有限理性的本质辨析与价值之争

有限理性不是受约束条件下的最优化, 更不能等同于非理性。从本质上说, 它是对迄今为止人类理性进化和发展水平的客观描述, 意味着无论在对待现实的态度上, 还是在认识和改造现实的能力上, 人都是理性的, 但人的理性是有限度的。有限理性观质疑当代社会科学中流行的强势理性观及其推演出来的方法论和知识体系的可靠性, 但并不质疑人的理性本身, 摆脱了历史上形形色色的理性论或非理性论非此即彼的二元论思维模式, 为我们提供了从资源观、量化观及动态发展观角度理解和把握人类理性本质的新视角。在价值理性意义上, 有限理性是有缺陷的, 但在工具理性意义上, 有限理性具有合理性, 需要在二者之间寻找适当的均衡点。心理学的有限理性研究及其产生的广泛影响酿成了继文艺复兴的概率革命之后又一次人类理性观的革命, 是这门学科为人类知识和思想宝库做出的最重要的贡献之一, 不仅具有深远的历史意义, 而且具有跨学科的方法论意义。     

理性、非理性与理性主义、非理性主义

冯玉珍：理性、非理性与理性主义、非理性主义人类精神是理性非理性的矛盾统一体。理性表现为人类超越自我有限生命,追求必然性、普遍性及永恒无限的能力,是生命的灵性之光辉。非理性体现着生命的自然欲望和冲动,表现为追求感性、具体、有限性的特性。理性和非理性是互...     

论信仰中的理性、非理性及其相互转化

论信仰中的理性、非理性及其相互转化上海财经大学陈新汉信仰是人类特有的一种精神活动。流行的观点往往把信仰理解为人们把握世界的非理性形式。其实,信仰的结构中既有非理性因素也有理性因素。两者在信仰中的不同地位,构成了宗教信仰和科学信仰的分野;两者的相互转化...     

理性和非理性概念研究

在现代西方哲学中,科学主义思潮和人本主义思潮对立的实质是理性主义与非理性主义的对立。理性主义和非理性主义对立、分歧和斗争的焦点在于理性与非理性的矛盾及其对人的意义。理性与非理性的矛盾及其对人的意义,不仅是现代西方哲学所面临的重大课题,而且也是哲学史上长期争论不休的重要问题,甚至可以说,它是整个哲学始终都在不断探讨和研究的根本课题之一。不言而喻,理性与非理性也就成为一对不可忽视的重要哲学范畴。但是,究竟什么是理性?什么是非理性?这在不同时期不同哲学家那里往往具有不同的理解和界说。这是研究和解决理性与非理性相关问题的一大障碍。认真研究和全面考察作为哲学基本范畴的理性与非理性概念,不仅对于研究和解决理性与非理性的矛盾及其对人的意义具有重要价值,而且也是哲学理论本身发展的需要。     

遭遇理性，遭遇戴维森

“非理性是在理性范围内的失败”,这是戴维森在《非理性的悖论》(1978)一文中提出的名言。初读此话,不求甚解:作为理性之异端的非理性何以进入理性的范围?细读戴维森的论证,方领悟其中真谛:一切被称作非理性的行为都包含着理性推理的内核,而它们之所以被称作非理性,只是由于在对这些行为的理由说明和因果说明之间出     

生存与理性

传统哲学与现代存在主义哲学都没有合理地理解人的生存与理性的内在关联传统哲学把理性与生存的关系看成是"纯粹理性"对"实存"的逻辑生成;而现代存在主义则把人的生存直接看成了非理性问题.非理性作为"能够自我意识到的本能",本是构成生存理性以及理性地阐释人生存的关键环节.理性对人生存的内在规定性具体体现在第一,理性理解人的生存,理性是人生存的具体的、历史性的表现,它本身就经历了从实存性向生存性的提升.第二,理性作为内蕴于人生存活动中的具有对象性功用的属性,又对人生存起着反省及评价的双重作用.第三,作为对生存性及生存意义的理解,理性必然从总体上引导着人的现实的生存活动.     

