论孔子的天命、人性及政治价值依据

孔子对天命的理解和体认,是在对殷周时期对天的基本价值观批判继承与创造发展的基础上完成的;孔子的天命观,经历了一个由信仰、怀疑直至超越的历程,经历了由神学、道德天命观向带有自然倾向的天道观念转化的过程。在人性论上,孔子作为“人性”理论的首倡者,奠定了以后儒家思想中对人性问题叙述和理解的基调,奠定了中国传统思想中有关这一问题的基本框架,后来的孟子、荀子将人性问题从善恶两个方面做了极端性的发挥。本文指出,由于受殷周以来传统政治思维模式的影响,孔子把其天命论、人性论作为其思想体系的出发点和政治价值依据。如果说天命为孔子政治思想体系建构的外在价值依据,那么,人性则成为孔子政治思想体系建构的内在价值依据。孔子的思想体系正是寻找到了具有超越性的两大价值依据,因此,不但具有了超稳定的仁—礼政治结构模式,而且成为影响中国政治社会与政治文化的最重要的政治思想资源。     

论“殷周之变”与早期人文主义的缘起

一般认为,商周天命观之变革在于周人以道德之天、伦理之天取代殷商的命定之天与前伦理之天,从而确立了“明德慎罚”“敬天保民”的德治传统,表现出“人道主义”“人文精神”或者“道德人文主义”的特征。但事实上,“以德受命”“为政以德”可能是源自殷商的一贯传统,而非周人的创造。周人的贡献在于,否定任何氏族、王朝与天“有亲”的观念,将“德”作为天命转移的唯一依据。然而需要注意的是,尽管周人的天命观总体上呈现如上倾向,但并不意味着此后理性精神的高歌猛进与绝对胜利:一方面,道德性成为天命的主要特征;另一方面,西周的天命观仍带有“不完全理性”的成分,与天道“有亲”的观念通过其变形依然得以留存,甚至对春秋末期孔子的天命思想犹有影响。     

论孟子“义利之辨”展开的基础及其政治走向

孟子"义利之辨"的展开有赖于两大基础,一个是现实基础,另一个是理论基础。现实基础是,战国时期诸侯国之间进行大规模的兼并战争,各国的统治者都想快速扩张自己的经济实力和军事实力;理论基础是儒家的"心性论"和"天人论"。其中,孟子本人的心性论和天人论是核心理论。孟子"义利之辨"的最终政治走向是"仁政",也即"王道政治"。从义利之辨出发,孟子的王道政治侧重于"仁义"这个价值要求,忽略了根本的政治制度的设计和安排,无法对统治者做出有效的限制。正常的政治实践要求价值理性与工具理性应该达到一定程度的平衡,而不是顾此失彼。总而言之,虽然孟子的"义利之辨"可以从理论上推导出"王道政治",张扬价值理性,但是在现实的政治实践中往往会遇到诸多困难。     

情理、心性和理性——论先秦儒家道德理性的形成与特色

现代新儒家牟宗三以康德作为会通儒家与西方思想的桥梁,但是越来越多的人认识到,由于康德的实践理性思想完全否定情感在道德基础中的地位,相对而言,在道德哲学的基础方面,儒家道德思想与康德实践理性的共同点反而不及与休谟经验论和海德格尔的存在论的共同点多,彼此沟通的难度也更大。实际上,原始儒家道德思想的建构有其独特的路径,就是情理合一,其成熟形态则是孟子的心性论。从《性自命出》的"道始于情"而"终于义",经过《五行》篇"形于内"的探索,原始儒家道德思想发展为孟子的以四端说四德,性、心、情理合一,以心性论完成了情、理合一,成为儒家道德理性的典型形态,进而为工夫论奠定了内在基础。     

历史危机、人生信念与实践抉择——儒家性善论的发生学分析

性善论是儒家人伦文明的精神标志,但它既不是一种理论逻辑的推论,也不仅仅是一种抽象的思想主张或所谓应然追求。从发生学的角度看,它是殷周以来中国轴心时代的思想家之继起探索与人文追求的一种历史结晶。在这一过程中,首先是周公的"以德配天"并以制礼作乐的方式完成对殷商以来传统天命观的人伦落实,使中国文化彻底告别了外在信仰的形态,走上了以人伦文明落实天命信仰的道路。继起的孔子,又以个体之士的身份深叩礼乐之源,通过视听言动之内在性统一,将德性文化与礼乐文明凝结为一种君子人格及其人生信仰。到了子思与孟子,则一方面以"天命谓之性"明确肯定了人性的天命根源,同时又通过实践生活中的"大体"与"小体"之辨,将"天之所予"的道德善性直接落实于君子的日用常行之中,从而完成了对儒家人伦文明的一种信仰凝结与精神奠基。     

