Infants attribute goals even to biomechanically impossible actions

Human infants readily interpret the actions of others in terms of goals, but the origins of this important cognitive skill are keenly debated. We tested whether infants recognize others′ actions as goal-directed on the basis of their experience with carrying out and observing goal-directed actions, or whether their perception of a goal-directed action is based on the recognition of a specific event structure. Counterintuitively, but consistent with our prediction, we observed that infants appear to extend goal attribution even to biomechanically impossible actions so long as they are physically efficient, indicating that the notion of ‘goal′ is unlikely to be derived directly from infants′ experience.     

Do 10-month-old infants understand others' false beliefs?

As adults, we know that others’ mental states, such as beliefs, guide their behavior and that these mental states can deviate from reality. Researchers have examined whether young children possess adult-like theory of mind by focusing on their understanding about others’ false beliefs. The present research revealed that 10-month-old infants seemed to interpret a person’s choice of toys based on her true or false beliefs about which toys were present. These results indicate that like adults, even preverbal infants act as if they can consider others’ mental states when making inferences about others’ actions.     

Infant and adult perceptions of possible and impossible body movements: An eye-tracking study

This study investigated how infants perceive and interpret human body movement. We recorded the eye movements and pupil sizes of 9- and 12-month-old infants and of adults (N=14 per group) as they observed animation clips of biomechanically possible and impossible arm movements performed by a human and by a humanoid robot. Both 12-month-old infants and adults spent more time looking at the elbows during impossible compared with possible arm movements, irrespective of the appearance of the actor. These results suggest that by 12months of age, infants recognize biomechanical constraints on how arms move, and they extend this knowledge to humanoid robots. Adults exhibited more pupil dilation in response to the human's impossible arm movements compared with the possible ones, but 9- and 12-month-old infants showed no differential pupil dilation to the same actions. This finding suggests that the processing of human body movements might still be immature in 12-month-olds, as they did not show an emotional response to biomechanically impossible body movements. We discuss these findings in relation to the hypothesis that perception of others' body movements relies upon the infant's own sensorimotor experience.     

Psychological Determinants of Optimism Regarding Consequences of the War

Gazing behavior of 10 three-month-old twin infants (five male and five female) and their mothers during play, bottle feeding, and spoon feeding activities were analyzed. Video-tape equipment was used in the home; data were gathered as naturalistically as possible. Mothers looked at infants for a greater percentage of the total time and for longer durations than infants looked at mothers. A consistency-activation personality theory in which mothers are highly motivated to gaze at infants, but infants seek visual interest by looking away from mother, is suggested to interpret the findings. Both looking and not-looking gazes and mean and median measures of central tendency were shown to be helpful and necessary for the gazing analysis.     

The format of representation of recognized words in infants' early receptive lexicon

Eleven-month-olds can recognize a few auditorily presented familiar words in experimental situations where no hints are given by the intonation, the situation, or the presence of possible visual referents. That is, infants of this age (and possibly somewhat younger) can recognize words based on sound patterns alone. The issue addressed in this article is what is the type of mental representations infants use to code words they recognize. The results of a series of experiments with French-learning infants indicate that word representations in 11-month-olds are segmentally underspecified and suggest that they are all the more underspecified when infants engage in recognizing words rather than merely attending to meaningless speech sounds. But underspecification has limits, which were explored here with respect to word-initial consonants. The last two experiments show the way to investigating further these limits for word-initial consonants as well as for segments in other word positions. In French, infants' word representations are flexible enough to allow for structural changes in the voicing or even in the manner of articulation of word-initial consonants. Word-initial consonants must be present, however, for words to be recognized. In conclusion, a parallel is proposed between the emerging capacities to ignore variations that are irrelevant for word recognition in a “lexical mode” and to ignore variations that are phonemically irrelevant in a “neutral mode” of listening to native speech.     

How do infants recognize joint attention?

The emergence of joint attention is still a matter of vigorous debate. It involves diverse hypotheses ranging from innate modules dedicated to intention reading to more neuro-constructivist approaches. The aim of this study was to assess whether 12-month-old infants are able to recognize a “joint attention” situation when observing such a social interaction. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, we habituated infants to a “joint attention” video and then compared their looking time durations between “divergent attention” videos and “joint attention” ones using a 2 (familiar or novel perceptual component) × 2 (familiar or novel conceptual component) factorial design. These results were enriched with measures of pupil dilation, which are considered to be reliable measures of cognitive load. Infants looked longer at test events that involved novel speaker and divergent attention but no changes in infants’ pupil dilation were observed in any conditions. Although looking time data suggest that infants may appreciate discrepancies from expectations related to joint attention behavior, in the absence of clear evidence from pupillometry, the results show no demonstration of understanding of joint attention, even at a tacit level. Our results suggest that infants may be sensitive to relevant perceptual variables in joint attention situations, which would help scaffold social cognitive development. This study supports a gradual, learning interpretation of how infants come to recognize, understand, and participate in joint attention.     

