Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

Eye Movements in Risky Choice

We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple—people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see—and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

自我—他人危机决策信息加工过程的差异:来自眼动的证据

本研究采用iView X-RED眼动仪,分两个实验来考察自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程的差异。实验一采用单因素实验设计探讨自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程,结果表明：为自我决策组的平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数都显著高于为他人决策组。实验二采用2（任务框架：积极,消极）x2（决策者角色：为自我、为他人）混合实验设计,结果表明：在积极框架下,为自我决策组平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数显著高于为他人决策组;在消极框架下,两个组没有显著差异。总体表现为,自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程存在差异,且受任务框架的影响。     

An eye movement analysis system (EMAS) for the identification of cognitive processes on figural tasks

EMAS is a software system (written in VAX-11 FORTRAN) for the analysis of eye movement data recorded during the performance of figural tasks. Its main functions are: (1) Calibration of raw coordinates of eye movements to determine their actual position on the stimulus display. Different kinds of measurement distortion may be corrected. (2) Identification of eye fixations and the determination of their locations and durations. (3) Analysis of fixation sequences. The frequency of transitions of fixations among specified sectors of the stimulus display is computed. A sequential list is made of the successive fixations in which the fixated sector and the fixation duration are graphically indicated. (4) Plotting of raw or calibrated eye movement data and fixation points. The sequence of fixations in specified display sectors can also be plotted in real time. Applications of the programs to the Embedded Figures Test and the Hidden Figures Test are illustrated.     

Inducing Thought Processes: Bringing Process Measures and Cognitive Processes Closer Together

The challenge in inferring cognitive processes from observational data is to correctly align overt behavior with its covert cognitive process. To improve our understanding of this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between gamble‐problems. Participants were either free to choose or instructed to use a specific choice strategy (maximizing expected value or a choice heuristic). We found large differences in looking patterns between free and instructed choices. Looking patterns provided no support for the common assumption that attention is equally distributed between outcomes and probabilities, even when participants were instructed to maximize expected value. Eye‐movement data are to some extent ambiguous with respect to underlying cognitive processes. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of motivation and volition in economic decisions: Evidence from eye movements and pupillometry

Economic decisions usually involve high stakes, real consequences, and some degree of personal risk. This article explores the impact of motivational and volitional states on economic decision processes in an incentivized lottery choice task. We investigated the patterns of decision time, choice, information search, and pupil dilation dependent on an experimental manipulation of motivation and volition, that is, the deliberative and the implemental mindset. The results indicated that choice preferences in economic decisions were robust and remained unaffected by motivational and volitional states, but decision processes were notably impacted. Decision makers in a deliberative state of mind searched for information more extensively and made slower decisions than the baseline. The implemental mindset was associated with more attention paid to the probability attributes of the gambles relative to the deliberative mindset. Furthermore, we observed that gamble outcomes that entailed no win at all (i.e., zero outcomes) played an important role for information search. These outcomes were largely disregarded in terms of predecisional information search but elicited pupillary responses similar to very high outcome lotteries. These results inform the current debate about the zero effect in risky choice. We also discuss the potential of eye-tracking studies of risky choice to dissolve ambiguities concerning the contributions of effort and arousal to modulating pupillary response. Implications for theoretical advances in decision research are discussed.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Task formats and ambiguity aversion

This paper proposes that task format (choosing or rejecting) moderates the effect of ambiguity aversion. Specifically, an ambiguous option is more attractive in a choosing task than in a rejecting task compared with a risky option. The author performed three experiments to test the propositions. In the first experiment, participants showed less ambiguity aversion when they had to choose a preferred option (risky or ambiguous) compared with when they had to reject an option they preferred less. In the second experiment with a monetary incentive, participants had to form a cash‐equivalent estimate for both a risky gamble and an ambiguous gamble in a traditional Ellsberg scenario. The ambiguous option emerged as more attractive than the risky option in the choosing task compared with the rejecting task. The third experiment showed that the participants' decision rationale mediated the effect of the task format on choice. These three experiments support the proposition that task formats moderate the effect of ambiguity aversion. On the basis of the findings, the author provides suggestions for practice and further research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

