Illusory recollection of voices

We investigated source misattributions in the DRM false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959, Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Subjects studied words in one of two voices, manipulated between‐lists (pure‐voice lists) or within‐list (mixed‐voice lists), and were subsequently given a recognition test with voice‐attribution judgements. Experiments 1 and 2 used visual tests. With pure‐voice lists (Experiment 1), subjects frequently attributed related lures to the corresponding study voice, despite having the option to not respond. Further, these erroneous attributions remained high with mixed‐voice lists (Experiment 2). Thus, even when their related lists were not associated with a particular voice, subjects misattributed the lures to one of the voices. Attributions for studied items were fairly accurate in both cases. Experiments 3 and 4 used auditory tests. With pure‐voice lists (Experiment 3), subjects frequently attributed related lures and studied items to the corresponding study voice, regardless of the test voice. In contrast, with mixed‐voice lists (Experiment 4), subjects frequently attributed related lures and studied items to the corresponding test voice, regardless of the study voice. These findings indicate that source attributions can be sensitive to voice information provided either at study or at test, even though this information is irrelevant for related lures.     

False recognition across meaning,language, and stimulus format: Conceptual relatedness and the feeling of familiarity

Four experiments examined contributions of conceptual relatedness and feelings of familiarity to false recognition. Participants first studied lists of unrelated items (e.g., table, lock) followed by a recognition test with three types of items: (1) studied items (e.g., table), (2) semantically related lures (e.g., key), and (3) unrelated lures (e.g., cup). Participants falsely recognized more related than unrelated lures when the stimuli were words (Experiment 1A) and pictures (Experiment 1B), when the studied items and related lures differed in language (Experiment 2), and when they differed in perceptual format (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation, designed to make feelings of familiarity nondiagnostic for memory judgments, eliminated the false-recognition effect obtained in Experiment 3. Overall, the study suggests that conceptual relatedness produces false recognition even in the absence of shared perceptual surface features between study and test items, and it does so by generating feelings of familiarity.     

Imagery encoding effects on memory in the DRM paradigm: A test of competing predictions

In three experiments the effects of imagery encoding and test format on false memory rates in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm were examined. After generating images of individual items (Experiment 1) or integrated subsets (Experiment 2), all of which were embedded in thematically related lists, participants were surprised by a recognition memory test or one of three kinds of source tests. As predicted by a distinctive encoding hypothesis, generating individual images led to better accuracy on presented items, and better monitoring of critical lures, than generating integrated images (Experiments 1 and 2). However, both kinds of imagery encoding led to fewer endorsements of critical lures compared to a non‐imagery encoding condition (Experiment 3). Imagery encoding effects were also independent of test format. The implications of these findings for the use of DRM‐false memory rates in debates about the use of guided imagery techniques are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Source attributions and false memories: a test of the demand characteristics account

When lists of related words are presented to subjects, they sometimes recall or recognize nonpresented words related to those lists (critical lures). In fact, subjects sometimes claim to remember which of two speakers said the critical lures. We examined whether this finding could be accounted for by demand characteristics. If subjects’ willingness to make source attributions to critical lures reflects experimental demand, one would predict that subjects should be willing to change and should have little confidence in these attributions. Subjects made more attributions, were less likely to change their attributions, and were more confident in their attributions for critical lures than for unrelated distractors. Subjects had even more confidence in the attributions that they made for words that had actually been presented, and they were even less likely to change these attributions. These findings suggest that false memories are quite compelling but that they are also subtly different from true memories.     

An investigation of false memory in perceptual implicit tasks

Reports of critical lure priming in perceptual implicit tasks [e.g., McKone, E., & Murphy, B. (2000). Implicit false memory: Effects of modality and multiple study presentations on long-lived semantic priming. Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 89-109] using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 803-814] procedure have suggested availability of the lexical form of lure items at study. Three experiments were conducted to further explore "false" implicit priming in perceptual tests. In Experiments 1 and 3, implicit and explicit stem completion tests were given in the DRM procedure with semantic lists; in Experiment 2, a graphemic response test was used in a similar design. For all experiments, explicit instructions resulted in reliable false memory, while implicit instructions resulted in priming for list items and no priming for lure items. Priming for lure items was evident for "test-aware" subjects only in Experiment 1 and in a combined analysis for all three experiments. These results establish boundary conditions for priming for critical lures and indicate that access to the lexical form of critical lures may not occur under incidental learning conditions when strong controls against explicit retrieval are implemented.     