王岱舆的“天命有三品”论与儒家的天命观

王岱舆作为明末清初四教（儒、释、道、回）皆通的伊斯兰著名学者,他提出的“天命有三品”论,既适应了当时以儒家为主流文化的背景,也保持了其独特的伊斯兰性,在巧妙地处理与儒家天命观分歧的同时,又开放地拿儒家文化为己所用,从而为两种文明都赢得了宽松的环境,使得两种文明能够共存、共荣、共同发展。本文从王岱舆天命观与儒家天命观的介绍入手,分析其与儒家天命观的契合与分歧。     

孔子天命意识综论

孔子有极深刻的天命意识 :他注重对神的体验 ,认为神是现世道德的本源和保证。孔子天命意识解决了道德的本源问题 ,可以为道德实践的主体提供心理支持 ,并对芸芸众生 (尤其是最高阶层 )发挥规范作用。孔子天命意识的意义 ,还可以从与之关系密切的几个历史人物身上 ,得到说明 :屈原最终用经验事实 ,否定了天命佑助善良的观念 ,但是 ,屈原恰恰因为彻底拒绝神的眷顾 ,而承受了人间最大的凄凉和孤独 ;司马迁一方面流露了对天道疾恶向善观念的浓重困惑 ,一方面却坚持天命对道德的眷顾 ;王充明确论定天命与德行了无关联 ,但却并没有否定儒学天命观的独特价值 ,即“合于人事”。要之 ,不论是就理论与实践言 ,还是就历史与现实言 ,孔子天命意识均不容回避     

荀子乐论与儒家乐论传统

乐论是古代典籍中关于乐的论述,这种论述包含着关于文化艺术的理论视角和价值立场,以及关于政治、道德伦理与艺术文化之关系的探讨。以荀子乐论为代表的先秦儒家乐论旨在通过主体的艺术化生存在工具与价值、感性与理性之间建立一种平衡关系。乐之和张扬着乐之独特价值的同时与主体心性修养、政治和谐密切相关。儒家乐论传统在经历了汉代天人之学...     

孟子责善论面临的合理性挑战

围绕孟子的责善论,后世学者既有辩护、传承、创新和发展,也有批评、责难。作为处理父子这一特殊人际关系的学说,孟子的责善论自古以来引起了长久而又广泛的争议和驳难,面临三种合理性挑战:一是己他关系向度的合理性挑战,孟子说的"古者易子而教"并不像他所担忧的那样一定会造成双方关系恶化;二是血亲伦理向度的合理性挑战,孟子"父子之间不责善"的理念与儒家一贯主张的谏亲理念难以融洽,导致血缘亲情与道德理性难以统一、亲情伦理与社会伦理难以统一;三是孟子的"父子之间不责善"理念因担心直谏、义诤和厉言会损害父子仁爱亲情走向拒绝"父子责善",这与他的仁宅义路观念、与仁义礼智"四德"为人的类特质思想相冲突。     

儒家的道德价值自觉论探析

中国儒家哲学,极其重视道德价值的自觉。儒家道德价值自觉论的主要内涵是:其一,道德是天命所赋予,"畏天命"是道德价值自觉的前提;其二,道德是人性所固有,"知人性"是道德价值自觉的根据;其三,道德是"人为贵"的标志,"知自贵"是道德价值自觉的主体;其四,道德是一切价值的核心,"义而后取"是道德价值自觉的关键。儒家以天佑德、以性生德、以人立德、以取守德的道德价值自觉论具有天道与人道合一、实然与应然贯通、本体与主体互化的鲜明特征。     

实践的逻辑与哲学终结论的困境

以实践是一种具体、历史的现实生活为基础,把马克思意义上的哲学终结论解释为以具体、历史的分析取代抽象、超历史的形而上分析这种愈来愈被认可的说法,由于马克思仍然把需要、经济、理性、发展视为一般性、永恒性的东西,而需要重思。实际上,马克思在反旧形而上学之路上前进的距离不能过高估计。对实践的自悖性估计过低是马克思未能继续前进的根源。同时,在马克思主义理论中反对过分的专门化富有意义,但把哲学终结于社会批判理论中的马尔库塞式见解也会造成某种漠视。     

个体主义/集体主义的影响因素:生态视角

个体主义/集体主义是衡量文化的重要维度。两者的价值取向有所区别,前者关注自我的独特性,而后者关注自我与他人的关系。近年来研究者发现了众多影响个体主义/集体主义的新因素并构建了理论。这些理论中有4个理论非常具有代表性:现代化理论、气候-经济理论、传染病理论以及大米理论。其中后3个理论从远因的角度来对个体主义/集体主义的成因进行了探讨,为研究者探究个体主义/集体主义成因提供了新思路。未来个体主义/集体主义影响因素的研究可以用多种测量方法综合的方式或者从基因的角度来进行探索。     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

Human Community with a Shared Future,Shared Values of Humanity and New Model for Human Advancement

