Careful calculation or a leap of faith? A field study of the translation of CBCA ratings to final credibility judgements

This field experiment investigated the influence of Criteria‐Based Content Analysis (CBCA) ratings on ultimate decision accuracy regarding the credibility of children's statements of sexual abuse. Following a selection procedure, based on case facts independent of statement quality, 21 truthful accounts and 10 fabricated accounts of 6‐ to 17‐year olds were analysed. Two experts rated the presence of the CBCA criteria and made overall credibility judgements for each statement. Rater one achieved an overall hit rate of 84% (95% for truthful statements and 60% for fabricated statements) and rater two a hit rate of 81% (81% for both truthful and fabricated statements) but the raters did not always agree. The CBCA criteria appeared more often in the truthful statements compared to the fabricated statements. Additional factors that influenced raters' credibility judgements, besides CBCA scores, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Automated verbal credibility assessment of intentions: The model statement technique and predictive modeling

Recently, verbal credibility assessment has been extended to the detection of deceptive intentions, the use of a model statement, and predictive modeling. The current investigation combines these 3 elements to detect deceptive intentions on a large scale. Participants read a model statement and wrote a truthful or deceptive statement about their planned weekend activities (Experiment 1). With the use of linguistic features for machine learning, more than 80% of the participants were classified correctly. Exploratory analyses suggested that liars included more person and location references than truth‐tellers. Experiment 2 examined whether these findings replicated on independent‐sample data. The classification accuracies remained well above chance level but dropped to 63%. Experiment 2 corroborated the finding that liars' statements are richer in location and person references than truth‐tellers' statements. Together, these findings suggest that liars may over‐prepare their statements. Predictive modeling shows promise as an automated veracity assessment approach but needs validation on independent data.     

Source credibility and syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments examined whether a source credibility effect would be observed for a syllogistic reasoning task. In the experiments, people were given two statements, presented as the results from a survey, followed by a conclusion that was supposedly made by one of two sources. In Experiment 1, one of the sources was described as honest and the other as dishonest, and in Experiment 2, one of the sources was described as an expert and the other as a non-expert. Because a pilot experiment showed that credibility can be overridden by people’s experience with a source, all conclusions in Experiments 1 and 2 were ones that were likely to be accepted (i.e., necessary and possible strong conclusions). Both experiments showed a clear source credibility effect, particularly for the invalid conclusions. These results, along with the belief bias effect and previous research with conditional reasoning, suggest that people can be influenced by extraneous context, such as the honesty or expertise of a source, in a syllogistic reasoning task.     

The development of cynicism

Two experiments explored the development of cynicism by examining how children evaluate other people who make claims consistent or inconsistent with their self-interests. In Experiment 1, kindergartners, second graders, and fourth graders heard stories with ambiguous conclusions in which characters made statements that were aligned either with or against self-interest. Older children took into account the self-interests of characters in determining how much to believe them: They discounted statements aligned with self-interest, whereas they accepted statements going against self-interest. Experiment 2 examined children's endorsement of three different explanations for potentially self-interested statements: lies, biases, and mistakes. Like adults, sixth graders endorsed lies and bias as plausible explanations for wrong statements aligned with self-interest; younger children did not endorse bias. Implications for the development of cynicism and children's understanding of bias are discussed.     

Speaker bias in children's evaluation of the external consistency of statements

The hypothesis of this study is that an assumption of speaker credibility affects children's judgments of the external consistency of statements. In two experiments, first and third grade children (6 and 8 years of age, respectively) and college adults were read short paragraphs containing contradictory information from a contextual source and a speaker. The contextual source was described as either authoritative or nonauthoritative and discredited. The speaker was either an adult or child. Thus the contextual source was either more or less reliable than the speaker. Subjects were asked to affirm or contradict the speaker's statement, and to choose either the source or the speaker as most believable. The results showed that adult responses varied with the contextual source alone, while the responses of the first graders varied primarily with the speaker's age. The responses of the third graders varied with both factors. The results suggest young children can assess the external consistency of statements but frequently do not because of their assumptions about speakers and other performance factors.     

