Causation as Property Acquisition

Persistence theories of causation – such as transference theory, conserved-quantity theory, and Douglas Ehring's theory – attempt to analyzecausation in terms of some persisting entityconnecting cause and effect. While mostpersistence accounts are intended as empiricaltheories, this article develops a persistenceanalysis of the concept of causation. The basic idea is that the central concept ofdirect causation can be analyzed in terms ofproperty acquisition. The analysis cohereswith our ordinary causal judgments andprovides a straightforward explanation of thedirection of causation. It also explains whybackwards causation is conceptually problematic.     

Reducing Causality to Transmission

The idea that causation can be reduced to transmission of an amount of some conserved quantity between events is spelled out and defended against important objections. Transmission is understood as a symmetrical relation of copresence in two distinct events. The actual asymmetry of causality has its origin in the asymmetrical character of certain irreversible physical processes and then spreads through the causal net. This conception is compatible with the possibility of backwards causation and with a causal theory of time. Genidentity, the persistence of concrete objects, can be given an explanation in causal terms. The transmission theory is shown to escape difficulties faced by two important alternative theories of causation: Salmon's (1984) Mark Transmission Theory and Dowe's (1992a) Conserved Quantities Theory.     

The Ontology of Causal Process Theories

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of ??causal process?? does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe??s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon??s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair??s phsyicalist reduction of causation.     

A Compatibilist Version Of The Theory Of Agent Causation

The Theory of Agent Causation has always been formulated as an incompatibilist view, but I think that this has been a mistake. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what agent causation theorists and their opponents have always believed, the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is actually a compatibilist version of that theory. I formulate the traditional version of the Theory of Agent Causation, and consider a series of objections to it and related views. With each objection comes a corresponding revision of the theory that is motivated by that objection, and with each revision the theory becomes increasingly compatibilistic until, finally, we arrive at a completely compatibilistic version of the Theory of Agent Causation, which I take to be the most plausible version of that theory.     

A theory of causality: Causality=interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field theory)

In this paper I put forward a suggestion for identifying causality in micro-systems with the specific quantum field theoretic interactions that occur in such systems. I first argue — along the lines of general transference theories — that such a physicalistic account is essential to an understanding of causation; I then proceed to sketch the concept of interaction as it occurs in quantum field theory and I do so from both a formal and an informal point of view. Finally, I present reasons for thinking that only a quantum field theoretic account can do the job — in particular I rely on a theorem by D. Currie and to the effect that interaction cannot be described in (a Hamiltonian formulation of) Classical Mechanics. Throughout the paper I attempt to suggest that the widespread scepticism about the ability of quantum theory to support a theory of causality is mistaken and rests on several misunderstandings.     

Physics and the direction of causation

Two proposals for a physicalistic analysis of causation — the so-called transference model and an account given by J. L. Mackie — are examined and found wanting on the score of physical objectivity. This shortcoming can be remedied, but it is further argued that both proposals embody a too restricted conception of what a physicalistic analysis of causation should be. A more general program is proposed.     

文本加工中情境模型建构的五个维度

情境模型理论是当代西方文本阅读加工的一个重要理论。该文通过详细介绍情境模型建构的空间、时间、因果、主人公、意图五大维度,以助于对情境模型理论整体理解。通过总结可知,目前国内外关于情境模型建构中的空间、因果和主人公三个维度的研究成果较多,研究范式也较为成熟,时间和意图维度则研究成果较少     

Is Dispositional Causation Just Mutual Manifestation?

Dispositional properties are often referred to as ‘causal powers’, but what does dispositional causation amount to? Any viable theory must account for two fundamental aspects of the metaphysics of causation – the causal complexity and context sensitivity of causal interactions. The theory of mutual manifestations attempts to do so by locating the complexity and context sensitivity within the nature of dispositions themselves. But is this theory an acceptable first step towards a viable theory of dispositional causation? This paper argues that the reconceptualization that the theory entails comes at too high a price, and is an unnecessary step in the wrong direction: these two central aspects concerning the metaphysics of causation can and should be accounted for in a dispositional account of causation without it.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

The social unconscious in persons,groups and societies,Vol 1: mainly theory; and Trauma and organizations

This paper considers the emotional life of the infant in the incubator and develops a new psychological theory which is called the ‘incubator psyche’. Theory building is advanced from three main discourses: (1) psychoanalysis, (2) neo-natal nursing and (3) psychology. A case study of Corey, a 7-year-old boy, who had been delivered prematurely, with a hole in his heart, and spent the first 6 weeks of post-natal life in an incubator, is presented to illustrate how aspects of an incubator psyche might be clinically manifest. The concept of an incubator psyche is advanced with reference to a particular kind of second-skin formation (Bick, 1968, The experience of the skin in early object relations, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 484–486). It is proposed that the incubator psyche characterises a client's mental functioning exercised as an environmental sensibility that could be understood in terms of the total transference situation (Klein, 1952, The origins of transference, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 33, 433–438; Joseph, 1985, Transference: The total situation, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 66, 447–454). Implications for practice are considered advocating particular attention to the setting.     

Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation

Summary  Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors (e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I evaluate the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency.     

Making Interpersonal Meaning: Significant Others in Mind in Transference

The social cognitive process of transference may serve as a means of constructing interpersonal meaning. Support for this proposition is presented through a review of evidence on the relational self in transference, reframed in terms of meaning construction, as well as new investigations of the ways precise ways in which transference can serve this function. In the underlying theory, knowledge one has about each of the various significant others in one’s life is represented in memory and linked to a distinct relational self in memory by means of the relationship with that other. Significant‐other knowledge can be activated in an interpersonal encounter and, when transference occurs, used to go beyond the information given about a new person and also influences affect, motivation, and self‐regulation ( Andersen & Glassman, 1996 ). Distinct relational selves also arise in transference depending on which significant other is triggered by the situation. These processes allow the individual to imbue the interpersonal encounter with personalized meaning. Further, recent evidence suggests that whole meaning systems shared with the significant other are constructed in that relationship and are thus evoked and pursued in the transference encounter.     

Changes in psychoanalytic ideas: transference interpretation

Interpretation of the transference is central to all psychoanalytic models. Definitions of transference and transference interpretation have changed greatly during the past half-century, influenced by major movements in philosophy, advances in psychoanalytic research and theory, and changes in our understanding of Freud. This paper suggests that historical, relatively simple, concepts of the transference as the reproduction in the present of significant relationships from the past do not adequately meet current clinical and theoretical demands. Modernist views of the transference emphasize as additional sources of transference responses, the role of the analytic background of safety, the constant modification of unconscious fantasy and internal representations, and the interactive nature of transference responses, with important interpersonal and intersubjective components. It is suggested that the evolving modernist views of transference and transference interpretation permit a fuller accounting for transference phenomena and open the way for better informed interventions. A brief discussion of the issue of psychological "truth" and "distortion" as applied to transference phenomena is presented. The themes are illustrated with clinical vignettes.     

Causal theories of the moving spotlight

This paper brings together the Sarvāstivāda (a major school of Abhidharma Buddhism) and Miller's (2019) moving spotlight theory to see how presentness is explained in terms of causation. The paper argues that a causal theory of presentness like Miller's encounters a dilemma: causation is either synchronic or diachronic, but neither is safe in the presence of the challenges. On the one hand, if causation is synchronic, how does a causal chain extend over time so that the wave of causation (and hence the spotlight) can move at all? On the other, if causation is diachronic, then a present moment has a temporal extension enough to accommodate a cause and its proximate effect. The paper proposes a synchronic notion of causation that counters the first challenge. This can be done by bringing together the Sarvāstivādin grasp-production model of causation, some Stoic ideas about causation, and some Armstrong's metaphysics.     

Causation Without Influence

David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation.     

THE WIDENING SCOPE OF INDICATIONS FOR PERVERSION

Much has changed in clinical practice and theory that bears on the diagnosis and treatment of perversion since Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). Definitions of perversion have been freed from assumptions of a heterosexual normality and from moralistic interpretations. The authors endorse the current emphasis on aggression and early narcissistic problems and include the notion of splitting and sexualized scenarios in their definition of perversion. They present several vignettes of male and female patients to demonstrate the debts owed to Freud's theories and the way in which their thinking differs. They emphasize the understanding of the transference‐countertransference picture and the patient's management and control of excitement.     

Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong

In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.     

Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation

The paper argues for four claims: (1) The problem of mental causation and the argument for its solution in terms of the identity of mental with physical causes are independent of the theory of causation one favours. (2) If one considers our experience of agency as described by folk psychology to be veridical, one is committed to an anti-Humean metaphysics of causation in terms of powers that establish necessary connections. The same goes for functional properties in general. (3) A metaphysics of causation in terms of powers is compatible with physics. (4) If combined with the argument for mental causes being identical with physical causes, that metaphysics leads to a conservative reductionism.     

Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens

In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.