道德市场的合理性及其存在论基础

西方市民社会的经济理论和文化观曾为道德和市场的二元分裂提供理论支持,企业活动的非道德性似乎在经济与市场活动中得到确证.但是,随着现当代经济实践活动中面临的各种伦理问题,道德市场的合理性与建构已成为经济学家和哲学家探讨的重大课题.鲍曼论证了企业作为道德人比作为自利的"经济人"更能理想地实现自己的效用.这一观点得到现代博弈论的进一步论证;而马克思从人的本真性存在为道德市场的合理性提供了存在论基础.     

道德经济:当代经济伦理学研究的应有主题

兴起于20世纪90年代的道德经济是在企业社会责任思潮和消费者对企业社会目标的期待的双重推动之下而兴起和发展的,社会企业的蓬勃发展是其兴起和发展的典型表征。以研究人们经济活动中的伦理道德问题为宗旨的经济伦理学应该把道德经济纳入其中并赋以主题地位,而道德经济也可以展现经济伦理学为经济发展创设价值目标的学科价值,丰富它的研究内容,为它合理指导经济决策提供新思路,从而构成经济伦理学现实化的实践平台。与社会学、人类学、历史学不同的是,经济伦理学研究道德经济建立在经济主体是"经济人"与"道德人"相统一的理论假设之上,以历史唯物主义方法和价值分析法研究道德经济。     

经济人思想:经济伦理学的理论基石

作为是古典经济学宝贵遗产中最重要部分的"经济人"思想,在经历了不断的被批评和被修正以后得到了进一步完善."经济人"思想之所以成为经济伦理学的理论基石,在于它实事求地回答了市场体制之下驱动人的行为的动机和经济活动为什么应遵循一定的伦理规则这一根本性问题.因此,经济伦理学的理论建构必须以"经济人"思想为立论的前提和基础.     

机会成本与道德的关系探微

"机会成本"作为影响市场资源配置效率与经济绩效的重要因素,是现代经济学中日益受到关注与重视的一个重要概念。机会成本除了受资源的稀缺性、多用途性、自由流动性、市场主体的经济判断能力等因素影响外,与市场主体的道德境界、价值取向及其道德品行密切相关。机会成本与道德是两个紧密关联的变量元素,道德是自变量,机会成本是因变量。虽然在社会实践中市场主体的道德性对机会成本及其企业绩效的影响力日渐凸显,但学界对二者关系的研究还处于分散的初始阶段。有鉴于此,在对机会成本概念疏义的基础上,对交易成本与道德的正相关性和负相关性进行全面的梳理与条陈并构建机会成本与道德协调发展的社会机制,具有重要的理论与实践价值。     

经济伦理视阈中的卓越价值观

"追求卓越"是对当代经济活动具有深远影响的经济伦理价值观.其基本含义是经济主体必须把经济绩效与伦理道德两者统合起来,在优异的经济绩效基础上去谋求优秀的道德表现,强调的是经济主体要具备经济关德,通过市场有规划地做好事.伦理道德并不是经济绩效的绊脚石,而是所有追求优秀业绩的经营者们的必备素质.作为一种经济伦理,卓越包含着人是目的的理念、健全的责任意识、超越法律追求道德的观念、自律意识、服务意识、竞舍意识、可持续发展现等思想,具有功利价值与道义价值统一、工具理性与实质理性共融、人际伦理与生态伦理并重、普遍伦理与地方智慧结合等特点.     

试论经济人的道德

西方古典经济学认为 ,经济人的利己行为通过市场可以转化为道德行为。然而二百多年的经济实践并未证实这一理论 ,其根本的问题在于经济人的利他并不是道德意义上的利他。加强经济人的道德建设 ,是完善社会主义市场经济的迫切要求     

冲破经济人与道德人的困厄──评《经济人与道德人》一书

由李权时、章海山等撰写的《经济人与道德人》一书（人民出版社1995年出版）是有关道德与经济关系理论研究的一部有特色的、开拓性的著作。我国正处于从计划体制向市场体制的转型时期,各方面都发生了巨大变化,经济活动正日益成为社会生活的主导,各种利益关系重新分化组合,道德领域也出现了非常复杂的情况。有关道德的现实研究和理论探讨,已成为我国学术界关注的一个热点,也成为理论工作者应担负的一项重要社会职责。该书就是带着鲜明的现实性和强烈的责任感,开展这一研究的。根据我国社会历史及文化传统,这本书将社会转型期道德问题…     

全球性道德危机与道德重建——麦金泰尔道德哲学意蕴

作为当代西方道德伦理学家的麦金太尔,一直以来都关注着社会伦理道德理论研究与现实状况：本文正是对其在道德危机领域的研究做了简单的梳理,对其关于当今全球性道德危机产生的根源及其重建进行了归纳与概括,     

当前我国医患关系矛盾的原因与对策分析——对"经济人"假设的反思

从时代语境出发,对制约医患关系的"经济人"假设加以反思.指出"经济人"假设对人"自利"性的强调以悬置伦理道德属性为代价,决定了该假设不适宜作为具有"利他"性质的医患关系的指导价值观.当前医患矛盾的根源在于"经济人"假设不恰当地泛化应用.最后提出构建和谐医患关系的几点策略.     

试论和谐社会中传统伦理道德的现代意蕴

中华民族是一个历史悠久的优秀民族,在长期发展中形成的传统伦理道德是国家和民族的宝贵精神财富,对社会的发展产生了深远的影响。构建社会主义和谐社会,离不开对中国传统伦理道德的扬弃,应以优秀的传统道德架构为基础,提高全民族的道德水平,促进当代社会文明的进步和发展,这样才能建立起中国特色的基础坚实的现代和谐社会。     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.