影响9点问题解决的关键行为

在已有研究的基础上,作者提出划出第三条线是解决9点问题关键行为的假设,并设计了三个实验来验证假设.结果表明:任意两条线的提示训练使9点问题的解决率接近或达到100%,因而,提示两条线不能被看成是解决9点问题的关键行为;而提示划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显高于提示其它任何一条线训练的效果,可以被认为是解决9点问题的关键行为;能够引导被试划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显提高.     

Representing and Solving Arithmetic Word Problems: A Study of Developmental Interaction

This study investigated the developmental relationship between children's mental representations of the arithmetic change problem structure (the change problem schema) and their use of part-whole strategies to solve change problems. Two hypotheses were contrasted. The first suggests that part-whole knowledge is a prerequisite for the development of the change problem schema. The second suggests that the change problem schema provides a framework for the development of part-whole knowledge. Part-whole knowledge was inferred from children's abilities to solve the most difficult type of change problem, that with start set unknown. The change problem schema was inferred from children's abilities to anticipate completion of the "how many?" question when given all information about the problem except the question. Only children who used part-whole strategies performed at greater than chance levels on the question generation measure. Part-whole knowledge, therefore, was seen as a prerequisite for the change problem schema.     

A Concurrent (Versus Stage) Model for Conceptualizing and Representing the Counseling Process

The counseling process is presented both conceptually and visually as a collection of activities occurring simultaneously in varying degrees. This concurrent model differs from traditional discrete, sequential-stage representations because it is more complex and less disjointed. The model better represents actual counselor-client interactions, overcoming the shortcomings expressed by others regarding their own models. The concurrent model is more inclusive and integrated, yet flexible, and is discussed as a potential aid for training, supervision, practice, and research. A case example is included, which highlights the utility of the concurrent model in understanding the counseling process.     

不同自尊的大学生防御方式及其人际冲突解决方式的比较研究

本研究试图结合自尊这一人格因素来探讨大学生的防御方式及日常人际冲突解决方式,对自尊的划分除传统的高、低自尊外,还把高自尊细分为防御性高自尊和真正性高自尊。结果表明不同水平上自尊的个体在以上两方面都存在一定的差异,防御性高自尊和真正性高自尊的个体仅在一些防御机制上存在差异,在人际冲突解决方式上不存在差异,而在这一点上与国外类似研究结果不同。     

Reasoning and Representing

I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content.     

Representing causation

The dynamics model, which is based on L. Talmy's (1988) theory of force dynamics, characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1-3 showed that causal judgments are based on several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between causation and time are discussed.     

Representing AIDS

AIDS has contributed to changes in how our society constructs its image of death. In the early 1980s Philippe Ariès argued that death and the symbols surrounding it had been “relegated to the secret, private space of the home or the hospital.” With the coming of AIDS, death demands its place in the public mind - and eye. Many artists have devoted their talents to making AIDS visible. In doing so, they have resurrected many questions about sexuality and mortality. This paper discusses several examples of current AIDS art and places them in a wider cultural and historical context.     

Locating and Representing Pain

Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show that one can be in pain while not having anything wrong in her body. Pain bodily location, then, would be illusory. I this paper I shall defend the representational thesis by presenting an argument against experientialism while conceding that the appearance/reality distinction collapses. A crucial role in such identification is played by deictics. In reporting that we feel pain here, the deictic directly refers to the bodily part as coinciding with the part as represented. So, pain location is not illusory. The upshot is that the body location is part and parcel of the representational content of pain states, a representation build up from the body map.     

Representing Bodies

According to the bodily awareness thesis (BAT), awareness of one's own body is a necessary condition for the acquisition and possession of concepts of primary qualities such as force and shape. I discuss two arguments for this thesis. The acquisition argument for BAT focuses on the role of bodily sensation and action in the acquisition of the concept of force. I suggest that this argument requires us to conceive of the content of sensation as both representational and non–conceptual. The objective reality argument for BAT claims that awareness of one's own body is an essential component of those experiences which are required for a proper grasp of concepts of primary qualities. I conclude by arguing, in opposition to Sartre and Merleau–Ponty, that there is no incoherence in the idea that one's body is a thing among other things.     