对整合模型和占优启发式模型的检验：基于信息加工过程的眼动研究证据

基于信息加工过程视角, 本研究采用眼动技术检验风险决策整合模型和占优启发式模型。结果表明, 自主决策任务条件下决策过程反应时及信息搜索模式均不同于期望价值(EV)迫选任务条件下的决策过程反应时及信息搜索模式; 自主决策任务条件下决策过程反应时并未随着选项间整体值(CPT值)差值的变大而变快, 且基于特征(attribute-based)的信息搜索多于基于选项(option-based)的信息搜索, 不符合整合模型预期。此外, 决策者亦未按照占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤进行决策。基于信息加工过程的检验结果既不利于以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型, 亦不利于占优启发式模型。文章建议从决策过程视角检验已有决策模型及建立新的启发式决策过程模型(process model)。     

Framing effects under cognitive load: The role of working memory in risky decisions

Framing effects occur in a wide range of laboratory and natural decision contexts, but the underlying processes that produce framing effects are not well understood. We explored the role of working memory (WM) in framing by manipulating WM loads during risky decisions. After starting with a hypothetical stake of money, participants were then presented a lesser amount that they could keep for certain (positive frame) or lose for certain (negative frame). They made a choice between the sure amount and a gamble in which they could either keep or lose all of the original stake. On half of the trials, the choice was made while maintaining a concurrent WM load of random letters. In both load and no-load conditions, we replicated the typical finding of risk aversion with positive frames and risk seeking with negative frames. In addition, people made fewer decisions to accept the gamble under conditions of higher cognitive load. The data are congruent with a dual-process reasoning framework in which people employ a heuristic to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort.     

Temporal characteristics of overt attentional behavior during category learning

Many theories of category learning incorporate mechanisms for selective attention, typically implemented as attention weights that change on a trial-by-trial basis. This is because there is relatively little data on within-trial changes in attention. We used eye tracking and mouse tracking as fine-grained measures of attention in three complex visual categorization tasks to investigate temporal patterns in overt attentional behavior within individual categorization decisions. In Experiments 1 and 2, we recorded participants’ eye movements while they performed three different categorization tasks. We extended previous research by demonstrating that not only are participants less likely to fixate irrelevant features, but also, when they do, these fixations are shorter than fixations to relevant features. We also found that participants’ fixation patterns show increasingly consistent temporal patterns. Participants were faster, although no more accurate, when their fixation sequences followed a consistent temporal structure. In Experiment 3, we replicated these findings in a task where participants used mouse movements to uncover features. Overall, we showed that there are important temporal regularities in information sampling during category learning that cannot be accounted for by existing models. These can be used to supplement extant models for richer predictions of how information is attended to during the buildup to a categorization decision.     

How Information Availability Interacts with Visual Attention during Judgment and Decision Tasks

Decisions in front of a supermarket shelf probably involve a mix of visually available information and associated memories—and interactions between those two. Several cognitive processes, such as decision making, search, and various judgments, are therefore likely to co‐occur, and each process will influence visual attention. We conducted two eye‐tracking experiments capturing parts of these features by having participants make either judgments or decisions concerning products that had been previously encoded. Half the time, participants made their choices with full information about the available products and half the time with crucial task‐relevant information removed. By comparing participants' use of visual attention during decisions and search‐based and memory‐based judgments, we can better understand how visual attention is differently employed between tasks and how it depends on the visual environment. We found that participants' visual attention during decisions is sensitive to evaluations already made during encoding and strongly characterized by preferential looking to the options later to be chosen. When the task environment is rich enough, participants engage in advanced integrative visual behavior and improve their decision quality. In contrast, visual attention during judgments made on the same products reflects a search‐like behavior when all information is available and a more focused type of visual behavior when information is removed. Our findings contribute not only to the literature on how visual attention is used during decision making but also to methodological questions concerning how to measure and identify task‐specific features of visual attention in ecologically valid ways. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Emotion on Visual Attention to Information and Decision Making in the Context of Informed Consent Process for Clinical Trials

