Day persons, night persons, and time of birth: preliminary findings

The authors conducted 2 surveys to determine the relationship between time of birth and being a day person or a night person. Day persons are most alert during daylight hours; night persons are most alert during hours of darkness. In Survey 1, the authors asked U.S. high school students to complete the Alertness Questionnaire (B. Wallace, 1993) and to respond to other items related to daytime or nighttime activity. In Survey 2, the authors administered the same items to a U.S. college population. In both surveys, time of birth was significantly related to being a day person or a night person. The results suggest that a critical period for setting the biological clock for alertness may be the moment of birth.     

Exploring the Time Preferences by Procrastinators: Night or Day,Which is the One?

In study 1, trait procrastinators compared to nonprocrastinators claimed they were ‘night persons’, individuals who are most alert and active in the late afternoon and evening hours. However, there were no significant individual differences in time preference for a set of social and individual activities considered pleasurable. In study 2, participants kept daily records for six straight days of when they had engaged in activities. Proneness toward behavioral (but not decisional) procrastination was significantly related to number of activities performed in the evening. Together, these studies suggest that procrastinators may be ‘late starters’ who prefer to engage in daily activities later in the day than early in the morning. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Best to Prevent Future Persons From Suffering: A Reply to Benatar

Abstract

David Benatar claims that everyone was seriously harmed by coming into existence. To spare future persons from this suffering, we should cease having children, Benatar argues, with the result that humanity would gradually go extinct. Benatar’s claim of universal serious harm is baseless. Each year, an estimated 94% of children born throughout the world do not have a serious birth defect. Furthermore, studies show that most people do not experience chronic pain. Although nearly everyone experiences acute pain and discomforts, such as thirst, these experiences have instrumental value. For example, when a person picks up a hot object, in response to the pain, the person releases the object, thereby preventing serious harm. The standard that Benatar uses to evaluate the quality of our lives is arbitrary, as I will demonstrate. His proposal that we phase humanity out of existence by ceasing to have children is misguided and an overreaction to the problem of human suffering. The ‘threshold conception of harm’, which is a targeted approach for preventing future persons from suffering, is a more sensible approach.     

Persons and Affordances

Abstract

Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts ‘person’ and ‘affordance’ supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to.     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles

In this paper I consider Derek Parfit's attempt to respond to Rawls' charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. I proceed by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit's arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the utilitarian maximizing approach to matters of distribution ignores something that is of moral relevance, viz., the difference between the degrees of connectedness that hold between different stages of the same person, and between that person and his nearest and dearest, and the lack of connectedness between that person and distant others who may be benefitted at his cost. To Parfit's charge that reductionism sees the differences between persons as being 'less deep', I reply that the sense in which they are less deep is not at odds with their retaining their original moral importance, perhaps now better understood.     

Declines in non-digital social interaction among Americans, 2003–2017

It is unclear whether Americans spent less time on non-digital social interaction in the 2010s than in the 2000s. In the nationally representative American Time Use Survey administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n = 191,558), U.S. residents 15 years of age and older spent 10 to 11 fewer minutes a day in non-digital social interaction during leisure time in 2017 compared to 2003, which translates to 67 fewer hours a year. The decline was primarily driven by adolescents and young adults ages from15 to 25, who spent between 21 and 23 fewer minutes per day on non-digital social interaction in 2017 compared to 2003, or 140 fewer hours a year. Thus, American adolescents and young adults spent less time on non-digital social interaction in the 2010s, with a less pronounced decline among those ages 26 and over.     

The Ontological Status of Persons*

Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non‐Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by‐but not identical to‐human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions. Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true     

Assessing Creative Persons*

ABSTRACT Personality assessment, in contrast to psychodiagnosis, psychological testing, and the measurement of individual differences, attempts to delineate the person as a whole through the use of a multiplicity of procedures and emphasizes the more favorable and positive aspects of personality and its potentialities for effective functioning. Developed during World War II, the method has been most extensively used by the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research, University of California. Berkeley, in its studies of highly creative persons. In these researches the characteristics of such persons have been effectively revealed, e.g., through the use of life history interviews, personality trait ratings, an adjective check list, and the Q-sort method, and their level of creativeness predicted by multiple regression analyses.     

