Perception is not all-purpose

I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: (a) one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal) and (b) one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual attention (everything else being equal). If we put these claims together, what we get is that one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal).

     

Adaptation is automatic

Two experiments were used to test whether selective adaptation for speech occurs automatically or instead requires attentional resources. A control condition demonstrated the usual large identification shifts caused by repeatedly presenting an adapting sound (/wa/, with listeners identifying members of a /ba/-/wa/ test series). Two types of distractor tasks were used: (1) Subjects did a rapid series of arithmetic problems during the adaptation periods (Experiments 1 and 2), or (2) they made a series of rhyming judgments, requiring phonetic coding (Experiment 2). A control experiment (Experiment 3) demonstrated that these tasks normally impose a heavy attentional cost on phonetic processing. Despite this, for both experimental conditions, the observed adaptation effect was just as large as in the control condition. This result indicates that adaptation is automatic, operating at an early, preattentive level. The implications of these results for current models of speech perception are discussed.     

Perception and perceptual-motor integration: there is a difference

Explored the independence of perceptual and perceptual-motor performance in a group of second graders with effects of chronological age and intelligence controlled. Resulting correlation indicated that 16% of the variance of one variable is predictable from the other variable, supporting the growing evidence that these two skills are to a large degree independent.     

Perception of timing is more context sensitive than sensorimotor synchronization

In three experiments, the effects of contextual temporal variation on the perception of timing and on sensorimotor synchronization were examined. Experiment 1 showed that exposure to a variably timed auditory precursor sequence reduces the detectability of deviations from isochrony in a musical test sequence. By contrast, in Experiment 2 there was only a small and transient effect of identical precursor sequences on the variability of finger taps that were synchronized with a similar test sequence. Moreover, the precursor did not impede phase error correction following deviations from isochrony in the test sequence. Experiment 3 employed a within-subjects design that required simultaneous detection of irregularities in and synchronization with nonmusical auditory sequences. Precursor variability impaired only detection, not synchronization performance. These results suggest that perception of deviations from regularity engages context-sensitive tining processes, probably related to conscious awareness, that are not involved in sensorimotor synchronization.     

Perception is a two-way junction: Feedback semantics in word recognition

Feedback semantics refers to whether a specific meaning can be represented by only one word (consistent) or by several words (inconsistent)—that is, whether a word has synonyms (e.g.,jail) or not (e.g.,milk). Models of word perception that allow feedback activation from semantics to orthography and phonology predict that performance should be worse for words that are feedback inconsistent (words with a synonym) than for words that are feedback consistent (words without a synonym). The present study showed that both naming and lexical decision responses are faster and more accurate to consistent than to inconsistent words. The results provide support for models that allow feedback activation between phonology, orthography, and semantics.     

Social Anxiety is Associated with a Negatively Distorted Perception of One's Own Voice

According to cognitive models of social anxiety, negatively distorted self-images have a central role in the development and maintenance of social anxiety. In the present study, the relationship between social anxiety and the perception of one's own voice was investigated in a sample of 17 undergraduate students. The participants were asked to recount a story aloud in front of a tape recorder, and then to rate their voice characteristics on a Voice Evaluation Questionnaire. Independent observers (speech therapy students) were then asked to listen to the tape recordings and to rate the participants' voice characteristics on an equivalent version of the Voice Evaluation Questionnaire. Two hypotheses were contrasted: a skill deficits hypothesis and a cognitive distortion hypothesis. The results supported the cognitive distortion hypothesis. A high level of social performance anxiety was associated with an underestimation of one's voice qualities, compared with the independent observers. It is suggested that sound-tape feedback with cognitive preparation should be tested as a method for correcting the negatively distorted voice perception that is associated with social anxiety.     

A model of automatic attention attraction when mapping is partially consistent

A model is described to account for the data of Durso, Cooke, Breen, and Schvaneveldt (1987). On the basis of the relative frequency of an item's presentation as a target, the item develops an automatic tendency to attract attention. When stimuli are then displayed, each calls the attention system to a degree determined by its present strength. We assume that attention eventually drifts to the strongest stimulus (which is then given as a response), but in a time determined inversely by the difference in strength between the two strongest stimuli. A version of this model in which the strengths were freely estimated parameters predicted the various elements of the data with good accuracy. In other versions of the model, strength values were derived from assumptions concerning the learning of automatism. Two of these models, quite different in character, captured the major qualitative features of the data. Further empirical tests of the models are suggested.     