“Girls Are as Good as Boys at Math” Implies That Boys Are Probably Better: A Study of Expressions of Gender Equality

Although “Girls are as good as boys at math” explicitly expresses equality, we predict it could nevertheless suggest that boys have more raw talent. In statements with this subject‐complement structure, the item in the complement position serves as the reference point and is thus considered more typical and prominent. This explains why “Tents are like houses,” for instance, sounds better than “Houses are like tents”—people generally think of houses as more typical. For domains about ability, the reference point should be the item that is typically more skilled. We further propose that the reference point should be naturally more skilled. In two experiments, we presented adults with summaries of actual scientific evidence for gender equality in math (Experiment 1) or verbal ability (Experiment 2), but we manipulated whether the reference point in the statements of equality in the summaries (e.g., “Boys’ verbal ability is as good as girls’”) was girls or boys. As predicted, adults attributed more natural ability to each gender when it was in the complement rather than subject position. Yet, in Experiment 3, we found that when explicitly asked, participants judged that such sentences were not biased in favor of either gender, indicating that subject‐complement statements must be transmitting this bias in a subtle way. Thus, statements such as “Girls are as good as boys at math” can actually backfire and perpetuate gender stereotypes about natural ability.     

Judgment of the credibility of rape allegations: a content analytic field experiment]

This study explores the issue of whether allegations of rape can be correctly identified as true or false on the basis of a set of content criteria used successfully in previous studies with respect to children's accounts of sexual abuse. A sample of 30 authentic protocols of police interrogations of women reporting rape were selected for the study. Fifteen cases were classified as false accounts because the complaints eventually confessed to having fabricated their allegations. The remaining cases were classified as true rapes on the basis of medical and other corroborating evidence. A group of experienced police officers (N = 30) judged these cases in terms of their credibility on the basis of the 19 content criteria suggested by Steller & K?hnken (1989) and gave an overall judgment of the true vs. false nature of each statement. A second group of police officers (N = 22) judged the credibility of the statements without reference to these criteria. The findings from a series of discriminant function analyses showed that the set of criteria as a whole is successful in distinguishing between true and false rape allegations. The results of the stepwise discriminant function analyses reveal which criteria in particular contribute to the correct identification of true and false cases. However, the higher percentage of correct classifications in the group using the content criteria was only marginally significant compared to the second group judging the cases without reference to the criteria. Altogether, the findings of this study support the basic tenet of statement analysis that the linguistic features of a statement contain essential clues for assessing its credibility.     

Criteria Based Content Analysis: The Less Scientific Road to Truth

Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is a forensic tool that aims atdistinguishing true from false statements made by crime victims. As such,CBCA and similar techniques are regularly employed by psychologicalexpert-witnesses in court. However, it could be argued that the diagnosticaccuracy of CBCA is moderate, and too low for application in the forensiccontext. The current article discusses problems that arise if conclusionsabout credibility of testimonies based on CBCA are presented in court. Afundamental, yet so far hardly addressed flaw is that CBCA suffers from aninherent truth bias. That is, the underlying notion that credibility isexamined by means of searching for signs supporting truthfulness isscientifically less valid than the approach in which credibility isestablished by focusing on alternative explanations and signs of deceit.     

Truthiness and law: Nonprobative photos bias perceived credibility in forensic contexts

Nonprobative but related photos can increase the perceived truth value of statements relative to when no photo is presented (truthiness). In two experiments, we tested whether truthiness generalizes to credibility judgments in a forensic context. Participants read short vignettes in which a witness viewed an offence. The vignettes were presented with or without a nonprobative, but related photo. In both experiments, participants gave higher witness credibility ratings to photo-present vignettes compared to photo-absent vignettes. In Experiment 2, half the vignettes included additional nonprobative information in the form of text. We replicated the photo presence effect in Experiment 2, but the nonprobative text did not significantly alter witness credibility. The results suggest that nonprobative photos can increase the perceived credibility of witnesses in legal contexts.     

