Some comments on the distinction between intention and intentionality

The topic of intention has recently received attention from behavior analysts (Hineline, 2003; Neuman, 2004). From a behavior-analytic perspective, it is important to identify the circumstances in which people utter such terms, and to identify the potential circumstances that maintain such utterances. It follows that from a behavior-analytic perspective, the focus is primarily on those who observe behavior and attribute intentions to that behavior. However, there has not been a distinction between intention and intentionality. The current analysis stresses the distinction between the two terms, both from a traditional point of view (psychologist and layperson) and from a behavior-analytic point of view. From a behavior analyst's perspective, the distinction is important because observers may be responding to distinct functional relations when they attribute intention or intentionality to behavior.     

An ER-fMRI investigation of morphological inflection in German reveals that the brain makes a distinction between regular and irregular forms

The hypothesis that morphological processing is supported by a mental dictionary of stored entries plus a set of mental computations based on rules is examined using event-related fMRI. If a rules-plus-memory model () reflects the actual organization of the language faculty, two distinct patterns of brain activation should be observed for production of German irregular and regular noun and verb inflections. If a connectionist alternative to the rules-and-memory model (, and many others since), which seeks to explain the production of both irregular and regular forms within a single associative memory mechanism, is correct, there should be no neural differentiation between German regular and irregular inflection. The results we report support the existence of substantially differing patterns of activation for regulars vs. irregulars, an outcome that is consistent with the two-component rules-plus-memory account.     

"Square-wave stimuli" and neonatal auditory behavior: some comments on Ashton (1971), Hutt el al. (1968) and Lenard et al. (1969)

Recent work reporting neonatal auditory responses to complex tones generated by applying electrical square-wave stimuli to loudspeakers is reviewed with reference to the nature of the acoustic stimulus. Attention is particularly drawn to the harmonic structure of such tones in relation to the nonlinear frequency response of small loudspeakers. A $\text{1}\text{3}\text{-}\text{octave}$ band analysis of some “square-wave tones” is given to illustrate the difficulties of interpreting the results of work using such complex stimuli. The findings of the previous studies are ascribed essentially to differences in the stimulus bandwidth, rather than to differences in audiofrequency, and difficulties apparently generated by using differences in stimulus bandwidth as the sole explanation are at least partially resolved.     

The level-style of creativity distinction: comments on a recent comparison of two measures of creativity style

A recent article published in this journal made a contribution to our understanding of the relationships between two measures of creativity style. The authors interpreted their results and made a few statements that made a subtle, yet substantial link between the styles measured by the assessments and creative abilities. The purpose of this commentary is to point out a more general concern relating to keeping these constructs distinct and then using clear measures to help increase our understanding and appreciation of diverse styles of creativity and how they contribute to improving creative abilities. Even those researchers who attempt to clarify the differences can slip into using language that conflates style with level.     

The distinction between desires and intentions

Within attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and intentions, and we articulate three main criteria, perceived performability, action‐connectedness, and temporal framing, that differentiate between the two constructs. Two studies are reported to test the distinction. Study 1 (n = 188) revealed that desires, compared to intentions, are less performable, are less connected to actions, and are enacted over longer time frames. Study 2 (n = 249) showed, among other things, that the perceived feasibility for actions that are desired and intended is higher than for those that are only desired, but only when the action refers to relatively short time frames (i.e. 1 week or 4 weeks vs. 4 months). The findings are discussed in the light of the distinction between intentions and desires and the role that they play in individual decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.