Sex,Drugs, Violence,and HIV Status Among Male-to-Female Transgender Persons in Houston,Texas

SUMMARY

To inform the Community Planning Group (Houston, Texas) in setting HIV-prevention priorities, risk behavior surveys were completed by 67 male-to-female (MtF) transgender persons. By self-identification, 58% were preoperative and 48% were self-described heterosexual women. We found this small sample of male-to-female transgender individuals to have high rates of HIV infection, and high prevalence of risky behaviors, intimate partner violence, and suicidal ideation. Twenty-seven percent were infected with HIV. Barriers were seldom used during oral sex and used less than half the time for anal sex with either primary or casual partners. Nearly one-third of the sample reported use of methamphetamines, amyl nitrite or LSD and 40% reported crack or cocaine use. Intimate partner violence and forced sex were reported by 50% and 25%, respectively. Suicidal ideation was reported by 16% in the last 30 days; lifetime suicidal ideation was 60%.     

Perceived importance of services for persons with AIDS: recipient, family, caregiver, and public differences

596 adults from a moderately sized community in central California were divided into four groups (person with HIV or AIDS, friend or relative, caregiver or service provider for such a person, or member of the general public) and completed a schedule assessing their perceptions of the importance of 36 items related to potential services for persons with HIV or AIDS. Factor analysis of these items yielded in six constructs (Counseling, Medical, Assistance, Homecare, Adjunct/Auxiliary, and Nontraditional), accounting for 65.0% of the variance. Over-all, regardless of group membership, Medical Services were perceived as of highest importance, but differences were found across all groups regarding Assistance Services and Nontraditional Services for persons with AIDS. Implications and suggestions for research are discussed.     

Indiscernible Persons

In this article I discuss identity and indiscernibility for person-stages and persons. Identity through time is not an identity relation (it is a unity relation). Identity is carefully distinguished from persistence. Identity is timeless and necessary. Person-stages are carefully distinguished from persons. Theories of personal persistence are not theories of identity for persons. I deal not with the persistence of persons through time but with the timeless and necessary identity and indiscernibility of persons. I argue that it is possible that there are non-identical but indiscernible temporally whole persons. I discuss the biographies of persons and develop the type or token distinction for persons. Twins in symmetrical or eternally recurrent universes are examples of indiscernible persons. I discuss temporal and modal branching, and I end with survival for person-tokens and eternity for person-types.     

Cross-Sectional Age Analysis of Sleep Problems in 2 to 17 Year Olds with ADHD Combined,ADHD Inattentive,or Autism

Sleep problems are common in autism and ADHD. No study has compared sleep problems by age in 2 to 17 year olds with autism versus ADHD-Combined versus ADHD-Inattentive type. Mothers rated 1415 youth with autism and 1041 with ADHD on 10 Pediatric Behavior Scale sleep items. Nighttime sleep problems were most severe in autism, followed by ADHD-Combined, and then ADHD-Inattentive. Difficulty falling asleep, restless during sleep, and waking during the night were the most common problems. Adolescents slept more at night than other age groups, and youth who slept more at night were sleepier during the day. Sleep problems declined with age, but correlations were small. In adolescence, 63% with autism, 53% with ADHD-Combined, and 57% with ADHD-Inattentive had difficulty falling asleep. Given that the majority of children in all age groups had one or more sleep problem, developmentally appropriate interventions are needed to address sleep difficulties and limit their adverse effects.

     

群体印象形成与个体印象形成：反基准比率效应

采用 “反基准比率效应”范式考察在群体印象形成与个体印象形成两种认知加工过程中, 基准比率对印象形成过程及其结果的影响。被试分别为39名19~25岁大学生(实验1：男生17名, 女生22名, 均为右利手)以及46名19~25岁大学生(实验2：男生21名, 女生25名, 均为右利手)。结果发现：无论是群体印象形成还是个体印象形成, 在学习阶段, 知觉者都能准确认知各类事件间的关系, 但会优先建构高频事件间的联结。而在测试阶段, 当低频事件与高频事件同时出现时, 知觉者发生明显关系误判, 即以反基准比率的倾向高估低频事件间的联结强度。实验表明群体与个体印象形成过程中都会产生反基准比率效应这样的加工偏差, 进而初步揭示反基准比率现象在社会信息加工领域具有一定的普遍性。     

