Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language

In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in OckhamÕs mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the same things or not for the same things.     

Consistency,Truth and Ontology

After a brief survey of the different meanings of consistency, the study is restricted to consistency understood as non-contradiction of sets of sentences. The philosophical reasons for this requirement are discussed, both in relation to the problem of sense and the problem of truth (also with historical references). The issue of mathematical truth is then addressed, and the different conceptions of it are put in relation with consistency. The formal treatment of consistency and truth in mathematical logic is then considered, with particular attention paid to the relation between syntactic and semantic properties of sets and calculi. After the crisis of mathematical intuition and the dominance of the formalistic view, it seemed that consistency could totally replace the requirement of truth in mathematics, also in the sense that the existence of “objects” of axiomatic systems could be granted by their consistency. A rejection of this claim is presented, whose central point is a detailed analysis of the theorem that any consistent set S of sentences of first order logic has a model. A critical scrutiny shows that this model is very peculiar, being offered by the elements of the same language that is being interpreted, and the satisfiability conditions for any sentence being constituted by the mere fact of belonging to S. Though not being insignificant from a metatheoretical point of view, this theorem fails to endow consistency (even in this privileged case) with an “ontological creativity”, that is, with the capability of providing a model ontologically distinct from the language itself (which is the precondition for the classical notion of truth that is also preserved in the Tarskian semantics and model theory). A final discussion regarding the different “ontological regions” and the referential nature of truth clarifies the different aspects of the whole issue discussed.     

What is a Truth Value And How Many Are There?

Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes and the set-theoretic paradoxes.     

试论语义悖论的弗完全理论

弗完全理论通过限制排中律的使用,弱化经典逻辑,采用非经典的三值语言来处理语义悖论,最终使得形式语言能够一致地包含自身的真谓词。文中我们讨论了弗完全理论的两种基本形式——基础的弗完全理论和高级的弗完全理论。基础的弗完全理论引入了＂真值空缺＂的思想,认为句子除了真假之外还有＂既不真也不假＂的第三值,像说谎者这样的语义悖论语句就落在真假之空缺中,该理论借助于对不动点的归纳构造过程证明了形式语言中真谓词的存在性。高级弗完全理论在前者的基础上引入一个适当的条件句,定义了一个＂更强的真＂,发展出了既满足真的素朴模式又具有不动点解释的、一致的高级弗完全理论。     

Truth as Translation – Part B

This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate – this is possible if truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping. However, this result has only been proved for languages without quantifiers. In Part B we now extend the result to first-order languages, and we show that this can be done in three different ways. In each case, the addition of a truth predicate to an interpreted language with a high degree of expressiveness leads to changes in the ontology of the language.     

外语焦虑、紧张情绪与认知负荷对外语说谎的影响：来自中-英双语者的证据

采用错误陈述范式探究中-英双语者用母语和外语说真话和说谎时的认知神经差异, 涉及外语焦虑、认知负荷和说谎诱发的紧张情绪。对P200和CNV观察发现：(1)中-英双语者用英语说真话的P200波幅比用母语大, 说明被试用英语说话时受外语焦虑情绪影响; (2)中-英双语者用英语说谎与说真话的P200波幅无显著差异, 但用母语说谎和讲真话的P200波幅差异显著, 说明被试用外语说谎没有用母语说谎诱发的紧张情绪大; (3)中-英双语者说谎时的CNV波幅比说真话时大, 说明被试说谎比说真话的认知负荷更大; (4)中-英双语者用英语说谎时的CNV波幅比用汉语说谎时大, 说明被试用外语说谎比用母语说谎产生了更大的认知负荷。相关分析表明, 英语熟练程度是影响中-英双语者用母语和外语说谎时的认知神经差异的重要变量。     

Reasoning with Truth

The aim of the paper is to formulate rules of inference for the predicate 'is true' applied to sentences. A distinction is recognised between (ordinary) truth and definite truth and consequently between two notions of validity, depending on whether truth or definite truth is the property preserved in valid arguments. Appropriate sets of rules of inference governing the two predicates are devised. In each case the consequence relation is in harmony with the respective predicate. Particularly appealing is a set of ND rules for ordinary truth in which premises and assumptions play different roles, premises being taken to assert definite truth, assumptions to suppose truth. This set of rules can be said to capture everyday reasoning with truth. Also presented are formal characterisations, in the meta-language and in the object language, of paradoxical and 'truth teller'-like sentences.     

Are you for real? Exploring language use and unexpected process questions within the detection of identity deception

The current study was to test whether reality monitoring and language use could distinguish identity liars from truth tellers when answering outcome questions and unexpected process questions. Truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) discussed their identity in a recruitment interview. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in the details they provided. In terms of language use, liars used more positive language than truth tellers, whereas truth tellers used more cognitive process words than liars. However, neither were more pronounced when asking process questions. Overall, process questions elicited more cognitive process and cause words than outcome questions. Therefore, process questions may be able to contribute to the cognitive load approach. The findings suggest that reality monitoring may not be diagnostic when applied to identity deception. We discuss the language use differences in relation to impression management theory.     

