Philosophical Works as Objects of Aesthetic Judgment

This paper draws attention to the fact that works of philosophy are often judged by aesthetic criteria. This raises the question of whether philosophical writings may properly be regarded as suitable objects of aesthetic judgement in a strong sense; namely, that judging their worth qua works of philosophy is an aesthetic endeavour. The paper argues in the affirmative with the aid of a Kantian account of aesthetic judgement. Judging a work of philosophy by the means chosen may be regarded as subjecting it to criticism by criteria established within a philosophical aesthetic.     

Communication of Confidence as a Determinant of Group Judgment Accuracy

The performance of interacting groups is often viewed as a function of the groups' ability to identify and weight their better members' judgments (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977). Accurate identification of the best group member is facilitated by individuals accurately assessing confidence in their own individual judgments and accurately communicating their confidence during group interaction (Sniezek & Henry, 1989). This paper examines the communication of confidence in interacting groups in two ways: by observing the performance of interacting groups for which confidence is anticipated to be communicated with high accuracy, and by observing the effects of changes in the group interaction setting that vary group members' ability to communicate confidence. This is achieved by examining the performance of a special type of interacting group, a laboratory financial market, that encourages relatively accurate communication of confidence and that can be modified to manipulate the extent to which confidence can be communicated. Results reveal generally high performance of groups which interact in settings that are conducive to communication of confidence, and significant learning from the interaction process by all group members (including the best member). Results also indicate a significant decrease in the performance of groups whose ability to communicate confidence during interaction is reduced.     

Moral Judgment as a Predictor of Enjoyment of Crime Drama

The goal of the study is to better understand the relationship between factors involved in moral judgment of entertainment and the enjoyment of crime drama. After completing numerous social-justice measures, the 139 participants viewed one of two clips from a crime-punishment movie and then responded to survey items regarding their enjoyment of the clip. The clips differed in the type of crime presented. It was predicted that the different crimes would elicit different levels of moral judgment about the punishments for those crimes, which would then impact enjoyment. Although the levels of enjoyment reported for the two clips were similar, enjoyment was predicted by different factors of moral judgment in each condition, as predicted. The results lend further support to disposition theory and the integrated model of crime-drama enjoyment, as well as identify factors of moral reasoning that consistently serve as predictors of crime-drama enjoyment.     

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.     

Meaning in Life as a Subjective Judgment and a Lived Experience

Meaning in life has long been recognized as a central dilemma of human life. In this article, we review some of the challenges of studying meaning in life from the perspective of social psychology. We draw on the diary of Etty Hillesum, a young woman who was killed in Auschwitz, to argue for the relevance of current empirical approaches to meaning in life. We review evidence suggesting that meaning in life is an important variable in the psychology of human functioning while also acknowledging that there is no consensus definition for the construct. Drawing on Hillesum's diary and our research, we argue for the importance of considering meaning in life as the outcome of a subjective judgment process. We then review research showing the strong relationship between positive mood and meaning in life and suggest that such a relationship is born out in the phenomenology of meaning in life.     

Motivated Strategies for Judgment: How Preferences for Particular Judgment Processes can Affect Judgment Outcomes

Beyond motivations to achieve particular outcomes, people also have motivations to use particular strategies while pursuing these outcomes. This article integrates research on the latter strategic preferences and discusses the place of such research in the broader investigation of motivated thinking. A review of studies examining the strategic preferences stemming from both motivations for promotion versus prevention ( Higgins, 1997 ) and motivations for locomotion versus assessment ( Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003 ) illustrates that these preferences have unique effects on basic processes of judgment, including the evaluation of alternative hypotheses or counterfactuals, the prioritization of fast versus accurate information processing, and the recall and activation of knowledge from memory. Moreover, this review also demonstrates important interactions between strategic preferences and outcome preferences. Strategic preferences thus appear to make distinct and important contributions to understanding how motivation influences judgment and should feature prominently in general analyses of motivated thinking.     

知觉的主动性与主动综合——对胡塞尔判断发生学的一个考察

在知觉的被动性阶段,自我还停留在一种被动的存在信念之中,即相信有某个东西存在着。但是自我并不满足于这种素朴的存在信念,它还试图采取进一步的行动来获得关于这个对象"是什么"以及"怎么样"的知识,试图全面地把握这个对象的内在性质和外部关系。这就迫使自我从知觉的被动性阶段前进到知觉的主动性阶段。知觉的"主动性"就是自我通过对一个对象的积极主动的观察,利用范畴形式将所观察到的内容进行主动的综合统一,构成作为知识的最基本形态的述谓判断"S是P"。通过对最原始的基底对象"S"的连续的判断,就构成了关于S的一个"意义的历史"。科学就是由"诸意义的历史"所构成的一个"总的意义的历史"。我们人所生存于其中的这个科学世界实际上就是一个充满了"意义的历史"的世界。     

An Examination of Information Quality as a Moderator of Accurate Personality Judgment

Information quality is an important moderator of the accuracy of personality judgment, and this article describes research focusing on how specific kinds of information are related to accuracy. In this study, 228 participants (159 female, 69 male; mean age = 23.43; 86.4% Caucasian) in unacquainted dyads were assigned to discuss thoughts and feelings, discuss behaviors, or engage in behaviors. Interactions lasted 25–30 min, and participants provided ratings of their partners and themselves following the interaction on the Big Five traits, ego‐control, and ego‐resiliency. Next, the amount of different types of information made available by each participant was objectively coded. The accuracy criterion, composed of self‐ and acquaintance ratings, was used to assess distinctive and normative accuracy using the Social Accuracy Model. Participants in the discussion conditions achieved higher distinctive accuracy than participants who engaged in behaviors, but normative accuracy did not differ across conditions. Information about specific behaviors and general behaviors were among the most consistent predictors of higher distinctive accuracy. Normative accuracy was more likely to decrease than increase when higher‐quality information was available. Verbal information about behaviors is the most useful for learning about how people are unique.     

Goals as Determinants of Nonlinear Noncompensatory Judgment Strategies: Leniency vs Strictness

A distinction is made between information processing variables and goals as determinants of nonlinear noncompensatory judgment strategies. The latter determinants are studied by manipulating judges′ goals to be lenient or strict in their judgment and examining the effects of these manipulations on the tendency to use disjunctive, conjunctive, or linear strategies. Implications for decision-making research are discussed.     

Responsibility and Judgment

I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View (JRV). According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability‐relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought.     

Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

Judgment in Fiction

Abstract

In this paper, I show that in order to gain an understanding of the facts about fiction it is more fruitful to pursue an analysis of judgment in fiction than an analysis of truth in fiction. I do so in two steps. First I take the analyses of truth in fiction which David Lewis provides in “Truth in Fiction”, which are formulated in terms of possible worlds, and provide counterpart analyses of judgment in fiction, formulated in terms of (mental) models and rules for the construction of (mental) models. In the course of discussion I identify various problems for Lewis’s account of truth in fiction and solve or dissolve them using the account of judgment in fiction. Second, I show that once we have an analysis of judgment which appeals to rules, we can extend the account of judgment by using Lewis’s account of accommodation and resistance in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” to explain the evolution of the genres of fiction, construed as systems of rules. The result is to provide a dynamic account of judgment which does justice to modern poststructuralist observations in the philosophy of literature.