Action tendencies and characteristics of environmental risks

It is assumed that the mental representation of the causal structure of environmental risks, i.e., the type of cause and the type of potential consequence, determines which sort of action tendencies are formed. We propose a model of risk evaluation that includes consequentialist and deontological judgments as well as specific emotions as mediators of action tendencies. Four hundred participants took part in an experiment which presented scenario information about environmental risks. The scenarios differed with respect to (a) causation (human vs. natural cause; single vs. aggregate causation), (b) consequence (harm to self vs. harm to other people vs. harm to nature), and (c) geographical distance (proximate vs. distant). Participants indicated how much they preferred each of 31 prospective behaviors. Factor analyses yielded five types of action tendencies: help, aggression, escape, political action, and self-focus. The causal structure of the risks was systematically related to action tendencies, e.g., environmental risks that are caused by humans, and in particular those caused by a single human agent, elicit aggressive action tendencies. The findings conform that the perceived causal structure of a specific risk determines whether the focus is upon consequentialist or deontological judgments, which, in turn, elicit specific types of action tendency, mediated by emotions.     

Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive-approach, negative-avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive-avoid, negative-approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

Is position "special" in visual attention? Evidence that top-down processes guide visual selection.

The role of spatial position in selective visual processing has been the source of recent debate. Experiments by Tsal and Lavie (1988) and van der Heijden et al. (1996) have been designed to establish the status of position in visual selection. Tsal and Lavie found that observers tend to select letters from a briefly presented array according to position. Using the same paradigm, van der Heijden et al. found that observers tend to select according to colour, except under conditions of low contrast and unrestricted eye movements. The present study attempted to reconcile these findings by exploring the influence of top-down processes (task instructions) while explicitly controlling for eye movements. Experiment 1 demonstrated there was no inherent selection bias for stimuli similar to those used by van der Heijden et al., suggesting that the tendency to select according to colour found by van der Heijden et al. was due to task demands. Experiment 2 further established the role of top-down factors by replicating the results of van der Heijden et al. with our stimuli. Experiment 3 demonstrated that selection can be switched from colour to position by changing the demands of the task. These results suggest that selection may be accounted for by task demands (e.g., instructions) with no priority access for position information.     

Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive–approach, negative–avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive–avoid, negative–approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

So many options,so little control: Abstract representations can reduce selection demands to increase children’s self-directed flexibility

Children often struggle to behave flexibly when they must use self-directed goals (e.g., doing homework without prompting) rather than externally driven goals (e.g., cleaning up when told). Such struggles may reflect the demands of selecting among many potential options, as required for self-directed control. The current study tested whether (a) 6-year-old children show difficulty in selecting among competing semantic representations, (b) providing category labels designed to reduce selection demands improves performance, and (c) such benefits transfer to self-directed flexibility. Selection was measured using the blocked cyclic naming task for the first time with children. Pictures were named repeatedly in either homogeneous blocks from the same category (e.g., all animals), which create high selection demands due to spreading semantic activation and engage effortful cognitive control, or mixed blocks with each picture from a different category. Children showed robust difficulty in selecting among options, as indexed by response time (RT) differences between homogeneous and mixed blocks. Providing subcategory labels designed to reduce selection demands by distinguishing among same-category items (e.g., “A cow is a farm animal. A cat is a pet.”) improved selection. Providing superordinate categories (e.g., “A cow is an animal. A cat is an animal.”) also improved selection, but these benefits were less robust, and subcategory labels led to greater benefits than superordinate category labels on a subsequent verbal fluency task. These results support a role for subcategory representations in reducing selection demands to aid self-directed flexibility while suggesting that some children may use superordinate category labels to activate subcategory representations on their own.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

How affordances associated with a distractor object affect compatibility effects: A study with the computational model TRoPICALS

Seeing an object activates both visual and action codes in the brain. Crucial evidence supporting this view is the observation of object to response compatibility effects: perception of an object can facilitate or interfere with the execution of an action (e.g., grasping) even when the viewer has no intention of interacting with the object. TRoPICALS is a computational model that proposes some general principles about the brain mechanisms underlying compatibility effects, in particular the idea that top-down bias from prefrontal cortex, and whether it conflicts or not with the actions afforded by an object, plays a key role in such phenomena. Experiments on compatibility effects using a target and a distractor object show the usual positive compatibility effect of the target, but also an interesting negative compatibility effect of the distractor: responding with a grip compatible with the distractor size produces slower reaction times than the incompatible case. Here, we present an enhanced version of TRoPICALS that reproduces and explains these new results. This explanation is based on the idea that the prefrontal cortex plays a double role in its top-down guidance of action selection producing: (a) a positive bias in favour of the action requested by the experimental task; (b) a negative bias directed to inhibiting the action evoked by the distractor. The model also provides testable predictions on the possible consequences of damage to volitional circuits such as in Parkinsonian patients.     