Perception

Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund, Chesham : Acumen Publishing, 2003, 240, £12.95 (paper) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:),     

When fair is foul and foul is fair: reverse priming in automatic evaluation.

Responses to information were facilitated by the rapid prior presentation of evaluatively congruent material. This fundamental discovery (R. H. Fazio, D. M. Sanbonmatsu, M. C. Powell, & F. R. Kardes, 1986) marked a breakthrough in research on automatic information processing by demonstrating that evaluative meaning is grasped without conscious control. Experiments employing a word naming task provided stringent tests of the automaticity of evaluation and found support for it. More strikingly, a previously unobserved reversal of these effects (i.e., slower responses to evaluatively matched rather than mismatched items) was found when primes were evaluatively extreme. Procedural variances across 6 experiments revealed that the reverse priming effect was highly robust. This discovery is analogous to demonstrations of contrast effects in controlled judgments. It is theorized that the reverse priming effect reflects an automatic correction for the biasing influence of the prime.     

Perception of temporal order is impaired during the time course of the attentional blink

Identification accuracy for the second of two target (T2) is impaired when presented shortly after the first (T1). Does this attentional blink (AB) also impair the perception of the order of presentation? In four experiments, three letter targets (T1, T2, T3) were inserted in a stream of digit distractors displayed in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), with T3 always presented directly after T2. The T1-T2 lag was varied to assess the perception of T2-T3 temporal order throughout the period of the AB. Factorial manipulation of the presence or absence of distractors before T1 and between T1 and T2 had similar effects on accuracy and on perception of temporal order. It is important to note that perception of temporal order suffered even when accuracy was unimpaired. This pattern of results is consistent with prior-entry theories of the perception of temporal order but not with episodic-integration theories. Simulations based on the Episodic Simultaneous Type, Serial Token (eSTST) model (Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009) provided excellent fits to the data except for the condition in which no distractors were presented in the RSVP stream.     

Perception of gait

Our ability of perceive the identity and naturalness of a human gait is examined in a series of four experiments involving computer-animated stick figures. The results indicate that the perceived naturalness of a walking or running gait can be influenced by the motion of any limb segment, but the perceived identity of these gaits is primarily determined by the movements of the lower leg (i.e., the tibia). The results also demonstrate that a perceptually salient walking gait can be transformed into running (or vice versa) by adding or subtracting a constant value to the angle of the lower leg over the entire step cycle. The size of this constant value is affected by the shape of the lower leg angle function and the motion of other limb segments.     

Perception of illumination

Abstract.— Previous research on the perception of illumination has primarily been occupied with the apparent paradox that "we must know the object colour in order to utilize the reflected light as an index of illumination, while we must know the illumination in order to use the reflected light as an index of object colour". The present study shows this paradox to exist only as a long as the traditional one-dimensional conception of achromatic colours is maintained. Two experiments are reported. In Exp. 1 it is shown that by mere variation of the luminance difference of two adjacent areas, a consistent shift in colourlshadow discrimination is obtained; i.e. within a certain range of luminance differences the observer may find it difficult to decide whether the difference is one of colour (two fields of different greyness in common illumination) or one of illumination (two fields of equal greyness under different illumination), above this range the observer perceives the differences as one of illumination. Taking the bidimensionality of achromatic colours into account in Exp. 2, results are obtained which show the brightness (alternatively termed luminosity) relations of adjacent areas to be the critical factor for the perceptual shift.     

Perception2

The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti‐individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or ‘essence’ on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal perceptual systems, especially visual systems, are similar, it criticises a dominant view of the last century, in both philosophy and large parts of psychology, according to which a range of sophisticated supplementary abilities have to be learned before a child can perceive objective features of the physical world.     

Moral Perception

Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind, people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections. I then address three residual concerns that my defense raises.