从人的生命本性看道德与伦理的区分

道德、伦理作为人类特有的现象,必然与人的生命本性有着内在关联.人的超自然性蕴含着做人问题,道德、伦理是做人问题在人的个体性与社会性两个方向上的解决.道德是个体做人方向与方式的选择,伦理是包含底线伦理和社会道德的规范系统.道德、伦理的区分具有重要的伦理学意义.     

基因与人性:影响人性的若干基因

人类行为既受到遗传因素的影响,同时也受到环境(文化)因素的影响。近年来逐渐引起众多学科领域关注的行为遗传学研究从行为的基因关联出发,系统研究了行为的遗传因素及其基因基础,取得了令人瞩目的成绩。该文系统总结了八种人类重要行为的基因基础及其与环境因素的关系,并从基因与人性的关系角度进行了讨论。     

科学不端行为是科学的一种本质特性

科学不端行为在实验科学的早期就已经出现.近几十年各种科学不端行为的发生率明显增高.科学开始显示出它的“病理学”的一面.回顾历史和现实中一些科学欺诈的案例,并对其进行了社会学分析.大量事实证明:科学不端行为是科学的一种本质特性,代表了科学的“黑暗面”.对科学不端行为从科学史学、科学哲学、科学社会学以及心理学、行为科学等多学科的角度综合研究,才能达到对科学本质的全面认识.     

论孔子对原始人性和现实人性的看法

在具体分析孔子人性论的时候,我们应该区分原始人性与现实人性.孔子并没有明确界定原始人性的善恶,但是他认为一小部分人的品性极善、资质很高;另一部分人的品性不好、资质愚钝;此外,绝大部分人属于中人,这部分人之间的本性差不多,孔子没有作出明确的善恶判断.孔子认为现实人性包含有对名利富贵的欲望,但是名利富贵要通过正当的途径来获得,并且欲望不能过度,纵欲是人性变坏的主要原因.此外,统治者的乱政是导致人性变坏的外部原因.所以他又主张通过礼法来约束欲望.     

The Human Relation With Nature and Technological Nature

ABSTRACT— Two world trends are powerfully reshaping human existence: the degradation, if not destruction, of large parts of the natural world, and unprecedented technological development. At the nexus of these two trends lies technological nature—technologies that in various ways mediate, augment, or simulate the natural world. Current examples of technological nature include videos and live webcams of nature, robot animals, and immersive virtual environments. Does it matter for the physical and psychological well-being of the human species that actual nature is being replaced with technological nature? As the basis for our provisional answer (it is "yes"), we draw on evolutionary and cross-cultural developmental accounts of the human relation with nature and some recent psychological research on the effects of technological nature. Finally, we discuss the issue—and area for future research—of "environmental generational amnesia." The concern is that, by adapting gradually to the loss of actual nature and to the increase of technological nature, humans will lower the baseline across generations for what counts as a full measure of the human experience and of human flourishing.     

论人性与道德——一种道德学的分析

揭示人性有哲学、心理学、生理学、伦理学等多重维度,但从道德上考究人性即关于人性善恶问题的讨论是主流;道德与人性的关系集中表现为人性决定道德还是道德决定人性的问题,决定道德的利益不过是人性的体现,而人性的善恶又以利益的取舍为标准,如果我们认同由伦理入道德的分析进路,那么人性就构成道德的"第二土壤";但人性又是欲望与情感的总和,利益只不过是人的欲望的现实化,就此而言,人性又构成道德的"第一土壤";因此,基于真实人性的道德学应该破除人性要素的二元对立思维,从人性的完整性、客观性出发,为正当与善提供坚实的人性基础,为"完整的人"和"自由的人"的实现提供道义支撑,真正使道德成为人的道德,而不是道德异化。     

论朱子性情关系中的性善论假设

在朱子性情关系的多重分析中,性善论只是一种假设。此种假设体现在“性体情用”原则中,体现在“心统性情”关系中,亦体现在“心贯已发未发”命题中。此种假设在朱子哲学中是可能与必要的。对于朱子性情关系中的性善论假设进行剖析,有助于为研究朱子哲学提供新的视角。     

