理论中占有重要的地位。"人格个体"(das persoenliche Individuum)与作为这种个体联合的"真正共同体"(wirkliche Gemeinschaft),构成马克思所追求的理想社会的密不可分、互为前提的两端。马克思对个体与共同体及其相互关系的认识和重建,集中反     

A Comprehensive Picture of the Decidability of Mereological Theories

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate which stands for the relation “being a part of” and it has been strongly suggested that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. Mereological theories owe their origin to Le?niewski. However, some more recent authors, such as Simons as well as Casati and Varzi, have reformulated mereology in a way most logicians today are familiar with. It turns out that any theory which can be formed by using the reformulated mereological axioms or axiom schemas is in a sense a subtheory of the elementary theory of Boolean algebras or of the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras. It is known that the theory of partial orderings is undecidable while the elementary theory of Boolean algebras and the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras are decidable. In this paper, I will look into the behaviors in terms of decidability of those mereological theories located in between. More precisely, I will give a comprehensive picture of the said issue by offering solutions to the open problems which I have raised in some of my papers published previously.     

论马克思市民社会理论的两种逻辑

<正>人们近年来围绕着马克思的市民社会理论进行了很多研究,不过,在笔者看来,这些研究尚未完全阐明这一理论的所有基本问题,因而对其作进一步研究的空间仍是敞开的。一个直接的问题是:人     

“现实的个人”与“共同体”关系之辨——重温马克思、恩格斯对一个重要问题的阐释与论证

<正>在研究者通常的印象中,较之《德意志意识形态》中的其他章节,"正面阐发"马克思、恩格斯见解的"费尔巴哈"章可能是最好把握和理解的了。然而,如果我们不是沿袭过去习见的那种抽象而宏观的研究方式,寻章摘句、断章取义,笼而统之地涉略而不顾及细节,就会发现事实并非如此。     

Fettering, Development and Revolution

In this article, I contrast two theories of history: a Marxist theory (that of G. A. Cohen) and an anarchist theory. Both theories, in their respective attempts at explaining epochal transitions, seem to require some plausible construal of Marx's claim that revolutions occur when a society's economic relations 'fetter' the development of its productive forces. From an examination of a number of different construals of 'fettering'—'development fettering', 'use fettering', 'ACRU fettering', 'net fettering', and even 'forfeitur'—I conclude that none of them supports the Marxist theory of revolution, while each is consistent with the anarchist theory of epochal transformation.     

Folk Theories of the Third Kind

The idea of a folk theory has played many important roles in much recent philosophy. To do the work they are designed for, they need to be both internal features of agents who possess them, and yet scrutable without the full resources of empirical cognitive science. The worry for the theorist of folk theories, is that only one of these desiderata is met in each plausible conception of a folk theory. This paper outlines a third conception that meets them both.¹     

Menkiti’s normative communitarian conception of personhood as gendered,ableist and anti-queer

This paper aims to indicate the sense in which Menkiti’s normative conception of personhood can be considered as gendered, ableist and anti-queer. I argue that Menkiti’s given account of personhood marginalises at least one of the categories of gender, people with disabilities and queer people. Therefore, I conclude that it should be rejected as a plausible theory of personhood insofar as it can be argued that inclusive theories of personhood are preferable, namely theories of persons that consider gender, people with disabilities, and queer people.     

Confucianism and the Idea of Citizenship

Does Confucianism have anything to contribute to the idea and practice of citizenship? Many critics would argue that it does not, on the grounds that it is inhospitable to values such as individuality, individual rights, equality and democracy. However, these grounds have to be severely qualified. Furthermore, there is no single conception of citizenship, even though the liberal conception stands out as, probably, the most influential one. Recently in the debate on citizenship, many commentators have been highly critical of the liberal conception, precisely for its uncompromising emphasis on individuality and individual rights, which tends to produce a political practice that fails to bring about equality and democratic values. Confucianism has much to contribute to the critique of the liberal conception of citizenship, as well as to the construction of a more viable conception, one that has a better chance to cope with the effects of globalisation.     

Reification as dependence on extrinsic information

Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or reified form of a given, determining reality. Marx leaves unclear exactly how the process exerts and maintains its hold on agents, the nature of the reasons they might have for wanting to free themselves of it, and under what conditions they could do so. However, it is possible to abstract somewhat from Marx's specific concerns and to model a self-reproducing practice of reification that works through the informational environment of decision. Though of wider interest, this more general conception can shed light on the nature and critique of Marx's inverted world. It draws on conceptual resources from decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory.The author wishes to thank Christopher Ake, Daniel Hausman, Carl Hedman, Mark Kaplan, John Koethe, Marc Linder and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments or suggestions. Work on this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation and by The Graduate School and The Center for Twentieth Century Studies of the University of Wisconsin — Milwaukee.     

Life,the Unhistorical,the Suprahistorical: Nietzsche on History

Abstract

Nietzsche was a philosopher who prided himself, in deliberate contradistinction with previous philosophers, on his ‘historical sense’. But this leaves many questions unanswered about the precise role of the historical in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Perhaps most importantly, can the conception of genealogy in Nietzsche’s later philosophy, as a revised historical method, be taken to represent his mature philosophical methodology in general? I argue, firstly, that there is considerable continuity between Nietzsche’s conceptions of history in the early essay ‘On the uses and disadvantages of history for life’ and those of his later philosophy. The former can therefore be used as a resource for understanding the latter. Through a reading of the early history essay I demonstrate that Nietzsche’s conception of the historical here is intimately bound up with the notion of the ‘unhistorical’ and that it is precisely renewed access to the unhistorical which is required in order for history to be conducive to the flourishing of humanity. I go on to contend that this holds for Nietzsche’s later writings as well, and that genealogy, being purely historical, must therefore be seen as one subsidiary part of a broader philosophy in which the unhistorical will play, literally, a vital role.