A NEW METHODOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Science and religion are the two strongest influences on the conduct of human life, yet their respective truth claims frequently clash. To facilitate better communication between scientists and theologians on these rival truth claims, the author recommends that Christian theologians use the language and current methodology of science as far as possible so as to present the content of Church teaching in an idiom that would be intelligible not only to scientists but to the educated public as well. In this way, the rival truth claims might complement rather than compete with one another. That is, clothed in the language of science, the truth claims of religion would gain in rational coherence and intelligibility. Natural scientists in turn would have conversation partners better able to deal with philosophical and ethical issues arising out of new scientific discoveries.     

Truth from language and truth from fit: the impact of linguistic concreteness and level of construal on subjective truth

In four experiments, the impact of concreteness of language on judgments of truth was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that statements of the very same content were judged as more probably true when they were written in concrete language than when they were written in abstract language. Findings of Experiment 2 also showed that this linguistic concreteness effect on judgments of truth could most likely be attributed to greater perceived vividness of concrete compared to abstract statements. Two further experiments demonstrated an additional fit effect: The truth advantage of concrete statements occurred especially when participants were primed with a concrete (vs. abstract) mind-set (Experiment 3) or when the statements were presented in a spatially proximal (vs. distant) location (Experiment 4). Implications for communication strategies are discussed.     

Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language

A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in (or translatable to) our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. (1) Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, (2) language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this context. I argue that, if deflationism is to remain consistent with its motivations, then it must opt for a language-immanent conception of truth.

     

James Fodor's Christian Theory of Truth: Is it Christian?

The 'task confronting contemporary theology', says James Fodor, 'is that of the rehabilitation or recovery of a distinctively Christian vision of truth' ( Christian Hermeneutics [Oxford, 1995] p. 72). In this paper I examine Fodor's attempt to construct a Christian or transformational theory of truth. I argue that his analysis of truth in terms of transformation leads to a concept of truth which is both subjective and relative. I argue further that Fodor's truth theory is either committed to a version of creative anti-realism, according to which the existence of basic structure of the world is determined by our linguistic activities, or it implies that although our language doesn't correspond to the world, we should go on making our theological truth claims anyway. I conclude that Fodor's Christian theory of truth is in most crucial respects not Christian at all.     

Medical science, culture, and truth

There is a fairly closed circle between culture, language, meaning, and truth such that the world of a given culture is a world understood in terms of the meanings produced in that culture. Medicine is, in fact, a subculture of a powerful type and has its own language and understanding of the range of illnesses that affect human beings. So how does medicine get at the truth of people and their ills in such a way as to escape its own limited constructions? There is a way out of the closed circle implicit in the idea of a praxis and the engagement with reality that is central to it and the further possibility introduced by Jacques Lacan that signification is never comprehensive in relation to the subject's encounter with the real. I will explore both of these so as to develop a conception of truth that is apt for the knowledge that arises in the clinic.     

Now is the time

The aim of this paper is to consider some logical aspects of the debate between the view that the present is the only ‘real’ time, and the view that the present is not in any way metaphysically privileged. In particular I shall set out a language of first-order predicate tense logic with a now predicate, and a first order (extensional) language with an abstraction operator, in such a way that each language can be shewn to be exactly translatable into the other. I shew that this translation is preserved at the metalinguistic level, so that equivalent truth conditions can be defined in a tensed metalanguage or an indexical metalanguage. I then make some remarks about the connection between proofs of relative consistency and metaphysical truth; and some historical remarks about Arthur Prior's use of formal logic in expressing his presentist views.     

The return of the Sophists

The author argues against a foundational epistemology and thus sides with the Greek Sophists. He shows that the search for foundations of knowledge and truth is the outcome of a referential theory of language. He finds that Nietzsche and Saussure pioneered attacks on and substitutions for this theory. Wittgenstein, Derrida and Rorty, inter alia, continued this trend. The author discusses the criticisms and theories of these philosophers and finds that he agrees with their criticisms and many of their positive moves but that he cannot accept their social relativism because it cannot account for inter- and transcultural understanding and the regulative role of truth. He looks for a theory of language and truth which will also comply with these requirements.     

Perception,Expression, and the Continuity of Being: Some Intersections between Nishida and Gadamer

This article draws on Nishida’s ontology to shed light on some problems with Gadamer’s concept of dialogical truth. This form of truth relies on the claim that self and world ‘belong together’ as aspects of a single, unitary phenomenon, one which is made manifest in language. This view has difficulty, however, accounting for the expression in language of that which is distorted, mistaken, or untruthful. To get past these difficulties, I suggest that we turn to the more dynamic and developmental vision of the continuity of being found in Nishida’s work. One can cultivate or neglect this relational continuity, and so achieve or fail to achieve it in its fullest forms. I argue that we can cultivate our perceptual capacity along similar lines, bringing the self and world together into a kind of harmony so that the expression of such perceptions comes to be the expression of truth.     

What is Said?

It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so‐called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.     

Tarski on “essentially richer” metalanguages

It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that it is necessary and sufficient that the metalanguage be essentially richer. Our contention, put bluntly, is that this claim deserves more scrutiny from philosophers than it usually gets and in fact is false unless essentially richer means nothing else than sufficient to contain a truth definition for the object language.