The building of a shared community requires enduring efforts. The human community with a shared future is the largest community of human society for nation-states so far, an inevitable result of globalization. In this era, globalization needs to be oriented at demolishing the false universality in the past and rebuild the genuine universality, which makes building a human community with a shared future constructively logical in contemporary globalization. The new universality is the shared values of humanity. In essence, the shared values of humanity are a “common good” formed by all nations for their common interests, common needs, and common development, which makes them a new universality. The emergence and formation of the shared values of humanity was developed naturally in the long term among the exchanges of all nations. From the perspective of the thinking mode, the shared values of humanity focus on the “communicative rationality” in the intersubjectivity of the countries and the nations instead of hegemonic rationality, while adhering to the consultative principle. From the perspective of the internal structure, the shared values of humanity unite the value of existence and development. Their fundamental connotation reveals that the shared values of humanity dialectically unite cultural commonness and particularity. Building a human community with a shared future and its core shared values has in fact proposed a new model for human advancement. The fundamental connotations of the new model for human advancement can be classified into three aspects: new cultural value, the new paradigm of civilization, and new cultural experience.     

Intrinsic Value as a Reason for the Preservation of Minority Cultures

In the Netherlands, the policy of supporting the efforts of ethnic-cultural minorities to express and preserve their cultural distinctiveness, is nowadays considered as problematic because it might interfere with their integration into the wider society. The primary aim is now to reduce these groups' unemployment rate and to stimulate their participation in the wider society. In this article I consider how the notion of the intrinsic value of cultures, if sensible, might affect the policy regarding ethnic-cultural minorities. I develop a theory of intrinsic value of culture, as an analogy of the theory of intrinsic value of non-human natural entities. My conclusion is that the dominant cultural group in the Netherlands should preserve clearly deviant minority cultures which have considerable intrinsic value.     

Confucius�� transformation of traditional religious ideas

Confucius’ religious thought summarized and utilized existing historical and cultural achievements. He strove to bring problems concerning traditional religious ideas such as destiny, the spirits, ritual propriety and faith into the realm of the rational. He sought to unearth the elements of human reason contained within these and to highlight the sublime and sacred in actual human society. He established a system of religious humanism that incorporated views on edification, faith, destiny, the ghosts and spirits and self-cultivation. Using a dialectic based on the mean, he established a spiritual mindset comprising rational faith, a this-worldly transcendence and a sacredness grounded in the human that led ancient Chinese religious thinking in a unique direction.     

Extending the Dynamics of Reason

What I call the dynamics of reason is a post-Kuhnian approach to the history and philosophy of science articulating a relativized and historicized version of the Kantian conception of the rationality and objectivity of the modern physical sciences. I here discuss two extensions of this approach. I argue that, although the relativized standards of rationality in question change over time, the particular way in which they do this still preserves the trans-historical rationality of the entire process. I also make a beginning in extending my historical narrative from purely intellectual history (both philosophical and scientific) to the wider cultural context.     

意见收敛定理与休谟问题

意见收敛定理是主观主义概率论的一条重要定理,它表明随着证据的增加,验前概率的主观性将被验后概率的客观性所代替。意见收敛定理被看作主观概率的动态合理性原则,因而被用来解决休谟问题,即归纳合理性问题。然而,哈金有说服力地表明,意见收敛定理证明的是条件概率Pr（h／e）的收敛,而不是验后概率Pre（h）的收敛。主观主义概率论暗中接受的一个等式是：Pre（h）=Pr（h／e）,通常称之为“条件化规则”。这样,归纳法的合理性问题变成条件化规则的合理性问题。为此,本文提出一个新的合理性原则,即“最少初始概率原则”,将它同“局部合理性”观念结合起来便可为条件化规则的合理性加以辩护。     

《易传》人性论探微

对<系辞>等传中论及人性及其与天道之关系的文字,古今学者的理解各有心得.作者认为,行<系辞>论性语义为一阴一阳的运行变化称之为道,人从天道变化中得到了善,人性使天道赋予人的这种善得到了完成和显现.并且认为,<易传>、<中庸>、<孟子>实际都是认为"性自命出,命从天降"的,都是在人性与天道有一致性的意义上肯定人性善的,故否定<易传>有性善论,以为<易>、<庸>、<孟>的人性说致思路数不同的观点,都是不合实际的.作者又认为,将天道赋予人道正义的意义又返而以支撑人道原则,自<易传>已然,宋儒的天道性命学说与此是一脉相承的,故否定理学与先秦儒学的联系也是不合事实的.作者还认为,中国古代思想家宣扬性善论的主题是弘扬理性,强化人们对人道的自觉与自信,其中凝聚的积极善良的正气,乃是我们民族文化的元神.     

Two minds rationality

I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore driven entirely by repeating behaviours which succeeded in the past. The new mind, however, permits the solution of novel problems by reasoning about the future, enabling consequential decision making. I suggest that the concept of epistemic rationality—striving for true knowledge—can only usefully be applied to the new mind with its access to explicit knowledge and beliefs. I also suggest that we commonly interpret behaviour as irrational when the old mind conflicts with the new and frustrates the goals of the conscious person.