Canonical Categories in Flashbulb Memories

Recall of canonical categories has been widely used to measure flashbulb memory performance. However, these canonical categories are based on a single study and have been inconsistently used in the literature making comparisons across studies potentially problematic. The purpose of the present study was to provide further data toward determining the generality of canonical categories. We asked 135 participants to provide open‐ended narratives of how they first learned about three public events, one of which was also a personal event for some of the participants. Results showed that seven categories of information consisting of two new categories (others present and thought) in addition to the five identified by Brown and Kulik (place, informant, activity, own affect, and aftermath) accounted for most of the information in flashbulb memory narratives. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Flashbulb Memories for September 11th can be Preserved in Older Adults

Flashbulb memories (FMs) are vivid, long-lasting memories for the source of surprising, arousing news. Laboratory studies have consistently found that older adults, especially those with below-average frontal lobe (FL) function, are impaired in source memory relative to young. We tested memory for the source of news concerning the September 11th terrorist attacks in older adults with high or low frontal lobe function and in young people. We found no age differences in source memory a year after the event and no differences related to FL function. Flashbulb memories may be different from usual cases of source memory because of their emotional content, personal importance, or social relevance.     

Fading Affect Bias in the Philippines: Confirmation of the FAB in Positive and Negative Memories but Not for Death Memories

Emotions associated with memories for the loss of a loved one and for negative events in general decrease in intensity more than memories associated with positive events, a phenomenon known as the fading affect bias (FAB). We tested whether FAB was cross‐culturally evident by collecting positive, negative, and memories for the deaths of loved ones from Filipinos. Memories were coded as violent/nonviolent and resolved/unresolved, and we predicted that resolved memories should show greater fading and that affective details should be lower in those memory accounts. FAB analyses revealed that negative affective intensity faded while positive affect remained constant, supporting FAB for positive and negative memories. However, there was no evidence of FAB in Filipinos' death memories. Filipinos' positive memories were distributed from the period of the reminiscence bump and focused on themes of childbirth and marriage, while negative and death memories did not cluster at any period of life.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

远离苏格拉底

在西方哲学的谱系中,苏格拉底可谓哲学精神的典范和化身,备受后人景仰。本文以阿里斯托芬对苏格拉底的喜剧刻划作为切入点,指出了远离苏格拉底的警告实际上从苏格拉底生前就一直伴随着对苏格拉底及其哲学精神的崇拜。通过对柏拉图《会饮》文本细节的分析,文章表明了《会饮》这篇对话生动体现了日神精神和酒神精神的紧张和互动,同时强调了哲学的危险始终与其崇高相伴随。     

Let's Not Do Responsibility Skepticism

I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility-realist/retributivist criminal justice system – is generally compelling, it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this (highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility-skeptical beliefs and attitudes.     

We Do Not Count by Identity

It is widely assumed in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics that we count by identity. For example, to count the dogs by identity, we correlate each dog that isn't identical to the rest with a natural number, starting with one and assigning each successive dog the successive natural number. When we run out of distinct dogs, we've yielded a correct count. I argue that this model of counting is incorrect. We do not count by identity.     

Predictors of Accurate and Inaccurate Memories of Traumatic Events Experienced in Childhood

How likely is it that traumatic childhood events are misremembered or forgotten? Research on children′s recollections of painful or frightening medical procedures may help answer this question by identifying predictors of accurate versus inaccurate memory. In the present study, 46 3- to 10-year-old children were interviewed after undergoing a stressful medical procedure involving urethral catheterization. Age differences in memory emerged, especially when comparing 3- to 4-year-olds with older children. Children′s understanding of the event, parental communication and emotional support, and children′s own emotional reactions also predicted accuracy. Memory did not reliably vary for children who endured the medical procedure once versus multiple times. Results are discussed in relation to possible precursors of accurate and false memories, and forgetting, of traumatic events experienced in childhood.     

Do Not Revise Ockham's Razor Without Necessity

Ockham's razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2010: 313—our italics), for one, tells us that, ‘I think the proper rendering of Ockham's razor should be ‘Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity’’. Our aim, here, is to challenge such re‐workings of Ockham's razor.     

All Roads Do Not Lead to Rome

In commenting on Philip A. Ringstrom's paper I add a few caveats of my own regarding the comparison of intersubjective theories under consideration, then go on to take up some of the topics Ringstrom highlights including projective identification, mutual recognition, reified language, and analytic authority. The strength of Ringstrom's paper is to return us to the type of critical inquiry regarding comparative psychoanalysis that Mitchell made the hallmark of his own intellectual project.     

Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ‘Q and I don't believe that Q’ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).     

Resilience and Positive Emotions: Examining the Role of Emotional Memories

Abstract Resilience has been frequently associated with positive emotions, especially when experienced during taxing events. However, the psychological processes that might allow resilient individuals to self-generate those positive emotions have been mostly overlooked. In line with recent advances in memory research, we propose that emotional memories play an important role in the self-generation of positive emotions. The present research examined this hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 provided initial data on the validity and reliability of a measure of emotional memories networks (EMN) and showed that it had a predictive value for broad emotion regulation constructs and outcomes. In addition, Study 1 showed that positive EMN mediated the relationship between psychological resilience and the experience of positive emotions in a context of sadness, even after controlling for pre-experimental positive mood. Study 2 replicated results of Study 1 in a context of anxiety and after controlling for positive affectivity trait.