Backward associative strength determines source attributions given to false memories

Source attributions for falsely remembered material were investigated in two experiments. A male and a female speaker each presented either an entire word list or half of the items from each of multiple Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists commonly used in this paradigm. In the latter condition the tendency of each list half to activate a nonpresented, critical list theme item was manipulated. All of the list halves differed in backward associative strength (BAS), and each was presented by one or the other of the two speakers. In these correlated conditions, when critical items were falsely recognized (Experiments 1 and 2) or recalled (Experiment 2), source attributions were more frequently made to the speaker of the list items with the higher average BAS. This source attribution effect appears to result from the binding of list item source characteristics to activated critical items during encoding, as opposed to being the result of a biased retrieval process. The results are interpreted as consistent with an activation/monitoring account of false memory in the DRM paradigm.     

Test-induced priming of false memories

Of interest was whether prior testing of related words primes false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. After studying lists of related words, subjects made old-new judgments about zero, three, or six related items before being tested on critical nonpresented lures. When the recognition test was self-paced, prior testing of list items led to faster false recognition judgments, but did not increase the rate of false alarms to lures from studied lists. Critically, this pattern changed when decision making at test was speeded. When forced to respond quickly—presumably precluding the use of monitoring processes—clear test-induced priming effects were observed in the rate of false memories. The results are consistent with an activation-monitoring explanation of false memories and support that retrieving veridical memories can be a source of memory error.     

Effects of repetition and response deadline on item recognition in young and older adults

In the present study, we examined the joint effects of aging, repetition, and response deadline in a plurality discrimination task. Young and older adults studied lists of unrelated singular and plural nouns, with half presented once (weak items) and half presented five times (strong items). Test lists contained old (same) nouns, plurality-reversed nouns (changed lures), and unstudied nouns (new lures), and the participants were asked to respond old only to same items. In Experiment 1, the participants were tested with both short and long deadlines. In Experiment 2, the tests were unpaced. In both experiments, repetition increased hit rates for young and older adults. Young adults tested with a long deadline or no deadline showed invariant (Experiment 1) or reduced (Experiment 2) false alarms to changed lures when the nouns were studied more often. Young adults tested with a short deadline and older adults tested with both long and short deadlines had increased false alarm rates for strong changed lures; without time pressure to respond, older adults did not have a significant increase in false alarms for changed lures. Implications of these results for theories of cognitive aging are explored.     

The effects of study order and backward associative strength on illusory recollection: A source-strength effect does not always occur

We investigated illusory recollection by dividing lists of associated words into three subsets (high, medium and low) based on their backward associative strength (BAS) to an unstudied theme. Participants studied these subsets at different visual locations on a computer screen and afterwards were given a source memory test. In Experiment 1, we varied the order in which high- and medium-BAS subsets were studied. In Experiment 2, we again manipulated study order as well as the associative strength of the medium-BAS subsets (strong or weak). Across both experiments, illusory recollection was constrained by both study order and BAS. Source attributions to the high-BAS location were more likely (a source-strength effect) when high-BAS items were studied first or studied following items of relatively low associative strength. However, attributions to the strong medium-BAS studied location were more likely when these items were studied before high-BAS items. These findings are interpreted as resulting from misbinding of source details at encoding which can be explained by the activation-monitoring theory of illusory recollection.     

Usage of semantic representations in recognition memory

Meanings of words facilitate false acceptance as well as correct rejection of lures in recognition memory tests, depending on the experimental context. This suggests that semantic representations are both directly and indirectly (i.e., mediated by perceptual representations) used in remembering. Studies using memory conjunction errors (MCEs) paradigms, in which the lures consist of component parts of studied words, have reported semantic facilitation of rejection of the lures. However, attending to components of the lures could potentially cause this. Therefore, we investigated whether semantic overlap of lures facilitates MCEs using Japanese Kanji words in which a whole-word image is more concerned in reading. Experiments demonstrated semantic facilitation of MCEs in a delayed recognition test (Experiment 1), and in immediate recognition tests in which participants were prevented from using phonological or orthographic representations (Experiment 2), and the salient effect on individuals with high semantic memory capacities (Experiment 3). Additionally, analysis of the receiver operating characteristic suggested that this effect is attributed to familiarity-based memory judgement and phantom recollection. These findings indicate that semantic representations can be directly used in remembering, even when perceptual representations of studied words are available.     

Testing effects for common versus proper names

The present study examines the testing effect as a function of item meaningfulness. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants studied lists of words that could serve as proper names or occupations (e.g., Mr Baker or baker), with the items given in a name context for one group and an occupation context for a second group. During an intervening phase participants restudied some items and were given a cued recall test (Experiment 1) or a free recall test (Experiment 2) on other items. On a final free recall test memory was better for tested items than studied items in both the name and occupation contexts. Experiment 3 followed the same procedure as Experiment 1, except that participants studied lists of proper names that do not have alternative uses in the English language (e.g., Mr Anderson) or studied concrete nouns (e.g., letter). Tested items were better remembered on a final test than studied items, and there was no interaction with type of study material. These results show that the testing effect extends to proper names, material that is commonly assumed to differ from common names on several dimensions.     