Intentions and Causes, Actions and Right Actions

I argue in this essay that belief/desire explanations are not logically true and not causal, and further that the antecedent of a true belief/desire conditional cannot be strengthened in such a way as to transform it into a true causal statement. I also argue that belief/desire explanations are not dispensable: they are presupposed in our justifications of scientific claims. The proposal is not that psychological determinism is false, but that some at least of our activities are not describable in causal terms. These arguments prepare the ground for a puzzle. If all human intentional behaviour is caused, then all actual linkages between psychological states and behaviour should be expressed in causal statements. But neither the action of asserting a causal statement nor the action of justifying the assertion can be described as the result of a cause. Therefore if one accepts that scientific claims can be justified, not all linkages between psychological states and subsequent action are expressible in causal statements. I do not offer a solution to this puzzle.     

Representing serial action and perception

This article presents a review on the representational base of sequence learning in the serial reaction time task. The first part of the article addresses the major questions and challenges that underlie the debate on implicit and explicit learning. In the second part, the informational content that underlies sequence representations is reviewed. The latter issue has produced a rich and equivocal literature. A taxonomy illustrates that substantial support exists for associations between successive stimulus features, between successive response features, and between successive response-to-stimulus compounds. We suggest that sequence learning is not predetermined with respect to one particular type of information but, rather, develops according to an overall principle of activation contingent on task characteristics. Moreover, substantiating such an integrative approach is proposed by a synthesis with the dual-system model (Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003).     

Representing auditory space

Ontario Institute for Studtes tn Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada M5S 1 V6 Auditory space has been characterized as an entity without bound or dimension, as opposed to visual space which is limited in three dimensions. While there is evidence that visual space may be represented mentally in terms of contrastive values on these dimensions, no evidence exists concerning the representation of auditory space. Two experiments used an auditory Stroop-like task to investigate (1) whether the linguistic code for auditory space is comprised of component dimensions as in vision or whether it is unitary, and (2) whether auditory space can also be encoded in a nonlinguistic fashion. Subjects were required to respond to the spatial location of a locative term whose meaning could be congruent, incongruent, or neutral with respect to its location. The findings pointed to the conclusion that when subjects are encouraged to code auditory space linguistically, the code is an undifferentiated symbol or name. Furthermore, some tentative evidence existed that auditory space may also be encoded in a nonlinguistic manner.     

Representing God's Presence

The article tackles two myths: the modern myth that God has vanished from human life, and the religious myth that the apostles, patriarchs, mystics and martyrs were in a more privileged position vis-´-vis God than we are. Dalferth argues that God has never been more present than today, has never been less hidden than today, and develops the thessis that the importance of God being present is central to the Christian understanding of God. Christian faith is faith in a present reality, not a set of beliefs about past events. The implications of this for the task of Christian communication are clear: the prime interest of Christian communication is to help those to whom it is addressed to develop a sense of the presence of God.     

Representing properties locally

Theories of knowledge such as feature lists, semantic networks, and localist neural nets typically use a single global symbol to represent a property that occurs in multiple concepts. Thus, a global symbol represents mane across HORSE, PONY, and LION. Alternatively, perceptual theories of knowledge, as well as distributed representational systems, assume that properties take different local forms in different concepts. Thus, different local forms of mane exist for HORSE, PONY, and LION, each capturing the specific form that mane takes in its respective concept. Three experiments used the property verification task to assess whether properties are represented globally or locally (e.g., Does a PONY have mane?). If a single global form represents a property, then verifying it in any concept should increase its accessibility and speed its verification later in any other concept. Verifying mane for PONY should benefit as much from having verified mane for LION earlier as from verifying mane for HORSE. If properties are represented locally, however, verifying a property should only benefit from verifying a similar form earlier. Verifying mane for PONY should only benefit from verifying mane for HORSE, not from verifying mane for LION. Findings from three experiments strongly supported local property representation and ruled out the interpretation that object similarity was responsible (e.g., the greater overall similarity between HORSE and PONY than between LION and PONY). The findings further suggest that property representation and verification are complicated phenomena, grounded in sensory-motor simulations.     

Religions and Conflicts

Many believe that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is not compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true. I argue that this ‘incompatibility problem’ (IP) is grounded in a ‘naturalistic assumption’ (NA), that is, the assumption that every subject, including religion, should be treated without taking into account that a super-natural being may exist and reveal to us an unexpected way to deal with our experience. I then argue that in matters of religion, NA is untenable and that its very opposite, which I call ‘super-naturalistic assumption’ (SA), should be adopted. My thesis is that, once SA is adopted, IP can be dismissed and that it is plausible to maintain that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true.