Infants and their families at risk: Assessment and intervention

One of the basic premises of child-rearing and intervention models is that infant behavior is part of a communication system with the caregiving environment. However, infants vary in the messages that they convey to the caregiving environment, and parents vary in their ability to interpret their infants' signals and provide appropriate caregiving. This paper examines some of the tension that may exist between infant communication and appropriate caregiving. We examine research findings from several different populations of at-risk infants and their mothers in which infant signals and parental responses are variously effective in providing clues for appropriate caregiving. Some kinds of fits or matches between infant characteristics and maternal characteristics may be better than others for optimal infant development. The implications for intervention are also discussed.     

INFANTS' RECOGNITION OF THE SOUND PATTERNS OF THEIR OWN NAMES

Abstract— Among the earliest and most frequent words that infants hear are their names Yet little is known about when infants begin to recognize their own names Using a modified version of the head-turn preference procedure, we tested whether 4 5-month-olds preferred to listen to their own names over foils that were either matched or mismatched for stress pattern. Our findings provide the first evidence that even these young infants recognize the sound patterns of their own names Infants demonstrated significant preferences for their own names compared with foils that shared the same stress patterns, as well as foils with opposite patterns. The results indicate when infants begin to recognize sound patterns of items frequently uttered in the infants' environments.     

Infants' perception of goal‐directed actions on video

Imitation studies and object search studies show that infants have difficulties using action information presented on video to guide their own behaviour. The present study investigated whether infants also have problems interpreting information shown on video relative to real live information. It was examined whether 6‐month‐olds interpret an action with a salient action effect as goal‐directed when it is performed by an actor on a video‐screen and when it is performed by a live actor. A video presentation of a goal‐directed action display was presented to one group of infants, and another group received the same action display, matched in all details, live on a stage. Results indicate that 6‐month‐olds in the video group as well as in the live group interpreted the human action as goal‐directed. Moreover, comparison across both groups revealed no difference in the overall looking pattern between the video and the live presentation group. Thus, our findings show that infants as young as 6 months of age can take important information from video clips and interpret televised actions in meaningful ways that is equivalent to their interpretation of live actions.     

Do 6‐month‐olds understand that speech can communicate?

Adults and 12‐month‐old infants recognize that even unfamiliar speech can communicate information between third parties, suggesting that they can separate the communicative function of speech from its lexical content. But do infants recognize that speech can communicate due to their experience understanding and producing language, or do they appreciate that speech is communicative earlier, with little such experience? We examined whether 6‐month‐olds recognize that speech can communicate information about an object. Infants watched a Communicator selectively grasp one of two objects (target). During test, the Communicator could no longer reach the objects; she turned to a Recipient and produced speech (a nonsense word) or non‐speech (coughing). Infants looked longer when the Recipient selected the non‐target than the target object when the Communicator spoke but not when she coughed – unless the Recipient had previously witnessed the Communicator's selective grasping of the target object. Our results suggest that at 6 months, with a receptive vocabulary of no more than a handful of commonly used words, infants possess some abstract understanding of the communicative function of speech. This understanding may provide an early mechanism for language and knowledge acquisition.     

Calculating the attentional orientation of an unfamiliar agent in infancy

By the end of the first year, infants are able to recognize both goal-directed and perceptually guided behavior in the actions of non-human agents, even faceless ones. How infants derive the relevant orientation of an unfamiliar agent in the absence of familiar markers such as eyes, ears, or face is unknown. The current studies tested the hypothesis that infants’ calculate an agent's “front” from the geometry of its behavior in the spatial environment. In the first study, 14–15-month-old infants observed a symmetrical, faceless agent either interact contingently with a confederate or act randomly. It then turn toward one of two target objects. Infants were more likely to look in the direction the agent turned than the opposite direction, but only in the contingent condition. In the second study, the location of the confederate and target objects was varied, which in turn influenced which end of the agent infants interpreted as the front. Finally, implications for infants’ early gaze-following behaviors with humans are tested and implications for theory of mind development more broadly are discussed.     

Do infants provide evidence that the mirror system is involved in action understanding?

The mirror neuron theory of action understanding makes predictions concerning how the limited motor repertoire of young infants should impact on their ability to interpret others’ actions. In line with this theory, an increasing body of research has identified a correlation between infants’ abilities to perform an action, and their ability to interpret that action as goal-directed when performed by others. In this paper, I will argue that the infant data does by no means unequivocally support the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and that alternative interpretations of the data should be considered. Furthermore, some of this data can be better interpreted in terms of an alternative view, which holds that the role of the motor system in action perception is more likely to be one of enabling the observer to predict, after a goal has been identified, how that goal will be attained.     

Mommy and me: familiar names help launch babies into speech-stream segmentation

How do infants find the words in the tangle of speech that confronts them? The present study shows that by as early as 6 months of age, infants can already exploit highly familiar words-including, but not limited to, their own names-to segment and recognize adjoining, previously unfamiliar words from fluent speech. The head-turn preference procedure was used to familiarize babies with short passages in which a novel word was preceded by a familiar or a novel name. At test, babies recognized the word that followed the familiar name, but not the word that followed the novel name. This is the youngest age at which infants have been shown capable of segmenting fluent speech. Young infants have a powerful aid available to them for cracking the speech code. Their emerging familiarity with particular words, such as their own and other people's names, can provide initial anchors in the speech stream.     