The strength-based mirror effect in subjective strength ratings: The evidence for differentiation can be produced without differentiation

Criss (Cognitive Psychology 59:297?C319, 2009) reported that subjective ratings of memory strength showed a mirror effect pattern in which strengthening the studied words increased ratings for targets and decreased ratings for lures. She interpreted the effect on lure items as evidence for differentiation, a process whereby lures produce a poorer match to strong than to weak memory traces. However, she also noted that participants might use different mappings between memory evidence and levels of the rating scale when they expected strong versus weak targets; that is, the effect might be produced by decision processes rather than differentiation. We report two experiments designed to distinguish these accounts. Some participants studied pure lists of weak or strong items (presented once or five times, respectively), while others studied mixed lists of half weak and half strong items. The participants from both groups had pure-strength tests: Only strong or only weak items were tested, and the participants were informed of which it would be before the test. The results showed that strength ratings for lures were lower when strong versus weak targets were tested, regardless of whether the study list was pure or mixed. In the mixed-study condition, the effect was produced even after identical study lists, and thus the same degree of differentiation in the studied traces. Therefore, our results suggest that the strength-rating mirror effect is produced by changes in decision processes.     

The impersistence of false memory persistence

When subjects study lists of thematically related words they sometimes falsely recognise non-presented words related to the theme. The gist extraction account of these findings provided by fuzzy trace theory suggests that false recognition should decline substantially more slowly than true recognition across a delay. In two experiments we demonstrated that corrected recognition of targets and critical lures can decrease by equivalent amounts across a 48-hour delay. However the results for uncorrected recognition were mixed. In Experiment 1 we found evidence that uncorrected recognition of targets declined more rapidly than uncorrected recognition of critical lures. In Experiment 2, we found evidence that uncorrected recognition of targets and critical lures declined at equivalent rates. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for fuzzy trace and source monitoring accounts of false memories.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Effects of repetition and response deadline on associative recognition in young and older adults

The present study examined the joint effects of repetition and response deadline on associative recognition in older adults. Young and older adults studied lists of unrelated word pairs, half presented once (weak pairs) and half presented four times (strong pairs). Test lists contained old (intact) pairs, pairs consisting of old words that had been studied with other partners (rearranged lures), and unstudied pairs (new lures), and participants were asked to respond "old" only to intact pairs. In Experiment 1, participants were tested with both short and long deadlines. In Experiment 2, the tests were unpaced. In both experiments, repetition increased hit rates for young and older adults. Young adults tested with a long deadline showed reduced (Experiment 1) or invariant (Experiment 2) false alarms to rearranged lures when word pairs were studied more often. Young adults tested with a short deadline and older adults tested under all conditions had increased false alarm rates forstrong rearranged pairs. Implications of these results for theories of associative recognition and cognitive aging are explored.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.     

False memory in aging: effects of emotional valence on word recognition accuracy

Memory is susceptible to distortions. Valence and increasing age are variables known to affect memory accuracy and may increase false alarm production. Interaction between these variables and their impact on false memory was investigated in 36 young (18-28 years) and 36 older (61-83 years) healthy adults. At study, participants viewed lists of neutral words orthographically related to negative, neutral, or positive critical lures (not presented). Memory for these words was subsequently tested with a remember-know procedure. At test, items included the words seen at study and their associated critical lures, as well as sets of orthographically related neutral words not seen at study and their associated unstudied lures. Positive valence was shown to have two opposite effects on older adults' discrimination of the lures: It improved correct rejection of unstudied lures but increased false memory for critical lures (i.e., lures associated with words studied previously). Thus, increased salience triggered by positive valence may disrupt memory accuracy in older adults when discriminating among similar events. These findings likely reflect a source memory deficit due to decreased efficiency in cognitive control processes with aging.     

Remembering words not presented in lists: Can we avoid creating false memories?

Can subjects avoid creating false memories as outlined in Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) false recognition paradigm if they are forewarned about this memory illusion? We presented subjects with semantically related word lists, followed by a recognition test. The test was composed of studied words, semantically related nonstudied words (critical lures), and unrelated nonstudied words. One group of subjects was uninformed about the false recognition effect, a second group was urged to minimize all false alarms, and a third group was forewarned about falsely recognizing critical lures. Compared with the uninformed and cautious subjects, the forewarned subjects reduced their false alarm rate for critical lures, and they made remember and know judgments equally often for recognized studied words and critical lures. But forewarning did not eliminate the false recognition effect, as these subjects and those in the other groups made numerous false recognitions in this task.