Response activation in overlapping tasks and the response-selection bottleneck

The authors investigated the impact of response activation on dual-task performance by presenting a subliminal prime before the stimulus in Task 2 (S2) of a psychological refractory period (PRP) task. Congruence between prime and S2 modulated the reaction times in Task 2 at short stimulus onset asynchrony despite a PRP effect. This Task 2 congruence effect was paralleled by a Task 1 congruence effect and emerged exclusively under conditions of cross talk, whereas it did not occur under dual-task conditions preventing cross talk between tasks. This suggests that response activation operates during the PRP in dual tasks and affects the response times in Task 2 via cross talk between common processing elements at prebottleneck stages but not by directly affecting the postbottleneck stages.     

The locus of the emotional Stroop effect: A study with the PRP paradigm

Stimuli that are clearly positive or negative (hence valence-laden stimuli) have the potential to interrupt unrelated task processing. A typical example is the emotional Stroop effect (ESE) in which responding to a certain task feature (e.g., color) is delayed by the presentation of task-irrelevant valent stimuli (e.g., negative pictures) compared to valence-neutral stimuli. Here we scrutinize which processes are slowed down by irrelevant but valent stimulation. In Experiment 1, participants performed in a Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) experiment with tone discrimination as Task 1 and color discrimination as Task 2. Importantly, colors in Task 2 were accompanied by valent or neutral pictures. Valent pictures delayed responding in Task 2 (thus an ESE) and this delay was additive to the time interval between tasks. In Experiment 2, task order was reversed and the ESE in Task 1 fully propagated to the Task 2 tone discrimination. These results imply that irrelevant valence-laden stimulation delays capacity-limited processes, and we suggest that this is a late perceptual process acting on stimulus categorization.     

Capacity limits of information processing in the brain

Despite the impressive complexity and processing power of the human brain, it is severely capacity limited. Behavioral research has highlighted three major bottlenecks of information processing that can cripple our ability to consciously perceive, hold in mind, and act upon the visual world, illustrated by the attentional blink (AB), visual short-term memory (VSTM), and psychological refractory period (PRP) phenomena, respectively. A review of the neurobiological literature suggests that the capacity limit of VSTM storage is primarily localized to the posterior parietal and occipital cortex, whereas the AB and PRP are associated with partly overlapping fronto-parietal networks. The convergence of these two networks in the lateral frontal cortex points to this brain region as a putative neural locus of a common processing bottleneck for perception and action.     

Central slowing during the night

The present study determined whether central information processing is subject to a circadian rhythm and, therefore, contributes to the well-known time-of-day effect on reaction time (RT). To assess the duration of central processing chronometrically, we employed the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm. In this task, subjects make fast responses to two successive stimuli. RT to the second stimulus is usually prolonged as the interval between the two stimuli decreases. This PRP effect is commonly attributed to a central-processing bottleneck. Subjects performed the PRP task every 2 hr during 28 hr of constant wakefulness under controlled conditions. The PRP effect was most pronounced in the early morning. We conclude that central processing is subject to a circadian rhythm, exhibiting a slowing during the night and a nadir in the early morning.     

Separate and shared sources of dual-task cost in stimulus identification and response selection

There is often strong interference if a second target stimulus (T2) is presented before processing of a prior target stimulus (T1) is complete. In the "Psychological Refractory Period" (PRP) paradigm, responses are speeded and interference manifests as increased response time for T2. In the "Attentional Blink" (AB) paradigm, stimuli are masked and responses unspeeded; interference manifests as reduced T2 accuracy. While different causes have usually been considered for PRP and AB phenomena, recent evidence has supported a unified account based on a single, shared restriction on concurrent processing. Here we show that a full assessment of separate and shared resource limitations requires direct comparison of hybrid PRP/AB trials with corresponding pure PRP and AB cases. Randomizing trial types in such a comparison also brings substantial benefit in addressing possible changes in task preparation or readiness. The data from two such experiments--combining speeded auditory (SA) and unspeeded visual (UV) task events--provide clear evidence for both separate and shared resource limitations. Often interference is strongest for T1 and T2 events of the same type, reflecting predominantly different limitations in SA and UV processing. With modest increases in demand, however, interference between different event types can also be made arbitrarily large, reflecting arbitrarily important shared limitations. For even such simple tasks as these, T--T2 interference reflects a combination of relatively local and relatively global sources.     

Attention and the processing of emotional words and names: not so special after all

Abstract— Previous research has suggested that a person's own name or emotionally charged stimuli automatically "grab" attention, potentially challenging limited-capacity theories of perceptual processing. In this study, subjects were shown two digits surrounding a word and asked to make a speeded judgment about whether the parity of the two digits matched. When the subject's own name was presented on a few scattered trials, responses were markedly slowed (replicating a previous study). However, in a subsequent block of trials in which half the words were the subject's name, the slowing did not occur. The same slowing occurred (but even more fleetingly) when an emotionally charged word was presented between the digits. When the name was embedded among multiple distractor words, it ceased to slow reaction times. The results suggest that perceptual analysis of high-priority stimuli is subject to the usual capacity limitations of other stimuli, but when enough capacity is available for a high-priority stimulus to be perceived, a transient surprise reaction may interrupt ongoing processing.     

