Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson

In a comment on my paper “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory” ( Walker 1992 ), Keith Burgess-Jackson argues that I have misdiagnosed the problem with modem moral theory. Burgess-Jackson misunderstands both the illustrative—“theoretical-juridical”—model I constructed there and how my critique and alternative model answer to specifically feminist concerns. Ironically, his own view seems to reproduce the very conception of morality as an individually internalized action-guiding code of principles that my earlier essay argued is the conception central to modern moral theories.     

Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison

Gerald Harrison identifies two Euthyphro-related concerns for divine command theories and makes the case that to the extent that these concerns make trouble for divine command theories they also make trouble for non-naturalistic moral realism and naturalistic moral realism (call this the parity thesis). He also offers responses to the two concerns on behalf of divine command theorists. I show here that the parity thesis does not hold for the most commonly discussed version of divine command theory. I further argue that his responses to the two concerns fail. Finally, I draw on some of Harrison’s ideas to identify an advantage that non-naturalistic moral realism has over divine command theories and naturalistic moral realism.     

Wishful Thinking and the Unconscious: A Reply to Gouws

Abstract

This paper argues against the view that the Freudian unconscious can be understood as an extension of ordinary belief-desire psychology. The paper argues that Freud’s picture of the mind challenges the paradigm of folk psychology, as it is understood by much contemporary philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The dynamic unconscious postulated by psychoanalysis operates according to rules and principles that are distinct in kind from those rules that organise rational and conscious thought. Psychoanalysis offers us a radical reconception of our ordinary way of thinking about our own minds.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Michael Zimmerman has recently argued against the twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. I offered a number of objections to Zimmerman’s view, to which Zimmerman responded. In this article, I respond to Zimmerman’s responses to my criticisms.     

Responsible Relationship: Imago Dei and the Moral Distinction between Humans and Other Animals

In light of modern evolutionary science, some theologians have criticized using the image of God to distinguish humans from other animals. This concept, however, still offers rich theological insight into the natures of both humans and other animals. Following the relational interpretations of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, this article explores how the imago Dei may be used to distinguish human creatures without necessarily implying a division in kind between humans and other animal creatures. Humans are distinguished not by any superior abilities they might possess, but by the character of their relationship to God and other creatures.     

On the Distinction between the Abstract Tacts Art and Craft: A Concept Analysis

The Psychological Record - We may marvel at both the creativity and quality of work in a piece of pottery or a sculpture, or of a well-played basketball game or well-acted play. Although each may...     

On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

Romantic Longings,Moral Ideals,and Democratic Priorities: On Richard Rorty's Use of the Distinction Between the Private and the Public

Abstract

The heart of Richard Rorty's philosophy is his distinction between the private and the public. In the first part of this paper, I highlight the profound influence that the inherited vocabularies of Romanticism and Moralism have had on Rorty's understanding of both the distinction and the problems he intends to solve with it. I also suggest that Rorty shares with Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche philosophical habits that cause him to treat two importantly different problems as one. Once the moral problem is disentangled from the political, it becomes clear that Rorty's distinction is unnecessary to the former and inadequate for the latter. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Rorty's non‐foundationalist pragmatism supports the view that the political problem is best resolved by what I call a democratic mechanism of arbitration. It is the lingering influence of Romanticism and Moralism, I suggest, that is the cause of Rorty's reluctance to embrace fully the political priority of democratic consensus. Finally, I discuss why this analysis of Rorty's liberalism may have implications for the general question of how best to resolve political disputes in pluralist societies.     

Autonomy and the Moral Symmetry Principle: Reply to Frowe and Tooley

Helen Frowe has recently objected to Michael Tooley’s famous Moral Symmetry Principle, which is meant to show that in themselves killing and letting die are morally equivalent. I argue that her objection is not compelling but a more compelling objection is available. Specifically, Tooley’s rebuttal of a proposed counter-example to his Moral Symmetry Principle has two problematic implications. First, it undercuts the very principle itself. If we reject the proposed counter-example, then any instance of the Moral Symmetry Principle will actually demonstrate the moral in-equivalence of killing and letting die. Second, it commits us to the view, which Tooley wishes to avoid, that we are just as obligated to refrain from doing wrong as we are to prevent others from doing the same. I conclude with a brief discussion of a more general concern regarding Tooley’s basic strategy. My focus here is quite narrow. My claims, if plausible, only show that the Moral Symmetry Principle is unsound and thus cannot serve as a basis for the view that killing and letting die are morally equivalent.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker

Axiomathes - The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better...     

On Empty Bathtubs: A Reply to Meehl

In the present state of ambiguity, negative studies of the validity of psychodiagnostic tests can easily be generated. But such studies throw little light upon the capacities of the tests and are confounded by the utilization of clinical interpretations. It would be most advisable to deal first with the central problems: the need for an integrated theory delineating tests in terms of the areas of optimum assessment and levels tapped; and, the development of realistic expectations on the part of clinicians. The studies frequently cited as throwing question upon the validity of projective tools are rejected on three grounds: the unrealistic wording of the hypotheses (i.e., are these tests valid or invalid, rather than under what circumstances and in what areas are the tests valid); the failure to consider the populations and the background experience of the clinician; and the methodological weaknesses in the designs of the studies. While the author admits that in the long run Meehl may turn out to be correct in suggesting that projective techniques have little value, at the present time Meehl's case for such a conclusion seems weak and should not serve as a deterrent for further investigations and proper utilization of projective techniques.     

阿奎那关于存在与本质相区分的思想

中世纪哲学家托马斯.阿奎那在秉承亚里士多德和波埃修等人相关思想的基础上,提出了以存在论为核心的形而上学学说。阿奎那首先界定了存在的含义及其在对存在者的认识中所具有的首要的和基础性的地位;进而对存在和本质做出了明确的区分,认为它们是构成不同存在者的基本原则,是区分存在者(实体)三种基本类型——复合实体、受造的理智实体和第一存在——所赖以展开的基础。阿奎那的形而上学存在论虽然在中世纪的语境中具有明显的神学意蕴,但他关于存在与本质真实区分的观点、关于存在先于本质的看法,则对以往的形而上学认识模式产生了非常重要的变革作用,并对随后的形而上学存在论思想形成了深刻的影响。