Rawls on Liberty and Domination

One of the central elements of John Rawls’ argument in support of his two principles of justice is the intuitive normative ideal of citizens as free and equal. But taken in isolation, the claim that citizens are to be treated as free and equal is extremely indeterminate, and has virtually no clear implications for policy. In order to remedy this, the two principles of justice, together with the stipulation that citizens have basic interests in developing their moral capacities and pursuing their conceptions of the good life, are meant to provide a more precise interpretation of what is involved in treating citizens as free and equal. Rawls’ critics, however, have argued that satisfying the two principles of justice is not the most appropriate or plausible way to respect the status of citizens as free and equal. In relation to this debate, the present paper has two aims. The first is to examine Rawls’ account of the type of freedom that a just society must guarantee equally to its citizens. I will argue that those who think of Rawls as a theorist of freedom as non-interference are mistaken, because his notion of liberty resembles in important respects the republican notion of freedom as non-domination. Second, I will consider the extent to which Rawls’ principles of justice successfully protect the freedom as non-domination of all citizens so as to effectively treat them as free and equal.     

Dewey and Rawls on Education

In this paper I compare the roles that the explicit and implicit educational theories of John Dewey and John Rawls play in their political works to show that Rawls’s approach is skeletal and inappropriate for defenders of democracy. I also uphold Dewey’s belief that education is valuable in itself, not only derivatively, contra Rawls. Next, I address worries for any educational theory concerning problems of distributive justice. Finally, I defend Dewey’s commitment to democracy as a consequence of the demands of productive public inquiry and education.

罗尔斯与功利主义

罗尔斯的正义理论和功利主义都把对方看做最主要的理论对手.这篇文章站在功利主义立场上对罗尔斯提出了批评:一方面,罗尔斯对功利主义所做的大量批评完全被误解了,也就是说,罗尔斯不仅没有驳倒功利主义,而且他对两个正义原则与功利主义的比较也是无法成立的;另一方面,因为两个正义原则与功利原则处在不同的层面上,这样从功利主义出发,不仅能够论证功利主义可以作为罗尔斯两个正义原则的基础,而且事实上罗尔斯也依赖功利主义者所使用的论证.     

The absolutism problem in On Liberty

Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem,’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account.     

论罗尔斯的契约论选择

罗尔斯的正义论试图复兴西方政治思想中的契约论传统,但是,罗尔斯的复兴和继承是有选择性的承继。本文首先分析了西方政治思想中的功利主义传统之悖谬和契约论传统的基本内涵,并在此基础上论述了罗尔斯对契约论传统本身的扬弃之实质所在。另外,本文驳斥了单纯认为契约论对罗尔斯思想建构仅有“论证方式”之意义的观点,同时为罗尔斯这一论证方式提供了一种经验性辩护。     

Rawls on average and total utility

Philosophical Studies -     

关于自由的一种存在论观点

一、关于自由的准备性理解自由、幸福和公正是在伦理学中必须讨论的三个基本问题 ,但是 ,自由并不是伦理学问题 ,而是伦理学的哲学基础问题 (与之不同 ,幸福和公正则是伦理学的核心问题 )。这样一个细微的区分并非没有必要 ,因为在现代社会里 ,绝大多数人都把自由看作是一种价值 ,而这是一个细微但是重要的错误。价值意味着关于各种事物的一种评价标准和生活偏好 ,人们有着不同的价值观 ,因此总能够选择或者拒绝某种价值。假如把自由看作是一种价值 ,就好像是说 ,某些人喜欢自由 ,那么他们将选择自由 ;而某些人没有对自由的价值偏好 ,那么他…     

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.     

密尔论帝国

密尔意图超越社会契约论的传统自由主义论证模式,处理大英帝国的崛起这一重大时势必然带来的共同体内部异质多元的问题。快乐分高低的功利主义建构起承认差等的同心圆结构,为帝国奠定内在的伦理秩序。激烈的道德批判容易遮蔽异质结构中如何妥善处理权力安排这一重要问题。分层治理的政治结构是帝国的合理选择,其核心和目标政治安排是代议制政府,文明演化的历时性过程被密尔转化为帝国内部差等秩序的团结进步。殖民帝国虽已成过去,但多元格局下权力的差等安排仍然是当今必须认真对待的问题。     

Rawls and the metaphysical tradition

Abstract

Political philosophers, like all philosophers, can be divided into roughly two camps. There are those who are principally metaphysical in their conclusions; feeling that there is something in the nature of things to find or locate to settle the disputes commonly considered to be political disputes, and those others who explicitly reject that type of formulation. Placing the work of John Rawls into one of these categories is, I think, rather challenging; crudely, Rawls can be seen as having made noises of both sorts. The attempt to situate Rawls’s A Theory of Justice both within and beyond the grand metaphysical tradition lies at the center of this paper’s ambitions. This paper also aims to reflect, more generally, on the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls’s Theory. While it will be argued that John Rawls’s early conception of justice is, for the most part, admirable, it will be shown that firstly, Rawls does not fully leave behind the metaphysical inclination that he, as a self-declared non-metaphysical philosopher, is adamant on setting aside, and secondly, although this is very much related to the first point, Rawls’s theory of justice is too heavily grounded in and dependent on the truth of liberalism and thus fails to be adequately mindful of historicism. An examination of the metaphysical flavors in the early articulation of Rawls’s Theory is significant for two main reasons (1) such an examination compels us to ask whether or not Rawls’s Theory was successful, given what we assume were Rawls’s non-metaphysical ambitions, and (2) that the legacy of John Rawls should probably be better off, philosophically speaking (ceterus paribus and by our present lights), if metaphysics were absent in his Theory.     

Williams and Rawls in Philadelphia

Res Publica - In A Theory of Justice John Rawls proposes that the two principles of justice should be realized through a four-stage sequence of institutional action that starts with a constitution...     

Rawls on the maximin rule and distributive justice

Philosophical Studies -