Retention of Implicit Sequence Learning in Persons Who Stutter and Persons With Parkinson's Disease

ABSTRACT. The authors investigated the retention of implicit sequence learning in 14 persons with Parkinson's disease (PPD), 14 persons who stutter (PWS), and 14 control participants. Participants completed a nonsense syllable serial reaction time task in a 120-min session. Participants named aloud 4 syllables in response to 4 visual stimuli. The syllables formed a repeating 8-item sequence not made known to participants. After 1 week, participants completed a 60-min retention session that included an explicit learning questionnaire and a sequence generation task. PPD showed retention of general learning equivalent to controls but PWS's reaction times were significantly slower on early trials of the retention test relative to other groups. Controls showed implicit learning during the initial session that was retained on the retention test. In contrast, PPD and PWS did not demonstrate significant implicit learning until the retention test suggesting intact, but delayed, learning and retention of implicit sequencing skills. All groups demonstrated similar limited explicit sequence knowledge. Performance differences between PWS and PPD relative to controls during the initial session and on early retention trials indicated possible dysfunction of the cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical loop. The etiological implications for stuttering, and clinical implications for both populations, of this dysfunction are discussed.     

Non-binary youth: Access to gender-affirming primary health care

ABSTRACT

Background: Transgender (trans) youth who identify outside the gender binary are a growing subpopulation. In this article, we document differences in access to gender-affirming health care between binary and non-binary identified trans youth and explore ways of meeting the health needs of non-binary youth within primary care settings.

Methods: The Canadian Trans Youth Health Survey is a national online survey of trans youth, 14–25 years, conducted in 2013–2014. Among the 839 participants who responded to gender identity items in the survey, 41% identified as non-binary. We compared demographic, health outcome, and health care access responses between non-binary and binary (trans girls/women and trans boys/men) youth.

Results: Non-binary and binary youth were similar in most demographics, including age, geographic distribution, and ethnocultural backgrounds, however a larger proportion (82%) of non-binary youth were assigned female at birth. Older non-binary youth (aged 19–25) were significantly more likely to forego needed healthcare than older binary youth; no significant differences were found between younger (14–18) non-binary and binary youth in foregoing healthcare. Overall, non-binary youth (13%) were significantly less likely than binary youth (52%) to access hormone therapy, but they were more likely than binary youth to report experiencing barriers to accessing hormone therapy when needed.

Conclusions: Non-binary trans youth in Canada report challenges in accessing needed gender-affirming healthcare. Primary care providers are well-situated to integrate a broad range of gender-affirming care services into practice in order to address the unique needs of non-binary youth. Future research is warranted to explore experiences of non-binary youth related to barriers to care and to explore how services can be designed and delivered to better meet the needs of non-binary youth seeking gender-affirming primary care.     

The Uniqueness of Persons

Persons are thought to have a special kind of value, often called "dignity," which, according to Kant, makes them both infinitely valuable and irreplaceably valuable. The author aims to identify what makes a person a person in a way that can explain both aspects of dignity. She considers five definitions of "person": (1) an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius), (2) a self-conscious being (Locke), (3) a being with the capacity to act for ends (Kant), (4) a being with the capacity to act for another (Kant), and (5) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla). She argues that none is capable of grounding both aspects of dignity since they are incompatible kinds of value; it is impossible for the same thing to ground both. Human persons are infinitely valuable in virtue of shareable qualities of their nature, whereas they are irreplaceably valuable because of a nonqualitative feature of their personhood.     

On Persons and Immortality Symposium on Pedro Tabensky,Happiness: Personhood,Community, Purpose

Abstract

This paper considers Tabensky’s method of critical introspection, and in particular the conception of personhood that informs it. By interrogating the lives of pure hedonism, divinity and immortality from our already existing conception of personhood, Tabensky argues that such lives are incompatible with what it is to be a person, and desiring to live them is therefore irrational. Concentrating on the example of immortality, I argue that, while there are undoubtedly disadvantages associated with the immortal life, these are contingent rather than essential to the notion of being a person. In fact, we have very little idea of the boundaries of that concept. The paper concludes by looking at the consequences of Tabensky’s approach for issues surrounding moral vision and improvement, and new technologies of the person.