Infants hierarchically organize memory representations

Throughout development, working memory is subject to capacity limits that severely constrain short‐term storage. However, adults can massively expand the total amount of remembered information by grouping items into chunks. Although infants also have been shown to chunk objects in memory, little is known regarding the limits of this ability. In particular, it remains unknown whether infants can create more complex memory hierarchies, binding representations of chunks into still larger chunks in recursive fashion. Here we tested the limits of early chunking, first measuring the number of items infants can bind into a single chunk and the number of chunks infants can maintain concurrently, and then, critically, whether infants can embed chunked representations into larger units. We tested 14‐month‐old infants' memory for hidden objects using a manual search task in which we manipulated memory load (the number of objects infants saw hidden) and the chunking cues provided. We found that infants are limited in the number of items they can chunk and in the number of chunks they can remember. However, we also found that infants can bind representations of chunks into ‘superchunks’. These results suggest that hierarchically organizing information strongly affects working memory, starting in infancy.     

Young infants readily use proximity to organize visual pattern information

Four experiments relying on novelty and spontaneous preference procedures were performed to determine whether 3-4-month-old infants utilize the Gestalt principle of proximity to organize visual pattern information. In Experiment 1, infants familiarized with arrays of elements that could be organized into either columns or rows were tested for their preference between vertical and horizontal bars. The infants preferred the novel organization of bars. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the novelty preference could not be attributed to an a priori preference or an inability to discriminate between the elements comprising the patterns. Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiment 1 in a bars --> elements version of the task, indicating that extended exposure is not necessary for infants to organize based on proximity. The results suggest that infants readily organize visual pattern information in accord with proximity. Implications of this finding for models of the ontogenesis and microgenesis of object perception in infants and adults are discussed.     

The effect of instructions to organize for good and poor learners

Two studies are reported which investigate the possibility that instructing individuals to organize their recall will differentially facilitate the performance of “fast” and “slow” learners (defined in terms of performance on a pretest). Experiment I utilized alphabetic organization in the free-recall learning of a list of unrelated words; Experiment II used a categorized word list under similar conditions. In each study, half of the individuals in each ability group received instructions, prior to the first of six learning trials, that contained information about the respective nature of organization present in the list and encouragement to use this type of organization in learning the list. In Experiment I, instructions to use alphabetic organization facilitated the performance of both ability groups to about the same extent. In Experiment II, instructions to use categorical organization in learning resulted in a substantial facilitation of performance for “slow” learners and a slight decrement in performance for “fast” learners. The results from the two studies are discussed in terms of sources of individual differences in learning.     

How we know what we intend

How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran??s ??Authorship?? view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed primarily with the attitude of belief in mind, is found wanting when applied to intention. An alternative account is proposed for knowledge of one??s own intentions that gives a central role to the mental act of deciding what to do. It is argued that we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action.     

Space-, object-, and feature-based attention interact to organize visual scenes

Biased-competition accounts of attentional processing propose that attention arises from distributed interactions within and among different types of perceptual representations (e.g., spatial, featural, and object-based). Although considerable research has examined the facilitation in processing afforded by attending selectively to spatial locations, or to features, or to objects, surprisingly little research has addressed a key prediction of the biased-competition account: that attending to any stimulus should give rise to simultaneous interactions across all the types of perceptual representations encompassed by that stimulus. Here we show that, when an object in a visual display is cued, space-, feature-, and object-based forms of attention interact to enhance processing of that object and to create a scene-wide pattern of attentional facilitation. These results provide evidence to support the biased-competition framework and suggest that attention might be thought of as a mechanism by which multiple, disparate bottom-up, and even top-down, visual perceptual representations are coordinated and preferentially enhanced.     

What we look at when we read

The entire surface phrase structure hierarchy of sentences influences visual scanning patterns in reading familiar material. A general eye-fixation rule predicts the pattern of adults’ eye-fixations in a study of reading predictable sentences: “fixate on the first half of phrase structure constituents.” This rule applies cumulatively at all levels of the surface phrase structure.     

Why we walk the way we do

By using inverse dynamics and forceplate recordings, this study established the principle of oscillating systems and the influence of gravity and body parameters on the programming of the gait parameters, step frequency and length. Calculation of the ratio of the amplitude of the center of mass (CM) and the center of foot pressure (CP) oscillations yielded an equation and established a biomechanical constant, the natural body frequency (NBF). NBF appears to be an absolute invariant parameter, specific to human standing posture and gait in terrestrial gravity, which influences the relative positions of CM and CP and whose value separates the frequency bands of standing posture from those for gait. This equation was tested by using the experimental paradigm of stepping in place and then used in calculating the magnitude of CM oscillations during gait. The biomechanical analysis of the experimental observations allows one to establish the relationships between body parameters and gravity and the central programming of locomotor parameters.     

A behavior-based circuit model of how outcome expectations organize learned behavior in larval Drosophila

Drosophila larvae combine a numerically simple brain, a correspondingly moderate behavioral complexity, and the availability of a rich toolbox for transgenic manipulation. This makes them attractive as a study case when trying to achieve a circuit-level understanding of behavior organization. From a series of behavioral experiments, we suggest a circuitry of chemosensory processing, odor-tastant memory trace formation, and the "decision" process to behaviorally express these memory traces--or not. The model incorporates statements about the neuronal organization of innate vs. conditioned chemosensory behavior, and the types of interaction between olfactory and gustatory pathways during the establishment as well as the behavioral expression of odor-tastant memory traces. It in particular suggests that innate olfactory behavior is responsive in nature, whereas conditioned olfactory behavior is captured better when seen as an action in pursuit of its outcome. It incorporates the available neuroanatomical and behavioral data and thus should be useful as scaffold for the ongoing investigations of the chemo-behavioral system in larval Drosophila.     

What we talk about when we talk about pediatric suffering

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - In this paper I aim to show why pediatric suffering must be understood as a judgment or evaluation, rather than a mental state. To accomplish this task, first I...     

Sometimes we fail

Pastoral Psychology -     

What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification

Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing.     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Psychology and social justice: why we do what we do

Much of psychological science and knowledge is significantly relevant to social justice, defined here as the goal to decrease human suffering and to promote human values of equality and justice. A commitment to social justice has evolved as a more important value in the last few decades for psychology, including for the American Psychological Association (APA). The mission, vision, goals, Ethics Code, and strategic plan of APA all provide a rationale for psychologists' involvement in systematic and visible ways of applying our knowledge to social issues. Although psychology has not been immune to the application of psychological knowledge in destructive ways, overall, psychology, many psychologists, and APA have demonstrated a commitment to social justice. This article provides a brief review of the key proponents, debates, and controversies involved in applying psychological science and knowledge to complex societal problems. Psychologists often find themselves in conflict and honest disagreement when the association addresses complex and controversial issues. An important goal is that we continue to find ways to agree or disagree in a respectful manner regardless of where each of us stands on the various positions that APA takes.     

What we want to do versus what we think we should do: an empirical investigation of intrapersonal conflict

People often feel torn between what they want to do and what they believe they should do. As a result, they experience intrapersonal conflict. For example, people know that they should avoid credit card debt, but they want to splurge on just one more purchase. Following Loewenstein's ( 1996 ) temporal perspective to understanding internal conflict and inconsistency, we offer three studies that empirically demonstrate (1) a distinction between the want self and the should self, (2) that behavior is more closely linked to the want self, (3) that the want self is the self that is temporally inconsistent, and (4) that adopting a want versus should perspective can have a significant impact on actual behavior. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.