理性的意志薄弱与慎思自我

意志薄弱难题的实质在于,如果经过全面慎思的最佳判断对行动者具有决定性的规范效力,那么为何在有些情况下他会有意地违反它而行动。本文指出,传统观点对意志薄弱的非理性解释是有问题的,它的两个支柱——作为辩护依据的"理性原则"和作为心理学基础的"准传动的模型",都是不完备的。更进一步,通过对慎思自我的结构特征的分析,本文阐明了意志薄弱源于自我融贯性的调整和建构过程。在此过程中,行动者是在理性地使用"理由不完备性原则",因为理由的不确定性映射着自我的不确定性。由此,我们为意志薄弱的理性说明提供了一个更加基础性的辩护。     

文化观念的基底——理性观

人们一般把理性(reason)理解为逻辑思维和道德原则,其实,这是对理性概念的简单比.在西方语言中,理性最基本的含义是人的活动的根据,理性观则是从根本意义上对何者为人们活动根据所作的一种概括.如果说人活动的根据就是人区别于动物的根据,而人类区别于动物的根据正是人类本性.亦即人性,据此而论,理性观也就成了从根本上把握何者为人性的一种观点.     

超越理性与非理性的抽象对立

超越理性与非理性的抽象对立复旦大学吴晓明理性与非理性的分离隔绝,是当今社会生活中实际发生的情形和问题,因而也是思想界所面临的重大课题。这种分离隔绝,在今天往往采取着尖锐对立的形式,以致于理性与非理性之间的疏远和矛盾,似乎达到了前所未有的程度。在较早的...     

现代社会中理性和非理性之界限的相对性和绝对性

现代社会中理性和非理性之界限的相对性和绝对性华东师大哲学系童世骏理性和非理性的区别问题并不是一个现代问题。但在现代以前,这个问题主要是作为心理活动的几种类型来讨论的：柏拉图把理性同激情和欲望相区别,孟子重视“人之所以异于禽兽者”,都是讲理性和非理性之...     

Rational Thought And Rational Behavior: A Review Of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.

Standard economic theory says that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions and then to select the one with the highest weight. Such a procedure would maximize subjective expected utility. But, because of constraints on time and available information, people and other animals often bypass this process by using “fast and frugal” heuristics to make decisions. Rationality is thus said to be “bounded” by time and information constraints. The articles in this book describe and organize common heuristics. They show that use of such heuristics is generally the best approach to many real world problems and therefore not irrational. Heuristics evolved, they say, not as deviations from rationality but as aids to rationality in cases where the standard model would have proved to be too slow or inefficient. Although the approach of almost all of the authors of these papers is that of cognitive psychology—a focus on internal cognitive mechanisms—their findings and even their theories may be interpreted in terms of reinforcement and punishment acting on behavioral patterns.     

Dispute Irrational Beliefs and Teach Rational Beliefs: An Interview with Albert Ellis

In this interview, Ellis acknowledges that irrational beliefs have a higher biological basis than rational beliefs and that they are not at opposite ends of the same continuum. Ellis agrees that irrational beliefs are more involved in mental health problems while rational beliefs contribute to the psychology of success. The strength of conviction in both rational and irrational beliefs including self-acceptance and self-downing is explored. Ellis equates the conviction with which rational beliefs need to be held to influence emotions and behaviors with “faith.” He acknowledges the importance of faith built on facts rather than religiosity. Ellis agrees that ridding strongly motivated individuals of self-depreciation may lead to a decrease in their high frustration tolerance and, ultimately, their drive for and achievement of success. Ellis supports adding an “F” to the ABCDE model—forcefully agreeing with and applying new rational beliefs. Ellis discusses the need to develop a literature on therapeutic techniques and methods for helping people to apply rational beliefs more strongly to different areas of their lives. Ellis highlights the perils of self-efficacy positive psychology interventions if people’s innate tendency towards self-depreciation is ignored. The interviewer concludes the interview expressing the view that if we listen to Ellis, “we” need to re-think the ways we teach people of all ages to think rationally knowing that the rational re-statement of previously disputed irrational beliefs is only one of many different teaching methods. This interview was conducted in January, 2005, at the Albert Ellis Institute. At the time of the interview, Dr. Ellis was in good health. In this interview held over two separate sessions, a series of questions prepared by the interviewer were presented to Albert Ellis that were designed to stimulate discussion on differences between rational and irrational beliefs and on the issue of whether once irrational beliefs have been disputed, more time and REBT methods need to be devoted to helping clients strengthen their conviction in and application of rational beliefs.     