Exposure to behavioral regularities in everyday life predicts infants’ acquisition of mental state vocabulary

There are two broad views of children's theory of mind. The mentalist view is that it emerges in infancy and is possibly innate. The minimalist view is that it emerges more gradually in childhood and is heavily dependent on learning. According to minimalism, children initially understand behaviors rather than mental states, and they are assisted in doing so by recognizing repeating patterns in behavior. The regularities in behavior allow them to predict future behaviors, succeed on theory-of-mind tasks, acquire mental state words, and eventually, understand the mental states underlying behavior. The present study provided the first clear evidence for the plausibility of this view by fitting head cameras to 54 infants aged 6 to 25 months, and recording their view of the world in their daily lives. At 6 and 12 months, infants viewed an average of 146.5 repeated behaviors per hour, a rate consistent with approximately 560,000 repetitions in their first year, and with repetitions correlating with children's acquisition of mental state words, even after controlling for their general vocabulary and a range of variables indexing social interaction. We also recorded infants’ view of people searching or searching for and retrieving objects. These were 92 times less common and did not correlate with mental state vocabulary. Overall, the findings indicate that repeated behaviors provide a rich source of information for children that would readily allow them to recognize patterns in behavior and help them acquire mental state words, providing the first clear evidence for this claim of minimalism.

Research Highlights

• Six- to 25-month-olds wore head cameras to record home life from infants’ point-of-view and help adjudicate between nativist and minimalist views of theory-of-mind (ToM).
• Nativists say ToM is too early developing to enable learning, whereas minimalists say infants learn to predict behaviors from behavior patterns in environment.
• Consistent with minimalism, infants had an incredibly rich exposure (146.5/h, >560,000 in first year) to repeated behaviors (e.g., drinking from a cup repeatedly).
• Consistent with minimalism, more repeated behaviors correlated with infants’ mental state vocabulary, even after controlling for gender, age, searches witnessed and non-mental state vocabulary.

     

Recognition,discrimination and categorization of smiling by 5-month-old infants

Perceiving emotions correctly is foundational to the development of interpersonal skills. Five-month-old infants’ abilities to recognize, discriminate and categorize facial expressions of smiling were tested in three coordinated experiments. Infants were habituated to four degrees of smiling modeled by the same or different people; following habituation, infants were presented with a new degree of smile worn by the same and by a new person (Experiment 1), a new degree of smile and a fearful expression worn by the same person (Experiment 2) or a new degree of smile and a fearful expression worn by new people (Experiment 3). Infants showed significant novelty preferences for the new person smiling and for the fearful expressions over the new degree of smiling. These findings indicate that infants at 5 months can categorize the facial expression of smiling in static faces, and yet recognize the same person despite changes in facial expression; this is the youngest age at which these abilities have been demonstrated. The findings are discussed in light of the significance of emotion expression face processing in social interaction and infants’ categorization of faces.     

The early origins of goal attribution in infancy

We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance', however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of Woodward (1999) showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions.     

Development of self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) demonstrate the ability to recognize themselves in mirrors, yet investigations of the development of self-recognition in chimpanzees are sparse. Twelve young chimpanzees, grouped by age, were given mirror exposure and tested for self-recognition and contingent movement. All 6 juveniles, 4 and 5 years old, exhibited mirror-guided, mark-directed behavior and clear evidence of self-recognition. In contrast, among the infants, only the oldest group of 2 1/2-year-olds exhibited clear evidence of self-recognition. All chimpanzees exhibited both self-directed behaviors and contingent movements. These results suggest that self-recognition occurs at a slightly older age in chimpanzees than in human infants. In humans, self-recognition is linked with other cognitive abilities. The results conform to the general pattern that great apes exhibit many cognitive skills comparable to those of 2-year-old humans.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Infant's perception of goal-directed actions performed by a mechanical device

The present work investigated whether by the end of the first year, infants interpret actions performed by a mechanical device as goal-directed and why they would do so. Using a modified version of the Woodward (1998) habituation paradigm, 9- and 12-month-old infants were tested in a condition in which they saw a mechanical claw performing an action (Study 1). When infants viewed the claw grasping and transporting objects to the back of a stage, 12-month-old but not 9-month-old infants interpreted the action as goal-directed. In Study 2, 9-month-olds received prior to habituation an information phase showing infants how a human held and operated the claw. This enrichment of infants’ knowledge enabled 9-month-old infants to interpret the action display as goal-directed. The role of the developing means-end understanding and tool-use for infants’ interpretation of actions performed by a mechanical device is discussed.     

0―1.5岁婴儿表征能力的研究概述

就0-1.5岁婴儿的知识表征方面,该文主要介绍了国外的一些研究成果,指出婴儿的表征能力由感知表征向意义表征发展.即使很小的婴儿都已经有了相当复杂的表征能力,能初步感知典型的变化,识别不同种类物体的物体,表征事物与事物之间的空间关系、数量关系、因果关系等,对动因有一定的理解,并逐渐形成概念和图示