The aim of this study was to examine the influence of emotion on visual information processing and decision making in the context of informed consent. Researchers are ethically obligated to ensure informed consent in clinical trials; however, many volunteers have unrealistic expectations about the value of an experimental therapy. Moreover, suboptimal participation rates for clinical trials may be partially attributable to perceptions that ethical obligations to volunteers are not met. This study examines whether discrete negative emotions (fear, anger, and sadness) differentially influence information processing, visual attention, and decisions in the context of clinical trial informed consent. Community participants completed a standard emotion induction (or control) and then read an actual consent form from a clinical trial while eye movements were tracked. Fear and anger produced the most prominently different patterns of systematic processing and visual attention, such that fear induced longer fixations to information presented, whereas anger induced shorter fixations. Moreover, among women only, fear increased decisions to participate, compared with anger and neutral emotion. Examinations of associations between eye‐tracking variables and self‐reported outcomes indicated that for angry participants only, less systematic processing was associated with greater decisions to participate. Negative emotions of any kind decreased accurate perceptions of trial benefit. These patterns suggest a complex interplay among emotion, processing style, and decision making. Future research is necessary to further probe these effects among potential clinical trial volunteers. Published 2016. This article is a U.S Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Changing plans: Dynamic inconsistency and the effect of experience on the reference point

This article presents a new test of a principle of decision making calleddynamic consistency. This principle was tested in an experiment in which participants were asked to make decisions about a second gamble within a sequence of two gambles. Participants were first asked to make a planned choice about the second gamble. The planned choice was madebefore the first gamble was played and was conditioned on the anticipated outcomes of the first gamble.After the first gamble was played, the same participants were asked to make a final choice about the second gamble, conditioned on the experienced outcome of the first gamble. The results showed that participants’ final choices were frequently inconsistent with their plans, even when the anticipated and experienced outcomes were identical. These inconsistencies occurred in a systematic direction. Experiencing an anticipated gain resulted with a change toward risk aversion, and experiencing an anticipated loss resulted in a change toward risk seeking. These results are explained in terms of the effect of actual experience on the reference point used for the evaluation of the decision problem.     

阅读研究中的主要眼动指标评述

眼跳和注视是阅读过程中的两种基本眼动现象.目前在对阅读的眼动研究中分析指标主要包括两类,一类是与眼睛何时移动有关的时间维度的眼动指标,具体包括以字或词为兴趣区的眼动指标,如单一注视时间、首次注视时间、第二次注视时间、凝视时间、离开目标后的首次注视时间、回视时间和总注视时间等,以及以短语或句子为兴趣区的眼动指标,如第一遍阅读时间、向前阅读时间、第二遍阅读时间、回视路径阅读时间、重读时间等.另一类是与眼睛移动位置有关的空间维度的眼动指标,具体包括眼跳距离、注视位置、注视次数、跳读率、再注视比率和回视次数等.在使用眼动指标时,需要注意眼动指标的分类、原始数据的删除标准以及眼动指标的选择等问题.     

Comparing naming, lexical decision, and eye fixation times: Word frequency effects and individual differences

Performance on three different tasks was compared: naming, lexical decision, and reading (with eye fixation times on a target word measured). We examined the word frequency effect for a common set of words for each task and each subject. Naming and reading (particularly gaze duration) yielded similar frequency effects for the target words. The frequency effect found in lexical decision was greater than that found in naming and in eye fixation times. In all tasks, there was a correlation between the frequency effect and average response time. In general, the results suggest that both the naming and the lexical decision tasks yield data about word recognition processes that are consistent with effects found in eye fixations during silent reading.     

Perceptual switching,eye movements,and the bus paradox

According to a widely cited finding by Ellis and Stark (1978 Perception 7 575-581), the duration of eye fixations is longer at the instant of perceptual reversal of an ambiguous figure than before or after the reversal. However, long fixations are more likely to include samples of an independent random event than are short fixations. This sampling bias would produce the pattern of results also when no correlation exists between fixation duration and perceptual reversals. When an appropriate correction is applied to the measurement of fixation durations, the effect disappears. In fact, there are fewer actual button-presses during the long intervals than would be expected by chance. Moving-window analyses performed on eye-fixation data reveal that no unique eye event is associated with switching behaviour. However, several indicators, such as blink frequency, saccade frequency, and the direction of the saccade, are each differentially sensitive to perceptual and response-related aspects of the switching process. The time course of these indicators depicts switching behaviour as a process of cascaded stages.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.