Relational Psychoanalysis and the Tragic-Existential Aspect of the Human Condition

I suggest we may benefit by opening relational thinking to a certain aspect of a classical psychoanalytic worldview. Opening to what we can call the tragic and existential dimensions of the human condition: the universal experience of a certain inner dividedness, hiddenness, and self-deception—a strangeness within the “otherness” that constitutes ordinary, good-enough human environment; as well as the equally universal experience of impermanence—lack, inevitable loss, and finitude. Such openness entails listening to themes we hear in many critiques of relational thinking—critiques that often devolve into caricaturing relationality as avoiding the dark, internally divided side of our nature. It entails listening well enough to these universal themes in ourselves and in our patients so that we can radically reframe them—without recourse drives—in expanded, relational terms. As in Mitchell’s words, “dialectical tensions not taken as polarities … but rather as interpenetrating and, in some sense, as mutually creating each other.”     

改造自然界与人的道德责任——论对世界存在和人存在的重新开启

长期以来,人们总是将改造自然界的实践活动理解为满足人的生存需要的手段,在马克思以前从来没有人将改造自然界的实践活动视为一种先行开启世界存在和人存在的本体论的目的性活动。正是对改造自然界实践活动的这一重大误读,导致了现代性的实践活动给自然界带来巨大破坏和对人的存在的严重扭曲。因此,正本清源,还改造自然界实践活动的本来面目,成为摆在理论工作者面前一项迫在眉睫的任务。改造自然界的实践活动是创造世界和创造人的本体,它的先行存在地位决定了它才真正是人们对自然环境负道德责任的形而上学根据,正是通过它才开启出世界的存在和人的存在,因而它才有资格成为道德责任的关怀对象。改造自然界实践活动的先在性,决定了人们怎样进行改造自然界的实践活动,就有怎样的世界存在和怎样的人性。道德上负责任地进行改造自然界的实践活动,意味着人要负责任地创造世界、负责任地创造人的存在。对改造自然界的实践活动负道德责任,就是对自然世界负道德责任、对人本身负道德责任。     

VII—A Compleat Chain of Reasoning: Hume's Project inA Treatise of Human Nature, Books One and Two

In this paper I consider the context and significance of the first instalment of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature , Books One and Two, on the understanding and on the passions, published in 1739 without Book Three. I argue that Books One and Two taken together should be read as addressing the question of the relation between reason and passion, and place Hume's discussion in the context of a large early modern philosophical literature on the topic. Hume's goal is to show that the passions do not require government by reason, and to illustrate various ways in which the passions of social beings regulate themselves. The underlying theme of the first Treatise is thus a new theory of sociability: sympathetic sociability.     

伦理原则与心性本体——儒家"仁内义外"与"仁义内在"说的内在一致性

郭简《六德》篇讲“仁内义外”,孟子则批评告子“仁内义外说”,而主仁义内在。学者疑之,至有据此否定郭简思想属思孟学派者。本文指出：《六德》篇与告子的“仁内义外说”,名词相同,但内涵迥异。郭简《六德》篇的“仁内义外说”,讲家族内、外治理方法的区别;告子所持“仁内义外说”,则是由人的情感生活与道德普遍性之割裂,而引生一人性“白板论”。《六德》篇“仁内义外说”所言治道,表达了儒家的一贯思想,亦为孟子所肯定。但告子“仁内义外说”所表述的人性论,则与儒家尤其思孟一系的核心思想相抵触,故为孟子所驳斥。孟子与告子有关“仁内义外说”的论辩,凸显了孟子人性论的根本特色和精神实质。孟子仁义内在于人的实存和情感生活的性善论,为《六德》篇“仁内义外说”所表达的儒家治道,奠定了坚实的理论基础。二者本无矛盾,不能据此而将《六德》乃至郭店儒简排拒于思孟学派之外。