Does perceptual learning in speech reflect changes in phonetic category representation or decision bias?

Recent studies show that perceptual boundaries between phonetic categories are changeable with training (Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003). For example, Kraljic and Samuel (2005) exposed listeners in a lexical decision task to ambiguous /s-integral/ sounds in either s-word contexts (e.g., legacy) or integral-word contexts (e.g., parachute). In a subsequent /s/-/integral/ categorization test, listeners in the /s/ condition categorized more tokens as /s/ than did those in the /integral/ condition. The effect--termed perceptual learning in speech--is assumed to reflect a change in phonetic category representation. However, the result could be due to a decision bias resulting from the training task. In Experiment 1, we replicated the basic Kraljic and Samuel (2005) experiment and added an AXB discrimination test. In Experiment 2, we used a task that is less likely to induce a decision bias. Results of both experiments and signal detection analyses point to a true change in phonetic representation.     

Performance costs when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive abilities: implications for mental resources and behavior

Emotion tunes cognition, such that approach-motivated positive states promote verbal cognition, whereas withdrawal-motivated negative states promote spatial cognition (Gray, 2001). The current research examined whether self-control resources become depleted and influence subsequent behavior when emotion tunes an inappropriate cognitive tendency. In 2 experiments, either an approach-motivated positive state or a withdrawal-motivated negative state was induced, and then participants completed a verbal or a spatial working memory task creating conditions of emotion-cognition alignment (e.g., approach/verbal) or misalignment (e.g., approach/spatial). A control condition was also included. To examine behavioral costs due to depleted self-control resources, participants completed either a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; Experiment 1) or a Black/White implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Experiment 2). Participants in the misalignment conditions performed worse on the Stroop task, and they were worse at controlling their implicit attitude biases on the IAT. Thus, when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive tendencies for one's current environment, self-control resources become depleted, impairing behavioral control.     

Decomposing the encoding of action events: A dual conception

Two experiments are reported in which we tested the hypothesis that encoding of verbal features of subject-performed tasks or SPTs (e.g., bounce the ball, lift the spoon) is attention-demanding and effortful, whereas physical features of this memory task (e.g., color, weight) are acquired with little effort, and without deliberate encoding strategies. In Experiment 1, subjects were asked to perform a series of SPTs and were examined on recall of verbal instructions and colors of objects involved under conditions of focused or divided attention. In Experiment 2, performance of a series of SPTs was followed by recall of verbal instructions and recall of weights of objects involved. Results of both experiments indicated that recall of the verbal task component was negatively affected by requirements of dual-task performance, whereas recall of both physical task features was equally good in both encoding conditions. The obtained pattern of outcome is interpreted as supportive of the dual conception hypothesis of the nature of the encoding of action events.     

The effect of fMRI (noise) on cognitive control

Stressful situations, the aversiveness of events, or increases in task difficulty (e.g., conflict) have repeatedly been shown to be capable of triggering attentional control adjustments. In the present study we tested whether the particularity of an fMRI testing environment (i.e., EPI noise) might result in such increases of the cognitive control exerted. We found that participants were more effective in controlling episodic retrieval of previous stimulus-response bindings (Experiment 1), in switching to a new task (Experiment 2), and shielding a current goal from distracting response tendencies (Experiment 3) if they were exposed to challenging task situations, such as 70 dB echo planar imaging noise sampled from an fMRI scanner. These findings have considerable theoretical implications in questioning the widespread assumption that people are equally devoted to easy and more challenging tasks, and methodological implications in raising the possibility that experiments carried out in fMRI scanners or under otherwise challenging conditions systematically overestimate contributions from cognitive control processes.     

The impact of stimulus-specific practice and task instructions on response congruency effects between tasks

In task switching experiments participants have to respond to the same set of stimuli while task instructions vary (e.g., digit stimuli are assigned to left- or right-sided key presses by means of magnitude vs. parity classification). Response congruency effects denote worse performance for a stimulus, which is associated with different responses in the two tasks as compared to a stimulus, which is associated with the same response. Previous research suggests that such effects reflect direct links between stimuli and responses acquired in the course of experimental practice. In the current study we investigated the impact of stimulus-specific practice and task instruction by reversing the S–R mapping of one task (Experiment 1) or replacing one task with a new one (Experiment 2) in the second half of an experimental session. Consistent with the direct link account, S–R links practiced during the first half of the experiment largely determined congruency effects despite altered task instructions. Furthermore, the results suggest that previously practiced S–R links (a) can be relatively quickly overwritten by practicing a novel S–R mapping, and (b) are subject to passive decay when no longer in use.     

