Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.     

An L1-script-transfer-effect fallacy: a rejoinder to Wang et al. (2003)

Do different L1 (first language) writing systems differentially affect word identification in English as a second language (ESL)? Wang, Koda, and Perfetti [Cognition 87 (2003) 129] answered yes by examining Chinese students with a logographic L1 background and Korean students with an alphabetic L1 background for their phonological and orthographic processing skills on English word identification. Such a conclusion is premature, however. We propose that the L1 phonological system (rather than the L1 writing system) of the learner largely accounts for cognitive processes in learning to read a second language (L2).     

Assessment of ADHD symptoms: comment on Gomez et al. (2003)

R. Gomez, G. L. Burns, J. A. Walsh, and M. A. de Moura (2003) examined the degree to which parent and teacher ratings of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms are accounted for by trait, source, and error variance. The importance and limitations of Gomez et al.'s findings are discussed in the context of clinical and research assessments of children suspected of having ADHD. Gomez et al.'s findings make clear that multimethod and multisource assessment protocols should be used in diagnosing children with this disorder. Further, clinicians and researchers must avoid relying too heavily on 1 source of data when evaluating the severity and frequency of ADHD symptoms.     

Factors in athletic achievement: reply to Van Rossum (2004)

Several lines of evidence have questioned the contribution of innate talents to achievement. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that belief in talent is still common and affects perceptions that athletes form about themselves and fellow competitors about different levels of achievement.     

Perceptions of the importance of training,experience, and athletic talent for achievement in sports

Ratings by 97 NCAA Division I athletes showed belief that successful athletes benefit more from training and experience and athletic talent than less successful athletes.     

Response to Pashler et al. (2016)

Pashler, Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, and Harris (2016/this issue) in their critique of Chatterjee, Rose, and Sinha (2013 Chatterjee, P., Rose, R., &; Sinha, J. (2013). Why money meanings matter in decisions to donate time and money. Marketing Letters, 24, 109–118. doi:10.1007/s11002-012-9215-0[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) data argue that (a) large effect sizes in Study 1 and Study 2 undermine the credibility of the data; (b) in a lexical task that is part of Study 3, a concentration of participants in (5,0) and (0,5) benefit/cost word data points and the similarity of 9 neutral word responses at these points are extremely unlikely; and (c) there are apparent errors in the execution of Study 3. In this response, I examine these issues in detail. A recent review of money prime literature (Vohs, 2015 Vohs, K. (2015). Money priming can change people’s thoughts, feelings, motivations, and behaviors: An update on 10 years of experiments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(4), e86–e93. doi:10.1037/xge0000091[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) notes many effect sizes that are as big as or bigger than ours. Although 8 coding errors were discovered in Study 3 data and this particular study has been retracted from that article, as I show in this article, the arguments being put forth by the critics are untenable. For instance, my analysis shows that results hold even without the concentration of (5,0) and (0,5) participants, and I offer statistical simulations to counter critics’ arguments. Regarding the apparent errors in Study 3, I find that removing the target word stems SUPP and CE do not influence findings in any way. I also report findings from MacDonnell and White (2015 MacDonnell, R., &; White, K. (2015). How construals of money versus time impact consumer charitable giving. Journal of Consumer Research, 42, 551–563. doi:10.1093/jcr/ucv042[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), who replicate the basic finding of Chatterjee et al. in a different context.     

Evaluating the MSCEIT V2.0 via CFA: comment on Mayer et al. (2003)

This investigation uncovered several substantial errors in the confirmatory factor analysis results reported by J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, D. R. Caruso, and G. Sitarenios (see record 2003-02341-015). Specifically, the values associated with the close-fit indices (normed fit index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and root-mean-square error of approximation) are inaccurate. A reanalysis of the Mayer et al. subscale intercorrelation matrix provided accurate values of the close-fit indices, which resulted in different evaluations of the models tested by J. D. Mayer et al. Contrary to J. D. Mayer et al., the 1-factor model and the 2-factor model did not provide good fit. Although the 4-factor model was still considered good fitting, the non-constrained 4-factor model yielded a non-positive definite matrix, which was interpreted to be due to the fact that two of the branch-level factors (Perceiving and Facilitating) were collinear, suggesting that a model with 4 factors was implausible.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.     