谈合理用药的相对性

合理或不合理用药是相对的,在临床工作中不能绝对化。首先,合理用药的目的是相对的,安全、有效、经济很难完全满足。其次,合理用药要求的内容是相对的,对于一个具体患者,药物治疗要符合病情、患者和药学的全部特点并非易事。再者,判断合理用药与否的主要依据(如临床资料、临床试验结果等)的可靠性或可信性也不是绝对的。最后必须指出,合理用药的结果受到诸多因素的影响,不一定理想,不一定令人满意。在临床工作中,应尽可能避免不合理用药,若无法避免,可先评估得失和权衡利弊,然后做出科学决策,并加强药学监护和医患沟通。     

Rational models as theories - not standards - of behavior

When people's behavior in laboratory tasks systematically deviates from a rational model, the implication is that real-world performance could be improved by changing the behavior. However, recent studies suggest that behavioral violations of rational models are at least sometimes the result of strategies that are well adapted to the real world (and not necessarily to the laboratory task). Thus, even if one accepts that certain behavior in the laboratory is irrational, compelling evidence that real-world behavior ought to change accordingly is often lacking. It is suggested here that rational models be seen as theories, and not standards, of behavior.     

The Development of a Short Form of an Irrational/Rational Beliefs Scale

Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy - This study developed a short form of the Attitudes and Beliefs Scale-2 (ABS-2), a measure of Ellis’s irrational and rational...     

REBT and Emotion I. A Role-Play Experiment Using A Shame/Disappointment Scenario to Investigate the Effects of Rational, Irrational and Indifference Beliefs on Inferences and Action Tendencies

This article reports an experiment testing an REBT hypothesis that beliefs affect inferences and action tendencies. Students at Goldsmiths College, University of London, were asked to role play a shame/disappointment scenario with one of three beliefs: rational, irrational or indifference. They were then asked to rate inferences and action tendencies on scales where a high score indicated dysfunctionality. It was predicted that the irrational group would score higher than the rational group, and that the indifference group would score lower than the rational group. From a sample of 89 students, 60 met the criteria for inclusion in the study. A between subjects design, a MANOVA and t-tests were used to analyse the data; the alpha level for all families of tests was 0. 05. The irrational group scored significantly higher than the rational group on both the inference and the action tendency scales. The indifference group scored significantly lower than the rational group on the action tendency scale. There was no significant difference between the rational and indifference group's scores on the inference scale.     

Testing a Rebt Theory: The Effects of Rational Beliefs, Irrational Beliefs, and Their Control or Certainty Contents on the Functionality of Inferences: I. In a Social Context

This article presents two experiments that examine the validity of REBT's suggestion that contents do not influence the effect that rational and irrational beliefs (beliefs) have on the functionality of inferences (FI). Specifically, two role-playing experiments indicated that control and certainty contents that refer to rational and irrational beliefs influence the effect that those beliefs have on the FI. This finding was demonstrated when beliefs and their contents referred to either one's self or other people in a social context. Based upon the results of these two experiments, it may be prudent for REBT to modify its hypothesis that contents do not influence the effects that rational and irrational beliefs have on the FI. Specifically, it may wish to hypothesise that beliefs interact with contents to affect the FI.     

The cognitive attitude of rational trust

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning.     

“临床路径”服务模式对于推进合理用药的伦理价值

药品是治病救人的物质基础,但要真正达到健康的目的,合理用药才是关键。从医学伦理学的视角来看采取临床路径服务模式推进临床合理用药,体现着“人本主义”的伦理原则,有利于患者“知情同意”原则的实现,有利于降低不合理的医药费用,有利于监测治疗效果,减少药物不良反应。     

Rational cognitive therapy with public offenders

In addressing the issue of how offenders may help themselves face the world in prison and outside, this article outlines how the principles of rational emotive therapy as outlined by Ellis and Maultsby can be simplified for use with this population in order to provide them a method for understanding and alleviating unhelpful emotional reactions. An example is provided to illustrate how a rational self-analysis model can be taught as written homework in individual or group sessions. Using the RSA model, offenders are taught to review and better understand the meanings of irrational words and how they upset themselves. Overall, our experience has been that offenders of many persuasions can be taught to be more rational and logical—an essential foundation for successful rehabilitation. This article is reproduced with permission in a slightly modified form from an earlier article authored by Smith and Lombardo “Rational Cognitive Therapy: An Executive Summary” that appeared inThe Correctional Psychologist, 27, 1995, pp. 2–5.