Chunking in task sequences modulates task inhibition

In a study of the formation of representations of task sequences and its influence on task inhibition, participants first performed tasks in a predictable sequence (e.g., ABACBC) and then performed the tasks in a random sequence. Half of the participants were explicitly instructed about the predictable sequence, whereas the other participants did not receive these instructions. Task-sequence learning was inferred from shorter reaction times (RTs) in predictable relative to random sequences. Persisting inhibition of competing tasks was indicated by increased RTs in n- 2 task repetitions (e.g., ABA) compared with n- 2 nonrepetitions (e.g., CBA). The results show task-sequence learning for both groups. However, task inhibition was reduced in predictable relative to random sequences among instructed-learning participants who formed an explicit representation of the task sequence, whereas sequence learning and task inhibition were independent in the noninstructed group. We hypothesize that the explicit instructions led to chunking of the task sequence, and that n- 2 repetitions served as chunk points (ABA-CBC), so that within-chunk facilitation modulated the inhibition effect.     

When the voluntary mind meets the irresistible event: Stimulus–response correspondence effects on task selection during voluntary task switching

In the present study, we investigated how task selection is biased by inherent stimulus characteristics in the voluntary task-switching paradigm. We used digits as the task stimuli, since they may automatically induce spatially horizontal representations of numbers. Specifically, we examined whether an irrelevant spatial representation of a number coincides with its associated response codes and whether such a stimulus–response (S–R) correspondence effect biases task selection for a digit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two different action code layout conditions: Two numerical tasks were arranged as inner/outer in the horizontal layout condition or as upper/down in the vertical layout condition. Participants in the horizontal layout condition were more likely to choose a task when the task’s action code and the digit’s spatial representation corresponded, as compared with when they did not. On the other hand, no selection bias was observed in the vertical layout condition, since there was no overlapping spatial representation between the stimulus and response. The present study extends previous findings by considering the influence of the stimulus-driven effect on task selection with regard to the S–R correspondence effect.     

General processes, rather than "goals," explain imitation errors

The goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI) states that copying of action outcomes (e.g., turning a light switch) takes priority over imitation of the means by which those outcomes are achieved (e.g., choice of effector or grip). The object < effector < grip error pattern in the pen-and-cups task provides strong support for GOADI. Experiment 1 replicated this effect using video stimuli. Experiment 2 showed that shifting the color cue from objects to effectors makes imitation of effector selection more accurate than imitation of object and grip selection. Experiment 3 replicated this result when participants were required to describe actions. Experiment 4 indicated that, when participants are imitating and describing actions, enhancing grip discriminability makes grip selection the most accurately executed component of the task. Consistent with theories that hypothesize that imitation relies on task-general mechanisms (e.g., the associative sequence learning model, ideomotor theory), these findings suggest that imitation is no more or less goal directed than other tasks involving action observation.     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

End-state comfort in bimanual object manipulation

The present experiment investigated the sensitivity for end-state comfort in a bimanual object manipulation task. Participants were required to simultaneously reach for two bars and to place the objects' ends into two targets on the table. The design of the experiment allowed to dissociate the relative roles of initial means (e.g., the selection of grips) and final postures (e.g., the anticipation of end-states). The question of interest was whether affording different grip patterns for the two hands would introduce a bias away from reaching end-state comfort. Results revealed a strong sensitivity for end-state comfort, independent of the required grip patterns. In particular, end-state comfort was preferred even if this meant selecting different initial means (i.e., different grips) for the two hands. Hence, end-state oriented action planning appears to dominate interaction costs that may result from motor-related, intermanual interference. We infer that movement planning is constrained by action goals (e.g., a comfortable end-posture for both hands), but largely unaffected by the type of motor actions necessary to achieve these goals.     

A psychophysiological study of the use of partial information in stimulus-response translation.

Ss performed a hybrid go/no-go reaction task in which colored letters were assigned in various ways to 4 finger responses, 2 on each hand. In addition to reaction time, psychophysiological measures were used to assess the duration of stimulus identification and the onset of central and peripheral motor activity. The results suggest that response selection can begin on the basis of 1 stimulus dimension (e.g., color), while the other dimension (e.g., letter form) has not yet been identified. Other results are discussed with regard to "selection for action" (Allport, 1987) and the importance of stimulus-response translation strategies in the use of partial information.