Economics and technological change: An evolutionary epistemological inquiry

The failure of neoclassical economic theories to explain the nature and significance of the phenomenon of technological change is critically looked at in this article. Although there are numerous excellent works in the literature on technological change that criticize the inadequacy of neoclassical economists’ approach to this phenomenon, my objective, however, is to open a new discourse on technological change by emphasizing the epistemological significance of technology. It is argued that the concept of technology as essentially a process of knowledge created for doing things and solving problems, and technological change as essentially a process of knowledge change occurring within the contexts of the political economic and social constructivist frameworks that inform the dynamics of this essentially qualitative process can address this failure. Empirically based analytical methodologies may be able to measure the impact of technological change, an evolutionary epistemology of technological change may be better equipped to understand and explain this phenomenon. He has previously taught at Illinois Institute of Technology and Virginia Tech. An earlier version of this paper was presented in a seminar to the Industrial Policy Management Group at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad on November 2, 1992. Thanks are due to Steve Fuller for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

An epistemological problem for evolutionary psychology

This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain‐specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain‐general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain‐specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will be argued, are such as to deny us epistemic capacities that evolutionary psychology presupposes in its pursuit of an objective, comprehensive account of human nature.     

Evolution and learning: An epistemological perspective

The deep formal and conceptual link existing between artificial life and artificial intelligence can be highlighted using conceptual tools derived by Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Starting from the observation that the structure itself of an organism embodies knowledge about the environment which it is adapted to, it is possible to regard evolution as a learning process. This process is subject to the same rules indicated by Popper for the growth of scientific knowledge: causal conjectures (mutations) and successive refutations (extinction). In the field of machine learning such a paradigm is represented by genetic algorithms that, simulating biological processes, emulate cognitive processes. From a practical viewpoint, that perspective allows to identify the two different kinds of learning considered by artificial intelligence, knowledge acquisition and skill improvement, and to get a different view of the problem of heuristic knowledge in learning systems. From a theoretical point of view, these considerations can shade a new light on an old epistemological problem: why do we live in a learnable world?     

The outlook for policy-making: An epistemological perspective

Improving the quality of public policy-making is a matter of great importance for nearly everyone. Significant improvements, however, require major (and unlikely?) changes in the epistemological foundations accepted by social inquirers—changes that make possible a conception of “policy” that can be used to achieve real world purposes reliably. A theory of knowledge adequate for that purpose is outlined, and some of its major implications for inquiry (and for policy-making) are explored very briefly.     

The observing subject and psychophysiological research: An epistemological discourse

Realizing that scientific knowledge was not based on a simple disclosure of reality, but was rather invented and developed in accordance with our own conceptions and prejudices, it should no longer be possible to consider matters as if they existed independently of us out there.Taking as examples the notions of memory and information we try to elucidate the relevance this perspective has with respect to neuro- and psychophysiological research.     

An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge

Gossip has been the object of a number of different studies in the past 50 years, rehabilitating it not only as something worth being studied, but also as a pivotal informational and social structure of human cognition: Dunbar (Rev Gen Psychol 8(2):100–110, 2004) interestingly linked the emergence of language to nothing less than its ability to afford gossip. Different facets of gossip were analyzed by anthropologists, linguists, psychologists and philosophers, but few attempts were made to frame gossip within an epistemological framework (for instance Ayim in (Good gossip, pp. 85–99, 1994)). Our intention in this paper is to provide a consistent epistemological (applied and social) account of gossip, understood as broadly evaluative talk between two or more people, comfortably acquainted between each other, about an absent third party they are both at least acquainted with. Hence, relying on the most recent multidisciplinary literature about the topic, the first part of this paper will concern the epistemic dynamics of gossip: whereas the sociobiological tradition individuates in gossip the clue for the (theoretically cumbersome) group mind and group-level adaptations Wilson et al. (The evolution of cognition, pp. 347–365, 2002), we will suggest the more parsimonious modeling of gossip as a soft-assembled epistemic synergy, understood as a function-dominant interaction able to project a higher organizational level—in our case, the group as group-of-gossips. We will argue that the aim of this synergy is indeed to update a Knowledge Base of social information between the group (as a projected whole) and its members. The second and third part will instead focus on the epistemological labeling of the inferences characterizing gossip: our contention is that the ever-present moral/evaluative dimension in gossip—be it tacit or explicit, concerning the objects or the partners of gossip—is best analyzed through the epistemological framework of abduction. Consequently, we will suggest that a significant role of gossip is to function as a group-based abductive appraisal of social matter, enacted at various levels.     