Lessons From Markey et al. (2015) and Bushman et al. (2015): Sensationalism and Integrity in Media Research

This article presents a response to the comment by B. J. Bushman, D. Romer, and P. E. Jamieson (2015). This reply addresses 2 issues raised by the commenters. First, they claim they and others have not made sensationalistic statements linking violent media to horrific acts of real‐world violence. In response, we supply numerous examples of sensationalistic statements made by them and others. Second, they claim they did not expect violence in films to be related to violent behavior among adults, but only among youths. However, by examining homicide arrests and homicide gun mortality rates among youths, we found that as films have become increasingly violent over time, both homicide arrests and gun‐related homicides have tended to decrease among this age group.     

Recall,recognition, and the hippocampus: Reply to Yonelinas et al. (2004)

Two recent studies disagree about whether recall is more impaired than recognition (and recollection more than familiarity) in patients with damage limited to the hippocampus (Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Yonelinas et al., 2002). Wixted and Squire (2004) pointed out that the disagreement about recall and recognition stems entirely from an outlying recognition score obtained by 1 of 55 control subjects in Yonelinas et al. (2002). In their comment on our paper, Yonelinas et al. (2004) minimize the importance of this result and argue that the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity is best studied using different methods that attempt to measure these processes directly. Here, we argue that the recall versus recognition comparison is the strongest test because it relies on the fewest controversial assumptions, and that the other approaches explored by Yonelinas et al. (2002) rely on questionable, theory-laden assumptions. We also rehearse the reasons for concluding that the patients studied by Manns et al. (2003) have damage limited to the hippocampal region (hippocampus proper, dentate gyrus, and subiculum), and we emphasize that important questions remain about the patients studied by Yonelinas et al. (2002), inasmuch as no neuroanatomical information and minimal neuropsychological information has been provided.     

Client perspectives and open-ended questions: a reply to Dean, et al. (2000)

Utilizing an open-ended question may allow subjects to respond in their own words but does not necessarily avoid the problem of narrowing the focus to a specific predetermined topic.     

Regret and Responsibility: A Reply to Zeelenberg et al. (1998)

M. Zeelenberg, W. W. van Dijk, and A. S. R. Manstead (1998, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 254-272) recently reported an altered replication of our earlier study (T. Connolly, L. D. Ordó?ez, & R. Coughlan, 1997, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73-85) concerning the effects of decision agency on regret and outcome evaluation. Our earlier study had found no such effect, but Zeelenberg et al. did. In two new experiments, we have largely confirmed Zeelenberg et al.'s result but have shown that, contrary to most theory, regret (a) can appear even in the absence of decision agency, (b) can be unrelated to outcome evaluations, and (c) may be more influenced by the experience of gains or losses from the status quo than by any decisional responsibility for those changes. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Mutual Suppression: Comment on Paulhus et al. (2004)

Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, and Tracy (Multivariate Behavioral Research, 2004 Paulhus, D. L., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H. and Tracy, J. L. 2004. Two replicable suppressor situations in personality research. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39: 303–328. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 39, 305–328) suggested that the three types of two-predictor suppression situations—classical suppression, cooperative suppression, and net suppression—-can all be considered special cases of mutual suppression, in that the magnitude of each of the two standardized partial regression coefficients exceeds the magnitude of its corresponding standardized bivariate regression coefficient. Classical suppression and cooperative suppression can be considered mutual suppression, but net suppression cannot. Hypothetical and empirical examples of net suppression in which the magnitude of the standardized partial regression coefficient for the suppressor variable is greater than, equal to, and less than the magnitude of its standardized bivariate regression coefficient are provided. The empirical examples were drawn from the social psychology literature relating psychological well-being outcomes to life aspirations.     

Evolving science in adolescence: comment on Ellis et al. (2012)

Ellis et al. (2012) bring an evolutionary perspective to bear on adolescent risky behavioral development, clinical practice, and public policy. The authors offer important insights that (a) some risky behaviors may be adaptive for the individual and the species by being hard-wired due to fitness benefits and (b) interventions might be more successful if they move with, rather than against, the natural tendencies of an adolescent. Ellis and colleagues criticize the field of developmental psychopathology, but we see the 2 fields as complementary. Their position would be enhanced by integrating it with contemporary perspectives on dynamic cascades through which normative behavior turns into genuinely maladaptive outcomes, dual processes in adolescent neural development, and adolescent decision making. Finally, they rightly note that innovation is needed in interventions and policies toward adolescent problem behavior.