Deep processing makes stimuli more preferable over long durations

The purpose of the current study was twofold. First, we investigated whether the type of stimulus processing (e.g. levels of processing) influenced preferences for novel objects. Second, we examined whether the influence of levels of processing on preferences was long lasting (e.g. longer than a day/week). Results showed that levels of processing affected preferences whereby more deeply processed stimuli were preferred over those that were shallowly processed. This effect was more robust for stimuli that were presented multiple times. Additionally, this levels of processing effect lasted for up to 6 weeks, suggesting stability in preferences for information that was more deeply processed. We discuss these results in terms of theories predicting the role of stimulus properties and exposure on the development of preferences.     

Ear differences in simple reaction time: The influence of attentional factors

Simple motor reaction times (right-handed) to tape-recorded consonant-vowel syllables were obtained from 12 subjects under two conditions of monotic stimulation: “expected” presentation (subject informed as to ear of presentation) and “random” presentation (ear of presentation varied randomly). Significantly faster left ear reaction times were obtained in the “expected” condition. The rank order of subjects' standard dichotic listening task scores correlated negatively with reaction time ear differences in the “expected” presentation condition. Results are discussed in terms of existing theories of response lateralization in simple reaction time tasks, and an expanded hypothesis is offered. Specifically, it is suggested that two or more distinct but potentially overlapping mechanisms may be responsible for observed asymmetries in monotic auditory perception. Both an attentional or lateralized motor response bias and an inherent lateralization of function may operate side by side, differentially activated by task demands, mode of stimulus presentation, and nature of stimuli.     

Queuing network modeling of the psychological refractory period (PRP)

The psychological refractory period (PRP) is a basic but important form of dual-task information processing. Existing serial or parallel processing models of PRP have successfully accounted for a variety of PRP phenomena; however, each also encounters at least 1 experimental counterexample to its predictions or modeling mechanisms. This article describes a queuing network-based mathematical model of PRP that is able to model various experimental findings in PRP with closed-form equations including all of the major counterexamples encountered by the existing models with fewer or equal numbers of free parameters. This modeling work also offers an alternative theoretical account for PRP and demonstrates the importance of the theoretical concepts of "queuing" and "hybrid cognitive networks" in understanding cognitive architecture and multitask performance.     

Working memory at work: how the updating process alters the nature of working memory transfer

In three N-Back experiments, we investigated components of the process of working memory (WM) updating, more specifically access to items stored outside the focus of attention and transfer from the focus to the region of WM outside the focus. We used stimulus complexity as a marker. We found that when WM transfer occurred under full attention, it was slow and highly sensitive to stimulus complexity, much more so than WM access. When transfer occurred in conjunction with access, however, it was fast and no longer sensitive to stimulus complexity. Thus the updating context altered the nature of WM processing: The dual-task situation (transfer in conjunction with access) drove memory transfer into a more efficient mode, indifferent to stimulus complexity. In contrast, access times consistently increased with complexity, unaffected by the processing context. This study reinforces recent reports that retrieval is a (perhaps the) key component of working memory functioning.     

Preparation for Donders' type B and C reaction tasks

Several variants of a precued reaction time experiment were performed to assess preparation for Choice (Donders' type B) or Go/No-Go (type C) reaction tasks. On each trial, the imperative stimulus could necessitate either a keypress with the left forefinger, the right forefinger, or no response. A precue given at lead times of 50-750 ms either informed the subject whether the task was a type B task (left or right forefinger response), a type C task (e.g., left forefinger or No Go), or carried no information (all three possibilities remained open). The noninformative cue produced minor facilitation of reaction time at long lead times only. At lead times of 50-250 ms, the other two precues speeded reactions by about 50 ms. At precue intervals of 400-750 ms, Go/No-Go reactions averaged 25 ms faster than Choice reactions in an experiment which utilized appropriate controls for stimulus and task parameters. The mixed-trial design rules out gross motor (e.g., postural) adjustments as an explanation for the advantage of C over B reactions. An interpretation in terms of a two-stage theory of motor preparation is discussed.     

The ecology of automaticity: toward establishing the conditions needed to produce automatic processing effects.

In the past 15 years, the single term automatic has been applied to a diversity of laboratory phenomena that differ as to the preconditions necessary for their occurrence. Several major strains of automaticity are distinguished, based on the experimental conditions under which they are obtained: preconscious automatic processes, requiring only the proximal stimulus event; postconscious automatic processes, similar to preconscious effects but needing a recent activation or "priming" event for their operation; and goal-dependent automatic processes, which occur only when a specific, intentional processing goal is in place. It is argued that to more accurately specify the conditions under which an automatic effect will occur in the natural environment, greater attention needs to be given to aspects of the experimental paradigm (e.g., subjects' task goal, questionnaire administrations, previous tasks) that might be necessary to produce the effect.     