An epistemological history of time: From technology to representations

Abstract

This paper attempts to link the social history of the mechanization of time with the history of the psychological notion of time. Historical processes such as the mechanization of tower clocks from the Middle Ages onwards, the reform of the Gregorian calendar and the quarrel of the Christian and Chinese calendars characterized the modern representation of time on three points: isochrony, desacralization and abstraction. While Western societies learned to domesticate the practical aspects of time, the scholars of the Enlightenment naturalized time. They considered it a concept only related to man and used quantified time for scientific purposes. Empiricists saw time as a product of the succession of thought while idealists considered it a form necessary for the human experience to occur. Both trends agreed in removing time from nature and accepted isochrony, desaralization and abstraction as the necessary foundation for the modern notion of time.     

Developmental-behavioral initiation of evolutionary change

The traditional approach to evolutionary psychology relies entirely on natural selection as the cause of the evolution of adaptations. Exclusive reliance on natural selection overlooks the fact that changes in development are a necessary prerequisite for evolutionary change. These developmental changes provide the material for natural selection to work on. In the neo-Darwinian scenario, the mechanisms of evolution are mutation or genetic recombination, selection, migration, and eventual reproductive isolation. In the spirit of evolutionary pluralism, the author describes a different 3-stage scenario in which migration (the invasion of new niches or habitats) may occur without mutation or genetic recombination and selection first initiating a change in genes or gene frequencies.     

Abduction and metaphor: An inquiry into common cognitive mechanism

Abduction and metaphor are two significant concepts in cognitive science. It is found that the both mental processes are on the basis of certain similarity. The similarity inspires us to seek the answers to the following two questions: (1) Whether there is a common cognitive mechanism behind abduction and metaphor? And (2) if there is, whether this common mechanism could be interpreted within the unified frame of modern intelligence theory? Centering on these two issues, the paper attempts to characterize and interpret the generation and evolution of scientific metaphors from the perspective of the cognitive mechanism of abductive inference. Then it interprets the common cognitive mechanism behind abduction and metaphor within Hawkins’ frame of intelligence theory. The commonality between abduction and metaphor indicates the potential to further explore human intelligence.     

Child mortality and parental grief: An evolutionary analysis

Across most of human history, infant and child mortality rates were very high, suggesting the death of a child was a challenge faced by many ancestral parents. Prolonged grief likely harmed grievers’ fitness, yet grief is ubiquitous and often protracted, thereby presenting a puzzle for evolutionary arguments. We integrate existing theories of grief with patterns of parental bereavement to examine how human psychology has been shaped to respond to the death of a child. We contend that variation in life history strategy may explain the relative difficulty with which individuals recover from losing a child. We propose that the same physiological mechanisms underlying detachment and grief during dissolved romantic relationships may also underlie the intensity of parental attachment and bereavement. This theoretical review thus integrates evolutionary theory with extant grief research to provide a functional analysis of the immense suffering associated with the loss of a child.     

Religious and epistemological mysteries

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation

My primary goal in this paper is to focus attention on a certain conception of internal access, on the Cartesian conception that a rational subject's capacity to determine sameness and difference in explicit propositional attitudes is independent of knowledge of the external world. This conception of introspection plays a crucial, if unacknowledged, role in numerous arguments and theoretical positions. In particular, it plays a large role in motivating psychological internalism. I argue in favor of rejecting this epistemology and the internalism it supports.