Susceptibility to postidentification feedback is affected by source credibility

How much a person is affected by postidentification feedback is dependent on the credibility of the person giving the feedback. Seven hundred and ninety participants across three experiments viewed a crime video, made judgments from a line‐up, were provided with co‐witness and/or outcome feedback (from police officers [high credibility] or children [low credibility]), and answered testimony‐relevant questions (e.g. How good a view did you get of the person in the video?). The aim was to find out how high versus low credibility co‐witness feedback affects a witness' retrospective judgments (Experiment 1) as well as estimations of these co‐witnesses' judgments (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 showed that the feedback effect was only observed when the co‐witness responses were attributed to a high credibility source. Experiment 2 showed that high credibility co‐witnesses were estimated to score higher on the testimony‐relevant questions as compared to low credibility co‐witnesses. Experiment 3 showed that outcome feedback (e.g. ‘you identified the suspect’) produces stronger effects on testimony‐relevant questions than co‐witness feedback. The implications of these findings are that when postidentification feedback is present, it is important to determine the source of this feedback. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assimilation and contrast in persuasion: the effects of source credibility in multiple message situations

The present research explores a contextual perspective on persuasion in multiple message situations. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, the effects of those messages are influenced by other messages to which people recently have been exposed. In two experiments, participants received a target persuasive message from a moderately credible source. Immediately before this message, participants received another message, on a different topic, from a source with high or low credibility. In Experiment 1, participants' attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable after they had first been exposed to a different message from a low rather than high credibility source (contrast). In Experiment 2, this effect only emerged when a priming manipulation gave participants a dissimilarity mindset. When participants were primed with a similarity mindset, their attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable following a different message from a high rather than low credibility source (assimilation).     

神经科学偏见效应：可重复性及其心理机制的探索

神经科学的发展对其他学科以及社会产生了重要的影响。虽然神经科学方法与行为研究方法都是探索人类心理与行为的有效手段并各有所长, 但神经科学的研究结果却可能引起人们过度的解读和信任。研究者发现, 当某一结论使用神经科学结果作为证据时, 比使用行为科学结果或者心理生理学指标作为证据时更加让人信服, 即使神经科学结果与该结论之间毫无关系, 这种现象被称为神经科学偏见(neuroscience bias)。通过系统回顾近年来关于神经科学偏见的研究, 我们发现：(1)虽然神经科学偏见存在可重复性的争论, 但该效应确实存在; (2)神经科学偏见的产生可能是因为个体倾向于还原论的解释(即使用低层次、简单的机制来解释更高层次上的现象)及心理本质主义的影响(即人们认为心理与行为的本质是神经活动)。神经科学偏见反映了公众对科学结果解读的偏见, 未来研究需要探讨这种偏见的心理机制, 从而引导科学结果的正确解读和运用。     

Is this a question? Not for long. The statement bias

Four experiments demonstrate a fundamental ‘statement bias’: questions are more often misremembered as statements than vice versa. The bias increases with increasing item comprehensibility (Experiment 1) and is related to depth of processing at encoding (Experiment 2). When sentences are simply comprehended, the bias is not affected by the truth of the statement underlying the sentence (Experiment 3). The statement bias generalizes to contexts in which people have to express consent with the content of the sentence (Experiment 4) but is somewhat reduced when they are not sure what the correct answer is. Our findings are consistent with the idea that during processing of a sentence the content of the sentence is represented similar to a statement.     

The influence of suspect ethnicity and evidence direction on alibi credibility assessment

We investigated whether evidence direction (incriminating versus exonerating) moderated the influence of intergroup bias on alibi credibility assessments. Israeli-Jewish participants (n = 160) assessed the credibility of an alibi statement provided by either an Israeli-Jewish or an Israeli-Arab suspect. Along with the alibi statement, half of the participants were presented with incriminating evidence, while the other half were presented with exonerating evidence. The results indicated that evidence direction influenced credibility assessment regarding both in-group and out-group suspects. Specifically, under incriminating evidence, Israeli-Jewish suspects were perceived as more deceptive than Israeli-Arab suspects, whereas under exonerating evidence, no such differences were found. These results emphasize the significance of group bias in assessing the credibility of alibi statements.     