The perception of identity in simultaneously presented complex visual displays

Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the information processing in a visual matching task, using digit sequences of varying complexity as the stimuli. Traditionally, reaction times for “same” judgments do not fit into a single-process self-terminating feature testing model, while those for “different” judgments do. Bamber (1969) proposed a two-stage model to account for the data, and the results of these experiments support this type of model. Strong evidence implying that Bamber’s “identity reporter” has a limited capacity in terms of stimulus complexity was also found. This complexity seems to be deemed by stimulus discriminability and the number of “chunks” of information rather than by “bits” of information being transmitted (Miller, 1956).     

Precueing Response Factors in Choice Reaction Time

This note discusses the assumption researchers make when movement attributes are precued in a choice reaction time (RT) paradigm—i.e., that the precue only reduces the number of response alternatives, so that changes in RT reflect the programming time for the unprecued attributes. However, it is argued that since the precue reduces the number of stimulus alternatives, changes in RT reflect changes in both stimulus processing and response programming. Therefore, the interpretation made by Klapp (1977), using the precue paradigm, that response selection and response timing are not independent sequential stages in the programming sequence, is not necessarily correct.     

Invisible Stimuli,Implicit Thresholds: Why Invisibility Judgments Cannot be Interpreted in Isolation

Some studies of unconscious cognition rely on judgments of participants stating that they have “not seen” the critical stimulus (e.g., in a masked-priming experiment). Trials in which participants gave invisibility judgments are then treated as those where the critical stimulus was “subliminal” or “unconscious,” as opposed to trials with higher visibility ratings. Sometimes, only these trials are further analyzed, for instance, for unconscious priming effects. Here I argue that this practice requires implicit assumptions about subjective measures of awareness incompatible with basic models of categorization under uncertainty (e.g., modern signal-detection and threshold theories). Most importantly, it ignores the potential effects of response bias. Instead of taking invisibility judgments literally, they would better be employed in parametric experiments where stimulus visibility is manipulated systematically, not accidentally. This would allow studying qualitative and double dissociations between measures of awareness and of stimulus processing per se.     

Precueing response factors in choice reaction time: a word of caution

This note discusses the assumption researchers make when movement attributes are precued in a choice reaction time (RT) paradigm-i.e., that the precue only reduces the number of response alternatives, so that changes in RT reflect the programming time for the unprecued attributes. However, it is argued that since the precue reduces the number of stimulus alternatives, changes in RT reflect changes in both stimulus processing and response programming. Therefore, the interpretation made by Klapp (1977), using the precue paradigm, that response selection and response timing are not independent sequential stages in the programming sequence, is not necessarily correct.     

See what you want to see: motivational influences on visual perception

People's motivational states--their wishes and preferences--influence their processing of visual stimuli. In 5 studies, participants shown an ambiguous figure (e.g., one that could be seen either as the letter B or the number 13) tended to report seeing the interpretation that assigned them to outcomes they favored. This finding was affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception (e.g., eye tracking, lexical decision tasks) and by experimental procedures demonstrating that participants were aware only of the single (usually favored) interpretation they saw at the time they viewed the stimulus. These studies suggest that the impact of motivation on information processing extends down into preconscious processing of stimuli in the visual environment and thus guides what the visual system presents to conscious awareness.     

A neuropsychological assessment of dual-task costs in closed-head injury patients using Cohen’s effect size estimation method

A test of whether patients suffering from a severe closed-head injury (CHI) were affected by disproportionate dual-task costs compared to those of healthy control participants was carried out through a direct comparison of CHI effects on dual-task (psychological refractory period, or PRP) performance and on single-task performance. In the dual-task condition of the present experiment, independent choice-responses were required to two sequential stimuli presented at a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). A significant delay of the reaction time (RT) to the second stimulus was reported by both CHI patients and controls at short (SOA) compared to long SOA, i.e., a PRP effect. The PRP effect was more pronounced for CHI patients than controls. In the single-task condition, a single choice-response was required to a stimulus presented in isolation. The RT produced by CHI patients in the single-task paradigm was longer than the RT produced by controls. CHI effects on dual-task performance and on single-task performance were compared following (1) their transformation into Cohen’s ds, and (2) the application of a correction algorithm taking into account the different reliability of single-task and dual-task measures. The analysis of Cohen’s ds revealed that CHI effects on performance were, if anything, smaller in the dual-task condition than in the single-task condition. The results imply that CHI patient’s slower responding in single- and dual-task performance reflects a single common cause—slowing of the central processing.     

On the locus of the divided-attention effects

Reaction times in a choice reaction task were used to localize the livided-attention effect (less proficient performance under dual than under ingle-taks conditions) in a sequential-stage model of human information processing. Experiment 1 eliminated a central (memory-dependent) processing tage, while Experiment 2 suggested that a stimulus sampling process within the hitial encoding stage was the locus of the effect. Thus, the effect was localized in the input, not the central or an output stage of processing. A slower stimulus ampling rate was indicated under dual-than under single-task conditions.