Differences in the Evaluation of Generic Statements About Human and Non‐Human Categories

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non‐human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non‐threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alternative hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects reflect differences between human and non‐human categories more generally, as adults showed a negativity bias for categories of non‐human animals, but not for categories of humans. These findings suggest the presence of important, early‐emerging domain differences in people's judgments about generics.     

Preconscious analysis of global structure: Evidence from masked priming

According to the global precedence hypothesis, the perceptual processing of complex objects proceeds from global structure to the analysis of local elements. In the present study, we used a masked priming paradigm to explore whether the global or the local level of hierarchical letters is analysed at preconscious processing stages. Experiment 1 found masked priming only after global prime letters in focused‐attention conditions. Experiment 2 used a divided‐attention task in which attention was not focused specifically on either level of hierarchy and did not find any priming. Experiment 3 used otherwise the same task as Experiment 2 but biased attention either to the global or the local level by manipulating the probability that targets appeared at one level. Priming was found after global prime letters in the global‐bias condition but not in the local‐bias condition. Experiments 4a and 4b suggest that the size of the local letters was not responsible for the lack of priming after local primes. The results suggest a priority for global processing already at a preconscious level and that attentional factors may modulate processes at this level.     

Reliability in Content Analysis

In a recent article in this journal, Lombard, Snyder‐Duch, and Bracken (2002) surveyed 200 content analyses for their reporting of reliability tests, compared the virtues and drawbacks of five popular reliability measures, and proposed guidelines and standards for their use. Their discussion revealed that numerous misconceptions circulate in the content analysis literature regarding how these measures behave and can aid or deceive content analysts in their effort to ensure the reliability of their data. This article proposes three conditions for statistical measures to serve as indices of the reliability of data and examines the mathematical structure and the behavior of the five coefficients discussed by the authors, as well as two others. It compares common beliefs about these coefficients with what they actually do and concludes with alternative recommendations for testing reliability in content analysis and similar data‐making efforts.     

On the Ease of (Dis)believing: The Role of Accessibility Experiences in Credibility Judgments

Credibility judgments are common and consequential in many applied settings. Although much research has addressed human observers' ability to discriminate true and deceptive statements, less is known about the psychological processes involved in such judgments. Here, it is proposed that the process of mustering evidence for or against credibility is reflected in a feeling‐based form (ease‐of‐retrieval) and that such feelings can be used as a basis for credibility judgments. The results of an experiment show, as predicted, that the perceived ease with which participants could identify clues strongly influenced credibility judgments. Ironically, mustering more clues in support of a truthful account lowered credibility judgments; in contrast, mustering more clues in support of a deceptive account increased credibility judgments. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because participants relied on a feeling‐based as opposed to content‐based judgment strategy. Practical implications are discussed, and theoretical issues regarding the process of credibility judgment are raised. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using the Reality Interview improves the accuracy of the Criteria‐Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring

Active interviewing approaches can exploit the verbal differences between truthtellers and liars, thus improving detecting deception. One such method is the Reality Interview (RI) aimed to facilitate recall from truthtellers, while increasing the difficulty for liars. This study investigated whether the RI could improve the diagnostic accuracy of the Reality Monitoring and the Criteria‐Based Content Analysis. Liars and truthtellers were either asked to freely recall an event or interviewed with the RI. As hypothesized, the RI improved the discriminability of Reality Monitoring and Criteria‐Based Content Analysis over Free Recall. Honest responses were longer, and the RI increased the word count difference between honest and false statements. However, after correcting for word count, results were no longer significant, showing its importance for deception detection. Nonetheless, the RI increased verbal differences between truthtellers and liars, demonstrating that using the RI with verbal credibility assessment tools is a powerful combination for investigative interviewing.     

Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.